

**an ANATOMY  
of PHILIPPINE  
MUSLIM  
AFFAIRS**

 **FILIPINAS  
FOUNDATION,  
INC.**



Ardo J. Jose, Jr. Mar-2 by Sept. 1974

# AN ANATOMY OF PHILIPPINE MUSLIM AFFAIRS

A Study in Depth on Muslim Affairs in the Philippines  
conducted under the auspices of

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## CHAPTER 1

## PHILIPPINE MUSLIM AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

The Muslims of the Philippines number some two million and represent the largest of the minority groups. However, since the beginning of the Philippines' self-government, it is apparent that there has been no successfully implemented program to integrate them into the population, much less to uplift their socioeconomic status. What was the most advanced and organized Philippine civilization prior to colonization five centuries ago is now a neglected sector of the populace. This, to some extent, has presumably been influenced by an apathetic lack of general understanding and knowledge of Muslim Filipinos and the prejudiced attitude of a Christian majority. In literature, history books, and even in the mass media, the Muslim Filipinos are pictured as unlovely, violent people who need constant watching. Such an image, born of a stormy history and, to quote Peter Gowing in his book Mosque and the Moro, "nearly 400 years of human failure in tolerance, acceptance, understanding and communication", has created a damaging cleavage among people of a nation, and, to the disadvantage of the outnumbered cultural segment. In addition, it has led some Philippine government agencies into consciously or unconsciously viewing Muslim Filipinos as politically and culturally inferior, with a consequential adoption of policies and programs that have been justifiably described as creating more problems than they solve.

The long years of obvious government neglect — whether accidental or intentional — coupled with the Muslim Filipino's growing awareness of his rights as a citizen and his increasing need to participate and enact his role from an equitable position, is giving way to a politically volatile situation fraught with varied dangers requiring identification. One simply has to pick up a daily and glance through the news items to realize why, as

a nation in a community of nations, we have not achieved the goal of creating a militant, real and one Filipino identity which reflects the combined aspirations and expectations of both Christian and non-Christian groups in the country. While there have been considerable deliberations on the matter, efforts toward solving the so-called problem of "national integration", starting with the Muslims in Mindanao, may well be described as "unsuccessful" or poorly managed attempts. This is if we take the overall results into account and use them as measures of performance. There have been talks of the rise of rebel-rousers in the South and speculations about the Mindanao Movement for Independence. Fears of secession, notwithstanding, little has been done to seriously probe into the root causes for the apparent alarm signal.

#### The FFI Research Program: Purpose and Aims

Taking into account the need to understand the so-called "minority group" prior to recommending action-programs or measures for planned change, the Filipinas Foundation, Inc. (FFI) decided to sponsor and undertake a definitive and in-depth study on Muslim affairs with three principal goals in view: (1) to identify problems relevant to Muslim affairs and national integration; (2) to bring about a better understanding of Muslim culture and concepts; and (3) recommend solutions in a proposed national program that will bear upon the psychosocial, economic, political and religious aspects of the problem.

The Objectives. The following describes the specific and original aims of the FFI research program:

1. To obtain information on Muslim culture, thereby gaining useful insights into the development and orientation of this particular segment of the population.
2. To identify Muslim thought leaders and political heads in Mindanao. In line with this objective, the aim is to

a. study the concepts of each leader, particularly as these relate to the developmental needs of their community or group.

b. determine the individual images projected by these leaders, their strengths and weaknesses (as perceived by the people), thereby obtaining some measure of their influence.

3. To study the attitudes of Muslim Filipinos, particularly as these relate to their perception of:

- a. their status and role as Filipino citizens
- b. the Philippine government
- c. religion
- d. education
- e. Christians
- f. the image they (Muslims) project to Christians
- g. Western culture

4. To determine some motivations and aspirations of Muslim Filipinos.

5. To determine how non-Muslim Filipinos in Mindanao perceive the mentioned minority group.

6. To gauge the solidarity of Muslim Filipinos.

7. To pinpoint the concepts or factors that strengthen the affinity of the members of Muslim society, as well as to identify those that separate them.

8. To determine the concept and the true essence of integration.

9. To find out how Muslim Filipinos regard the concept of separation of Church and State.

10. To ascertain how the concept of the Sultanate/Muslim hierarchy fits within the context of Philippine democratic/constitutional set-up.

11. To study and evaluate the Muslim system of political leadership and elections and determine the foundation thereof.

12. To identify which areas in Mindanao should be given priority in terms of economic development. In this respect  
a. cite Philippine industries in each area; b. determine whether there is market/labor availability justification.

13. To review land/wealth holdings in Muslim territories - from pre-U.S.; pre-1935; pre-liberation to the present.

14. To determine the extent and types of public lands in Mindanao and provide guidelines for a Land Reform Program for Muslims.

15. To obtain a demographic profile.

16. To evaluate the Commission on National Integration (CNI) and its beginnings.

17. To obtain data that would serve as the platform for proposing a budget for a developmental program. In this connection,

a. Estimate how much the Philippine government can afford and over what period of time the program is expected to accomplish its objectives.

b. Determine labor/manpower requirements.

18. To identify the sources of loans, both local and foreign, and determine whether loan solicitation can be made available through the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Development Bank of the Philippines, Central Bank, etc.

The Questions or Lines of Inquiry. On the basis of the objectives enumerated, the study attempts to answer the following questions:

1. Who are the Muslim thought leaders and political heads? How do they compare with one another in terms of strength of influence? What are their individual concepts and programs of community development? What image do each of these leaders project to the Philippine Muslim community? What are their strengths and weaknesses?

2. What are the attitudes and perceptions of Muslim Filipinos in relation to their status and role as Filipino citizens? the Philippine government? religion? education? the Christians? the image they think they (the Muslims) project to Christians?

3. How united are Muslim Filipinos? Is there a social cleavage among this group? If so, what factors contribute to this disunity? What factors contribute to their solidarity as members of a group?

4. What are the aspirations of Muslim Filipinos as individuals? as members of a group?

5. Around what areas do their actual and perceived needs and problems revolve?

6. How are Muslim Filipinos perceived by non-Muslim Filipinos in Mindanao?

7. How do present Muslim leaders compare with previous political chiefs in terms of acceptance and the amount of personal faith vested in them by their people?

8. How do Muslims regard the concept of separation of Church and State?

9. How does the concept of the Sultanate/Muslim hierarchy fit within the context of the Philippine democratic/constitutional set-up?

10. What can be said about the Muslim political leadership and elections?

11. What areas in Mindanao should be given priority in terms of economic development?

12. What is the historical background of land/wealth holdings in Muslim territories?

13. What is the extent and types of public lands in Mindanao? What are the implications for a Land Reform Program for Muslim Filipinos?

14. What can be said about the efforts of the Commission on National Integration?

15. What program or programs can be recommended and developed on the basis of this study? What would be a workable budget for such undertakings? What period should the program cover?

16. What are the possible sources of loan - foreign and local?

Some Hypotheses. A few hypotheses have evolved prior to the launching of the study, these being the following:

1. There is a lack of identification among Muslim Filipinos with the national government as a result of cultural background and traditions.

2. Muslims perceive their group as rejected and their status and roles demeaned by Christians who comprise the largest segment of our society.

3. Muslim Filipinos perceive themselves as independent and self-sufficient, thus capable of conducting their own affairs without the help of the national government.

4. Consciously or unconsciously, Western education is viewed in a negative light as it is deemed a threat to Muslim unity and Islamic culture.

5. Muslim political leaders who have received Western education are not fully accepted by their people and, as such, do not voice nor reflect the common opinions of the community under study.

6. Politics is viewed as a means of upward mobility, and yet, the practice is also perceived negatively. Hence, ambivalence toward political leaders of the Philippine Muslim community is present.

### The Research Design

The interdisciplinary approach was used in undertaking the study. To accomplish this, a steering committee was formed, consisting of social scientists and representing the disciplines of economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology and statistics. It was the function of each individual member to assist in the overall research design, evaluating the data relevant to his particular discipline, and making recommendations for an action program.

Owing to the extent and breadth of the study, the following techniques were used to obtain the required information: (1) historical method; (2) casual observations; (3) interviews

with "knowledgeable" respondents from the area under study; and (4) the survey.

The Historical Method. Secondary and historical data have been of immense value in this study. In the first place, they hold the answers to many of the questions which were posed at the beginning of the project. Secondly, the materials, having been produced by historians, legal minds and others, have somehow increased the number of disciplines involved to include history, law, and political science. Then again, the data provided a means that enabled us to countercheck the data obtained from other sources and through the use of other instruments. For instance, we were able to compare the findings of the survey with those that have been provided to us by secondary sources and, consequently, fill in shortcomings attendant to the use of the former method.

The materials treated in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 basically rest on secondary sources, and, by themselves, appear to answer many of the questions raised by the researchers.

Casual Observations and Interviews. Trips to Mindanao were made by some members of the steering committee to observe current conditions, to gather secondary data and to interview respondents from the area who could contribute relevant information. Cagayan de Oro, Iligan City, Marawi City, Davao City, Cotabato, Zamboanga City and Jolo were the principal areas of coverage.

The following are among the principal respondents (composed of both non-Muslims as well as Muslims) interviewed:

1. Datu Udtog Matalam (of Pagalungan, Cotabato)  
Ex-Governor of Cotabato
2. Atty. Yusop Pendaliday (of Cotabato City)
3. Mr. Unson Manampan (of Carmen, Cotabato)
4. Mr. Virgilio L. Leyretana (of Cotabato City)

5. Mr. Cipriano B. Ontal\* (of Landasan, Cotabato)
6. Mr. Gregorio Jumao-as\*  
Notre Dame University Graduate School  
Cotabato City
7. Datu Francisco Pangilan (of Davao City)  
President of the Federation of Muslims  
and Association of Cultural Minorities
8. Hadji Ahmad Macadutu (of Marawi City)  
Secretary General of Ansar al Islam
9. Ulomuddin Said (of Marawi City)  
Religion supervisor  
Jamiatul Philippine Islamia (JPI)
10. Ex-Mayor Mendog Dianalan  
Marawi City
11. Ismael Dianalan  
Provincial Agriculturist and concurrently  
RCPPC Provincial Director, Marawi City
12. Hadji Muripaga Mangondato  
Public Relations Officer  
Mindanao State University
13. Dr. Mauyag M. Tamano  
(then Dean, Office of External Studies,  
Mindanao State University)  
President, Mindanao State University
14. Datu Mesug Calaca  
Ex-Vice Governor of Marawi City
15. Mr. Gregorio P. Gempes\*  
Chief Librarian, University of Mindanao  
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\* non-Muslim respondent

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St. Michael's College, Iligan City
18. Mr. Manuel Hamoy<sup>\*</sup>  
Superintendent, National Power Corporation  
Iligan City
19. Mayor Lomala Sarip  
Balindong, Lanao del Sur
20. Atty. Acaima Bagul  
Department of Labor  
Iligan City
21. Mr. Japar Usman  
Iligan City
22. Mr. Camid Gandamara  
Iligan City
23. Mr. Maning Gunting  
Iligan City
24. Mr. Tanny Acranan  
Iligan City
25. Hadji Imam Yacob<sup>\*\*</sup> (of Jolo)
26. Hadji Imam Radjare<sup>\*\*\*</sup> (of Jolo)
27. Ustadz Imam Hadji Ibrahim Ghazali<sup>\*\*\*\*</sup> (of Jolo)

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<sup>\*</sup> non-Muslim respondent

<sup>\*\*</sup> Imam of the Tulay mosque and President of all Muslim organizations in the Philippines.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Supervisor of religious teachers at the Philippine Muslim College and the first Tausug to have gone to Cairo to study.

28. Dr. Mamitua Saber \*

Dean, Mindanao State University

Much of the data gathered from interviews with the respondents have been integrated in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 (with emphasis on the first two chapters mentioned). They, moreover have served to countercheck or verify data derived from other sources - the survey, documented manuscripts, etc.

The Survey. The general objectives of the study led to the formulation of a sample design appropriate for a Statistical Survey. Mindanao was divided into urban and rural areas and particular attention was given to the Muslim population as opposed to the non-Muslim population. The sample size targeted was 1,500. Since Muslim areas were principally involved, the expected ratio of Muslim respondents to non-Muslim informants was 2:1 in favor of the former. This expectation was, however not realized since out of the 1,500 sample population, only 1,416 were willing to be interviewed; 203 were Muslims; 1,196 were non-Muslims and 17 gave no indication as to their religious affiliation. In other words, roughly 15% of those who identified their religion were Muslims which is not far off from the estimate of 23% for Muslim population in the regions covered by the survey.

In view of the limited overall sample size, the design was envisioned to obtain useful results for Mindanao and Sulu as whole, classified by ethnic group (Muslim and non-Muslim) and by area (urban and rural); it was not intended to yield meaningful results for each province, much less for each city.

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\*Project consultant; prior to his acceptance of the assignment, Dean Saber was a respondent-informant.

The concepts used in defining the urban and rural areas are as follows:

Urban Areas - Included in this category are chartered cities, provincial capitals, and all poblaciones.

Rural Areas - These areas include all other places not considered urban as defined above.

For purposes of the survey, Region IX (Northern Mindanao) and Region X (Southern Mindanao and Sulu), as defined by the BCS Survey of Households, were considered.

Region IX Northern Mindanao

1. Agusan
2. Bukidnon
3. Lanao del Norte
4. Lanao del Sur
5. Misamis Occidental
6. Misamis Oriental
7. Surigao del Norte
8. Surigao del Sur

Region X Southern Mindanao  
and Sulu

1. North Cotabato
2. South Cotabato
3. Davao del Norte
4. Davao del Sur
5. Zamboanga del Norte
6. Zamboanga del Sur
7. Sulu

Ethnic Grouping

Muslim Areas

1. Lanao del Norte
2. Lanao del Sur
3. North Cotabato
4. South Cotabato
5. Sulu
6. Davao del Sur
7. Davao del Norte
8. Davao Oriental
9. Zamboanga del Norte
10. Zamboanga del Sur

Non-Muslim Areas

1. Agusan
2. Bukidnon
3. Misamis Occidental
4. Misamis Oriental
5. Surigao del Norte
6. Surigao del Sur
7. Camiguin

The grouping of the cities and provinces all over the country into ten regions took into consideration factors such as economic activities, climate, crops grown, dialects spoken, ethnic origins and others.

A simple, stratified three-stage sampling was employed for the urban areas. The electoral precinct constituted the first-stage unit, the household the second-stage unit, and the household member (age 16 through 60) the third-stage unit or the elementary which was selected at random.

A simple, stratified three-stage sampling was employed for the rural areas. The barrios, the first-stage or primary sampling units, were drawn with probability proportionate to size of population. The households were selected systematically with a random start. Again, the household member respondent was selected at random from those aged 16 through 60.

The number of household taken into the sample in both the urban and rural areas was such that the results or characteristic values obtained would be self-weighted.

It should be borne in mind that the data from this sample survey of households are subject to sampling variations. They, therefore, would likely differ to a certain extent from figures that would be obtained from a complete enumeration making use of the same schedules, instructions, and interviewers. The chances are that about 19 out of 20, the difference between an estimate and the figure that would have been obtained from a complete enumeration would be less than 1.96 times the standard error of estimate. Additionally, biases not due to sampling might have affected the estimates. Every effort, however, was made to reduce to the minimum the effects of such conceivable biases.

### Scope and Brief Description of the Study in its Initial Stage

The study is principally limited to the Mindanao area where the majority of Muslims are concentrated, and where, it is felt, social and economic reforms must be instituted in order to integrate an important yet, until now, neglected segment of the population.

The Planning and Initial Phase. This study on Muslim affairs was conceptualized early in April, 1970 by the Filipinas Foundation, Inc. April was a month which was entirely devoted to inviting consultants who would form the steering committee, pooling together the staff to be involved in the project, and making preparations to launch the Mindanao survey.

The original plan was to commence the research early in May, have all the data in by the third month of the same year, that is - July and, possibly have the first draft of the research report ready within August of 1970. Write-up and discussion of the findings was estimated at two months so that the research group estimated the project's completion to fall on September, 1970. However, some members of the FFI panel of consultants felt the target date for the project's completion to be rather optimistic, owing to the breadth of the undertaking and the difficulties envisioned in studying this cultural group. Past experiences have pointed to the difficulty of conducting studies on a different ethnic group, more so because of the language problem and the communication gap that has been widened by religious, political, social and psychological barriers. Despite this awareness, it was generally felt worthwhile to make the best efforts to complete the research program within the shortest possible period of time.

It is noteworthy that the consultants and staff have been carefully selected so as to minimize the entry of possible biases. Aside from looking into their qualifications, the individuals' personal backgrounds were screened prior to the project's commencement to ascertain that they are in no way connected with groups or

associations the net result of which would have damaging effects on this study.

Following the plan of study, a questionnaire was devised by the steering committee. This consisted of thirty-one (31) principal questions (Appendix I) and, among other things, was designed to look into:

1. The occupation perceived as most desirable by Muslim Filipinos.
2. The nation with which Muslim Filipinos most closely identify.
3. Muslims' attitudes toward the present economic situation; Western education; non-Muslims; politicians, and the Philippine government.
4. The most pressing community problems.
5. The peace and order situation.
6. The top Philippine Muslim leaders and their programs.
7. The attitudes of non-Muslims toward Muslim Filipinos.
8. The role of Islam in solving community problems.

The questionnaire was translated into three basic tongues: Tausug, Maranao and Maguindanao although the language used during the interviews was suited to the respondents' requirements. At times, Cebuano, English or Tagalog was used as medium of communication.

The original intention was to supplement the survey by conducting panel or group depth interviews among prominent Muslim leaders or personalities, and, making use of the questionnaire devised by the steering committee. The described program was not implemented largely because of the impracticality and difficulty of getting Muslim respondents together in the manner

desired. It was difficult enough to obtain the cooperation of some respondents without imposing on them further as the researchers had to explain the purpose of the interviews in detail before they could elicit any cooperation. It may also be added that it was not a practical idea to adopt a structured interview using the standard set of questions; much less to jot down responses on the questionnaire during the time of interview as it was observed that this procedure tended to put respondents ill at ease. The researchers, therefore, had to content themselves later on by using the questionnaire as a mere guide; memorize the set of questions and conduct the interviews in a less structured fashion, yet without necessarily omitting the questions contained in the standard interview schedule. A conversational mode of interrogation was adopted wherein the questions were allowed to follow one another in a natural and sequential manner. Recording was done on a notebook or separate sheets of paper.

Fieldwork. Preparations for launching the field operations began between April 19 to May 17, 1970. It was during this period that the questionnaire forms were prepared, and field survey supervisors contacted for the Alpha (survey) portion of the FFI project. Ocular/observational trips may be said to have been undertaken during the months of May and June. The research team made its first field trip on May 18, simultaneous with the survey or Alpha operations. A total of seventeen (17) days in a straight row, were spent in Mindanao, during which time interviews were made with certain members of the community who were willing to give their assistance by way of information. The research team also took advantage of their stay in Mindanao by attending the 5th Muslim National Convention held last May 28 - 31 in Zamboanga City.

There were quite a number of problems encountered by the research team during the ocular trip such as difficulty in contacting respondents many of who were unavailable since they

had gone ahead to Zamboanga City in preparation for the 5th Muslim National Convention, lack of relevant secondary data, and changes in plane schedules. Despite these, the Alpha (survey) team appeared to have had equally difficult, if not worse, problems. These may be compressed into the following problems:

1. Difficulty of obtaining and maintaining good interviewers. There were a number of dropouts among interviewers, many of whom were discouraged due to the apathetic response of many interviewees and the problems posed by transportation.
2. In some areas, houses are distantly located from one another so that traveling time increased.
3. Difficulty in interviewing and probing illiterate barrio folks.
4. Mailing problems.

The venue of the survey's field operations phase was two weeks and the FFI research coordinator expected the returns to be in within the first week of June. The deadline was not met as bottlenecks were encountered, particularly in Jolo. The questionnaires were finally received in the middle part of June, 1970 and processed during the following month of July, August and September. The gathering of secondary data continued up to the month of September; the months of October 1970 through January 1971 were spent evaluating the findings and preparing the first draft of the manuscript.

### Limitations

Despite serious efforts to control the quality of the study, this research has its own share of limitations which will have to be taken into consideration. At the very start, problems were encountered by the research group which constituted the bottleneck to prevent the completion of the data gathering phase within the

estimated time requirement of three months. These problems contribute to the limitations of the study which are identified as follows:

1. Survey results' limitations owing to the following:

a. Refusals on the part of some selected respondents to participate in the study.

b. Partial cooperation from many of those who agreed to be interviewed. Lack of cooperation was exhibited by non-Muslim respondents as well as Muslim interviewees. In fact, only 47.5% of those interviewed were reported as "very cooperative", which may be taken to mean that, on the whole, the cooperation shown has been - at the most - average. A number of questions have elicited defenses on the part of some respondents. (This, however, will be taken up further in the presentation of survey results.)

c. The questions 17(c) and 17(d) were not well understood so that instead of getting categorical answers of yes or no, side comments were made which did not really answer the questions. Besides these, there were a lot of nonresponses and the scanty replies to said questions do not permit us to make any conclusions. These are therefore being deliberately omitted. (It is to be noted that these questions were asked in order to be able to determine whether the tendency exists to refer to or think of a particular group when referring to politicians. However, from the tables in the appendices, it is evident that the term politician and the traits ascribed to them apply to both groups of Muslims as well as non-Muslims.)

d. In question no. 12 (What does the government do or not do that makes them feel that way?), the responses given were so meager that no table could be

prepared as it would not be, in any way, conclusive. It is felt that the reason for nonresponse could have been due to the hesitancy of subjects in voicing their opinions, especially since the question refers to government activities.

2. Limitations in making detailed and accurate estimates of budgets needed to launch the required programs. It must be stressed that the very broad scope of the research program undertaken, as well as time and budget requirements, prevent the research group from coming out with the detailed budget. At the onset of this study, when the problems were not clearly identified, it was presumed that this objective could be accomplished. However, in the process of data gathering and evaluation, the research group encountered a number of possible programs that may be undertaken to minimize - if not entirely eliminate - the problems in Mindanao. While these programs have indeed a bearing on this particular project, by themselves they can be treated as individual projects for which separate studies should be undertaken in order to emerge with much more realistic and accurate figures. In short, this research can, at best, answer most of the principal questions posed at the beginning, identify the problems, recommend solutions, and pinpoint programs that may be undertaken by the government and/or private agencies. How much financing will be required to undertake them, what human resources will be involved, and the time required within which to complete the programs are questions that must be taken separately by groups of persons who are known for their competence in the fields of public administrative and systems management control, supported by an economic staff.

## CHAPTER 2

## A BRIEF SKETCH: MUSLIM FILIPINOS

Concentrated in the relatively undeveloped islands of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan, the Muslim Filipinos constitute a potent segment in Philippine society today. Based on the census of 1939, there were about 800,000 Muslim Filipinos. Current estimates, however, place the number at a rough two million, which, if correct, means that there are more Moros in the Philippines than there are American Indians in the United States.<sup>1</sup> By way of further comparison, Muslim Filipinos are more numerous than the populations of the Republic of Costa Rica or the Kingdom of Libya. They are distributed in a variety of ethno-linguistic groups, principally the following: (1) the Tausug of the Sulu Archipelago, Palawan, Zamboanga and Davao; (2) the Maranao of the Lanao Provinces, Cotabato, Zamboanga and Bukidnon; (3) the Maguindanao of Cotabato; (4) the Samals of the Sulu Archipelago and Zamboanga; (5) the Yakan of Basilan Island and Zamboanga; (6) the Badjao of the Sulu Archipelago; (7) the Sangils of Davao and Cotabato; (8) the Melebugnons of Balabak Island; (9) the Jama Mapun of Cagayan de Sulu; and (10) a percentage of the Palawani of Palawan. Some ninety-two per cent of all Muslim Filipinos belong to the Tausug, Maranao, Maguindanao groups.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Antonio Isidro, Muslim-Christian Integration at Mindanao State University (Marawi City: MSU University Research Center, 1968) p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>Peter Gowing, Mosque and Moro: A Study of Muslims in the Philippines (Manila: Philippine Federation of Christian Churches, 1964), p. 1.

### The Tausug

The Sulu area consisting of several tropical islands is inhabited by the Tausug (people of the current), Samals and the Badjaos (sea gypsies). According to the Bureau of Census and Statistics, the population of the area as of 1960 was 326,898 of which 310,926 or 95% are Muslims. The highest concentration of Tausug is found in Jolo and the Tapul group while there are thin dispersions in Tawi-tawi, Sibutu, and Pangutaron Islands.<sup>3</sup>

Numerically, the Tausug may be considered as the third largest Muslim group in the Philippines. They are divided into two sub-groups, the Parianon (people of the landing) who live on or near the sea, and the Guimbahanon (hill people) who live in the interior of the islands of Sulu and are principally farmers. The former, who are sea-oriented people, are well-known as navigators. Their sapits (native cargo craft) travel beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines to Borneo, Indonesia, and other neighboring Southeast Asian countries. In exchange for copra and rice, they bring in a wide variety of highly dutiable commodities like porcelain, gold dust, brass, copper, iron, cigarettes, perfumes, textiles, and playing cards which they sell at high profits. The Guimbahanon, on the other hand, are principally farmers who cultivate their land intensively to the extent of harvesting rice twice a year.

### The Maranao

The Maranao (people of the lake), estimated to be over 450,000 in the two Lanao provinces, are numerically the second largest Muslim group in the country. About 90 per cent of all

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<sup>3</sup>Isidro, op. cit., p. 66.

the Maranao live in Lanao del Sur while the remaining 10 per cent live in Lanao del Norte and in some parts of Cotabato and Zamboanga del Sur. They are primarily agriculturists, and cottage industries (particularly mat-making and woodcraft and metalcraft) play an important role in their economy.

### The Maguindanao

The Maguindanao (people of the foot plain) live along the banks of Rio Grande de Cotabato. Composed of some 550,000 members, they constitute the largest group of Muslims in the Philippines.

The Maguindanao family is, like those in other Muslim groups, a fairly large one consisting not only of their immediate members which are the parents and their children but also direct line relatives of the second degree like grandparents and grandchildren. As an economic unit, the family is even larger as considerable communal assistance, including financial, are evident in marriage celebrations, feasts, social events, deaths, and religious festivities.<sup>4</sup>

Agriculture is the chief pursuit of the people. The plains in Cotabato are wide and fertile and, coupled with a favorable climate, provide a potentially tremendous source of rice.<sup>5</sup>

### The Samals, Badjaos, and Other Muslim Groups

The Samals, Badjaos and minor groups represent the subjugated elements of Philippine Islam. The first group is estimated to number some 160,000 people concentrated in the southern half of the Sulu Archipelago. They are described

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid, p. 70.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid

as less militant and aggressive than the major Muslim groups like the Maranao and the Tausug. Like the Badjaos, they are sea-oriented, living on boats and in coastal villages made up of stilted houses built out over the water. Politically, the Samals have never had an independent existence, and circumstances have forced them to be loyal commoners in the hierarchy of peoples in their homeland, beneath the Tausug, though above the Badjao. Economically, they are the poorest of the major Muslim groups.

The Badjaos (popularly called "Sea Gypsies") are chiefly found in Southern Sulu and roughly estimated to be 20,000. The more numerous Yakan (about 100,000) of Basilan Island are said to be part Polynesian in origin. Population estimates for the other minor Muslim groups are as follows: Sangils - 50,000; Melebugnons - 50,000; Jama Mapun - 10,000; and Muslim Palawani - 53,000.<sup>6</sup>

#### General Characteristics of Philippine Muslims

Racially, the Philippine Muslims, in common with most other Filipinos, are of Malayan and Indonesian stock. Some exceptions may be the Yakan and some upper class Tausug who have a mixture of Arabic ancestry. On the whole, however, Muslim Filipinos are physically indistinguishable from other Filipinos.

As far as it is known, all the languages spoken by the Muslim Filipinos belong to the Central Philippine Subgroup and are thus closely related to the major languages spoken by Christian Filipinos, notably Tagalog and Cebuano. But there is no language understood by all Muslim groups. Maguindanao and Maranao (also called "Iranon") may be said to constitute one Mindanao language in that they are

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<sup>6</sup>Gowing, op. cit., pp. 5 and 6.

mutually intelligible, the major difference being that the former is an "l" dialect and the latter an "r" dialect. Tausug seems to be closely related to Cebuano and is only slightly understood by the Mindanao Muslims. The Samals, Badjao, Jama Mapun and Yakan speak languages that are closely related to one another, while the Sangils have their closest affinities with Muslim groups found in the Celebes; and the linguistic relationships of the Melebugnons appear to be with certain Bornean groups.<sup>7</sup>

Some groups whose languages are not mutually intelligible resort to second languages in their inter-group communications. A large number of poblacion Muslims speak English, Tagalog, Bisayan or Chabacano.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid, pp. 6 and 11.

<sup>8</sup>Mamitua Saber and Mauyag M. Tamano, "Decision Making and Social Change in Rural Moroland: An investigation of Socio-Economic Problems in Community Development." (Study Series No. 16, C.D.R.C., University of the Philippines, 1961), p. 7.

## CHAPTER 3

## ISLAM IN THE PHILIPPINES

Anyone who writes about Philippine Muslims must first decide how to refer to them. While it is a common practice to refer to them as "Moros", this term is currently viewed with distaste by a great number of Muslim Filipinos, possibly owing to the negative connotations attached to it over the past centuries since the Spanish occupation of the Philippines. The image of the Moro that has been created by the Christians is that of a fierce, lawless, and warlike people. To a great extent, it has managed to survive and to heighten the social barrier between the Muslim Filipinos on the one hand and the Christian Filipinos on the other.

While some Muslims reject the Spanish appellation "Moro" and prefer to be identified as "Muslim Filipinos", there are those who proudly accept the term. Technically, the term Moro is often more appropriate than Muslim for there are many who share in the Moro tradition with only a very weak participation in the Muslim faith.<sup>9</sup> Hence, the terms "Moro" and "Muslim Filipinos" shall be used interchangeably.

For, to quote one noted Muslim lawyer author:<sup>10</sup>

It is a word that is customarily used to denote, as a whole, the nine different Philippine Linguistic communities that profess Islam religion. Moros are referred to as "Moors", "Moriscos" or Muslims. "Moors" is a derivative of the Latin word "Mauri" used by the Ancient Romans to describe the inhabitants of the territory comprising the western portion of Modern Algeria and northeastern portion of Modern Morocco which in classical times, constituted the Roman

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Jainal D. Rasul, Struggle for Identity (Manila: Nueva Era Press, Inc., 1970), pp. 23-24.

province of Mauritania.

The term "Mauri" presumably of Phoenician origin refers therefore to the western inhabitants of the Roman province of Mauritania. When Spain became a Muslim or Moro province under the Ummayyad Caliphate from July 19, 711 to January 2, 1492, covering a period of 781 years, the Muslim Spaniards were then called the Moriscos, probably to distinguish them from the Moors of Morocco. To the Spaniards in Spain, the term "Moro" did not originally carry any malice. But later on, Spaniards and Christian Filipinos infused into the word, by pressures from the clergy, the idea of malice.

In subsequent years, the word "maure" was sometimes used to describe the inhabitants of a large Saharan area, lying to the south of Morocco and between that country and the Republic of Senegal and Mali of which the greater portion forms the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. In English writing of the last three centuries, the word "Moor" has more often been used as the equivalent of the Moroccan and sometimes to describe the former Muslims of Spain of mixed racial origin who created the Arab Andalusian and later settled in large numbers as refugees in North Africa between the 11th and 12th centuries . . . . To facilitate the reconquest of Spain from the Muslims surrendering (surrounding\*) Muslim communities in Aragon and Valencia were usually guaranteed (in\*\*) their religion by treaty as were those of Granada in 1492. But the Spanish crown found this pledge embarrassing to uphold against the proselyting zeal of the clergy, and in 1525, because of ecclesiastical pressure, Emperor Charles V, enforced the "baptism" of the Muslims of Valencia and Aragon, and entirely prohibited Islam in Spain. The raison d'etre for the prohibition was that the "new Christians" continued openly to speak, write and dress like Muslims while some secretly continued to worship as Muslims. By 1567, Philipp II forbade Granada Moriscos' language, customs and costumes. Hence, the Moriscos rebelled on December 26, 1568, and were suppressed at great expense. The Moriscos were deported en masse in 1609. Consequently, it is understandable why the Spaniards with their fierce anti-Muslim attitude, had to apply the name "Moros" to the Muslims of the Philippines upon their arrival in the Philippines for colonization in 1571, having found striking similarities of religion, customs and traditions with the Moors of Spain. By extension, corresponding to the Spanish usage, the word "Moro" is occasionally employed to Muslims in general . . . .

On a broader aspect, if we have to look at the word "Moro" without religious prejudice, the Muslims should indeed have reasons to be proud of the name. For it was the Moros

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\* probable word

\*\* omission, ours.

who succeeded in holding Spanish colonization of the Philippines in abeyance. It was the Moros who defended Manila in 1571 long after the establishment of the Sultanate of Sulu, the first organized government in the Philippines, and it was the Moros that enriched the history of Mindanao and Sulu which caught the first attention of Madrid, Lisbon, London and America.

### The Coming of Islam as a Way of Life

According to some authors, Islam arrived in the Philippines about 200 years before the introduction of Christianity and was rapidly spreading throughout the Archipelago, from North to South when the Spaniards came to settle in 1565, A.D. and checked its advance. In the middle of the 14th century, Arab traders and adventurers brought Islam from the Malay Peninsula first to Borneo, then to Sulu and thence to the Southern coasts of Mindanao.<sup>11</sup> The introduction of the religion into the country may however, be credited to an Arab missionary, Sharif Makdum who, along with traders from Malay Peninsula and Borneo, landed in Sulu in 1380. Islam was further propagated by an Arabian scholar, Abu Bakr, whose marriage to the daughter of Raja Baquinda, enabled him to succeed his father-in-law as Sultan of Sulu. During his reign, he exerted efforts to convert the inhabitants of Islam.<sup>12</sup>

In Mindanao, the missionary work was led by Sharif Mohammed Kabungsuwan, a soldier-trader-missionary, and Sultan of Malayan ancestry. In 1475, Kabungsuwan, heading a small army of Samals, landed at the mouth of the Cotabato River. Through conquest and diplomacy, he was able to gradually extend his rule and the religion of Islam throughout the Cotabato Valley and Southern Mindanao. In Lanao and other parts of Northern Mindanao, the movement for Islamization was spearheaded by Sharif Alawi who was supposed to have come from Cotabato.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Gowing, op. cit., p. 16

<sup>12</sup>Isidro, op. cit., pp. 35 and 36.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid

Islam was readily accepted by the native inhabitants and conversion to the new faith was fast for several reasons. As a religion, Islam is centered on the supremacy of one God, Allah. The rituals are easy to perform and the people were not forced to give up their pre-Islamic tenets and practices. Instead of coercion, Muslim preachers persuaded the people to accept the new faith while retaining much of the old traditions. Missionaries worked with dedication, lived among the people, married their women, adjusted themselves to their customs, and learned to speak the native tongue. In sum, they identified themselves with the people whom they converted. These policies, practices, and attitudes of the Muslim missionaries are radically different from those employed later by their Spanish counterparts.

Besides religion, Muslim missionaries taught the inhabitants the system of government and law, introduced Arabic literature and helped the people in their various activities.

The meaning of Islam is crucial to an understanding of Muslim affairs and the accompanying problems. Yet not too many people understand what Islam is in the true sense of the word.

Islam, to Muslims, is more than a religion; it is a way of life. Literally, Islam means peace. As a religion, it means submission to the will of God. It rejects the Doctrine of Original Sins and maintains that men and women are born innocent and it is only by their own deeds and actions that they become good or evil. Islam is a derivative of an Arabic root, "salm" or "silm" which, in its primary sense, means, "to be tranquil," "at rest," or "at perfect peace." It is in this sense that the words "Din" and "Islam" were used in the Holy Qur'an, the Book of Divine Guidance of Islam, when God said:

"This day I have perfected for you your 'din' (religion), and completed my favor to you, and chosen for you Islam as a 'din' (religion)." (5:3)

Since "Islam" means, "to enter into peace" and since "Din" means "the natural way of life," then ISLAM, in its technical sense as a religion, means a way or a system of life where man enters into peace with his co-being and with his Creator. Since his Creator is a Being above and superior to him, ISLAM, in its technical sense, came to be defined as a complete submission to, or acceptance of, the will of ALLAH, or God.<sup>14</sup>

### Fundamental Tenets of Islam<sup>15</sup>

The conception of God is the basis and foundation of Islam (Tauhid), according to Islamic ideas. The whole life of men should be an act of worship to God . . .

In this relation, there are (5) cardinal beliefs: (1) belief in one God (Allah), which could be summed up into the formula, "La ilaha iila Allah"; (2) belief in survival or resurrection after death and in the day of judgment. According to this belief the life of this world and of all that is in it will come to an end on one appointed day when everything will be annihilated. That day is called "Qiyamah", the Day of Resurrection. (3) belief in the Prophets of God, in all countries and among all nations of the earth, in the different stages of civilization; belief in Prophet Muhammad as the last of the Prophets through whom the message of God was sent in all its fullness; (4) belief in the existence of God's angels; angels are believed as incapable of sin and their station is not fixed; and (5) belief in the Books of God and in the Qur'an as the Book which contains the words of Allah as revealed to Archangel Gabriel and to Prophet Muhammad.

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<sup>14</sup>Ahmad Domocao Alonto, "Islam - A Brief Exposition", (A paper written and read in a symposium on Muslims in Contemporary Philippines sponsored by the Mindanao State University, on the occasion of its Seventh Foundation Day at the University campus, Marawi City, on September 7, 1968.), pp. 2 - 3.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid, pp. 23-24; and Rasul, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

The Qur'an. The Koran or Qur'an is the basis of Islam, as the Bible is the foundation of Christianity.<sup>16</sup> It is the fundamental source of law that governs most of the Muslim's daily conduct and behavior. In theology, it lays down the rules on prayers, puts a tax rate for charity, pilgrimage and fasting during the Ramadan. It contains the civil and criminal laws on marriage, divorce, adultery, and all kinds of social relationships.

The Qur'an is essential to the education of the Muslims. Since it is the basis of worship, the Muslim child is taught its verses in Arabic. It is also the basis of curricula in the elementary grades, the secondary school, and the university and actually provides the larger content of general education. A study shows that the Qur'an consists of 77,934 words in 6,236 verses with a total of 323,621 letters. The following paragraphs quoted in the words of a prominent Muslim author,<sup>17</sup> gives a more lucid and vivid description of this Book of Islam faith.

To a Muslim, the Qur'an is the word of God and the Divine Guidance. As a code of life, it has no compeer. The Qur'an is addressed to the entire humanity, transcending all barriers and limitations of race, region, or time. Further, it seeks to guide man in all walks of life, spiritual, temporal, individual and collective. It contains directions for the conduct of the head of state, and a simple soldier, for the rich as well as the poor, for peace as well as for war, for spiritual well-being as for commercial and material prosperity.

The Qur'an seeks, primarily, to develop the personality of the individual and then organize the individuals into an ideal society, so as to usher in an era wherein goodness and virtue may flourish and evil and vice are eliminated. It declares that every human being will be personally responsible to his Creator.

The method of the Qur'an is that it not only gives commands, but also tries to educate the people

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<sup>16</sup> Isidro, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

<sup>17</sup> Alonto, op. cit., pp. 18-20.

and convince them about the validity and usefulness of its injunctions. It appeals to the reason of man and invites him to exercise his own intellect in order to understand himself, his station and purpose of life, his conduct with his fellow-beings and, above all, his relationship with his Sustainer.

The Qur'an adopts various ways and methods for enabling man to understand the truth. It relates stories and parables and invokes the testimony of history to show what the right course is, and what caused the doom of nations in the past. The Qur'an teaches man the Attributes of the Divine Being which are manifest from the Names of the Almighty, such as, the One, the Creator, the Nourisher, the Sustainer, the Powerful, the Just, the Merciful, etc. etc.

It lays stress on the fact that man has been created to fulfill the wishes of his Creator and to lead his individual and collective life in accordance with the instructions contained in the Holy Book and as taught by the Prophet (peace be upon him.)

The Qur'an is a comprehensive code of life covering each and every aspect and phase of human existence. This Book of God lays down the best of rules relating to social life, commerce and economics, marriage and inheritance, penal laws and international conduct.

### Sources of Islam<sup>18</sup>

There are three (3) sources from which Islam emerged: (1) the "Qur'an" (as previously mentioned, is the original source from which all principles and injunctions of Islam are dependent.); (2) the Sunnah of the Prophet or the Hadith; and (3) the Litihad.

The Sunnah literally means a way or rule or manner of acting, or mode of life, and Hadith means any saying conveyed to man, either through hearing or through revelation. In its original sense, Sunnah then indicates the doings, and Hadith, the sayings, of the Prophet. However,

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<sup>17</sup>Alonto, op. cit., pp. 18-20.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid, pp. 18-22.

these are terms which are interchangeably used and purports to convey any saying of the Prophet, or any action or practice of his, or his silent approval of an action or practice of another person.

The third source from which the Islamic Law is drawn is "Ijtihad or exercise of judgment in accordance with the spirit and general scheme of the Shari'ah in respect of matters which have not been decided upon therein. The word itself is derived from the Arabic root jahd which means exerting oneself to the utmost or to the best of one's ability, and Ijtihad which literally conveys the same significance, is technically applicable to a jurist's exerting the faculties of his mind to the utmost for the purpose of forming an opinion in the light of the Islamic principles in case of law where the Shari'ah is silent.

### Pillars of Faith<sup>19</sup>

Islam is based on what are called the Five Pillars of Faith consisting of the profession of faith in one God and the practice of the four obligations, namely: praying, alms-giving, fasting, and pilgrimage. "There is but one God, Muhammed is the Apostle of God," is the credo of the Muslims, while another Qur'anic verse says: "Oh ye who believe, believe in God and his Apostles and the Book which He hath sent down to His Apostles and the Scripture which He hath sent down formerly. Whosoever denied God and His angels and His books and His apostles and the last day hath strayed far from truth."

Prayer (Salat) is one of the most important obligatory duties of the Muslims. It is engaged in five times in

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<sup>19</sup> Isidro, op. cit., pp. 39-41.

24 hours: before sunrise (Fajr); just after mid-day or noon (Zhur); later afternoon (Asr); at sunset (Maqhreb), and before going to bed (Isha).

Prayers can be recited anywhere, but preferably in the mosque with the Imam who leads the prayers and sets the timing of the accompanying prescribed movements. While praying, they face the direction of the antique mosque, Kaaba,\* in Mecca. Women in veils join the congregation during the prayers but they stay in rows behind the men. On Friday, there is a regular congregational prayer. In Marawi, all activities are supposed to cease and business establishments owned by Muslims close to give every religious person time to go to the Mosque. Before praying, absolution - done by bathing or washing the face, hands, elbows and by wiping the head and feet with water or fine sand - is required.

Alms Giving (Zakat) or compulsory charity is the third pillar of Islam faith. In the Qur'an the giving of alms is regarded as a sign of piety and a way to salvation. Alms-giving consists of two kinds: obligatory and voluntary. The former constitutes one-fortieth of a man's income in cash or in kind; the latter is left to the conscience of the giver.

Fasting. Saum or fasting is the fourth foundation of Islam. It connotes complete abstinence from food, drinks, smoking, and sexual relationship from dawn until sunset.

Fasting is done during the Ramadan or the ninth month in which the Qur'an was revealed, and it is only the very young, the ailing, and travellers who are exempted.

Pilgrimage (Hajj). The fifth foundation of Islam is Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca. A Muslim is expected to visit Mecca and, optionally, the tomb of the Prophet at Medina, at

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\* A small shrine located at the Mosque in Mecca. Ka'ba is a cube shape of gray stone and marble, the dimension being 40 x 35 by 50 ft.

least once in his lifetime.

The performance of the pilgrimage requires certain ceremonies like going around the Kaaba seven times and running between the nearby hills of Arafa and Marua. On the ninth day of the month, all pilgrims gather on the Hills of Arafa twelve miles away. This event is accompanied with the sacrifice of sheep and camels, the stoning of a devil, and the kissing of the Black Stone on the wall of the Kaaba.

### Islam as a Unifying Factor<sup>20</sup>

Islam is both a unifying and divisive influence in the history of Philippine politics and society. While it binds them in the country, it also sets them apart from the rest of the population. As a religion, they acquired it as a symbol which made them rally against all foreign enemies.

Before the war, Islam was expressed as a social and moral conduct for its outward practices that were mainly epitomized by the mosques and Imams. But the underlying essence of these religious practices was hardly felt by the large segment of the Muslim population. Perhaps, this prevalent ignorance could be attributed to the lack of religious leadership so essential in Muslim social organization of a Muslim society or the incessant Muslim resistance against invasion. Hence, during this period, Islam was more of a unifying symbol than a working spiritual force. Following the war, the picture began to change when Islam surged as a vibrant influence in the life of Philippine Muslims.

As a social establishment it unified those who believed in its teachings and those who assisted its brotherhood - Dar-al-Islam. These changes seemed to have awakened the

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid, pp. 45-48.

the interest of other Muslims in other countries.

In the Philippines, the resurgence of Islam is evident in many ways. There has been an increase in number of educated Muslims who are now leaders in the revitalization of the Islam faith. The observance of Islamic obligations has become more common and regular. Better mosques are being constructed in many villages. More pilgrimages are made to Mecca at great personal sacrifice. All of these attest to the growing interest among Philippine Muslims in fulfilling their sacred obligations.

Meanwhile, Islam has also been exercising principal influence in the schools. With the return of Muslim scholars from Cairo, the Madrasah schools have increased and have improved in their teaching efficiency. Arabic, the teaching language of Islam, is a significant part in the school curriculum. It is taught as a subject in every grade of the Kamilol Islam Colleges, now Philippine Jamiatul Al-Islamia, which expresses a universal language in the Arabic world.

The Philippine Jamiatul Al-Islamia offers courses in Liberal Arts, Commerce, and Education in the college level and regular secondary and elementary school curricula as well. Associated with it is the Institute of Islam Studies offering courses in Islamic theology, history, science and law in the Arabic language. The school which follows the teachings of orthodox (Sunni) Islam has expanded rapidly in recent years with the Alonto family as the moving spirit in its developments.

In addition, Islamic organizations like the Muslim Association of the Philippines have been established to bind the people of the faith. Muslim leaders were likewise seeking greater participation in the affairs of the government and a number of Muslim leaders now occupy important public positions.

The Islamic sector of the country is getting attention from other Muslim countries deeply involved in the world-wide movement for the unification of Islam. During the past several years, there have been Arab volunteers in the Muslim provinces who teach the Arabic language and the principles of the Qur'an. They usually stay for some time and learn the local dialect and customs of the people. As spiritual leaders, they render services in much the same way as the American Peace Corps Volunteers or the British Volunteers, except that they are committed to the enhancement of Islam. But, international interest in Philippine Muslims is also expressed in the form of monetary contributions for the promotion of the Islamic cause. The construction of the Islamic Center in Manila, for example, is to be financed from various contributions among Muslims from other countries. His Highness, Prince Aga Khan, has donated a sizeable sum for the construction of the Museum for Muslim Arts on the campus of the Mindanao State University.

Furthermore, there have been an impressive number of visitors from Arabia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Indonesia who have bolstered the local Muslim's interest in his faith. In 1963, a widely known authority on Islamic history and customs from the University of Karachi, Dean Hassan Siddiqui, gave a series of lectures in Marawi City and the University. High officials of the United Arab Republic have also visited Marawi and other Muslim centers in the country. His Excellency, Mohammed Tewfic Oweida, Secretary-General for Muslim Affairs of the UAR, was the last visitor before the outbreak of the Israeli-Arab conflict. He went to various Muslim schools and delivered addresses on important gatherings to explain the meaning of Islam and the contributions it has given to world civilization especially in the fields of law, mathematics, astronomy, geography, chemistry, and Medicine.

In sum, one might say that there has been a resurgence of Islam in the Philippines for the following major reasons: (1) The influence of Arab bloc countries which have contributed advice, money, and missionaries to bolster the Muslim faith in many parts of the world. (2) The improvement and establishment of educational facilities in Muslim areas which, consequentially, increased literacy and made greater numbers of people more receptive to religious education. (3) The coming of missionaries from Egypt, Arabia, Pakistan, and Indonesia since World War II. (4) The rise of intelligent, highly efficient organizations (for men, women and youth, established on the local, provincial and national levels) which have done much to appeal to and strengthen the religious solidarity of the Muslims.

#### Muslim Institutions<sup>21</sup>

The four recognized Islamic institutions are as follows: (1) State; (2) administration; (3) education and (4) arts.

Islam, strictly speaking, is a total way of life and tolerates no division between the state and religion. As a matter of fact, a state, in Islam is a religious institution having as its constitution and law, the Shariah. The form that the Islamic State assumed after the death of Prophet Muhammad is the Caliphate with a Caliph as its head. A Caliph is neither a secular ruler nor the Muslim equivalent of a pope. He has neither the power to legislate nor to define dogma. He is the chief executive of a religiously constituted community. During the Abbasid period, the Caliph gradually lost power and became a figurehead while the real power passed into the hands of the Sultan. Finally, in 1920, the Caliphate was abolished by Mustafa

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<sup>21</sup>Rasul, op. cit., pp. 62-64.

Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, to the shock of the Islamic world.

In the Sultanates of Mindanao and Sulu, the Sultan was looked up to as a vice regent of God. Only colonialism has converted them into functionless titles but the conditions prevailing in the Philippines today demand for a composite system of law, recognizing the Islamic interests of the Muslims like those obtaining in India, between Muslims and Hindus prior to her partition in 1947. A serious study of Indian legal system is considered beneficial to Philippine Muslims.

Education, as an Islamic institution, occupied a place in Muslim life as the Qur'an places high value on knowledge and learning. Islamic instruction included the inculcation of honesty, truthfulness and moral character. The subjects taught in a rudimentary level were reading and writing Qur'an, prayer in catechism and some law and arithmetic.

The overriding principle under which Islamic art developed under all foreign influences was the religious rejection of images and in general, representative form of art. It is said that "the Arabesque, so characteristic of Islamic art, represent nothing except to remind one of the transcendence and unity of God."

Islamic art expressed itself in mosque architecture, castles, background of figure paintry, details of sculpture like glasses, pots, vases, furniture, bronze implements, arms, jade and ivory carvings.

### The Development of Shariah or Islamic Law<sup>22</sup>

Shariah (translated literally as "path to the watering place") in religious implication means the total way of

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<sup>22</sup>Rasul, Ibid, pp. 58-60; and Isidro, op. cit., pp. 37-41.

life as explicitly or implicitly commanded by God. The concept of Shariah as formulated by Muslim religious teachers includes both doctrine or belief and practice or the law (fiqh). Historically, the formulation of Islamic law took place earlier than the crystallization of Islamic Theology. The following are the four major sources of Islamic law: (1) the Qur'an; (2) the Sunnah or traditions of the prophet; (3) the Ijma or consensus of scholars on the meaning of the Qur'an and the Sunnah; and (4) the analogical deductions from the three. These are further divided into two: Qiyas or analogical reason or Ijtihad or the right of original thinking.

Both Ijma and Ijtihad are open to revision.

General Muslim laws, the Shariah, or Divine law as revealed and written in the Qur'an, and others just mentioned contain provisions on marriage and divorce and the treatment of slaves whose liberation is also the humanitarian concern of Islam. Also included are many other ethical injunctions such as the prohibitions against drinking alcohol, eating pork, gambling, and thievery and the corresponding penalties for murder, homicide, and other social infractions.

Among Philippine Muslims, general Islamic laws are supposed to be of extensive application, but they have, in the process, been so integrated with native traditions as to create obvious cultural diversities between the Philippine and foreign Muslim communities.

There are four sciences of Shariah, as follows:  
 (1) Hadith or prophetic traditions, as already explained;  
 (2) Tafsir or Qur'anic exegesis; (3) Kalam or theology;  
 (4) fiqh or law. The first two are the materials for theology and law. During the first two centuries of Islam,

there were four schools of law, led each by an imam:

(1) Hanafi, followed by Muslims in Central Asia, India, Turkey and the Middle East; (2) Maliki - followed in Northern and Western Africa, Sudan and the Persian Gulf; (3) Shafii - followed in Eastern Africa, parts of Arabia and South East Asia; (4) Hambali - limited to Wahabi's of Central Arabia and parts of the Persian Gulf. The Philippine Muslim clearly follows the school of law led by Imam Shafii. Among Filipino Muslims, Shariah law is actually applied to a certain degree, if we only take time in compiling Philippine laws affecting Muslims since 1915 up to the present. To cite instances, we have Qur'anic oath-taking among the Muslim litigants. Second, we have Philippine Muslim divorce law. Third, Act 2550 was passed during the Philippine Commission authorizing CFI judges to modify Philippine laws in Civil cases involving Muslim litigants. This refers to the contracts, known as Sandah and Arindao which are neither Mortgage, Pledge or anti-chresis found in our New Civil Code. In this relation, however, the question has been raised by a prominent Muslim author-lawyer as to whether a Christian CFI judge can apply this law in Muslim regions.

Concept of State.<sup>23</sup> Ideally, in an Islamic state, sovereignty emanates from Allah, but this does not mean that all laws come from God or the Qur'an or are prescribed with the people's participation. As mentioned above, the Ijtihad and Ijma provide reasoning and consensus as the basis of man-made laws for the Muslim state or community. As a whole, Muslim society is governed by both divine and human contractual laws. Enactment of state laws are made by the people, but consistent with Qur'anic fundamentals. Thus, a Muslim state is both religious and temporal.

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<sup>23</sup>Isidro, Ibid, p. 39.

Originally, law and theology were not separated. Theology was a mere statement of the doctrine. Yet the doctrine became the subject of discussion between Muslim and non-Muslims or within Islam between rationalizing schools of Mutazillites and Orthodox fundamentalists. Consequently, out of the cleavage between law and doctrine, law became independent and claims its title not only as the science of Shariah par excellence but was identified as Shariah itself.

#### Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-Hard<sup>24</sup>

According to the Muslims, the world is divided into two spheres: Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-Hard, with specified territories between Muslims and non-Muslims, respectively. The faithful is obligated to defend the boundaries of Dar-al-Islam from invasion, even through Holy War or Jihad.

Dar-al-Islam is classified into four territories: forbidden, reserve, cannonical, and the Irredentist. Mecca and Medina are considered forbidden to non-Muslims. Iraq, Syria, the Arabian Peninsula, Persia, Egypt, and Afghanistan - where there is continuous Muslim control - belong to the category of reserve. The cannonical territories are those countries which are governed by non-Muslim rulers, but where Muslim minorities are allowed to practise Islam - like the case of the Philippines. The Irredentist territories are countries where previous Muslim rulers held political control but were later expelled, like Spain and now Israel.

#### Sects in Islam<sup>25</sup>

The following are the different sects in Islam: (1) Shia, found chiefly in Pakistan, Iraq, Southern Lebanon, and Persia;

<sup>24</sup>Ibid, pp.42-43

<sup>25</sup>Rasul, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

(2) the Ismailis or the Seveners; (3) the Zaidites; and (4) the Ahmadiya sect founded in India by Mirza Gulam Ahmad at the turn of the twentieth century, which sect is further subdivided into two parties: the Qadrians and the Lahore Ahmadiya.

Despite the presence of different sects, there are no definite boundaries that divide those members of the Islam faith and the word "Muslim" applies to all its adherents regardless of sect. The following paragraphs derived in the very words of the author should give the reader a better understanding of the different sects in Islam and their origins:

During the Caliphate of Ali, in the Republic age of Islam, after the battle of Siffin in 156 A.D. between Ali and Muawiyah over succession to the Caliphate, a group broke with Ali and they were called Khawarij or Kharijites. They taught that faith consisted not only in belief but equally in words. Few of them survive in Africa and eastern Arabia as a sect in Islam. The most important medieval sect, though numerically smaller than the main body of Sunni is that of Shia or party of Ali. Their dissension was first political, believing the Caliph not only as the chief executive as the Sunnis did but also as infallible as the Pope in whom worked a divine Charisma, restricted to the House of Ali. Theologically, they believe in the Twelver (Ith'na Ashariya) believed to be the 12th and last imam. Muhammad Al-Mustazzar disappeared in 878 but that he is believed to be still living and will appear before the last day to save the world. This Sect is found chiefly in Pakistan, Iraq, Southern Lebanon and Persia. The Shia Sect evolved their own system of law. Some Shia believe that the text of the Quran is incomplete without a praise for Ali to the profession of faith. The pilgrimage may be performed by proxy or its place may be taken by a visit to the tomb of Shite saints like Ali at Najaf at Iraq; of Hussain at Karbala; Iraq; of Rida (Riza) at Meshed, Iran and of Fatima, daughter of Imam Musa at Quiem, Iran. Furthermore, the death of Hussain, grandson of the prophet of Islam is celebrated with passion plays. Public or collective prayers to this sect are not obligatory since it asserts that there

is no legitimate imam at present, as opposed to the orthodox or Sunni. Temporary marriage (mut<sup>a</sup>) for specified period, a year, a week, a day, is allowed.

The next Sect in Islam is the Ismailis or the Seveners. They are the followers of Ismail whom they regard as the Seventh imam rather than his younger brother Musa (797) recognized by the twelvers. Their main body is led by Aga Khan\* or his successor, who is the spiritual (spiritual) or temporal head. Another branch of Ismailis belong the Karmatians, and the Fatimids of Egypt, the assassins and the Druze.

Another Sect called Zaidites are the followers of Zaid, grandson of Hussain. They hold that the Caliphate (immamate) belongs to Ali and Fatima but they accept Abubakar and Omar as being justified by circumstances.

Ahmadiya Sect was founded at the turn of the 20th century in India by Mirza Gulam Ahmad. In 1879, he began to claim that he was the promised messiah, in the village at Qadian in Punjab, India over the general muslim belief. They believe that Jesus was not actually crucified but was able to escape to Kashmir and died in Shinagar. He also claimed to be manifestation of (Buruz) Mohammad, the Prophet of Islam or the incarnation of Krishna of the Hindus. He interpreted the doctrine of Jihad as being an exclusive pacific struggle "by the pen, not by the sword," thereby criticizing orthodox Muslims and Christian crusaders.

In 1912, the Ahmadiya Sect, after the death, of its first Kalifa, was split into two. The main body Qadrians who recognized Bashiruddin, son of the founder, as the second Kalifa. The second party called Lahore Ahmadiya rejected the doctrine of Gulam's prophethood as well as his son and moved closer to the orthodoxy. The latter followed the Christian way of propagation in Europe, Africa and America.

Among the Muslims in the Philippines, most of them claim to belong to main body of orthodox Islam- the Sunnis. But practices are evident that a good number of them follow the Shites as in pilgrimage by proxy; Ismailis like the weighing of one in baptism or (dua<sup>a</sup>) prayer of Kwary or beliefs in

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\* probable word

Saints. Actually Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu like those of India, Malaysia or Indonesia see no drawn sectarian lines as they are evident in christianity. The reason for all these is the common belief in the basic tenet of Islam as to allow all of them to pray in the same mosque, anywhere in the world . . ."

## CHAPTER 4

## FROM SULTANATE TO DEMOCRACY

Muslim political condition represents a conflict between the old and new systems in Muslim land. The sultanate or datanship is based on Islam whose civil and religious aspects have given added vigor to Pre-Islamic ways of life. The sultanate resisted the intrusion of democratic ideals which eventually, though gradually, dominated at some cost. And it is this political conflict which is at the core of the so-called Moro problem.<sup>26</sup>

A brief glance into history should enable the reader to study the problem in wider perspective.

Mindanao Sultanate<sup>27</sup>

During the Pre-Islamic Era, Mindanao did not have Sultans. Social institutions were simple. The family which has been the basic unity of society was enhanced by religious solidarity and worship of common ancestors. However, the growing complexities of tribal life was to call for the "Datu or "Raja" as chieftain in the light of Indo-Malay influence.

The Sultanate was founded in Mindanao by Shariff Muhammad Kabungsuwan and during a time when Mindanao was in a primitive state of animism and superstitions. Shariff Kabungsuwan was the son of Shariff Ali Jainal Abidin, a descendant of Prophet Muhammad who emigrated from Hadramaut, Southern Arabia to Johore, Malay Peninsula. The Sultan of Johore was a Muslim called Iskandar Thul-Karanayin. The Arabic word "Shariff" (meaning noble) is a title which is

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<sup>26</sup>Isidro, op. cit., p. 50.

<sup>27</sup>Rasul, op. cit., pp. 67-76.

universally given to the descendants of Prophet Muhammad. According to Najeeb Saleeby, the full title is "Sayed Shariff" meaning "master, "noble". "Sayed" is generally used by the Arabs although the Philippine Muslims have adopted the name "Shariff". Shariff Ali Jainal Abidin married Jusul Asiqin, the daughter of the Sultan of Johore, who bore him three children: Ahmad, Alawi, and Kabungsuan. The word was adopted by Philippine Muslims with the same meaning. Authorities concur that the oldest, Ahmad, founded the Sultanate of Brunei; the second, Alawi, founded the Sultanate of Sulu, and the youngest, Kabungsuan founded the Sultanate of Mindanao.

Kabungsuan established in Maguindanao and received the submission of many chiefs - all of whom he converted to Islam. He took as his first wife Sarabanun, the daughter of Shariff Maraja with whom he had no child. With Putri Tunina, his second wife, he had three daughters, one of whom (Purri Manur) married the first Muslim datu of Buwayan, Malangsa-Ingud. At Malabang, Kabungsuan married for the third time Angintabu, the daughter of the chief of that place. It was she who bore him the son who was to succeed him - Shariff Maka-Alang.

There have been countless Sultanates in Mindanao but the large majority of them are small and have never been fully numbered and described. They generally represent small divisions of territory and sub-divisions of tribes. Two large distinct groups existed however, the Maguindanao and the Ilanon. The main Sultanates in the order of its importance are the Sultanate of Maguindanao, the Sultanate of Buwayan and the Sultanate of Kabuntalan or Bagumbayan.

It was not until the year 1500 that Shariff Kabungsuan was able to establish the Maguindanao Sultanate where the form of government was somewhat based on a feudal system with some semblance of a Sultanate. Similar to the Rhuma

Bechara of Sulu, the Maguindanao Sultanate has a Raja Muda or a crown prince; Raja Laut or Secretary of Navy; six ministers or mantiris and Kanakan or Suttan vassals with real estate.

When Kabungsuan died sometime in the year 1520, he was succeeded by his son, Shariff Mohammad Maka-Alang who married a Bilan woman, related to Parasab, a Bilan chief. Maka-Alang was, in turn, succeeded by his son, Bangkaya some thirty years later.

Little have been recorded about the reign of Sultan Bangkaya of Maguindanao but some of the information disclose him as having had three wives, daughters of the chiefs of Slangan, Maguindanao and Matamply, each of whom gave him a son. His sons, Dimasangkay, Gugan Sarikula and Kapitan Lawut Buisan all became Sultans and succeeded him in ruling Maguindanao.

Kapitan Lawut Buisan distinguished himself more than his brother-predecessors and was considered the most powerful enemy of Spain encountered in Mindanao in her first effort to reduce the Morolandia. It was during his reign that Mindanao was first attacked by the Spaniards.

About the year 1602, Sultan Buisan died and was succeeded by his son Sultan Dipatwan Qudrat, the corralat of Combes. The word "Dipatwan" is Malay in origin and means "master" or "sir". The word "Qudrat" is Arabic and means "power". Sultan Qudrat overshadowed his father, Sultan Buisan and ruled with a strong hand. Under his rule, Buwayan which has been an ally of Maguindanao became a part and parcel of Maguindanao Sultanate. The bloodiest battles of Mindanao were fought during the reign of Sultan Qudrat, a fearless fighter and a Muslim hero, in defense of Islamic faith and Philippine liberty.

Sultan Qudrat died about the year 1650 with his son Dundang Tidulay of whom little is known ascending the throne.

Sultan Dundang Tidulay had two sons, Sultan Mohammad Sa Barahaman and Sultan Moh. Kaharuddin Kuda. It was his elder son, Sultan Mohammad Sa Barahaman who succeeded him upon his death about 1670-75. After the death of Sultan Mohammad Sa Barahaman about 1690, his son, Jaafar Sidik Manamir was proclaimed Sultan. As Manamir was very young, his succession was contested by his uncle, Sultan Kaharuddin or Jamalul Ahlam Kuda. A civil war ensued which lasted for more than thirty years.

Sultan Manamir was finally killed by his nephew, Malinug, the son of his brother Dipatuan Answar. As Manamir was the rightful Sultan, he was called "Sahid Mupat" (meaning "died a martyr") on his assassination. Pakir Maulana and Pakaruddin, the son of Sahid Mupat or Sultan Manamir retired to Tamontaka. Conflagration destroyed and divided the Sultanate of Maguindanao. The great palace was burned and plundered. Meanwhile Sultan Answar died in Batwa and has since been called Mupat Batwa. Malinug, his son and assassin of Sultan Manamir assumed the Sultanate and kept up the fight. After a tedious, desultory war, Sultan Malinug or Sultan Moh. Tahiruddin fled to Pulangi then to Buwayan. Pakir Maulana then got possession of all the lands about Maguindanao and peace was thereafter re-established. Sultan Malinug then died about the year 1750. Pakir Maulana, Malinug's first cousin ascended the throne as Sultan Mohammad Kayruddin Hamja or Sultan Maulana Ameeruddin.

The Sultanate flourished during the reign of Pakir Maulana, but he abdicated in 1774 in favor of his brother, Sultan Moh. Pakaruddin, alias "Bulagas Almansa". But Pakaruddin was weaker than his brother and practically had very little control over the state affairs. In about 1789, he was succeeded by his nephew Kibad as Sultan Moh. Amirul Umra Alimuddin or Sultan Kibad Sahrial or Zakariya. Kibad possessed many of the good qualities of his father, Pakir Maulana and ruled with firmness and success. He maintained friendly

relations with Spain and signed a treaty with her in 1749 wherein he promised not to enter into any treaty or agreement with another foreign power.

Kawasa, son of Kibad succeeded his father upon the latter's death. He is often called Anwaruddin (lights of religion) or Amirul Umra (Prince of Princes). When he died, he left the Sultanate to Unting, the son of his nephew Raja Tua. Unting ascended the throne as Sultan Sakandar Qadrata-Ilah or Jamalul Ahlam about 1840. Qadrat II was the last Sultan who observed all the customs and rites of the Sultanate. He was young when he assumed power and his reign marked the beginning of the downfall of the Sultanate and the occupation by Spain of Rio Grande Valley. Sultan Mohammad Makakawa, the son of Intrunni, succeeded his grandfather Qadrat II. Makakawa was the last Sultan who lived in Cotabato. The Spaniards paid him a monthly salary of 80 pesos but kept him under complete control. In his days, modern Cotabato was built and in 1871, it was made the Capital of Mindanao. Makakawa died about 1883 and his son Pablu became Sultan as Sultan Mohammad Jalaluddin Pablu. He lived at Banabu, opposite Cotabato and was the last Sultan who received salary from the Spanish government. In 1888, Pablu died and the seat of the Sultanate remained vacant until 1896 when Mangigin became Sultan. Even after his assumption, Mindanao Sultanate was now broken into sub-sultans. The Spanish influence gradually crept in, to assert itself in the local administration. Successions to Sultanate were no longer by inheritance as was done before, in strict accord with royal traditions but by wealth, courage or influence, so much so that you can find Datus and Sultans almost everywhere in Mindanao, if you conform to the newly set standard. Though Sulu Sultanate maintained its royal lineage to the present in a more or less functionless title, it nevertheless was able to withstand weakness and innovations on royal inherited lineage unlike in Lanao, Cotabato, Zamboanga or Basilan.

The title of "Datu" in Mindanao, is now liken to a respectable but ordinary prefix "Mr." to one's name.

During the American regime, the Maguindanao people did not also give up easily. They resisted and fought to the bitter end. The first engagement of magnitude between the Maguindanaos and the Americans was the terrific battle of Bayang which found the 27th Infantry and the 25th mountain battery busy, costing many American lives. About 1,200 American soldiers entered Lake Lanao country under the command of Colonel Baldwin and the minor engagement in serious cotta or hand-to-hand fight in 1899. Four years afterwards, in 1903, fresh expeditions became necessary under General John J. Pershing. Cotta Bacolod was taken after 3 days, with 15 Americans killed and several others wounded. Cotta Calahun was the next target. The resistance of the Maguindanaos against the Americans in several battles convinced President Theodore Roosevelt of Pershing's valour when the latter, in an unprecedented manner, promoted Pershing from Captain to Brigadier-General. After 4 years of American administration, the Americans realized a separate form of government for Mindanao is advisable on account of its differences with the Visayas and Luzon, necessitating a different treatment or approach. Thus on June 1, 1903, the "Moro province" was created to provide civil government for the Maguindanaos, supplemented by military aid. This continued for a time. Even the Cedula Act of 1903 was never fully enforced for thirty years.

### Sulu Sultanate<sup>28</sup>

The Muslim State in Sulu did not start with the arrival of Raja Baguinda in 1390. It was Sayed-Al-Hashim Abubakar, known to western historians as Abubakar, who established a

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, pp. 77-105.

Sultanate after marrying Paramaisuli, Raja Baguinda's daughter. His title after his proclamation was Paduka Masahari Maulana Al-Sultan Sharif Al-Hashim. All succeeding Sultans claimed descent from him. The traditions about Abubakar reveals that he was born in Malacca. His father Jainal-Abidin came from Mecca who became a Sultan of Juhur or Malacca. From the annals of Malacca, Abubakar was a famous authority on Islamic law and religion. So that this proclamation as the first Sultan of Sulu heralds the beginning of the first organized government in the Philippines.

Abubakar, as Sultan, was the Supreme Head of the government - descendant of Prophet Muhammad. He divided Jolo into five administrative districts, namely: Parang, Pansul, Gitung, Lati and Luuk - Each "district" is governed by a Panglima. Under each Panglima or Pakasa is Maharaja or Ulangkaya and next to Ulangkaya is Paruka who is equivalent to present-day barrio captain. The Sultan is assisted by a council of elders known as Rhuma Bechara composed of leading royal datus, living in different places of the Archipelago.

The Rhuma Bechara literally means a House of Discussion or consultation. Usually, the members of the Rhuma Bechara, aside from performing the function of legislators or councilmen, are assigned specific cabinet duties. For example, we have Datu Raja Muda as crown prince; Datu Maharaja Adendah as Sultan's palace commander; Datu Ladja Laut as admiral; Datu Maharaja Layla - commissioner of customs; Datu Amir Bahar as speaker of Rhuma Bechara; Datu Tumangong, executive secretary; Datu Muluk Bandarasa as secretary of commerce; Datu Muluk Kahar as legislative secretary; Datu Juhan, as secretary of information; Datu Sawajaan, as secretary of interior; Datu Bandahala, secretary of finance; Mamaneha as inspector-general; Datu Sabandal, as Sultan's personal envoy

and Datu Nay as ordinance or weapon commander; and Wazil as prime minister. Every detail of the administration was thus looked after but nothing was decided without consultation.

During his reign, Abubakar brought about dramatic, social, political and cultural changes in Sulu. His main policy was to consolidate Sulu archipelago and widely propagate Islam as the religion of the state. Even his position as Sultan is supposed to derive its power from God, patterned after the Persian concept of the divine right of king. As a representative of the Divine on Earth, the Sultan is not only feared by the recalcitrants but also revered by the loyalists. With a farsightedness often wanting in rulers of later times, he perceived that the stability of the Sultanate and its material development depended upon the prosperity of the agricultural classes. All lands and plantations are supposed to belong to the Sultan and quarrels or land disputes that characterize the present-day administration in Mindanao and Sulu is entirely wanting. The Sultan derives his strength from his divine origin, from belief, subsequently known that he is the direct descendant of Prophet Muhammad and the absolute ruler of a kingdom. Shariff Al-Hashim, likewise, introduced trade, commerce with the outside world, astrology, navigation, home industries and education by importing Arab teachers. It was during his time that trade contact with Arabia, China and Malaysia was started. He established defense, taught the natives sports and even luxury and most of all, he gave the natives a nation and cultural identity of their own.

Although Abubakar was tolerant in his religious policy, there were privileges attached to the dominant Islamic faith as has always been the practice in other countries and among other communities which acted equally with conviction in

inducing a rapid abandonment of the old cults. The tendency of the rules and principles of Islam is towards democracy with a strong tinge of socialism. All men, rich and poor, are equal in the sight of Allah and the rulers are only his lieutenants to protect them from anarchy. The revenue of the Sultanate is not for the benefit or enrichment of the Sultan but for the good of the people. The poor tax or zakat was ordained from the rich for the relief of the poor and charity was embodied in the Islamic state policy based on the Qur'an. Mosques were established in almost all places under the charge of a panglima or pakasa. Imams, Hatibs and Bilals, the three religious groups were appointed by the Sultan. The Imam or in his absence the Hatib, leads the faithfuls in prayer. The Bilal usually is charged with a call to prayer. In some cases, religious learned men were given preferences by these Imams to lead the public or cathedral service and prayers and delivered the Friday Oration (Khutba) a religious sermon but oftentimes, during the early days of the Sultanate, as in most early governments in other places, the oration became political manifesto in order to encourage the faithful to give service, their lives for their Sultan or for the country or bangsa.

Sultan Hashim died in 1480 and was succeeded by his eldest son, Sultan Mohammad Kamaluddin. There was not much need of a judge during Sayed Abubakar's reign because he was so noted for his knowledge in Islamic law that he had no equal. But after the ascension of Kamaluddin, there was a clamor for the appointment of civil judges by the Sultan. As if following the pattern of Caliph Omar, the second disciple of Prophet Muhammad, Kamaluddin believed that justice is supposed to be administered by a Qadji or judge. The judge was named Hakin-ush-shara, meaning ruler through law, for law rules through the utterance of justice.

Thus, the Islamite administration, even in its infancy, proclaims in word and in deed the necessary separation between judicial and executive powers. The Sultan set the example by holding himself amenable to the order of a duly constituted judge. Subsequent events, however, will show a change of this policy to a stronger executive, the Sultan, demanded by the exigencies of war.

In 1505, Sultan Kamaluddin died and his eldest son, Datu Mohammad Deraja ascended the throne with the title of Sultan Amirul Umara. It was during this time that trade was conducted as far as the Visayas and Luzon. Travels made by the people of Sulu afford them to make contact with the Sultan of Maguindanao and Raja of Manila. Principalities of the Sultan of Sulu was established in Mindoro, Batangas and the Ilocos region. It is true that by this time, Islam has set fast in Jolo and in Tawi-Tawi and some parts of Mindanao and Palawan. The Sultanate having increased in jurisdiction, the need for money has likewise risen. It was during the reign of Sultan Amirul Umara that Basilan, Palawan, Mindoro, Mindanao, Borneo and Celebes, Visayas and Luzon were the frequent targets of trade. There were no piratical raids, though it is possible that isolated cases of robbery occurred as it is usual in modern governments today.

The Sultan's armed forces were comprised of tribal levies from Jolo, Tapul, and neighboring Islands and volunteers drawn chiefly from Tawi-Tawi, Basilan groups and portion of Jolo. They were at times paid from taxes derived by Datus, panglimas, or the Sultan's treasury. But later on, the Sultan's army was not paid. It was merely because of a belief that they were doing service for the Sultan and for themselves in paradise. For it is a religious belief among the Muslims that no death is more honorable than death in holy war, in defense of the

Islamic faith. The armed forces were composed, mostly of seamen; they were armed with shields, barong, kris, spears and firearms which were first introduced to Sulu by Raja Baguinda and imitated by the natives, by local manufacturing of the same. The great superiority of Muslim navy and army consists not in their salary for they had none of the modern soldier's privileges, but in their extreme mobility, their ability to adjust themselves in sea as well as in land. Their superiority more depends on their perseverance, their power of endurance, qualities which joined to enthusiasm made them invincible. They were always well-provisioned. The foot soldiers were clad in tight-fitting tunics descending below the knees, and shawars (trousers) like those used by Burmese or Thais. They marched to battle chanting verses from the Qur'an, usually "Allah o Akkbar" or "God is great" like the covenanters of Scotland or the protestants in the thirty years war.

It is significant to note that it was during the reign of Sultan Amirul Umara that Magellan was killed in Cebu in 1521 and that his remaining ships passed by Cagayan de Sulu, on their sail homeward. In 1527, after 22 years reign, Sultan Umara died and his son Datu Mohammad Upo ascended the throne with a title of Mizzul Mutawaddin. The new Sultan followed the policy of his father along the the lines of religion, trade, and conquests. It should be understandable that by this time, the Sultanate of Sulu has reached a point of strength and as in other lands in our history whenever a country becomes strong, the tendency was to expand in its territorial jurisdiction. Contacts with Java Sumatra, Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Celebes, Mindanao, Visayas, Luzon, Formosa and China were frequent and products in foreign lands were found almost everywhere

in the Muslim kingdoms of the Philippine South.

After a reign of 21 years, characterized with territorial gains, and domestic prosperity, mainly resulting from trades and home industry, Sultan Muizzul Mutawaddin died in 1548 and he was succeeded by his eldest son, Sultan Nasifuddin Awal Diguran, who followed the policy of his father, with more vigor. In the field of propagation of the faith, the Muslims of the Philippine South, competed with the Spaniard whose main concern by now was to christianize the natives. Parts of Luzon, Mindoro, Cebu, Leyte, Bohol, Lanao, Negros, Palawan and Panay were by this time under the Muslim rule. The trade with Spaniards were prohibited by the Muslims.

The reign of Sultan Nasifuddin Awal Diguran came to a tragic end about 1570. He was succeeded by his eldest son Muhammad Halim Pangran Buddiman. For 19 years, Sultan Buddiman followed the policy of his father in matters of religious propagation and territorial acquisition. He finally died in 1585 leaving to his son, Batarasa Shah<sup>o</sup> Tangah the throne. His cousin, Datu Abda Saelan (Abdul Salim) who was appointed by Sultan Pangiran Buddiman to rule over Basilan raised a revolt. The latter's bravery and munificence greatly influenced the people of Sulu who flocked to his help and even took an oath of fealty to him. His strength grew and Sultan Tangah felt insecure and wanted to prevent his cousin from overpowering him. Tangah then left for Manila to seek Governor Sande's aid. Upon his return to Sulu, he was accompanied by two Spanish ships. Datu Abdasaelan, being already strong and secured, gave battle. In the ensuing fight, Sultan Tangah was killed. Datu Abdasaelan, however, fled, after the destruction of his forts mainly caused by the

Spaniards. Upon the death of Sultan Tengah, his son succeeded him, under the title of Sultan Mawalil Wasit, Raja Bungsu, in 1600.

It is significant to note that during the reign of Batarasa Shah Tengah in 1587, Sultan Pangiran's attempts at alliance between Brunei, Sulu and Maguin-danao with the disgruntled Muslim aristocracy of Manila and Tondo, already under Spanish Rule to dislodge the Spaniards from the Philippines were evident. Call for help was sent to Java and Malaya. In Manila, Magat Salamat, son-in-law of the Sultan of Brunei led a revolt against the Spaniards. This revolt, however, fizzled out because it was nipped in the bud and being the son of Lakandula or the cousin of Raja Soliman added significance to the resistance of the Philippine Muslims against Spanish colonialism. It must be recalled that the father of Magat was the same Lakandula, who was the Raja Matanda of Manila allegedly cooperative with the Spaniards. As opposed to Raja Soliman, who perished in a naval battle with his followers, Magat must have realized and acted upon the promised aid from Mindanao, Sulu, and Brunei which never came.

The reign of Sultan Mawalil Wasit (Raja Bungsu) of Sulu in 1600 marks the beginning of bloodiest and the longest war ever pursued by any group of people in the Philippines. For a period of 40 years, he steered the Muslim State against Spain, then known as the leading world power. Sultan Mawalil Wasit's breath of views and large outlook required of a statesman, coupled with his soldiering qualities as a sovereign brought conflicting elements into harmony. It was during his reign that Sulu Sultanate has reached the zenith of influence. As

disclosed in certain phases of Parang Sabil, the Sultana-  
nate at this time included Celebes (Sulwasi, Indonesia)  
with Makasar as the seat of local government; Kalimantan,  
(Indonesian Borneo) with Balikpapan and Tarakan as the  
center of local government; Sabah (formerly North  
British Borneo) with Sandakan and Marudu as the seat  
of local government; Palawan, to oversee the Muslim  
principalities in the Visayas and Luzon and Basilan to  
oversee Mindanao and Sulu, with Jolo as the overall  
central government. While the rest of the Christianized  
Indios were already starting to be called Filipinos, in  
honor of King Philip of Spain, such name was a complete  
anathema to the culture and independence of the Muslim  
region.

The yearly expeditions during the administration  
of Governor Sande, particularly those led by Captain  
Figueroa and Ronquillo, brought untold suffering to the  
Muslims. This could be considered as the first foreign  
organized European aggression in the Philippines because  
although Portuguese and Dutch ships made some attempts  
even before the coming of the First Adelantado, Miguel  
Lopez de Legaspi, they were only isolated cases. The  
Filipino Muslims were the ones who put up this resistance,  
not to mention, Raja Soliman, Raja Lakandula, Raja Humabon,  
Lapu-lapu, Sikatuna and Sigala who all appeared Muslim  
oriented. But the most significant aspect of this  
aggression was the aid from Visayas and Luzon, especially  
Pampanga. These early Spanish expeditions against Muslims  
aroused in the latter a great desire for revenge.

Sultan Mawalil Wasit died in 1639 and his son  
ascended the throne under the title Nasiruddin Ahir. His  
short reign of 12 years appears to have been replete with  
the consequent misfortunes he inherited from his predecessors.

Emisaries sent by Sultan Mawalil Wasit to Jolo resulted in the arrival of the Dutch vessels in Sulu during the reign of Sultan Nasiruddin in 1644. These Dutch vessels managed to incite the Muslims of Sulu to fight and drive away the Spaniards from the shore of Jolo. It must be remembered that all this time, there was a threatened attack from China and rival influence of Holland. With these considerations in the context of geopolitics, the Spanish administration managed to enter into a treaty with Sultan Nasiruddin Ahir, substantially designed to form an alliance with the Muslim of Sulu against foreign enemies, perhaps against the Dutch. Spain by this treaty, recognized the authority of the Sultan of Sulu from Tawi-Tawi down to Jolo. Hence, pursuant to this agreement, on April 14, 1646, the Spanish troops in Jolo withdrew and evacuated the town. After a relative early reign of Sultan Nasiruddin Ahir, the supremacy of Sulu was again reestablished in Sulu and rehabilitation and reconstruction of men and materials followed, not to mention the spirit of the age. So that towards the end of his reign, Sultan Nasiruddin was well firm in his throne throughout the entire sphere of his influence. In 1652, he died and his son, popularly known to the Spaniards as Datu Baktial ascended the throne with the title of Sultan Salahuddin Karamat. During his reign, the Muslim fighters became active again. The Muslim fleets were sent to several directions from Zamboanga to Visayan Islands and Luzon. The nearness of Zamboanga to Sulu, subject the former to incessant attacks without aid from the central Spanish government. It is to be remembered that at this time, there was a threatened invasion of the Chinese from the North and of the war with Holland. Hence, the Spanish government decided to abandon Zamboanga and Moluccas. The territorial recapture of lost jurisdictions on the part of Sulu, became evident. Even the power of the Sultan as far as North Borneo was still held questionable. And Spain's

political power waned. In 1668, after a reign of 16 years, Sultan Karamat died. He was succeeded by Sultan Sahibuddin or Sahabuddin, his eldest son who reigned for 12 years. As under previous Sultans, the ruling Sultan almost invariably, nominated his successor in his lifetime. When the nomination had been made, the chief datus of the Sultanate, most of whom are members of the Rhuma Bechara including powerful panglimas and maharajas were called upon to take oath of allegiance to the heir-designate named Raja Muda. This was called the biat or fealty, perhaps patterned after the system of Caliphate of the early Saracenic days in the Middle East. The person taking oath placed his hands in those of the crown prince and swore that he would be loyal and faithful. To impart greater validity to the Sultan's title, the biat was renewed upon the demise of the reigning sovereign. This was the procedure adopted. But whereas in previous Sultan's succession, the eldest son of the incumbent is usually made the crown prince, Sultan Sahabuddin nominated his brother Mustafa Safiuddin as Raja Muda, thereby breaking the precedent practised by previous Sultans.

Sultan Sahabuddin's object was the consolidation of his Sultanate. This is due to the rising power of the Dutch in Borneo and Celebes. To attain this end, aggressive enterprises and foreign conquests were abandoned. In 1680, Sultan Sahabuddin died and his brother, Raja Muda, ascended the throne with the title of Sultan Mustafa Safiuddin. Following the policy of his predecessor, he nominated his younger brother, Datu Badaruddin as his heir-apparent or Raja Muda. For 16 years, Sultan Mustafa Safiuddin ruled Sulu. His reign was relatively peaceful and emphasis was more on domestic improvement,

though it could not disregard isolated cases of mañgangayaw or piracy, common even in many modern governments.

During the reign of Sultan Mustafa Safiuddin, social and cultural progress was almost everywhere. But it was in 1672, at the time of the reign of his brother, Sultan Sahabuddin, that the latter received a call for help from Sultan Muhaiddin of Brunei in a civil war with his first cousin Abdul Mobin for control of Brunei Sultanate. Sultan Sahabuddin dispatched his men and made Sultan Muhaiddin secure in his throne by defeating Abdul Mobin. North Borneo was ceded to Sulu Sultanate during the reign of Sultan Sahabuddin in 1672. This cession was not in writing, though succeeding Brunei Sultans recognized this cession. Sultan Mustafa Safiuddin was the first Sultan of Sulu to enjoy the Obeisance of Borneans since the death of his brother, Sultan Sahabuddin in 1680. In 1700 Sultan Mustafa Safiuddin died and he was succeeded by his Raja Muda, his younger brother, with the title of Sultan Badaruddin I. For 19 years, his reign was fruitful in commerce. It was, however, during his time that dynastic rivalry was evident between Sulu and Maguindanao because Sulu wanted dominion over Cotabato and Zamboanga about 1710. On account of advanced age at the time of his ascension, he was wanting in "energy and enthusiasm." Even the religious education of the masses was left entirely to the religious class. After 19 years of reign, Sultan Badaruddin I died in 1720. He was succeeded by his eldest son, with the title of Sultan Nasiruddin II. Following the practice of Sultan Sahabuddin, who broke the precedent of nominating a son as heir-apparent, Sultan Nasiruddin, nominated his brother, Datu Alimuddin, as his Raja Muda. From 1720 to 1740 covering a period of 20 years, his reign was turbulent and many war-like panglimas were clustering around his throne. His younger cousin, Datu

Bantilan was fiery and deeply prejudiced against Non-Muslims. In most of the raids conducted at this time, he often personally led, with or without the consent of the Sultan.

Sultan Nasiruddin died in 1740 and his brother, Raja Muda ascended the throne, with the title of Sultan Alimuddin I or Amiril Mu-Minin.

Sultan Alimuddin I was the most known sovereign of Sulu. He found the kingdom almost in a chaos, torn by many factions, a prey to anarchy and exposed to continued raids on the part of the Spaniards and the Christian natives. In spite of innumerable obstacles, he made the Sultanate greater and stronger than ever before. He was a man of peace and a reformer. Being a religious man, he suppressed outlawry during his reign. The organization he established for this purpose was so efficient that strangers or traders could travel in the most inaccessible tracts without the least fear of molestation or danger.

Unfortunately, his position was coveted by his cousin, Datu Bantilan, son of Sultan Sahabuddin. It is to be noted that being the son of Sultan Sahabuddin, Bantilan was entitled to succeed his father upon the latter's death, yet his father nominated his uncle, Sultan Safiuddin who in turn also nominated the latter's brother Badaruddin I, Bantilan's uncle.

Bantilan attempted to assassinate Sultan Alimuddin I, and was able to proclaim himself Sultan with the title of Sultan Muizuddin II after Alimuddin's departure for Zamboanga.

The Spaniards, aiming at the conversion of the Muslims through Alimuddin, sympathized with him. He was finally "converted" at Paniki, Tarlac on April 29, 1750 and given the name of Ferdinand. Several Spanish writers referred to

him as "Don Fernando" de Alimuddin I, Catholic Sultan of Jolo.

Before leaving Zamboanga for Jolo, Alimuddin sent a letter to the Sultan of Maguindanao, Sultan Maulana Moh. Ameruddin, which substantially gave evidence that he did not take to heart his baptism or "conversion" to the Catholic faith. When Governor Zacarias of Zamboanga discovered this, the Sultan and his party were returned to Manila and imprisoned until 1763 when the English after their conquest and occupation of Manila reinstated him on the throne of Sulu. This was after an absence of 14 years. Bantilan was thus forced to withdraw from Jolo and move into the interior, Kuta Subang, Parang. In the later days of his reign, Alimuddin I was addressed Amiril Mu<sup>3</sup>Minin or prince of the faithful. In November 1773, two years before his death, he abdicated his throne in favor of his son Isirail. This is the first and only abdication in the history of Sulu Sultanate.

Sultan Isirail I followed the policy which characterized his father's government. His succession was, however, contested by his second cousin, Alimuddin II, who was the son of Bantilan. Muizuddin believed that Alimuddin I was no longer a Sultan after the Spaniards baptized him and, therefore, Isirail, for like reasons, could not also ascend the throne. The people were not unanimous in the choice of the Sultan.

It was during his time that the English were eyeing Sulu. The English wanted to be allowed to move their factory from Balambagan, Borneo to Tandu Dayang near Jolo. On the other hand, King Carlos III of Spain sent greetings of friendship and wanted an alliance to be formed between Sulu and Spain. The Spaniards promised to help the Sultan to

organize his navy and army and wanted an agreement to open the ports of Sulu for them. In 1775, majority of the leading datus headed by Alimuddin II favored the alliance with England against Spain. However, Sultan Isirail was in favor of an alliance with Spain. Accordingly, he sent forces to Balambagan under his royal Datu Teting and destroyed the English garrison there in 1775 with the assistance of other natives of that place. This, however, angered some Sulu Datus and, consequently, Sultan Isirail was poisoned in 1776. The reign of Sultan Isirail was only a short five-year period. Alimuddin II, son of Bantilan ascended the throne and for eleven years saw hostilities between Sulu and the Spaniards. Communications between Luzon and Sulu were cut. Raids and conflicts were numerous.

In 1787, Sultan Alimuddin II died and it is said that he was also poisoned by the brother of Sultan Isirail I whom he poisoned. Sarapuddin, son of Alimuddin I, and younger brother of Sultan Isirail I, took over the throne. He died in 1797 and was succeeded by his nephew Sultan Aggimuddin Salih I, the son of Sultan Isirail I. Sultan Aggimuddin's reign, however, was short-lived because on the second year since his ascension to the throne, he was poisoned by his cousin, Sultan Alimuddin III, the son of Sultan Sarapuddin. It should be noted that at the death of Sultan Sarapuddin, Alimuddin III was only a minor and did not succeed his father. His cousin, Aggimudin Salih, being mature, was favored by the leading datus. The reign of Alimuddin III was only for five years covering a period of 1799 to 1804. He was succeeded by his brother, Sultan Isirail II, who was later on poisoned the following year in 1805 by Sultan Aliuddin who succeeded him. The short reigns of Aggimuddin Salih, Alimuddin II, Isirail II and Aliuddin were characterized by internal troubles arising out of royal successions. It is to be noted that in the

first nine Sultans of Sulu, the eldest son always succeeded to the throne. Sanguinary domestic war started when a nephew or brother succeeded either because the eldest son was still a minor or the brother or nephew succeeding was so powerful that he met the favor of the leading or principal datus. Upon the death of Sultan Aliuddin, his son Sakirullah ascended the throne in 1808. He is described as a very honorable, pious man who was very sensitive to human sufferings. For a period of 15 years, Sultan Sakirullah laid emphasis on religious education. In 1823, he died and his uncle, brother of his father, succeeded him as Sultan Jamalul Kiram I. The assumption of Sultan Jamalul Kiram I in 1823 established the House of Kiram that is of far-reaching historical significance. Upon the death of Kiram in 1842, his son, Datu Pugbal ascended the throne with the title of Sultan Muhammad Pulalon.

The twenty years reign of Sultan Muhammad Pulalon (1842-1862) marks the decline of the Muslim power. While it is true that Sultan Pulalon's reign was still independent and strong, it was during the later part of his reign that steam vessels and firearms were introduced to the Spanish administration that impressed the beginning of the decline of the power of the Sultanate. In 1862, Sultan Pulalon died and his son, Sultan Jamalul Ahlam ascended the throne, marking the beginning of a protectorate form of government. His reign covers 19 years (1862-1881).

On April 8, 1881, Sultan Jamalul Ahlam died, leaving two sons: Badaruddin and Amirul Kiram. Badaruddin was elected Sultan by a council of datus to succeed Jamalul Ahlam. He died on February 22, 1884. His death has been described as bringing dissections to the Muslims and

vexation to the Spaniards because of the interest of two Houses: the House of Sultan Sakirullah, represented by Datu Aliuddin; and the House of Sultan Jamalul or Kiram I, represented by Amirul Kiram. It will be recalled that Datu Aliuddin was the grand-nephew of Sultan Sakirullah and his father, Datu Isirail could have succeeded Datu Sakirullah. But Jamalul Kiram, Sakirullah's uncle, succeeded instead, because of the traditional arrangement for the Maimbung groups to interchange with the Patikul group in matters of succession to the throne. In fact, when Sultan Jamalul Ahlam went to Mecca in 1882, Datu Aliuddin took over the reign of government. This claim is reasonable. On the other hand, Amirul Kiram's claim could be taken from the argument made by his mother, Pangian Inchi Jamila, the widow of Sultan Jamalul Ahlam. Pangian Inchi Jamila is likewise called Pangian Darao or Pangian Sayah because her mother was a Spanish girl captured by the Muslim Datus. She was very attractive. She maintained that it is the right of the reigning Sultan to nominate his successor and Sultan Jamalul Ahlam wanted her son to succeed upon his death but due to his minority, his brother Sultan Badaruddin succeeded. The nearest heir therefore was her son, Amirul Kiram.

Governor Parrado tried to overcome the conflict by suggesting that Amirul Kiram be elected Sultan but Aliuddin should act as regent. This proposal was acceptable to Amirul Kiram but Datu Aliuddin rejected on the ground that Amirul Kiram was only 16 years old, having been born only March 27, 1868. A civil war ensued. The Maimbung Forces greatly outnumbered and defeated their adversaries. Datu Aliuddin was forced to escape to Basilan, and lived for a while with Sarif Agil; then he went to Pandami, Siasi, and later on returned to Patikul where he

died. After the victory of Amirul Kiram over Datu Alimuddin, Datu Harun entertained a right to succession on the ground that his lineage comes from Alimuddin I because his grandfather was Datu Jaafar who is the grandson of Datu Putong, the brother of Sultan Isirail I and Sultan Sarapuddin. Datu Putong was the only son of Alimuddin I who did not become a Sultan. But it must be recalled that Datu Harun's lineage to Alimuddin can be traced to a woman, Pangian Bandung, the mother of Datu Jaafar and the first cousin of Alimuddin III, who was the father of Jamalul Kiram I from whom he traced direct lineage. Hence, the people of Sulu did not pay much attention to his secret claim.

Nevertheless, directions were received from Madrid and Manila that Amirul Kiram be installed Sultan and Datu Harun be installed sub-Sultan. Amirul Kiram cannot reconcile himself submitting to the jurisdiction of Madrid and Manila, in his succession to the Sultanate because by this time, Amirul Kiram was already proclaimed and recognized by the people of Sulu; hence, he refused to go to Manila but Datu Harun, who secretly wanted to become Sultan applied tact to Pangian Inchi Jamila, the mother of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II that he be authorized to go to Manila, in behalf of the Sultan. Unsuspectingly, she accepted the proposal and Datu Harun, as expected obeyed the royal directions from Manila.

He went to Manila with a recommendation from Governor Arolas, the Spanish Governor of Sulu at that time, that he be made Sultan. Consequently, on September 24, 1886, Datu Harun was proclaimed Sultan of Sulu. He took Sheik Mustafa as his prime minister while Hadji Butu continued to serve the Sultan's prime minister from the time of Sultan Jamalul Ahlam to Sultan Badaruddin and Sultan

Jamalul Kiram II. Sultan Harun arrived in October 1886. Governor Arolas was in favor of Sultan Harun. His expedition to coerce Panglima Sayadi was to no avail. To force the people to accept Sultan Harun, he supported the largest expeditions ever conducted which, however, failed. The people of Sulu considered Sultan Jamalul Kiram II as their Sultan and Sultan Harun as Spanish Sultan. The succeeding Spanish Governors of Sulu saw in Sultan Harun a weak man unsupported by the great bulk of the people. Sultan Harun was thus exiled to Palawan, accompanied by Hadji Butu. In 1894, the Spaniards recognized Sultan Jamalul Kiram II.

### The Beginnings of Democracy<sup>29</sup>

On May 19, 1899, Spain's partial rule over the Muslim region of Mindanao and Sulu ended. This was after the defeat of the Spanish fleet by the Americans in the Battle of Manila Bay. On August 20, 1899, an agreement by General Bates and Sultan Jamalul Kiram II recognized the partial sovereignty of the United States. On June 1, 1903, the American Administration created the so-called "moro province" for the Muslims, with General Leonard Wood appointed as first Governor of the Moro Province. His rule was marked by strong oppositions from datu who refused to recognize American authority. It was during the incumbency of General Wood in November, 1903 that the refusal of Imam Panglima Hassan of Luuk erupted with 4,000 armed krismen. It was also during the rule of Governor Wood that the famous battle of Bud (Mt.) Daho\* occurred (March 5, 1905). This battle is one of the

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid, pp. 106-111.

\* Bud Daho is a lava cone of an extinct volcano, with an altitude of 2,000 ft. in Patikul, Sulu.

most significant American-Moro battles.

In the middle of 1907, a year after the battle of Bud Daho, another historical figure in Sulu by the name of Jikiri appeared to contest American authority.

Another battle that stands out in the history of American colonization was the battle of Bud Bagsak in 1913. In this battle, John Pershing, another American military genius who succeeded General Bliss and who later made history in the first world war was involved. Out of about 700 Muslims, 300 were massacred; only 14 American soldiers were killed with several wounded. General Pershing was a warrior like General Wood but unlike the latter, he did not interfere with the personal affairs of the Moros. General Wood was racially prejudiced, and went as far as working for the divorce of the late Congressman Hadji Gulamu Rasul with his widow, Alma Stewart Rasul, an American. General Wood failed in his efforts. The resistance to American authority, however, continued. Among the last Muslim leaders to die or to resist fighting for their freedom were Saipul, Punглу, and Sahibuddin and Maharaja Untung, all in the year 1914 and Datu Tahil in Bud Langkwasan in 1927.

In 1913, however, the Department of Mindanao and Sulu was created, supplementing the old "moro province", by virtue of an Act of Philippine Commission on December 16, 1913. Peace-loving Frank W. Carpenter became first civil governor, replacing General John J. Pershing. He brought along with him his long experience in public administration. His policy of attraction soon won the heart of many prominent Muslims. His personal affability and able administration within a few years accomplished

what the Toledo blade of Spain and the gutting guns of America had failed to achieve many years of warfare. The so-called Carpenter's agreement of March 22, 1915 sealed America's objective. For the first time in the history of Sulu, the Sultan knowingly surrenders its temporal sovereignty to the American flag. The date of March 22, 1915, is significant because it marks the beginning of the formation of a truly Filipino nation including the Muslims.

In February, 1920, realizing the improvement of peace and order condition, the Department of Mindanao and Sulu was abolished and its administration was placed under the Bureau of non-Christian tribes. Governor Carpenter was its first Director. He was succeeded by Teofisto Guingona and Jose G. San Victoria. Shortly after the establishment of the Commonwealth, the Office of the Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu replaced the Bureau of non-Christian tribes. This office was abolished when the same was converted as a Division of Mindanao and Sulu, under the defunct Department of Interior. When the latter department was abolished, its function was transferred to the office of local government, Malacañang until the creation of the Commission on National Integration, by virtue of Republic Act No. 1888 dated June 22, 1957, previously intended to effectuate in a more rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the Non-Christian Filipinos.

The reign of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II is the longest in Sulu History because it covers a period of 52 years. More than its length, however, is the significance attached to its administration including three regimes, Spanish, American and the Philippine Commonwealth. Next to the reign of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II was that of Sultan Mawalil Wasit

or Raja Bungsu (1595-1640) covering a period of 40 years. Mawalil Wasit was widely known as the most Romantic Sultan of Sulu. The third lengthy reign belongs to the famous Sultan Alimuddin I, covering a period of 36 years honored by both Christians who claimed him as the Ferdinand II, Catholic Sultan of Sulu and by the Muslims who called him Amirul Mu'minin or Commander of the Faithful. He appears to be the most liberal and the most peaceful Sultan of Sulu.

The succession to the Sultanate was nomination by the reigning Sultan, accepted by the council of elders or Rhuma Bechara. The first nine sultans of Sulu from Sultan Sariful Hashim to Sultan Nasiruddin Ahir II covering a period of two centuries from 1450-1652, the eldest son always succeeded. From the 10th Sultan to the 29th, under Sultan Jamalul Kiram II in 1936 in some cases, brother, cousin, nephew, or uncle succeeded. Six brothers who succeeded to the throne of Sulu were: (1) Sultan Salahuddin Karamat (1652-1668), who succeeded Sultan Nasiruddin I (1640-1652); (2) Sultan Mustafa Safiuddin (1680-1696), who succeeded Sultan Sahabuddin (1668-1680); (3) Sultan Badaruddin I (1696-1715), who succeeded Sultan Safiuddin (1680-1700), (4) Sultan Alimuddin I (1735-1777), who succeeded Sultan Nasiruddin (1715-1735); (5) Sultan Isirail II (1804-1805), who succeeded Sultan Alimuddin III (1799-1804); (6) Sultan Jamalul Kiram II (1884-1936), who succeeded his brother, Sultan Badaruddin II (1881-1884). Four cousins who succeeded to the throne are: (1) Sultan Muizuddin II (Bantilan, 1774) who succeeded Sultan Alimuddin I, during his stay in Manila; (2) Sultan Alimuddin II (1776-1787), who succeeded his cousin Sultan Isirail I (1771-1787); (3) Sultan Sarafuddin (1787-1797), who succeeded Sultan Alimuddin II (1776-1787); (4) Sultan Alimuddin II (1799-1804) who succeeded Sultan Aggimuddin Salih (1797-1799). Two nephews who succeeded to the throne are: (1) Sultan Aggimuddin Salih (1797-1799), who succeeded his uncle Sultan Sarapuddin Isirail

II (1804-1805). It is, therefore, evident that out of 29 sultans, up to Sultan Jamalul Kiram II, in 1936, 17 were sons, six were brothers, 4 were cousins and 2 nephews and one uncle who ascended the throne of Sulu. The first Sultan of Sulu had started the preference to the eldest son. This was followed for a time but there was no definite rule which gave birth to individual ambitions to the detriment of the Sultanate, and in later times became the fruitful cause of dynastic wars and religious schism. Among Muslims in Sulu, perhaps prior to the Sultanate, the chieftancy of tribe was hereditary but elective; the principle of universal suffrage is recognized in its extremest forms and all the leading members of a tribe. The election is made on the basis of seniority among the surviving members of the deceased chieftain's family. With the establishment of the Sultanate, the reigning Sultan usually nominates and after his death, confirmed by the leading datus, usually members of the Rhuma Bechara. On account of the significance of the reign of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II, it is well to understand that the Sultanate was still legally recognized up to the Philippine Commonwealth. Sultan Hadji Jamalul Kiram's passing on June 7, 1936, brought about immediate dispute as to the succession and again brought the Rhuma Bechara into active function. It is the definite prerogative of the Rhuma Bechara under Sulu Law, to decide the succession to the Sultanate.

The legitimate candidate was Jamalul Kiram's brother, Paduka Datu Rajamuda Mawalil Wasit - long recognized heir-apparent. For some reasons, the Raja Muda was never proclaimed Sultan, primarily because a majority of the members of the Rhuma Bechara appeared to have opposed his succession. Furthermore, support for succession was divided between two other rival candidates - the late Dayang Dayang Hadji Piandao and Datu Tambuyong. As opinions were made clear that a woman

could not legally and historically head the Sultanate, this question was resolved by her marriage to Datu Ombra Amilbangsa who through the Dayang Dayang's influence with the Rhuma Bechara was finally elected Sultan and proclaimed to succeed to the throne, despite strong opposition of a considerable section of the legitimate members of the Rhuma Bechara. The oppositionists could do nothing significant but to proclaim also as they did proclaim Datu Tambuyong as Sultan Moh. Jainal Abirin. In an effort to resolve this dispute, an appeal was made to the late President Manuel Quezon as Head of the Philippine Commonwealth but the latter refused to take action on the alleged ground that the Sulu Sultanate had ended with the death of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II. President Quezon was prompted to entertain this idea because of the Sultan's acceptance of the Carpenter's agreement of 1915 and the benefits conferred under Acts 2722 and 3118. Unofficially, however, the claim of the Dayang Dayang Hadji Piandao and her consort Datu Ombra was supported by a majority of the Philippine officials in Sulu until the outbreak of the second world war in 1941. With the events of war and the death of the Dayang Dayang, it was clear that Sultan Muhammad Jainal Abirin (Datu Tambuyong) gained the support of a considerable majority of the Rhuma Bechara and the Sulu people themselves. However, the subsequent death of Sultan Jainal Abirin and the proclamation of Datu Esmail Kiram as Sultan of Sulu on December 30, 1950, has changed the picture. The Philippine claim to North Borneo (Sabah) has in fact convinced the Philippine government for the sake of national interest to recognize as in fact it recognized Sultan Esmail Kiram as Sultan of Sulu on September 12, 1962, with certain recognized privileges. The recent succession of the son of Sultan Jainal Abirin as Sultan Jamalul Abirin and Datu Yahcob as Sultan Alimuddin IV has not diminished the rights of Sultan Esmail Kiram as far as the Philippine government is concerned especially in her

dealing with Malaysia over Sabah. In all other matters, however, it is clear that the high sounding but functionless titles become important only in the light of history and Islamic cultures for the very subjects of Sultans, in the olden days now possess the education and the official power which can look down upon the right of the Sultanate of Yore, under a democratic system of government.

## CHAPTER 5

## MUSLIM SOCIETY AND CULTURE

Mindanao and neighboring provinces of Sulu and Palawan are collectively called the Minsupala region; their combined area of 11,625,000 hectares represents 39.1% of the country's total land area. Of the fourteen provinces in Minsupala, undivided Cotabato is the largest with an area of 2,297,000 hectares. Within the region are groups of islands in the Sulu Archipelago which extend over 200 miles. Among these are Jolo, Tawi-Tawi, Bongao, Sitangkai, Tandubas, and Sibutu which are only a few miles off North Borneo or Sabah.<sup>30</sup>

The Minsupala region has three types of climate: indistinct dry season in the East; short dry season in the West; and long dry season in Palawan. In Mindanao, the annual rainfall is 60 inches, and the average temperature is between 79.30°F and 81.5°F. The lowest recorded temperature in the region is 53.06°F in Bukidnon while the highest is 100.76°F in Cotabato.

Lying between 8° to 12° latitude, the region is relatively free from typhoon except northern Agusan, eastern Surigao, and eastern Palawan. The vegetative cover of the Minsupala region is broken as follows: 35% commercial forest, 18% non-commercial forest, 9% brush land, 9% open land, 3% marshes, and 26% cultivated land.<sup>31</sup>

The pressure of population, especially in the northern portions of the country, has resulted in the influx of people into Mindanao. In 1960, migrants represented 23% of its total population: 2% were from the Ilocos, 42% from East Visayas, and 24% from West Visayas. To encourage migration, the government

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<sup>30</sup> Antonio Isidro, The Moro Problem: An Approach to Education (Marawi City: MSU University Research Center, 1968), p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> Antonio Isidro, Muslim-Christian Integration at the Mindanao State University, (Marawi City: MSU University Research Center, 1968), p. 95.

established in 1939 the National Land Settlement Administration which opened settlement projects, namely: Koronadal Valley and Allah Valley both in Cotabato and Malig Plains in Isabela — where 8,200 families were resettled at the cost of ₱11 million. In 1950, the Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) was created to introduce mechanized farming. This agency established several projects: in Bukidnon with 35,599 hectares; in Carmen with 7,255 hectares; in Columbio-Tulunan, Central Cotabato with 100,000 hectares; in Bongao-Balimbing, Sulu with 18,000 hectares; and in Sto. Tomas, Davao with 15,340.<sup>32</sup>

The population of Mindanao has increased over the past decades and this is attributed to two factors: the high rate of population increase and the influx of migrants from congested areas in Luzon and the Visayas.<sup>33</sup>

As of February 15, 1960, the total population of Mindanao was 5,384,000. This was about 20% of the 1960 national population and represented an increase of 83% from the reported Mindanao population in 1948. This may be compared to a 41% increase in the national population within the same period.

Table 1 contains the population and the implied population annual growth rates for the Mindanao provinces, based on the censuses of 1948 and 1960. Except for Sulu, Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur, the provinces in Mindanao have population growth rates higher than that of the whole Philippines. Davao, Cotabato, Agusan, Zamboanga del Sur and Lanao del Norte exhibit the highest growth rates.

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32 Ibid, p. 96.

33 Ibid

Table 1. Population and Population Growth Rates for Mindanao, by Province: 1948 and 1960

	Oct. 1, 1948 (thousands)	Feb. 15, 1960 (thousands)	Annual growth rate
<b>Southern and Western Mindanao</b>			
Cotabato	440	1,029	8.0
Davao	365	893	8.5
Zamboanga del Norte	168	281	4.8
Zamboanga del Sur	354	743	7.0
Sulu	241	327	2.8
<b>Northern and Eastern Mindanao</b>			
Agusan	126	271	7.2
Bukidnon	64	194	10.6
Lanao del Norte	132	270	6.8
Lanao del Sur	212	378	5.4
Misamis Occidental	208	249	1.7
Misamis Oriental	370	389	0.5
Surigao del Norte	143	195	2.9
Surigao del Sur	122	165	2.8
Mindanao	2,945	5,384	5.6
Philippines	19,234	27,088	3.2

Source: Bureau of the Census and Statistics.

Allowing for migration into the region, the Mindanao population is estimated to be 9,186,000 by 1970 and 11,377,000 by 1975. A more detailed projection of population in the Mindanao provinces for 1970-1975 is given in Table 2.

Table 2. Projected Population of Mindanao by Province: 1970-1975

	As of July 1st (Thousands)					
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Southern and Western Mindanao						
Cotabato	1,790	1,867	1,949	2,033	2,122	2,215
Davao	1,578	1,649	1,722	1,798	1,878	1,962
Zamboanga del Norte	448	466	485	505	526	547
Zamboanga del Sur	1,353	1,410	1,469	1,531	1,595	1,662
Sulu	476	493	512	531	550	571
Northern and Eastern Mindanao						
Agusan	475	498	522	548	575	603
Bukidnon	349	366	383	401	419	439
Lanao del Norte	477	503	531	560	590	622
Lanao del Sur	554	574	594	615	637	660
Misamis Occidental	356	368	380	392	405	419
Misamis Oriental	569	590	611	633	656	680
Surigao del Norte	288	299	311	323	336	349
Surigao del Sur	244	258	272	288	304	321
Mindanao	8,927	9,316	9,722	10,145	10,587	11,050

Source: Mindanao Development Authority.

The Muslim population in Mindanao is concentrated in three provinces in the region: there are the Tausugs, Samals and Badjaos in Sulu; the Maranaos in Lanao del Sur; and the Maguindanaos in Cotabato\*. Somewhat lower concentrations of Muslims are found in Zamboanga del Sur and Lanao del Norte. In Table 3, the population of Muslims in Mindanao is given for the years 1948 and 1960. It is interesting to note that the Muslim population ratios in the Mindanao provinces underwent only slight changes

\* Unless otherwise stated, "Cotabato" refers to the present (Northern) Cotabato and Southern Cotabato combined.

from 1948 to 1960. Small increases are recorded for Sulu and Misamis Oriental, and small decreases for the remaining provinces, with Davao registering a maximum decrease of 2.4 percentage points.

Table 3. Muslim Population in Mindanao by Province: 1948 and 1960

	1948		1960	
	Number	Percentage of Population	Number	Percentage of Population
<b>Southern and Western Mindanao</b>				
Cotabato	155,162	35.3	356,460	34.6
Davao	18,362	5.0	22,883	2.6
Zamboanga del Norte )	133,348 )	25.5	16,211	5.7
Zamboanga del Sur )			178,233	24.0
Sulu	226,883	94.2	310,926	95.1
<b>Northern and Eastern Mindanao</b>				
Agusan	373	0.3	151	-
Bukidnon	1,321	1.9	2,781	1.4
Lanao del Norte )	237,215 )	69.0	56,533	20.9
Lanao del Sur )			355,727	94.1
Misamis Occidental	415	0.2	133	-
Misamis Oriental	384	0.1	660	0.2
Surigao del Norte )	1,101 )	-	67	-
Surigao del Sur )			72	-
<b>Mindanao</b>	<b>774,474</b>	<b>26.3</b>	<b>1,300,837</b>	<b>24.2</b>

Note: Dash means less than 0.1%

Source: Bureau of the Census and Statistics.

As indicated in Table 4 below, of the total population in Mindanao in 1960, 63% were Roman Catholics, 24% were Muslims with the rest belonging to other minor denominations.

Table 4. Population of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan in 1960

	Total Population	Roman Catholic	Protestant	Aglipayan	Iglesia ni Kristo	Muslim	Buddhist
PHILIPPINES	27,087,685	22,686,096	785,399	1,414,431	270,104	1,317,475	39,631
% Distribution	100%	83.8%	2.9%	5.2%	1.0%	4.8%	0.2%
Agusan	271,010	243,573	8,041	12,145	2,625	151	79
Bukidnon	194,368	159,869	12,890	5,197	608	2,781	38
Cotabato	1,029,119	467,790	78,147	15,090	8,958	356,460	1,274
Davao	893,023	777,996	46,634	5,209	5,898	22,883	1,274
Lanao del Norte	270,603	198,210	5,298	5,732	1,596	56,533	138
Lanao del Sur	378,327	19,934	923	591	399	355,727	40
Misamis Occidental	248,371	168,029	11,589	61,218	1,864	133	53
Misamis Oriental	388,615	338,307	5,642	37,416	1,009	660	185
Palawan	162,669	116,493	10,292	712	909	12,776	68
Sulu	326,898	10,019	982	25	31	310,926	1,900
Surigao	359,997	304,255	7,653	42,321	1,607	139	164
Zamboanga del Norte	281,429	226,264	8,779	3,045	433	16,211	90
Zamboanga del Sur	742,404	490,175	33,156	8,949	4,234	178,233	1,106
Total Mindanao	5,546,833	3,520,914	230,026	197,650	20,171	1,313,613	6,429
% Distribution	100%	63.4%	4.2%	3.5%	0.4%	23.7%	0.1%

Source: Bureau of the Census & Statistics

## Social and Political Organization

The inhabitants of Muslim Mindanao have preserved the remnants of an ancient system called the Sultanate, Datuship, or Datu System.

Each clan is headed by a Datu to whom allegiance (and in some places even tribute) is paid. Muslim government centered in the Sultan as chief of state aided by a cabinet of ministers. One who held the office of Sultan either claimed to represent the Prophet Muhammad by virtue of being a descendant or he viewed his religious authority as emanating from the Caliph of Constantinople who was the spokesman for most of the Islam world.<sup>34</sup>

In former times the Sultan (or Rajah) stood at the top of the Muslim political pyramid and ruled over a number of villages or settlements. Below him was the panqlima, an administrative officer who governed over lesser officers and clan chiefs (datus). Around the Sultan were powerful noblemen who formed a kind of royal council (Rhuma Bechara). In promulgating laws, the Sultan depended on his kali, or chief religious adviser, who had general governance over the bintalas (district supervisors of priests) and the imams (Islamic priests or teachers). Indeed, in Sulu, law-making was largely the prerogative of the religious body headed by the kali.<sup>35</sup>

The rule of a Sultan was not just the rule of a man, it was the rule of a book as well – the Holy Qur'an. Philippine Islam, taking its cue from the Islam of Indonesia and other Malayan Muslims, adopted the Lawarn Code and the Shafi'ite School of Islamic law, based on the Qur'an, the Sunna (Sacred

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<sup>34</sup> Gowing, op. cit., p. 39

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, pp. 39-40.

Tradition) and the Ijima (precedental "mind of the community"). The local laws promulgated by the Sultan (assisted by his religious advisers) were added to this body of law and thus took on a religious cast. Obedience to them was obedience to Allah.<sup>36</sup>

The Concept of "Sultanate". The concept of "Sultanate" and other commonly used terms in the Muslim socio-political institutions do not often render strictly identical meanings among the different groups.<sup>37</sup>

The Sultanate had an overall territorial and political power, actual, and theoretical, upon Sulu Archipelago, Basilan, the southern tip of Palawan with the small neighboring islands, and North Borneo. The highest chief of state was the Sultan who assumed both civil and religious authorities which he exercised with the assistance of two kinds of advisers. The overall advisory state council was called the Rhuma Bechara normally composed of: 1) the Sultan as presiding officer; 2) datus who were royal, rich, and powerful; 3) prestigious sherifs or sharifs; 4) the raja-muda or heir-apparent; 5) the majaraja adinda or second heir-apparent; and 6) other respectable persons holding formal titles.<sup>38</sup>

Contrary to the stereotyped image of Sultans, the Sultan of Sulu - the patriarch of his domain - was not, according to tradition, an absolute monarch. In the performance of his office he was closely assisted in law-making and decision-making by the Rhuma Bechara, and in executive matters for the territories, by the panglimas (his representatives or "governor") whom he appointed

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid, p. 40.

<sup>37</sup> Isidro, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, pp. 25-26.

along with lesser officials in consultation with the state council. The government of the Sultanate was controlled by general order or authority based on the Holy Qur'an, the Shariah (Divine Law), and the adat or traditionally-handed customary law. These laws taken altogether, which regulated social relations, belied the myth of a "one-man-rule" often imputed to the Sultanate government. Vested however with relatively high power, the Sultan had the prerogative to appoint his subordinate officers, often after consultation with the Council.<sup>39</sup>

As a body, the Rhuma Bechara could vote to punish an island's inhabitants going against the Sultanate or declare war. New legislation or decision-making in the Council needed consultation with the kali (Arabic gadi) who was an expert on religious and civil laws appointed by the Sultan as an advisor to him and the Council. As in modern government there could be irregularities or corruptions in the management of public affairs in the Sultanate. A strong Sultan could dominate the Council or if the latter were strong the former could be a "rubber stamp". But generally, the law had an effective force for control.<sup>40</sup>

The panqlimas had territorial jurisdictions. In Jolo island, there were originally five panqlimas (from lima - five) whose number was gradually increased for all the outlying territories, including North Borneo where the "governor" was called datu bandahara. Below the panqlimas were other appointed officers of various ranks such as maharajas, nakiba, orangkayas (rich men), etc. In certain islands where Samal was the predominant population, the Sultan appointed Samal panqlimas although in some cases, Tausugs were appointed.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p. 26.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

<sup>41</sup> Ibid

Besides the kali, the other religious functionaries of the realm were the imams (mosque leaders) and the ulema or panditas (learned men) who were also consulted by the Sultan and the Council on spiritual matters. The Sultan was entitled to canonical fees and tributes collected for him by the panglimas and orangkayas in their respective jurisdictions; the two kinds of officers kept parts of such fees for their sustenance. The panglimas needed the cooperation of datus who as local chiefs had followers and slaves from whom they collect some kinds of tribute or tax.<sup>42</sup>

Datus were of various kinds; those who claim royal descent from the first founding Sultan; those who could inherit the rights to other titles besides Sultan; and those appointed by the Sultan in recognition of some personal qualities and achievements. Strong datus could disobey or refuse to pay tribute with impunity. But their kinship connections defined by tradition moderated the opposition to the Sultan.<sup>43</sup>

We have more or less a basis for comparison among different Muslim political institutions with regards to office occupancy. The Maranao and Maguindanao appear to have a "close system" whereby most titled-persons inherit their offices of power and prestige. On the other hand, the Sulu people had a more "open system" with regards to opportunities for social mobility and ascension to office, lower than that of the Sultan's office, to which persons of achievements could be appointed.<sup>44</sup>

It is noteworthy that there has been no sultanate, past or present, that has exercised overall control of the various Muslim groups although each group has similar political system.

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid, pp. 26-27.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 27.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid

According to pre-Islamic tradition Sulu was formerly composed of numerous small organized communities, each called a ban-wa - similar to Hilongo banua and Tagalog baranggay - which had their own island territories with chiefs and followers. They were relatively independent from each other despite the existence of inter-community alliances for trade and mutual protection. Obviously, the introduction of Islam and the Sultanate form of government gradually unified the ban-was into a "national" state governed by the Sultan, the Rhuma Bechara, and other officers.<sup>45</sup>

The past Spanish manarchial rule based on Christian ideological values attempted to replace this other type of monarchy in Sulu, hence came the rivalry between a crusader's invasion and a jihad defense. The belligerents were still stalemated at the coming of the American forces bringing another mission to supplant the Sultanate, not with monarchy but another in-coming force - "democracy". The Sulu Sultanate, like its counterparts in mainland Mindanao, was exposed to both "monarchical" and "democratic" invasions. Democratization is still the continuing process under the Philippine Republic wanting to accelerate integration. During over six decades of direct contact, many "generals" of the Sultanate have capitulated to become agents for the new social order which prescribes a new type of leaders and leadership for this developing nation.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid, p. 28.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid

In the minds of loyal traditional followers, the Sultanate of Sulu still exists even in theory with its civil and religious leaders. But in actuality, there has been established the dominant institution of a modern province headed by the governor tending to completely supplant the Sultanate and the Sultan with the larger and stronger power structure of the national state. In the changing process, the situation of conflict could be placed in the dramatic cast of "sultanate versus province" or "sultan versus governor". The first in the dichotomies is giving way to the latter's institutional dominance as is the situation today.<sup>47</sup>

The Concept of State. The concept of "state" can be translated into the classical Maranao word pangampong\* with a literal meaning close to the anglicized Arab term "sultanate". Thus, the Maranao distinguish their political organization from those of other groups by what they call Pat-a-Pangampong ko ranao, referring to the "Four States of Lanao", composed of Bayabao, Masui, Onayan, and Baloi. Each of these is the name of a territory with a community of people recognizing an allegiance to some sort of an internal authority. In each, the titular sultan enjoys the right of being addressed with his title of prestige, but holds no well-defined control over the people or territory. Excepting the once powerful Sultan of Masiu, the titular pangampong sultans are accorded high social status but their ranks bear little authoritarian function. The Sultan of Masiu had a stronger hold over the land, property, and people than the other state sultans.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid, pp. 28-29.

\* Derivation of the word kampong, which is in Maranao epic called Darangen, refers to a place or community having warriors and power structure. A setting in the epic is classically called kampong. Kampong is universally used in the Malay word to refer to village.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, pp. 14-15.

Within each pangampong there are numerous units of sultanate or agama organizations which are relatively stronger in power and organization within their respective jurisdictions.<sup>49</sup>

Little is known about the Yakan, Sangil, and Samal groups. It had been reported that they had no independent political existence and were once the subject peoples of either the Sultanates of Maguindanao or Sulu.<sup>50</sup>

The various sultanates in Lanao and Cotabato and the degrees of authority the sultans hold differ from principality to principality. The number of titled persons and offices found in a sultanate also vary. In Lanao the offices are many and a minor sultan might exercise a more effective power of control over his local jurisdiction than a supposedly higher sultan having just a theoretical sovereignty over a larger territory.<sup>51</sup>

The preservation of the Moro formal system of political organization seems to furnish a picture of unique characteristics of Muslim Mindanao that distinguishes the area from the rest of the Philippines. This is by no means as great a difference as it first seems. The concept of the "state" was shared by the Moros and other Filipino groups before their contacts with Islam and Christianity. The ancient barangay government and social structure among the ancestors of the present-day Christian-Filipinos were probably shared by the ancestors of the Moros who seemed to have modified the early pattern with influences from Arab or Hindu-Malay culture. The names of offices in the Moro organization such as the Arab sultan and the Hindu-Malay radiamuda (originally raja muda) and the

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49 Ibid, p. 15.

50 Ibid

51 Ibid

widespread Filipino title of datu are convincing proofs of original similarity on which later occurrences brought variation.<sup>52</sup>

Both smaller and larger sultanates were involved in the past organized resistance against all foreign attempts to stamp out local powers. Under the reign of Sultan Dipatuan Kudarat (Cachil Corralat to the Spaniards), the Sultanate of Maguindanao resisted Spain's influence for about half-a-century and the succeeding rulers continued the defiance up to the coming of the Americans. Similarly, the small sultanates of Bayang, Masiu and Bacolod Grande in Lanao fiercely defended themselves against the American forces. Besides their past military functions, the various sultanates still manifest their strength for other events of collective undertakings affecting their territorial jurisdiction.<sup>53</sup>

Changes are occurring in this traditional system which are gradually minimizing the unique characteristics of Muslim Filipino society.<sup>54</sup> In the competition for authority between the Moro's traditional system and the constitutional system of the government, the former will probably become modified, as did the historic barangay system.

In spite of their solidarity under traditional institutions and the reinforcement of these bonds by the new Islamic associations, the Muslims are drawn by the impact of political parties and civic organizations. All national political parties have their constituents in Muslim communities.<sup>55</sup>

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52 Ibid

53 Ibid, pp. 15-16.

54 Ibid, p. 16.

55 Ibid

Politics has both integrating and disintegrating effects. Individuals and groups either split or unite into parties and issues, though kinship still plays an important part in defining political affiliation. Intergroup political interest saw the appearance of a Muslim-Christian party in Cotabato during recent elections. On the other hand, the division of Lanao\* into two provinces drew favorable support from the majority in both the Maranao and Christian communities. While Lanao del Norte is predominantly Christian, Lanao del Sur is largely a Muslim province.<sup>56</sup>

In the chartered cities of Marawi and Cotabato, international service organizations like the Lions and Rotary Clubs have Muslim members in addition to the Christian Filipinos and Chinese. A good number of Muslims joined the Masonic Lodge. Interest in associational forms of social organization is mostly found among Muslims in mixed communities where Parent Teachers Association, puroks, and other similar voluntary groupings are organized. However, in pure Muslim areas, the PTA organizations seem to appear more on paper and puroks on signboards.<sup>57</sup>

Republic Act No. 1408 prescribes the organization of barrio councils in the rural areas of the country including those of Moroland. Interviews with responsible community development workers in Cotabato and Lanao revealed that the barrio council idea has yet to gain widespread support and understanding in the Muslim rural communities. The literal meanings of purok and barrio council, which are organized on the basis of

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\* The province was divided into Lanao del Sur, regarded as the Mother province, and Lanao del Norte under Republic Act No. 2228, approved on May 22, 1959. Both provinces were inaugurated on July 4, 1959.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, pp. 16-17.

written laws, have their parallels in the Muslim's traditional council of datu leaders within an agama or sultanate. We shall examine the conflicts and correlations between the two kinds of systems as they exist side by side in the structuring of social life in the marginal areas.<sup>58</sup>

Plural Marriages. In Muslim society, a man can have four wives. The Qur'an tolerates four wives, provided that he can do justice to all his wives and treat them equally.<sup>59</sup>

Following the Qur'anic law, the Muslims practice polygamy. Practised quite extensively during the Spanish time and even in the early years of the American regime, polygamy is now gradually diminishing. This has been attributed to the improvement of education among the Muslims, most particularly the girls, and to the general trends the world over.<sup>60</sup>

Besides the provisions of Islamic law, there are other factors that tend to promote polygamy among the Maranaos. The greater the number of wives a man has the higher is his social prestige. Aside from being a status symbol, polygamy serves as a means of extending one's influence. He who has four wives establishes relationships with four families, which in the local society, are solid and close units. With the increasing interest in politics, family relationship has great significance since it means more votes. Before a second or succeeding wives can be brought to the household, permission of the first wife and that of her parents must first be secured. The wives hold different

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58 Ibid

59 Ibid, p. 43

60 Ibid

degrees of importance in the household according to priority or seniority. The first or the senior wife can demand service and request assistance from her junior "partners". Since every additional wife means increased household assistance, the senior wives do not usually object to the husband taking additional wives.

Power and Status. Power in Muslim Filipino society was formerly (and to some extent still is) reckoned in terms of the number of followers a leader had. In order to achieve political rank, it was necessary for a person to have ability and wealth wherewith to attract followers. High birth assured social distinction but not political power. If somehow he could, by prowess and wit, gain wealth and followers, it was even possible for one of very low birth to rise in station and acquire power. The jihad and piracy afforded opportunities for this in the past days.<sup>62</sup>

Muslim society was composed of three classes: the hereditary aristocracy, freemen and slaves. The first class (called the Malai-i-bangsa among the Maranao) was composed of the sultans, wealthy datus and their immediate families – the royal blood, so to speak. The second class (called Mabubai-bangsa or Mataqtao) consisted of the small farmers and artisans. The third class (Bisaya) were servants and slaves. These classes were not so much fixed positions as differences in prestige and access to political authority. Any person achieving power could rise into the aristocracy (though he could not become a sultan, which was strictly a hereditary position). Slaves, though their life was hard, were able to end their lot through marriage, adoption or purchase of freedom. Class lines are breaking down in the face of changing times, but the broad outlines of the ancient three classes are still extant in Muslim society, though the Bisaya

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid, pp. 43-44.

<sup>62</sup> Gowing, op. cit., p. 41.

class is steadily diminishing. Modern conditions have favored the growth of a still small but vigorous and growing Muslim middle class.<sup>63</sup>

The passing years have seen the deterioration of the power and influence of the old sultanates, and in places at the present time, the office is purely honorary. But the datu is still a strong force, comparatively, in Muslim society.<sup>64</sup>

The Administration of Justice. The general concept of adat law is shared by all the Muslim groups, despite the variation of contents and applications. It is traditional as opposed to modern law. The administration of traditional justice can either be very simple or complex in the different localities. For example, among the Maguindanao, the settlement of conflicts is presided by a datu (chief) with the assistance of a kali (law consultant), and a vizier. While the datu presides with honor, the kali is more important in the administration of law for which he is expected to be the best informed among the elders of a community.<sup>65</sup>

Besides using Qur'anic laws, the kali refers to the luwaran as a local penal code. The luwaran applies inequally to higher and lower classes of people in Maguindanao society involved in court cases.<sup>66</sup>

Among the Maranaos, trial-by-jury is practised by a council of leaders (pamitiara) which include sultans, datos, other wise men and, of course, a kali who also interprets the law for the enlightenment of the court in rendering decisions.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p. 42.

<sup>65</sup> Isidro, op. cit., p. 54.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p. 55.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid

Adat law can also be misapplied, abused, or corrupted by those who administer it. The latter body of law is gradually losing its power to the state law. Indeed, perceptible changes are taking place.<sup>68</sup>

The adat law, derived from the Arabic word, "adat", commonly connotes customs, practices, and usages. Adat law varies from region to region because of the influences of local customs and tradition, but in general, it governs the conduct of the community and the behavior of the individual. Therefore, the violation of such law has legal punitive consequences.<sup>69</sup>

The transition from the adat law to the state law of the Republic of the Philippines requires time. Adat law becomes difficult to interpret when it conflicts with government laws and vice-versa. The idea of the separation of church and state is indistinct in the Muslim concept. Philippine civil laws approved by Congress are based on the Roman law and American jurisprudence. To reconcile therefore the civil laws, Islamic laws, and the indigenous practices and traditions would require time. This is illustrated in the case of polygamy as a unique feature of Muslim marriage.<sup>70</sup>

In 1916, upon the approval of the Jones Law which became the organic law of the country, polygamy was prohibited. Realizing that it would be in conflict with the practices of the Muslims, the Philippine Congress made certain dispensations with respect to the application of this law. Plural marriages in the Moroland was permitted for a period of 20 years. At the end of this period, it was found that the Muslims were not yet ready

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<sup>68</sup>Ibid,

<sup>69</sup>Ibid, p. 53.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid, p. 55.

to conform to the general law of the land. Dispensation was renewed for another 20 years so that in the Revised Civil Code of 1949, the following was provided:

"Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in non-Christian provinces will be performed in accordance with customs, rights or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary."

However, 20 years after the approval of this Code, all marriages performed between the Muslims or pagans shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of the Code, but the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of Interior may at any time, before the said expiration of said period, by proclamation make any of said provision applicable to the Muslim and non-Christian inhabitants of any of the non-Christian provinces.<sup>71</sup>

### Education<sup>72</sup>

The educational situation in the Muslim areas did not change with the coming of the Spaniards as their raiders' efforts seemed mainly concentrated in the Visayas and Luzon. Even with the shift of administration from the Spaniards to the Americans, education was not immediately attended to. American teachers were, however, eventually assigned in Mindanao. Unfortunately, their efforts somehow failed since the Muslims were wary of the intentions of the Americans and suspected education to be merely a device to alienate them eventually from their Islamic faith and convert them to Christianity. This problem was compounded by the lack of school facilities and poor economic conditions which made it doubly difficult for Muslim youth to study.

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid, pp. 55-56.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, pp. 81-93; and Isidro, op. cit., pp. 29-60.

Somehow, the same situation persisted during the Commonwealth period. While public education in Christian communities greatly improved due to President Quezon's interest in the masses, the Muslims continued to lag behind educationally. The Constitution provides that the government shall establish a complete and adequate system of public education with at least free primary instruction. Accordingly, the national government tried to implement the provision but, unfortunately, the available funds were not enough to educate all the children of school age. As a result, the Quezon administration approved the Educational Act of 1940 which eliminated Grade VII and provided for the double-session plan in the elementary schools in which two classes, one in the morning and the other in the afternoon, were handled by one teacher. With the implementation of the Act, the pupils had to content themselves with only half of their original load and their elementary schooling reduced from seven to six years. The rationale behind the Act was to accommodate, even to such unsatisfactory extent, the growing demands of popular education. The limited resources of the government for buildings, textbooks, and salaries of the teachers had to be spread over to a larger number of children, no matter how thinly.

If the schooling of the children in Luzon and the Visayas was limited by the available resources, the situation in the Muslim communities was even worse. As a government policy, Mindanao and Sulu have always been relegated to the background and provisions for their educational advancement were more scanty than elsewhere. There were fewer teachers, less school buildings, and poorer instructional materials.

With the inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines, educational opportunities could not still cope with the needs of the increasing population. This already deplorable situation was aggravated by the damages that the country suffered during the World War II. Thousands of school buildings and libraries were bombed; thousands of textbooks and reading materials, burned. Necessarily, to fill up the inadequacies, numerous teachers had

to be recruited anew and teacher-training programs had to be accelerated. But this was very difficult in a newly independent nation where expenditures for other countless programs had to be met. Although the allocation for education - constituting about 30 per cent of the total government expenditures - was the second largest item in the national budget, it was still insufficient to meet all the essential demands of education. The program of the government concentrated more on economic development and construction of basic infrastructures designed to help improve the economic state of the country. The whole system of education, for both Christian and Muslim, had to suffer financial inadequacies.

In the Philippines, the educational policy and the highly centralized administration did not function effectively among the Muslims. The educational policy was to give a uniform curriculum and instructional materials to pupils throughout the country. So that the adopted textbooks - approved by the Board on Textbooks and the Bureau of Public Schools - were the same from Aparri to Jolo, for Juan and Abubakar. There was no consideration for differences in social conditions or cultural heritage. The system of administration was so highly centralized that adaptations of some materials to local conditions were not possible. All instructional materials in the forms of bulletins and circulars were made by the General Office and applied in all parts of the country. There was a time when the Director of the Bureau of Education could tell by just looking at a prepared course of study what was taught to the children in Luzon, the Visayas, and Sulu at any given time. The rigidity of administration took away the initiative of teachers since their work was merely to follow the dictates of the higher authorities in the Bureau.

From 1954 to 1966, the educational situation in the Morolandia - that is, in Cotabato, Sulu, and Lanao del Sur - has changed a bit. Three types of school joined together in the

intellectual advancement of the people: the Madrasah, the private, and the public schools.

Madrasah Schools. The Madrasah schools - equivalent to the convent schools in Christian communities - are sectarian schools designed to preserve the Islamic faith. Supposedly first established in Sulu, they offered six-month and one-year courses in Muslim catechism, prayers, and rituals to the students, irrespective of age and grade. The teachers were local religious leaders who received their subsistence from the people contributing money, food, and services. Recently, the facilities of the Madrasah schools have been improved and the curriculum equally upgraded to meet the diversified needs of the people. Better teachers are now trained; the courses, as in the public and private schools, are now adjusted to different grade levels: a six-year elementary education, a four-year secondary course, and a two-year collegiate course. The curricular offerings are broadened with the addition of more subjects: Arabic, reading and writing, pronunciation, arithmetic, current events, history, and government. Like in any institution, tuition fees of ₱30 or more and miscellaneous expenses are required. However, because of the keen competition that the private and public schools offer the enrolment in Madrasah schools has been going down.

The importance of the Madrasah schools to the propagation of the Islamic faith did not escape the attention of many Muslim leaders and organizations which now contribute for their improvement. The Kamilol Islam Society in Marawi supports the establishment of the Moopamarol Islamic Academy in Bayang, Lanao del Sur. The Hidayatol Islam Society and the Maahadul Islam Society have their Madrasah schools. The Agama Islam Society operates the Mindanao Arabic Institute. Many other religious societies are now active in the development of the Madrasah schools which may yet develop into an effective instrument for the education of the Muslim masses if revitalized with modern course offerings.

A large number of the Madrasah school teachers graduated from the institutions in Cairo and Mecca. It must be mentioned here that the United Arab Republic has been active in the spread of Islam. It provides scholarships for the Muslim youth who, after graduation, proceed to the teaching field. In 1966, the UAR secretary general visited Marawi and pledged support for the continued maintenance of Islamic teaching.

The UAR government contributes actively to the cultivation of Islam and the Arab culture also by sending Arabic teachers to different Muslim regions of the world. In Marawi, there are three or four Arabic teachers who live with the people and teach in the Madrasah schools to strengthen Islam and to give a better understanding of the traditions and culture of Arab civilization. These teachers also lecture about adjustment to modern life which similarly affects Muslims of the Middle East.

Private Schools. The schools under the Bureau of Private Schools are contributing much toward the education of the people in Mindanao and Sulu. They are usually run by corporations, private citizens, or religious organizations. Found in cities as well as in remote towns, the private schools zealously pioneer in the dissemination of education in the elementary, secondary and collegiate levels. This is particularly true with sectarian schools which consider it a part of their mission to give the benefit of education to the people of the hinterlands. The private schools perform a great service to the people of Mindanao and Sulu. In isolated communities, particularly, where public education is not available, the private schools solely fill up the educational needs. For example, all over Cotabato most private secondary schools are established by one religious order. It is therefore, to the credit of the various religious organizations, private citizens, and corporations that most of the people in this area are accorded the necessary education which otherwise would have been denied them.

Public Schools. Based on the assumption that the stability of a democratic government depends upon an enlightened and educated citizenry, complete and adequate system of education is organized. Accordingly, therefore, various educational measures were adopted by the administration including the Educational Act of 1940 and the Elementary Education Act of 1953 providing for compulsory primary education. However, the intention of the constitutional framers was not faithfully fulfilled especially in the Muslim region. In 1959-60, the national estimate of children between the age of 7 and 13 years in public schools was 5,051,867, representing 78.6 per cent of children of school age. The percentage of children in school varied from region to region; in the Ilocos and Mountain Province, 78 per cent of the children of school age were in public schools; in Cagayan Valley and Batanes, 81 per cent; in Central Luzon, 78.3 per cent; in Western Visayas, 85.7 per cent; in Eastern Visayas, 80.5 per cent; in Cotabato, 63.2 per cent; in Sulu, 66.73 per cent; and in Lanao del Sur, 17.7 per cent. From the preceding data, it is obvious that the number of Muslim children in public schools is deplorably small. The situation calls for a re-examination of the educational facilities and opportunities in the Morolandia if the constitutional provision for free elementary education is to be fulfilled.

Dr. Antonio Isidro made a study of the status of education in the Muslim provinces of Cotabato, Lanao del Sur and Sulu. The aims of the study were to answer the following questions: (1) To what extent has the government complied with the constitutional injunction regarding the provisions for complete and adequate education? (2) What is the quality of education as may be judged from the qualifications of teachers, availability of school buildings, textbooks, and other instructional materials?

The following paragraphs are the major findings.

(1) In the provinces mentioned, the Bureau of Public Schools operates 557 elementary schools, 3 general high schools, 3 agricultural schools, and 4 trade schools.

(2) Private schools are extensive and generally are organized as new settlement areas are developed.

(3) In Cotabato, sectarian schools have increased their facilities far more than the public schools. There are 56 private high schools in Cotabato alone, mostly run by religious orders, with a total enrolment of 22,397 students as against 2 public high schools with only 4,435.

(4) In the three provinces of Cotabato, Lanao del Sur and Sulu, there are 77 private high schools with a total enrolment of 26,630 and 3 public high schools with 7,060. Including the elementary school enrolment, the number of students served by the private schools is 36,554.

(5) As revealed in Table 5, the total enrolment in Cotabato, Lanao del Sur and Sulu in 1966 was 345,613. Of this number, 276,439 or 79.99% were in the primary schools; 62,114 or 17.97% in the intermediate grades; and 7,060 or 2.04% in the high schools.

TABLE 5

ENROLMENTS IN THE PUBLIC ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS  
AND HIGH SCHOOLS IN THE THREE MUSLIM  
PROVINCES (1966)

	COTABATO		LANAO SUR		SULU		TOTAL	
	( 3 Divisions)	%	( 3 Divisions)	%	( 2 Divisions)	%	No.	%
PRIMARY GRADES								
I	55180	25.38	17570	33.48	26461	34.95	99211	28.77
II	43668	20.08	11025	21.01	16009	21.14	70702	20.46
III	38208	17.57	8664	16.51	11842	15.64	58714	16.99
IV	31908	14.68	7102	13.53	8802	11.63	47812	13.83
TOTAL	168,964	77.71	44,361	84.53	63,114	83.36	276,439	79.99
INTERMEDIATE								
V	24539	11.29	4556	8.68	5548	7.32	34643	10.02
VI	19482	8.96	3561	6.79	4428	5.85	27471	7.95
TOTAL	44,021	20.25	8,117	15.47	9,976	13.17	62,114	17.97
HIGH SCHOOL								
1st Year	1527	0.70	-	-	900	1.19	2427	0.70
2nd Year	1217	0.56	-	-	712	0.94	1929	0.56
3rd Year	925	0.43	-	-	584	0.77	1509	0.44
4th Year	766	0.35	-	-	429	0.57	1195	0.34
TOTAL	4,435	2.04	-	-	2,625	3.47	7,060	2.04
GRAND TOTAL	217,420	100.00	52,478	100.00	75,715	100.00	345,613	100.00

From the data as revealed in the foregoing table, we see a tendency for students to drop-out from elementary school and to an extent that only a very small minority of 2% are able to obtain the benefits of secondary education.

(6) There is a disparity in educational advantages between those provided for the predominantly Muslim provinces and the rest of the country as revealed by the fact that in 1960, Cotabato, Lanao del Sur, and Sulu were among the five provinces with the lowest percentage of children in the elementary school, namely: Negros Oriental, 68.2%; Cotabato, 64.3%; Zamboanga del Sur, 69.6%; Sulu, 67.1%; and Lanao del Sur, 18.2%. During the same year, the five provinces with the highest percentage of children in school attendance were: Abra, 100%; Romblon, 98.2%; Pampanga, 96.1%; Camarines Norte, 95.1% and Sorsogon, 96.9%.

The facilities for secondary education are even more limited than those in the elementary schools. In Cotabato, there are only two public high schools in three school divisions with a total enrolment of 4,435 or 2.04% of the total public school enrolment in both elementary and secondary levels; in Sulu there are two high schools with 2,625 students or 3.4% of the total school enrolment; in Lanao del Sur with two school divisions, including the City of Marawi, there is not even one public general high school maintained directly by the local, provincial, or national government. The total public high school enrolment in the three provinces is only 7,060 representing 2.04% of the total school population. This contrasts with that for the entire country, where the youth, age 13-16 years, in the public secondary schools, was 17.9% in 1958-1959.

(7) Compounding the problem of lack of educational facilities provided to the inhabitants of Muslim areas, the drop-out percentage, especially in Lanao and Sulu, is the highest

in the country. Of the 55 provinces and cities reported, the five provinces having the highest retention rates in the elementary schools and the five having the lowest rates are the following:

1st	Manila	80.2%
2nd	Rizal	77.0%
3rd	Pangasinan	65.9%
4th	La Union	65.1%
5th	Catanduanes	65.1%
	Philippine Average	<u>44.7%</u>
51st	Capiz	30.6%
52nd	Masbate	28.0%
53rd	Negros Oriental	25.0%
54th	Sulu	22.0%
55th	Lanao	20.9%

Cotabato's retention rate was 52.6%.

Among the mentioned causes of these alarming drop-outs were the following: poverty, sickness, and lack of interest on the part of parents and pupils. Other drop-out causes are poor transportation; inadequate school facilities; frequent contributions collected from parents and children; transfer of parents to other places; "truancy" of teachers; and ineffective teaching.

(8) Adding to the problems confronting public education was the attitude of distrust towards the system. Muslims suspected that the government-sponsored public education was actually intended for Christian children and introduced in the Muslim areas to alienate the people from their Islamic faith and convert them to Christianity. Some people even felt that it ran contrary to Islamic faith to attend public schools.

There were also some school practices and conditions running counter to Muslim traditions. One of these is the concept of co-education which was opposed by the Muslims who frown on their women mixing with the male population.

(9) Based on the opinions of school officials and teachers, the present curriculum is overcrowded with a wide number of subjects having short time allotments. Attendant to these problems are related problems that have to do with the ineffectiveness of English instruction and inadequacy of the teachers handling the English subjects. The qualifications of the teachers in the provinces of Cotabato, Lanao del Sur, and Sulu are presented in the following table.

TABLE 6

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF ELEMENTARY TEACHERS  
AND THEIR QUALIFICATIONS IN THREE MUSLIM  
PROVINCES 1966

Highest Grade and Degree Completed	COTABATO (3)		LANAO (2)		SULU (3)		TOTAL		NAT'L AVERAGE	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1. Elementary Graduate	3	0.05	13	0.80	30	1.30	46	0.44	129	0.09
2. High School Graduate	43	0.67	652	40.22	479	20.77	1174	11.35	2356	1.69
3. Secondary Normal	94	1.46	28	1.73	39	1.69	161	1.51	2526	1.81
4. Secondary Vocational	14	0.22	36	2.22	1	0.04	51	0.49	334	0.24
5. E. T. C.	2567	40.01	734	45.28	1179	51.13	4480	43.32	47245	33.90
6. E. T. C. - H.E. (Comb.)	234	3.65	11	0.68	3	0.13	248	2.40	4724	3.39
7. B. S. E. (Inv.)	1289	20.09	57	3.52	106	4.60	1452	14.04	38796	27.84
8. B. S. E. (w/ major)	233	3.63	19	1.17	35	1.52	287	2.77	6502	4.66
9. B. S. E. ED.	1259	19.62	52	3.21	116	5.03	1427	13.80	36762	26.38
10. All Others	680	10.60	19	1.17	318	13.79	1017	9.83		
TOTALS	6416	100.00	1621	100.00	2306	100.00	10343	100.00	139374	100.00

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The teaching of the local vernacular and the national language is hampered by the lack of textbooks and instructional materials. There are schools where three or four children are forced to share one book while reading their lessons and the general ratio seems to be one book for every three or four children.

At the time of the study, there were 10,343 elementary school teachers in the three provinces - 6,416 in Cotabato, 1,621 in Lanao del Sur, and 2,306 in Sulu. Considering that the national standard requirement for teaching is possession of the degree of Bachelor of Science in Elementary Education (B.S.E.Ed.), the impressive fact revealed in Table 6 is the large percentage of teachers with sub-standard qualifications. Some teachers are merely graduates of the elementary school. Eleven per cent completed the general high school course and more than two per cent are graduates of the Secondary Normal and Secondary Vocational courses. A large percentage of the teachers - 43.32% - are holders of the Elementary Teacher's Certificate (E.T.C.), a two-year normal course which was given up more than two decades ago as the minimum requirement for teaching in the elementary school in the Philippines. In Lanao del Sur, teachers with this qualification constitute nearly one-half of the total teaching force. Taken together, 59.51% of the teachers in these provinces have qualifications equivalent to a second-year college student. Teachers who hold the required B.S.E.Ed. represented 13.8%. In general, it has been pointed out that for every ten teachers in the area, seven do not have the standard qualifications for teaching.

The predominance of teachers with sub-standard education or qualifications is partly explained by the influence of outside pressure, political pressure, and Republic Act No. 2260

which provides that "an applicant who has had some training for teaching or has had some kind of education, provided that he belongs to the cultural minorities, can be appointed as teacher."

Then there is the problem of building facilities. Most of the school buildings are temporary and are of light inexpensive materials. About half (47.69%) of all the buildings found in the region are temporary structures. Semi-permanent buildings constitute almost the other half of the facilities (43.01%). Less than 2% are permanent buildings or made of concrete materials. In the province of Lanao del Sur, there is not a single permanent elementary school building and in Sulu, there is only one. Cotabato ranks among three provinces in the number of semi-permanent buildings (56.39%), while 65.79% of school buildings in Lanao del Sur are temporary and 11.84% are borrowed. About 90% of the buildings in Sulu are temporary and semi-permanent and 9% are rented.

The classroom situation presents an equally dismal picture. Some classes have no classrooms and meet under the trees.

The whole situation has been described as "paradoxical" by Dr. Isidro when it is considered that all along the government has pledged interest in the education of the Muslims to enable them to find national identification with their Christian brothers from the North; and yet, when the Muslims eventually accepted the public school, the government failed to provide the funds to maintain the schools effectively. The government must manifest greater interest in the welfare of Muslims if they are to develop a feeling of oneness with the rest of the people in the country.

The Economic Life of Muslim Filipinos <sup>66</sup>

The density of population in 1960 for the entire Philippines was 91.8%. This means that there was only 1.1 hectares available for every person. In Mindanao, however, there were 21.1 hectares per person. Because of the rapid increase of population, the land-to-person ratio is also rapidly becoming smaller.

Agricultural Development. In 1961, of the more than 11 million hectares of the Minsupala region, 3.9 million hectares, certified as disposable, were set aside for settlement and agricultural purposes. The great potential areas for agriculture are the provinces of Cotabato, Davao, Surigao, Zamboanga del Norte, and Palawan. Generally, however, the entire region has fertile lands and favorable climate for mass crop production. Rice, corn, root crops, and fruits are the chief farm products although other crops like coffee, cacao, abaca, coconut, vegetables, cotton, ramie, and rubber are likewise grown. In 1963, Mindanao alone produced 2,881,090 metric tons of agricultural crops valued at ₱677 million.

The wide grasslands, estimated at 2.24 million hectares, represent about 20.8% of the total area of the region. This make Mindanao an excellent place for the development of livestock industries. In Cotabato, Davao, and Bukidnon, there are an increasing number of cattle ranches, breeding stations, and dairy farms. Industries like poultry, swine, and goat raising also augment the meat and milk supply of the region. In 1963, its total animal population was more than 10 million representing 16% of the national animal population valued at ₱182 million.

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<sup>66</sup> Antonio Isidro, Muslim-Christian Integration at the Mindanao State University, (Marawi City, MSU University Research Center, 1968), pp. 96-105,

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Fisheries Resources. Mindanao is also blessed with extensive inland and coastline waters considered to be the richest fishing grounds in the whole country. There are numerous lakes, the more notable of which are: Lake Lanao, the second largest lake in the Philippines; Lake Mainit; and Lake Bulusan. There are wide marshes which offer a promising potential for freshwater fisheries such as the Ligwasan Marsh and the Libungan Marsh in Cotabato. There are many fishing grounds like the in-shore waters of Davao Gulf, Iligan Bay, Mindanao Sea, Moro Gulf, Sibuquey Bay, and Surigao Strait. The deeper seas like the Sulu and the Celebes Sea teem with tuna and sardines which are good for canning purposes; marine fishing, however, remains an unventured field.

Palawan is just as richly endowed with fisheries potentialities. There are idle mangrove swamps which can easily be converted into fishponds. There are abundant fishing grounds like the Malampaya Sound, Bacuit Bay, Coron Bay, Dumaran Channel, and Green Island Bay. In 1963, the 17 fishing grounds in the area produced 108 million kilograms of fish representing 51.8% of the total Philippine production from commercial fishing boats. Important commercial species include anchovies found richly in the Coron Bay, sardines in the Moro Gulf, and brown scad in the Sulu Sea. Fish culture in the region is a recent venture but a number of large fishponds, covering 20,000 hectares, have already been constructed mostly in Zamboanga del Sur, Cotabato, Agusan, Davao, and Lanao.

Forest Resources. About 67% of the total land area of Mindanao are covered by forests. They are technically classified into three distinct types: dipterocarp, mangrove, and mossy. The dipterocarp, a hardwood family, covers 94%

of the total forest area in the island. The mangrove forest is confined to the narrow tidal strips along the coast.

The mossy forest is commercially unproductive. The Mindanao forests contain a net volume of 1,154 million cubic meters in sound trees and 102 million cubic meters in cull trees.

In 1963, the net volume of sound trees in virgin dipterocarp forest was estimated at 884 million cubic meters.

One of the lamentable observations regarding the forest resources is the fast-shrinking reservoir. In 1963, it was estimated that the forest area decreased annually at an average rate of 30,000 hectares in Lanao, Bukidnon, Cotabato, and Misamis Oriental; 25,000 hectares in Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, and Misamis Occidental; and 41,742 hectares in Davao, Surigao, and Agusan.

Mineral Resources. The mineral reserves of Mindanao consist of iron ore, coal, limestone, manganese, chromite, copper, gold, silver, nickel, cobalt, and quicksilver valued potentially at ₱27 billion. More than 20 million metric tons representing 30% of the coal reserves in the country are found in Surigao del Sur and Zamboanga del Sur. Iron, about 470 million metric tons representing 78% of the national reserves, is found in Zamboanga del Sur, Davao, Surigao del Norte, and Cotabato. Limestone, about 1,373 million metric tons representing 29% of the total Philippine reserves, is found in practically all provinces of Mindanao. Nickel, estimated at 174 million metric tons representing 100% of the national reserves, is found in Surigao. Chromite is found in Palawan, Misamis Oriental, and Surigao del Norte while copper is abundant in Zamboanga del Sur, Davao, Agusan, Surigao del Sur, Cotabato, and Palawan. In 1963, the total contribution of Mindanao to Philippine mineral production was 15.2%. The biggest mineral

production centers in Mindanao include Zamboanga del Sur with 35%, Lanao del Norte 26%, and Davao 23%.

Manufacturing Industries. Mindanao is still predominantly agricultural but a number of industries are beginning to develop. In a study conducted in 1962, there were 1,487 manufacturing establishments broken down according to their products as follows: food and beverages, 733; textile and clothes, 313; wood processing except furniture, 148; metal products, machineries, transportation, and equipment, 125; and other firms, 168. These establishments employed a total of 3,574 workers.

Manufacturing industries are centered in cities which have special locational advantages. Iligan City, for example, has a large developing industrial complex primarily because of the cheap and abundant electric power from the Maria Cristina Falls. Cagayan de Oro, due to its strategic location in Northern Mindanao, is a market outlet for the Visayas. Zamboanga City serves as a port for inter-island and international shipping vessels. Butuan City is the center of logging and plywood operations in eastern Mindanao. Davao City is the heart of southeastern Mindanao. Of these cities, Iligan and Davao are easily the most progressive.

Davao has a big industrial space, a good harbor, and sufficient transportation facilities. It is a gateway to rich agricultural lands, forests and mineral resources. It has established an extensive system of commerce and trade. It has several plywood factories, ramie plants, and coconut oil processing plants. Because of the many native advantages of Davao, it has been selected by the Mindanao Development Authority as an industrial estate. This will attract manufacturing establishments from highly congested areas into the industrial estate

where generous spaces are available. Furthermore, as planned, the estate will be provided with basic infra-structures like roads, water and electric power systems, sanitation facilities, transportation facilities, parking and landscaping spaces. The same plan of industrial estate development is envisioned for the cities of Iligan, Zamboanga, Cagayan de Oro, Cotabato, Dadiangas, and other sectors where an industrial base has already been started.

Like Davao, Iligan is forging ahead in economic development. For the implementation of the concept of industrial estate, the energetic Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan secured the transfer of government property consisting of 31.5 hectares of coastal land to the city. This will be the future site of a modern port which is to be constructed by the city government and the National Investment Development Company (NIDC) in coordination with the Program Implementation Agency (PIA). As conceived, the port will include a wharf big enough to harbor not only interisland vessels but also ocean liners, strategic warehouses equipped with the latest cargo handling facilities, a machine and engineering shop, and a properly zoned industrial area adequately provided with water, electric power, and essential utilities. With all the attractions of Iligan, it is expected to develop into one of the first fully industrialized estates in Mindanao.

Several industrial establishments have already been set up. Among these are the following: the Pillsbury Flour Mill with a capital of P4 million; the Marcelo Fertilizer Plant with P18 million; the Maria Cristina Chemical Industries with P3.5 million; Mindanao Portland Cement with P20 million; the Mabuhay Rubber Corporation with P16 million; and Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc.

In connection with this industrialization program, the Mindanao Development Authority, upon the advice of the consultants from Stanford Research Institute, drew up a number of prospective industries for Mindanao.

1. The production of plywood and veneer wallboard and other similar items associated with wood pulp processing, rayon manufacturing and utilization of wood wastes.
2. The large-scale processing of almasiga or Manila copal for producing plastic.
3. The establishment of an Integrated Coconut Processing Industry for the manufacture of copra and coconut products.
4. The exploitation of Mindanao's mineral reserves including iron ore, coal, chromium, manganese, copper, and silica.
5. The processing of agricultural crops for the manufacture of cornstarch and other related items.
6. The large-scale growing and processing of African palm oil.
7. The investigation of long-term demand for abaca and ramie.
8. The study of additional fish processing plants in other parts of Mindanao.

The industrial development program as conceived by the National Economic Council "is predicated mainly upon the exploitation of rich resources endowments of the area and in

the context of meeting the national development objectives of broadening the current industrial phase of the country. For these reasons priority is extended to metals, non-metals chemicals, pulp and paper, fibers, rubber, wood, and food processing industries."

One of the keys to effective industrialization is electric power. Fortunately, the Minsupala region has abundant water resources with a water power potential estimated at 7 million kilowatts. Lake Lanao, alone, has a water power potential of 750,000 kilowatts of which only 50,000 kilowatts are utilized. Aside from the National Power Corporation at Maria Cristina, there are seven other electric plants whose total capacity is 4,700 kilowatts.

The general direction of economic development program for the Minsupala region is significantly worded by the Mindanao Development Authority:

The program presents a comprehensive five-year development plan designed to achieve a balanced growth among all the productive sectors of the region's economy and has for its basis three-fold over-all objectives:

To exploit Mindanao's resources at optimum levels so that it can contribute an increasing share in the national effort towards the earlier achievement of the administration's goals set in the "Five-Year Integrated Socio-Economic Program for the Philippines";

To correct existing regional imbalances so that Mindanao can, at least, approach the levels which the Philippine economy, taken as a whole, has already achieved at present; and

To effect structural changes in the pattern and direction of the regional economy aimed at a gradual shift from that of a predominantly peasant, agrarian economy into a highly developing agro-industrial economy where manufacturing activities, construction and services which have so far lagged behind will be given ample opportunities to attain higher degrees of development.

However, there has been a lack in the implementation of this plan.

## THE ALPHA REPORT ON MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONSHIP

Thus far, we have presented a brief background of Muslim Filipinos -- their society, culture, traditional customs and ways of life. To a certain extent, this profile which has been drawn from historical accounts and information from varied sources, yield insights into the basic questions that led to this study. For instance, some of the questions that were answered had to do with currently existing problems. It also touched on how Muslim Filipinos regard the concept of separation of Church and State; how they perceive Western education, and, to some extent, also gave useful information on Muslim-Christian relationships.

However, as expected, the data obtained from historical and secondary sources were limited in scope. Many questions still had to be explored, these having basically to do with current attitudes and perceptions of which little is known. Furthermore, it was considered appropriate to crosscheck some of the findings.

The Alpha Survey conducted during the months of May and June (1970) was appropriately envisioned as the instrument which would bridge the information gap and furnish the researchers with additional information for a more comprehensive report. This chapter deals exclusively with the findings of the FFI research team during their ocular trip and the survey conducted in the various regions of Mindanao.\* For purpose of simplification, the discussions of the findings shall be distributed among the following topics: 1) self-perception of Muslims; 2) Muslims' attitudes toward English or Western education; 3) occupations perceived as desirable; 4) attitudes toward politicians; 5) attitudes toward the government; 6) perception

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\*See appendices for statistics and tables.

of peace and order in the community; 7) perceptions of Muslim-Christian relationship and 8) top Muslim leaders.

### Self-Perception of the Muslims

Among the principal objectives of the Alpha Survey was the determination of the nationality with which Muslim Filipinos identify. This is considered a significant problem as it relates to the question of perceived identity. How Muslims regard themselves, whether they think themselves to be basically Filipinos or Muslims or some other nationality, has a bearing on their proximity to the Philippine government and on the strength of their ties to the rest of the people in this country.

To obtain this information, the following question was posed: "Some people consider themselves to be Americans, Indonesians, Chinese, Japanese and so on. What do you consider yourself to be?"

It is interesting to observe that only 29.1% of the Muslim sample viewed themselves as "Filipinos" and that a significant majority (65.5%) referred to themselves as "Muslims". A minor 3.0% perceived themselves to be "Indonesians"\*. On the other hand, it is also noteworthy that of those who referred to themselves as Muslims, almost 98% responded positively when asked: "How about 'Filipino' - do you consider yourself to be a Filipino?"

Discussion. From Tables 1a and 1b and the findings of the FFI research team during their ocular inspection, it would seem that Muslim Filipinos have a primary identification with Muslim society, and that this culture is their frame of reference. In other words, there is an indication of an awareness of the Filipino component in Muslim identification, but identification as Muslim suggests strong in-group (locality and ethnic)

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\*It is important to stress that perception may not reflect a genuinely existing situation. Hence, while 3% of Muslim respondents perceived themselves to be Indonesians, it does not necessarily imply that three per cent of Muslim Filipinos are actually Indonesians.

solidarity vis-a-vis non-Muslims.

Despite the prevalent feeling among Christians or non-Muslims that this minority group consider themselves to be Filipinos, identification with the nation as a whole seems weak among the Muslims who prefer to be called "Muslim-Filipinos". The fact that quite a number regard themselves as such psychologically suggests the presence of a cultural-religious cleavage with the Muslims on one side and the Christians on the other. It would, moreover, seem that co-existence is regarded as an inevitable course, a matter to be tolerated in the absence of a solution. In the perception of the Muslim, Filipinos fall into two categories - the "Christian Filipino" and the "Muslim-Filipino" who are bound by regional ties, but severed by essential differences in religious beliefs and ways of life.

#### Muslims' Attitudes Toward Western Education

Only 37% of the Muslim respondents commented favorably on the present English or Western education while a majority of 55% refrained from giving any opinion. This refusal to comment or give an opinion may indicate negative attitudes on the part of a majority. From a comparison of the responses by socioeconomic class, it may be further inferred that a majority of the members of the upper class have favorable attitudes toward Western education. Seventy per cent (70%) of the upper class Muslim respondents expressed favorable attitudes. By contrast, only 25.3% in the middle class and 45.8% in the lower class voiced favorable opinions. Despite this generally unfavorable attitude toward Western education among Muslim Filipinos, a majority of 94.6% of them feel that young people should study for a profession. This feeling is shared by non-Muslims and is common among the various groups of respondents (See Table 3).

Discussion. These data are supported by the information gathered during the ocular trip made by the FFI research team

to Mindanao. On the basis of special interviews with selected members of the Muslim Filipino community, it would seem that Muslims on the whole favor sending their children to study for a profession. This, they believe, is one means by which they can elevate their social standing and improve their capacity to earn a living. Teachers are respected and Western education per se tends to meet with little resistance from those belonging to the upper socioeconomic stratum. However, one objection was voiced relative to its influence on the morality of the youth, young girls in particular. Modern education is seen as having a negative impact on mode of dressing, and the "mini-skirt" was cited as an example.

#### Occupation Perceived as Desirable

To what occupations do Muslim Filipinos gravitate? From the responses, it would seem that this group favor the following occupations: teaching (21.7%); medicine (14.3%); engineering (10.3%); and law (9.4%). These findings are supported by interviews with prominent and knowledgeable respondents in Mindanao from whom it has been gathered that the Muslims' choice occupations are law, teaching, medicine and engineering. While varied reasons have been mentioned for such occupational preferences, altruistic motives rank highest. At this juncture, it is interesting to note that the professions considered most desirable are those which are traditionally given preference in this country. In fact, Filipinos generally consider education, medicine, engineering and law as the most "prestigious" of all courses offered in schools, perhaps because these courses were not offered in the past. Then too, considering the prevailing problem that point to an underdeveloped region with poor roads and gross lack of health and educational facilities, it should not be surprising if Muslim Filipinos perceive the mentioned occupations as ways of improving their lot and status. Law, for example, holds definite attractions for many as it is considered a powerful tool which enables one to defend himself and to obtain or keep that which is rightfully

his without resorting to physical violence. It moreover is associated with government and political positions to which many would aspire, desire for prestige being only one among the various motives prevailing.

Considering these, it is no surprise to note the attraction that politics and army life hold for Muslim Filipinos and, despite the presence of ambivalent feelings toward careers which are somehow associated with the national government - hence a form of departure from their own cultural values.

A comparison of the responses of the two group (Muslims and non-Muslims) in relation to occupational preferences shows a possible convergence among Muslims and non-Muslims although traditional mobility aspirations of Muslims for the legal profession and military occupation continue to be strong. Teaching, medicine and engineering have been selected by both groups as the choicest occupations. However, the rank position of a lawyer appears to be significantly different between Muslims (who ranked law as fourth) and non-Muslims (who ranked the legal profession as sixth).

#### Attitudes Toward Current Economic Conditions

From Table 5, it would seem that about one-fifth (19.2% of the Muslim population are indifferent to economic conditions while less than one-half (43.8%) consider their present economic condition to be "good". This is slightly higher than the percentage of favorable ratings obtained from the non-Muslim population (39.8%). However the differences between the two groups being small relative to the sample, no conclusions can be made.

From the same data, it would also seem that unfavorable attitudes are generally more prevalent in the rural areas and among the lower socioeconomic classes, the adolescents (16 to 20 years age bracket), and those with no formal education.

Discussion. On the whole, it appears that Muslims perceive their economic lot as one which could stand an improve-

ment, Iligan for one, gives a less optimistic description and the favorable aspects are described as being dependent upon the government's ability and efforts to check graft and corruption.

Christians, on the other hand, appear to consider the Muslims' economic lot as favorable. The latter are seen and described as having a "low standard of living but receiving considerable government support". In fact, such aid tends to be resented by the former as he regards it prejudicial to the interests of the Christians.

### Attitudes Toward Politicians

How are politicians perceived by people in Mindanao? To obtain this information, a question was raised requiring respondents to state whether "none or very few", "some" or "most" politicians could be described in terms of the following traits: greedy, honest, hardworking, corrupt, nationalistic, an example to follow.

From the high rate of refusals to describe politicians in relation to some of the traits listed (such as greed, corruption, nationalism), it appears that the questions tended to inhibit those interviewed, thus raising the problems of evaluation of the data obtained. However, considering that Filipinos normally express favorable sentiments and withhold unfavorable comments, it would be reasonable to treat the "don't know" and "no answer" items as negative responses, and infer that, on the whole, the general attitude toward politicians is negative.

"Honest," "hardworking", "nationalistic" and "an example to follow" are considered as positive characteristics. Yet it is noteworthy that only a minority of both Muslims and non-Muslims credit these traits to "most" or "some" politicians

think about the government?" and "What do people in general feel about the government?"

The framing of these questions rest on three assumptions: First, an indirect or "third-person" type of inquiry would stimulate a more spontaneous flow of information and be more revealing of the respondents' genuine feelings, opinions, and perceptions. Secondly, the first question ("What do people in general think about the government?") is likely to yield insights into how the population "thinks" while the second should give indications as to how people "feel" about the government. In the study of attitudes, it is important to consider both thoughts (often referred to as cognitive component) and feelings (affective component). The third assumption is that the strength of people's attitudes may, to some extent, be gauged by consistency (or for that matter dissonance) in thoughts and feelings. Where dissonance occurs between the two components, one is apt to eventually be swayed in favor of the other.

Tables 8a to 8d reveal the existence of generally unfavorable attitudes toward the government. It is noteworthy that cognitions surpass affects in strength of negativism and this may be taken to mean that the people of Mindanao think of the government in a more negative manner than they actually feel towards it.

There are indications that negative attitudes are triggered by the government's public image of inefficiency and feelings on the part of many that the institution is principally responsible for the upsurge of economic problems. In fact, the government's perceived influence on the life of Filipinos in Mindanao, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, revolve around rising prices and low wages, thus having to do more with contributing to community problems than to solving them (Tables 16a and b).

The social distance between the members of the community and the Philippine government and the lack of confidence in the

latter as a supportive agency are confirmed by the data in Tables 9a and b. Only 13.3% of the total respondents and 28% of the Muslim Filipinos interviewed expressed a feeling of general confidence that the government would act on community problems. However, a comparatively higher percentage (29.2%) expressed personal confidence in the institution.

The data in Table 9b also show Muslims to have a higher degree of political inefficiency. Non-Muslims are more optimistic, but even among them, a great deal of uncertainty exists.

Discussion. Additional information obtained from both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents reveal Muslim Filipinos as negatively predisposed toward the national government. Held largely accountable is the behavior of government officials, particularly in matters of finance. Non-Muslim as well as Muslim respondents stressed that it is not the mechanics nor form of government per se that is considered undesirable, but rather, the way the government is run by those in power. Politicians, in general, are seen as mainly responsible for the current spiraling of prices, especially for prime commodities, the floating rate, rampant smuggling, and the presence of graft and corruption in the country. Instead of being regarded as helpful, they are considered as impediments to national development owing to the practice of "red tape". Assistance, which is described as a slow and tedious process, is also said to be rendered faster if influences (or "pull") is used.

Compounding these problems is the prevailing feeling of neglect among Muslim-Filipinos. The government is perceived as being neglectful towards the Muslim people and grossly amiss in their obligations to Mindanao, seeking only to exploit its rich natural resources, yet hardly giving anything in return.

It is further noted that Muslims generally feel that the present government should not have a say in the "Sharia". The

prevailing opinion is that the "Sharia" should not be a part of the national law or present government.

Just what community problems are considered as most pressing by Muslim Filipinos? The Alpha Survey identifies perceived problems as having principally to do with the lack of such facilities like light, water, medical aid, health centers, roads, bridges, school buildings, and transportation. Awareness of such problems notwithstanding, the specific agency which could be instrumental in their solution is something which has not been identified. In the first place, there is an evident lack of confidence in the government's interest and/or capacity to solve existing community problems. To the Muslim mind, the role of politics in community development is hazy and ill-defined. Even Islam seems to offer no practical solutions and quite a number of Muslims themselves feel that religion has no concrete role in affairs which should be the concern of the government. The implication here is that while definite problems are seen and felt, there is a consensus that no particular person or group is really attending to their solution. It would also appear that the most pressing problems that need looking into revolve around the improvement of educational programs and facilities, the construction of roads and bridges, the introduction of PACD type of activities and the creation and improvement of medical health centers.

This is borne out by observations and crosscheck interviews with knowledgeable members of the community. In Iligan, for example, the housing situation, presence of squatters, sky-rocketing prices and unemployment were found to be principal problems. In Cotabato, the peace and order situation pose the great difficulty. The region is marked by cattle rustling, political feuds, vendettas, land conflicts and the like. Aggravating this is the big gap between the rich and the poor and the obvious neglect of the government in developing the area. Transportation is difficult. As one goes into the interior parts of the province, he is apt to encounter long

stretches of bumpy roads and tracts of undeveloped and uncultivated land.

In Marawi City, sanitation is a big problem. Diseases (like El Tor) have been known to plague the citizens of Marawi because of lack of medical facilities and the scientific knowledge with which to control epidemics.

In spite of the prevailing negative attitudes of Muslim Filipinos toward the government and the apparent lack of strong identification with this country which is principally perceived to be a Christian domain, a majority of Muslims feel that they should stay as a part of the Philippine Republic. While 21.2% expressed a desire to separate, 55.1% favored remaining united and primarily because they consider themselves to be Filipinos. A 23.7% were noncommittal.

It is significant to point out the Muslims' so-called lack of identification with the Philippines seems mainly triggered by cultural (mainly religious) differences and a need to achieve an identity rather than from a genuine rejection of this country. There are definite indications that Muslim Filipinos, adhering to religious values in a country where they are outnumbered by Christians, automatically consider themselves as a separate and distinct group of people. In a sense, one might consider this flocking together as also emanating from the instinct of self-preservation. Thus, it should not be surprising that Muslims here in the Philippines still consider themselves to be Filipinos (at least in a geographical sense), and despite the presence of grievances -- both perceived and real.

#### Perceptions of Peace and Order in the Community

The peace and order situation in Mindanao has been favorably pictured by both Muslims and non-Muslims. A majority of 77.1% of all those interviewed gave favorable comments on

the conditions within their community with most of them denying the presence of trouble and problems pertaining to peace and order. Those who gave unfavorable comments cited three major problems: 1) the presence of trouble-rousers, especially among drinkers; 2) clashes among community leaders and 3) the presence of undisciplined non-law abiding officials.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that only 40.3% rated their communities as "Very Safe". This may mean that, despite the rosy picture given, less than one-half actually feel secure in terms of the peace and order situation.

Discussion. The FFI research team have reason to consider the peace and order situation in Mindanao as relative. During the period of investigation, Cotabato was rated as the "Worst" place in terms of peace and order. Prevailing conditions then prevented the researchers from going about as freely as they did in the other regions such as Davao, Iligan and even Marawi City (which was pictured as a dangerous place). The main hazard posed in Cotabato, particularly in the city itself, is the presence of warring political parties: the "Sinsuat faction" and the "Pendatun-Matalam group". Frays and open gun-battles were frequent, especially after five o'clock in the afternoon. The atmosphere itself was obviously different in that people were wary and guarded in behavior. Ranking next to Cotabato was Jolo where a mini gang war took place not long after the researchers' departure in June of 1970.

Davao and Iligan were rated as the "most peaceful" of all Muslim areas visited.

#### Perception of Muslim-Christian Relationship

Tables 18 to 21 pertain to the manner in which Muslim-Christian relationships are viewed by both the Muslims and non-Muslims of Mindanao. Owing to the very high rate of refusals to comment, it is dangerous to make inferences on the subject of Muslim-Christian relationship using the survey data obtained.

However, there are indications that the relationship between Muslims and Christians is not perceived as adequate,

particularly by the former. Each group perceives the other as the rejecting party. The Muslims who were able to express themselves commented on the Christians' feeling of superiority and discriminating attitude. The non-Muslims, on the other hand, expressed similar feelings. Their impression is that it is the Christians who are looked down upon by the Muslims and treated with discrimination. One difference between the two groups is that negative attitudes towards Muslims were directly expressed by non-Muslim respondents, wherein the former group was described as treacherous and revengeful towards the Christians.

When the question was raised as to what conditions Muslims and Christians can cooperate with one another; three principal answers emerged:

1. "Have respect for each other.."
2. "Through intermarriage"
3. "No discrimination in giving privileges/opportunities"

Discussion. In general, Muslim-Christian relations leave much to be desired. This has been bared by the survey and the special trip undertaken to probe into prevailing conditions in Mindanao. While open hostility toward one another is averted, the interaction and relationship between the two groups is initially one of tolerance, cordiality and suspicion. Muslims consider Christians to be a discriminating and prejudiced people who look down on them, belittle their customs and traditions, and avoid their company. Christians, on the other hand, likewise perceive Muslims as withdrawn and generally distrustful of them.

Interviews and observations indicate the presence of a social cleavage with the Muslims on the one hand and Christians on the other. Each group extrapunitively expresses sentiments against the other with both parties justifying its own social distance as a natural response to what is seen as rejecting behavior. Counteracting this underlying sentiment is the conscious desire of both groups to be understanding and accepting of each other's views, concepts,

and ways of life. In social situations, particularly where members of both groups are present, one notes a tendency to deny the rift. Whether consciously or unconsciously, effort is exerted to erase the impression of differences through strong expressions of approval for one another.

### Valued Personal Traits

Table 24 shows that a premium is placed on the following three traits: honesty, helpfulness or cooperation, and hospitality (which is considered as "good public relations"). There are, however, differences in personal characteristics preferred. While both groups considered honesty as the most valuable trait, the Muslims<sup>o</sup> second and third choices were hospitality and good manners in this order; non-Muslims, on the other hand, ranked helpfulness second and hospitality third.

It is noteworthy that the first two personal traits considered as most important likewise apply to electoral candidates, meaning that, it is considered necessary for electoral candidates to be honest and helpful above all. In contrast, responsibility or maturity, patriotism, and intelligence have been positioned at the bottom of the scale.

Honesty, hospitality/good Public Relations, and industry are traits perceived by Muslims as most important in an electoral candidate. For non-Muslims, it is honesty, helpfulness, and loyalty or sincerity in this order.

Personal attributes or traits may be classified into the following three categories: (1) social-relational, with emphasis on the group (SR-G);<sup>\*</sup> (2) social-relational, with emphasis on the self (SR-S)<sup>\*\*</sup> and (3) individual qualities (IN-Q).<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Further analysis of the findings show a significant difference

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<sup>\*</sup> Behavioral traits that are principally perceived as benefiting a recipient group.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Behavioral traits that are principally perceived as benefiting "the other person" or individual recipient.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Behavioral traits or characteristics that are perceived as positive values in themselves and principally benefiting the possessor of said attributes.

between Muslims and non-Muslims in that the former gives more stress to individual qualities and social-relational traits with emphasis on self. Non-Muslims, on the other hand, give premium to social-relational traits and underplay the importance of individual qualities. These findings evidence the lack of group-orientation or "unity" among Muslim-Filipinos. Moreover, the wide difference (4.1% vs. 30.6%) in the group-orientation rating between the two groups suggest that non-Muslims have comparatively stronger group ties, hence are more unified.

TABLE 2  
PERSONAL TRAITS CONSIDERED "MOST" IMPORTANT

	TOTAL %	MUSLIMS %	NON- MUSLIMS %
<u>Social-Relational, with emphasis on Group (SR-G)</u>			
Helpfulness, cooperation	11.4	1.5	13.2
Hospitality, good PR	9.4	2.5	10.4
Loyalty, faithfulness, sincerity	3.5	0.1	4.0
Courtesy	<u>2.5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>3.0</u>
	<u>26.8</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>30.6</u>
<u>Social-Relational, with emphasis on Self (SR-S)</u>			
Honesty	26.2	28.6	25.6
Responsibility, maturity	1.4	-	1.6
Good manners	<u>10.5</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>12.3</u>
	<u>38.1</u>	<u>29.6</u>	<u>39.5</u>
<u>Individual Qualities</u>			
Industry	7.1	2.5	7.9
Intelligence	2.2	11.8	0.6
Others (brave, resourceful, etc.)	<u>17.8</u>	<u>35.0</u>	<u>15.1</u>
	<u>27.1</u>	<u>49.3</u>	<u>23.6</u>

From Table 3 below, it appears that non-Muslims look upon national traits, rather than national achievements, as the Filipinos' main object of pride. The fact that 43% of non-Muslim respondents failed to mention any particular reason as to why he is most proud might be taken as an indication of a lack of nation awareness among many Filipinos in Mindanao.

TABLE 3  
THINGS OF WHICH NON-MUSLIMS ARE MOST PROUD OF AS  
A FILIPINO CITIZEN

	%
<u>Responses Connoting Achievements of RP</u>	( 18.8 )
Independence	14.8
International beauties	2.8
National heroes	0.5
Philippine industries	0.5
President is one of the richest men	0.2
<u>Responses Connoting Qualities</u>	( 25.4 )
Filipino traits	17.5
Considered superiority	4.3
RP - birthplace	3.2
RP - only Christian nation in Asia	0.4
<u>Nothing to be proud of</u>	( 5.2 )
<u>Other Combined Responses</u> *	( 12.8 )
<u>No Answer</u>	( 37.8 )

\* With frequency of one each.

In addition to the Alpha findings, interviews with selected respondents reveal that despite the obvious significance of social issues, voters often relegate these into the background. Frequently, what largely tips the scale in favor of an electoral candidate and maximizes his chances of winning is the strength of his family's position in the community. Status or prestige and strong support from a large group of followers insure the candidate's success so that, to some extent, a potential winner may be spotted by his wide sphere of social influence, his large family and the image of his ancestry in the local community.

These data suggest a tendency on the part of Filipinos to be more subjective than objective in their choice of leaders. Premium is placed on personal traits that would benefit oneself rather than on a candidate's past performance, qualifications, or ability to do a good job.

Discussion. Honesty is regarded as the most valuable personal trait by Filipinos of Mindanao, an attribute which they further perceive as most important for an electoral candidate to possess. This finding in the Alpha portion of the FFI study is consistent with other data that show a tendency on the part of voters to relegate social issues into the background, notwithstanding their importance. Aside from individual status and prestige, what generally insures an electoral candidate's chances of winning is the influence and strength of his family in the community. Thus, a potential winner may be detected through a person's wide sphere of social influence, his large family, and the image of his ancestry in the local community.

Another significant finding points to the difference in the traits given importance by Muslims as compared to non-Muslims. The first group puts more stress on individual qualities and social-relational traits with emphasis on self while non-Muslims place

premium on social-relational traits and underplay the importance of individual qualities. This finding, along with data showing only a minority (26.8%) of the entire sample population as emphasizing SR-G traits strongly suggest a lack of group-orientedness among Filipinos in Mindanao, particularly among the Muslim population. Moreover, there are indications of lack of nation awareness among over two-fifths of the population investigated.

#### Top Ranking Muslim Leaders

The question "Who are the top Muslim leaders?" elicited nonresponses from the majority of the respondents interviewed. Only one out of five respondents answered the question. On the basis of those who replied, however, the following names were mentioned with the highest frequency: Congressman Ali Dimaporo, Malamit Umpa, Mamintal Tamano, Congressman Anni, Governor Sangkula, Governor Salih, Congressman Salipada Pendatun, Udtog Matalam and Blah Sinsuat.

The following are the "top Muslim leaders" by province:

1) Bukidnon; Senator Mamintal Tamano, Congressman Salipada Pendatun, Congressman Ali Dimaporo, Ex-Congressman Rasid Lucman, Ex-Senator Domocao Alonto and Ex-Governor Dimacuta; 2) Cotabato; Salipada Pendatun, Udtog Matalam, Blah Sinsuat and Simeon Datumanong; 3) Zamboanga del Sur; Hadji Nuño, Hadji Abdul Hah, Datu Ayu Mandi and Sakluran; 4) Misamis Oriental; Mamintal Tamano; 5) Salu; Congressman Anni, Governor Sangkula, Governor Salih, Yakiya Rodjare, Mayor A. Abubakar, Secretary S. Ututalum, Atty. Abraham Rasul and Yacob Isni; 6) Davao del Sur; Mamintal Tamano and 7) Lanao del Norte; Congressman Ali Dimaporo, Malamit Umpa and Senator Mamintal Tamano.

Principal reasons given for according status to Muslim leaders have to do with personal traits and the fact that these people have been elected in the positions they occupy. There is an appalling lack of awareness as to the programs of the leaders mentioned. However, from the meager feedbacks obtained, it would seem that: Mamintal Tamano is associated with community help and donations, helping to improve Muslim-Christian relations, helping members of the cultural minorities, construction of roads, bridges and schools, and improving employment and labor relations; Salipada Pendatun is associated with lawmaking; Ali Dimaporo is associated with construction of roads, bridges and schools, community help and donations, community improvement, land reform projects, helping improve Muslim-Christian relations and improving food production; Udtoq Matalam is associated with maintenance of peace and order; Simeon Datumanong and Secretary Ututalum are associated with construction of roads, bridges and schools; Rasid Lucman, Congressman Anni and Hadji Nuño are associated with community improvement; Domocao Alonto is associated with helping in the improvement of Muslim-Christian relations; Governor Sangkula is associated with construction of roads, bridges and schools and community improvement; Governor Salih is associated with construction of roads, bridges and schools, community improvement and teaching people religion; Mayor A. Abubakar is associated with construction of roads, bridges and schools and community improvement; Yakiya Rodjare is associated with construction of roads, bridges and schools and teaching people religion; Yacob Isni and Abraham Rasul are associated with teaching people religion; and Malamit Umpa is associated with maintaining peace and order, community improvement, community help and donations and construction of roads, bridges and schools.

### Top Ranking Community Leaders

The top ranking community leaders by province are as follows: Davao Oriental, Jing Angala; Davao del Sur; Lorenzo Aranguis, Inguan Bankas and Ricardo Reyes; Cotabato; Crispin Gardose and Arthur Bagang; Surigao del Sur; Mayor Masangkay, Mayor Linaza, Barrio Captain Tony Malazarte and Barrio Captain Salvacion; Davao del Norte; Agustin Ragay, Pedro Torno and Bonifacio Villa Abrilillo; Surigao del Norte; Eriberto Gemad, Bernalda Modelo, Ludivico Años, Floriano Ceda, Prudencio Gealan, Alfredo Ebal, Roque Geir, Sulphicio Codillo, Patillano Montanes, Andres Cabag-Iran, Lamberto Sibonga, Anselmo Premio, Fausto Perez, Ladelina Alceba, and Andres Tabasa; Camiguin; Congressman Jose Neri, Governor Crisologo Llacuna, Mayor Julio Vivares and Vice-Governor Antonio Corrales; Agusan; Exiquio Hesta, Dagani and Ernesto Campus; Bukidnon; Jose Aseñero, Candido Simbulan, Arthur Mariano, Pedro Ronario, Mayor Dinlayan, Teodoro Pepito and Alfredo Baldivia; Lanao del Sur; Barsi Tomawis, Macabayo Dicampong, Mata Atar, Tarimbabak Ronda, Shiek Alabi Abdul, Hadji Tiburon Alamada, Hadji Yusop, Quezon Gato, Basher Badio, Asis Batalo, Macondara Manardas, Hasien Alapa, Maura Patarean, Han Mariga and Mr. Olayo; Lanao del Norte; Mayor Simplicio Hernandez and Macabangkit Sangkay; Misamis Oriental; Marcelo Biaco and Timoteo Vasquez; Misamis Occidental; Timoteo Eribuagas, Isabelo Bembrazo, William Gonzaga, Dionisio Tejano and Ramon Quimno; Zamboanga del Norte; Bartolome Saile, Mayor M. Bael, Jaime Reynate, Felipe Delasas, Gil Bermudez and E. Acosta; Zamboanga del Sur; Nicolas Guevarra and Tomas Gonzales; and Sulu; Barrio Captain, Gumla Yusop, Alawi Abubakar, Calli Ahmad and Hadji O. Ismael.

### Top Ranking Provincial/City Leaders

Enumerated are the top ranking provincial/city leaders: Camiguin; Jose Neri, Crisologo Llacuna, Julio Vivares, Antonio Corrales, Vicente Aravas and Councilor Reyes; Misamis Oriental; Romulo Rodriguez, J. Serriña, P. Roa and Governor Diel; Davao

del Norte; Verulo Boiser and Lorenzo Sarmiento; Davao del Sur; Elias Lopez and De los Cientos; Bukidnon; Governor Carlos Fortich, Congressman Cesar Fortich, Esmeraldo Cudal, Pedro Daapong, Rosario Rodano and Angelo Lopez; Cotabato; Salipada Pendatun, Simeon Datumanong, Honorable Angeles and Blah Sinsuat; Davao Oriental; Constancio Maglana, Leopoldo Lopez and Doding Palma Gil; Surigao del Norte; Governor Jose Sering, Constantino Navarro, Mr. Cortez, Mr. Eviota, Mrs. Patenio and Mrs. Hondrado; Sulu; Congressman Indanan Anni, Governor Murphy Sangkula, Mayor A. Abubakar, Hadji Arsad Salih and Secretary Salih Ututalum; Lanao del Norte; Mayor Camilo Cabili, Governor Arsenio Quibranza, Congressman Ali Dimaporo and Vice-Mayor Gerardo Padilla; Lanao del Sur; Linang Mandangan, Vice-Governor Marohombsar, Omar Dianala, Rasid Sampaco, Guiemba Mendayan and Honorable Lucman; Zamboanga del Norte; Congressman F. Azcuna and Governor Lacaya; Zamboanga del Sur; Joaquin Enriquez, Jr. and Mayor Brown; Misamis Occidental; Mayor Alfonso Tan; Agusan; G. Sanchez, Consuelo Calo, Osin, Democrito Plaza and Jose Gonzales and Surigao del Sur; Governor Castillo and Congressman Puyat.

From Table 38, it would seem that Muslims consider their congressmen, governors and mayors in this order as persons most capable of helping them if given the resources and the help to accomplish the objectives set. When asked to comment as to whether the persons identified were liked by the people or not, a majority of 85.2% (of Muslim respondents) expressed a feeling that these persons were liked.

Discussion. Congressman Mohammed Ali Dimaporo, described by Muslims as the richest man in Lanao, appears to be the most powerful Muslim-Filipino in the sense that he received the highest frequency of mentions as a "top Muslim leader". However, caution must be taken in interpreting the ratings indicated in Tables 27 to 29 owing to the significantly high rate of nonresponses.

In Sulu, the indisputable leaders are Congressman Indanan Anni and Governor Murphy Sangkula.

In Cotabato, a power struggle exists between the Pendatun-Matalam faction on the one hand and the Sinsuat group on the other. The upper valley is controlled by the latter while the lower is run by the first faction. Ex-Governor Matalam, said to have a large group of followers, is considered as a leader of the masses. Congressman Pendatun\* is looked upon as a leader for intellectuals.

On the Sinsuat side are the following leaders: Mama Sinsuat, Datu Blah Sinsuat, Hadji Odin Sinsuat, Datu Puti Sinsuat and Datu Mando Sinsuat.

The stronger of the two groups is the Pendatun-Matalam faction\*\* and this seems amply verified by the ratings in Tables 28a and 29a.

	<u>Table 28a Rating</u>	<u>Table 29a Rating</u>
	%	%
Salipada Pendatun	26.2	20.2
Blah Sinsuat	10.7	17.8
Udtoy Matalam	8.3	20.2

On the whole and based on the overall findings, the following may be considered as among the Muslim elite:\*\*\*

- 1) Congressman Moh. Ali Dimaporo, 2) Senator Mamintal Tamano,
- 3) Congressman Salipada Pendatun, 4) Ex-Governor Udtoy Matalam (organizer and leader of the Mindanao Independence Movement),
- 5) Congressman Indanan Anni (organizer of the United Muslims of the Philippines and considered by Joloans as a top Muslim leader),

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\* President of the Muslim Association of the Philippines

\*\* Based on the feedbacks from various persons (respondents) in Mindanao and those familiar with the political struggle between the two groups. The Sinsuat faction, however, is the most powerful in Cotabato City.

\*\*\* Not necessarily in this order.

- 6) Governor Murphy Sangkula (to whom credit is given for the construction of the new provincial capitol building in Jolo),
- 7) Governor Salih, 8) Datu Blah Sinsuat, 9) Ex-Congressman Rasid Lucman, 10) Ex-Senator Domocao Alonto\*, 11) Simeon Datumanong, 12) Hadji Nuño, 13) Secretary Salih Ututalum and 14) Linang Mandangan.

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\* Immediate past President of the Muslim Association of the Philippines (MAP).

## CHAPTER 7

## MUSLIM PROBLEMS IN PERSPECTIVE

While Mindanao has been dubbed a land of promise and properly so, little has been done to contribute to its development and look into the welfare of its people, particularly those in the so-called minority group.

The multiple problems present may principally be described as economic and social in nature, with perhaps the second factor playing a vital role in the growth of the former.

The Economic and Social Problems

The economic and social problems of Muslim Filipinos are concentrated around the following: (1) limited opportunities for regular employment; (2) lack of adequate knowledge of mechanized farming; (3) inadequate income; (4) lack of domesticated farm animals; (5) inadequate electrical service; (6) poorly maintained roads and difficulty of transportation; (7) inefficient mail service; (8) poor health and sanitation facilities; (9) disparity in educational advantages between those provided for the predominantly Muslim provinces and the rest of the country; (10) dearth of qualified public teachers and inadequate educational facilities; (11) agrarian problems and (12) lack of rapport between the Christians and Muslims.

Limited Opportunities for Regular Employment. Opportunities for regular employment are very rare. Firstly, there are very few Muslims who have the skills needed for employment. Despite a high regard for professional occupations in Lanao del Sur and Marawi City as per census of 1960, only 188 had completed

a four-year college course. Professional and college degree holders among the Maranaos are relatively few and this predicament is mainly due to the financial inability of parents to send their children to college. Secondly, not many industrial firms have been attracted to the region. With the exception of the cities of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, Iligan, and perhaps Zamboanga where industrialization has taken place, Mindanao can be described as a frontier region which is still in the process of developing its potentials.

Lack of Adequate Knowledge of Mechanized Farming.

Farming is generally very primitive and is done without the use of fertilizers, insecticides and other requirements of scientific farm management. In addition to this is the lack of sufficient capital to go into mechanized farming and improved methods of agriculture.

Inadequate Income. The income of the average family is very meager. Because of pressing family needs and lack of adequate storage, a rice farmer usually sells all his produce immediately after harvest and resorts to buying for family consumption later in the year.

Lack of Domesticated Farm Animals. Chickens are hardly or inadequately domesticated. Hogs are never raised because of religious restraint.

Inadequate Electrical Service. Despite the fact that Lake Lanao provides the water which generates electric power at the Maria Cristina Hydro-electric Plant, there is no electrical service around the lake except in the Mindanao State University (MSU) campus and in some areas in Marawi City where electric lines from Iligan have been installed.

Poorly Maintained Roads. Roads in Lanao del Sur and in Cotabato are very poorly maintained thus making transportation difficult. Commuting from one town to another around Lake Lanao

is difficult and dangerous. Regular transportation facilities are rare and when available are unduly overloaded.

Mail service is, on the whole, inadequate.

Poor Health and Sanitation Facilities. Health and sanitation is a major problem as indicated by the mortality rate among Muslim-Filipinos which is high compared to the national average. This is in part influenced by the existence of traditions and beliefs. For instance, the Muslims, especially the Maranaos in the rural areas, are suspicious of drugs and medical treatments administered by physicians and other medical personnel, preferring the services of quack doctors and herbolarios. Unscientific beliefs are so pervasive and deeply-rooted in the culture of the people as to prevent them from cooperating in government health programs such as vaccinations, deworming projects, and other sanitary measures for community hygiene. This cultural apathy towards modern medicine is compounded by the lack of government health personnel in the different Muslim communities.

Statistics show that in the preponderantly Muslim provinces of Sulu, Cotabato, and Lanao del Sur, there are many municipalities without complete rural health units. In Lanao del Sur alone, there are more than ten municipalities without either a physician or nurse and the people here depend solely on sanitary inspectors whose medical knowledge may be inadequate. There is only one government hospital, the Lanao Provincial Hospital, and its facilities are not adequate to cope with the increasing number of patients seeking admission, while the few private medical clinics in Marawi City can accommodate only 10 to 15 patients. This problem is compounded by the fact that schools have no facilities nor personnel to teach better health and sanitation in the community. For instance, in 1966, a school physician could only examine 5%

of the pupils, the dentist could treat 14%, and the nurse could minister to 8%. On top of these, there was no medicine to dispense. Out of 2,673 pupils who were examined, 831 were found to be suffering from tinea flava, but they remained untreated for lack of medicine. In Sulu, some 42,000 children have been under the care of one physician; 21,290 children are served by one dentist and 10,500 children by one nurse.

Disparity in Educational Advantages. There is a disparity in educational advantages between those provided for in the predominantly Muslim provinces and the rest of the country. Adding to this problem is the lack of educational facilities provided to the inhabitants of Muslim areas as well as the percentage of drop-outs.

Dearth of Qualified Public Teachers. There is a dearth of qualified public teachers and, the educational curriculum, as described, is deficient. Firstly which is geared towards educating the Christian communities is made to fit into Muslim regions. Secondly, the present curriculum is overcrowded with a wide range of subjects having short time allotments.

There is a need for more school buildings; more classrooms; more textbooks and instructional materials. Because of these inadequacies, opportunities for cultural advancement are greatly limited.

Agrarian Problems.<sup>67</sup> On top of all these difficulties, the influx of migrants into the province of Cotabato has

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<sup>67</sup> Manaros Boransing, "The Land Problems of the National Cultural Minority: A Position Paper" (Manila: A paper read on the occasion of the Seminar-Workshop of the Presidential Committee on Land Problems held at the SSS Auditorium on August 4-5, 1970), pp. 1 & 3 (mimeographed).

triggered a number of agrarian problems as Muslims, although without legal titles, refused to give up their land on the basis of traditional and historical claims. To date, the Muslims who used to dominate the area now constitute only one-third of its population, the remaining two-thirds being mostly Christian settlers.

The land grabbing problem in minority areas has been practised even before World War II but the issue was not raised earlier because there was still sufficient land at the time. In the early 1930's however, Christian settlers started to migrate to Mindanao. Congressman Pendatun recalls that it was the late President Osmeña who facilitated the Christian migration to Mindanao, making this possible through the help of prominent Muslim datus in Cotabato and Lanao.

The traditional system of land holding and land use came face to face with the Western system at the onset of the American regime. At the time of the first Cadastral Survey in the middle of the 1930's, the Muslims and other minority groups were not fully acquainted with the system of land titling. Moreover, at that time, they had not fully accepted the fact that they become Filipinos and, therefore, was subject to Philippine laws. To the Muslims and other minority groups, land title holds little meaning and is perceived as having no practical value. Land holding being governed by traditional laws (adat), the concept of land titling was alien. What matters to them is that they can occupy the land and raise their crops.

These gave the Christian migrants a built-in advantage. Being more educated and acquainted with the system of land titling and reinforced by the fact that practically all the government personnel involved in the granting of titles were Christians, it was easier for them to acquire land titles.

It is noteworthy and significant that, aside from the Cadastral Survey in the 1930s, there never was another massive government effort to do another cadastral survey until now.

The problem was complicated further by copying the American system of land titling. Land owners are required to go to the Buresu of Lands or hire a surveyor to obtain land titles. While this system has been successful in the United States, it has not worked as well in the Philippines owing to the major factors: poverty and ignorance. In the first place, people are generally not familiar with the government's procedure in relation to land title acquisition. Then even if they did, most of them can ill afford to spend for the survey and processing of papers. The problems are enhanced by the bureaucratic methods of government agencies involved. Although charged with the responsibility of assisting the public, government personnel often act only when complaints and/or applications are presented to them.

A study completed by the Senate Committee on Cultural Minorities (SCCM) in 1963 likewise points to the significance of agrarian problems and their crucial role on Muslim-Christian relationship. According to this study, the provinces of Davao, Cotabato, Bukidnon and the island of Basilan are the major trouble spots. Natives in these provinces have complained that they were being driven away by influential persons and big companies who have been awarded rights to lands long occupied and improved by members of the cultural minorities. The following accounts (abstracted from the research report of the SCCM) should provide some insights:

1. Requests for the exclusion of the areas occupied by natives from the areas awarded to large corporations and influential persons were received from Tibulao, Panabo; Malabog, Bunawan district; and Kilagdeng and La-ac in Asuncion, all in Davao province.

2. A petition was received from Sinolon, Banga in Cotabato asking for the cancellation of the permits awarded to a local government official, well-to-do individuals and other Christians. Here the natives claimed that their crops were being destroyed and that they were being driven toward the mountains. In both provinces, the Minorities bewailed their inability to learn about, and to protect, their rights ...

3. In Bukidnon, natives charged several influential persons, including an engineer, a government prosecutor, a judge, a physician, and a former government official with land-grabbing and harassment. The exclusion of 6,500 hectares in Barrio Guihean, Impasugong, from the logging concession of a large corporation was also requested.

4. In Basilan, Yakans from Calvario, Kapatagan and Moslem migrants in Pamonalin, Maluso, complained that their lands have been awarded to, and their plants being destroyed by, outside applicants. Some of the natives expressed their willingness to go to jail so that their families would not starve.

5. A request for the denial of an additional pasture lease application of a wealthy rancher was submitted by Bilaans in Matanao, Davao. The natives claimed that they were being tricked and driven away by agents of the Bureau of Forestry and Lands. They threatened to take up arms if their grievances were not heard.

6. Bilaans from Lamba, Cotabato, also charged that the cattle of influential ranch applicants, one of whom was a judge, were destroying their crops. The natives claimed that in the investigation of the application of a rancher from Banga, the District Forester showed partiality to the applicant.

The Bilaans are asking for the denial of the pasture application.

7. Complaints that lands applied for by natives were awarded to Christians, and that government surveyors do not pay attention to the Minorities, were received from Banga, Buluan and Columbio in Cotabato. Cases of private parties engaged in bringing in settlers for a fee and in conducting surveys that have prejudiced the minorities in Davao City and in Banga, Cotabato, were brought to the attention of the researchers.

Ignorance and poverty on the part of the Cultural Minorities and connivance between influential people, local politicians and government agents in charge of the disposition of land matters were blamed for the occurrence of the aforementioned problems.

8. Requests for the proclamation of reservations, the release from the forest zone of lands occupied and improved by the Minorities, and their subdivision to the native occupants were received from Lake Sebu, Banga, and Polomolok, Columbio, both in Cotabato; from different barrios of Impasugong, and from Upper Pulangi, Dangkagan, and in Dagumbaan, Maramag, all in Bukidnon; from Calvario, Kapatagan, Basilan City; and from the other areas where cases of conflict were reported earlier.

9. In Magdagondon, Lupon, Davao, Moslems asked for the return of the reservation, proclaimed in 1915, which had been disposed of by the Sultan-founder of the Community.

The release of additional hectares for the CNI settlement at Palomolok, Cotabato, in order to accommodate more Minority applicants was also requested.

10. The need for the dredging of the lakes which have covered part of the old reservations in Recodo and in Campo

Islam, which could be used for homesites, and the purchase of private lands for a Moslem reservation in Rio Hondo, Zamboanga City, was also expressed.

11. Conflicts between Moslems and Christian settlers in the NARRA settlement in Bato Bato, Tawi Tawi were reported. The desire of natives to settle in the NARRA settlement, or to have a reservation of their own in Sulu, was brought out.

Lack of Rapport Between Christians and Muslims. As discussed in the previous chapter, there is an evident lack of rapport between the Christians on the one hand and Muslims on the other. The latter tend to perceive the former as a discriminating and prejudiced people who look down on them, belittle their customs and traditions, and avoid their company. Christians, on the other hand, see Muslims as generally withdrawn and distrustful people. (According to psychoanalytical interpretation, ethnic hostility is a projection of unacceptable inner strivings on to a minority group. Projection is a mechanism by means of which one tries to solve a conflict within oneself by ascribing to another person emotions, motives, and behavior which actually belong to oneself. For instance, if we hate another person without justification, that creates a conflict within us if our conscience does not approve of the emotion of hatred. Instead of solving this conflict by overcoming our hatred, we may try to get rid of it through projection. We project our hatred into the other person so that it appears to us not as if we hate him, but that he hates us. Thus in a devious way we not only try to get rid of an emotion which is not acceptable to our conscience, we are also now justified in hating the other person if we so desire, because we think he is hating us).

Personal interviews with both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, observations, and secondary information all suggest the existence of discrimination towards the minority

group of Muslim Filipinos. The Mindanao Development Authority, for instance, are more manned by migrants than by the natives of Mindanao. Military reservations in Muslim cities have reportedly caused more irritants and suspicion since the image of these soldiers is that of "enemies of the faith." The resettlement of "reformed criminals" established in Muslim areas facilitated the establishment of syndicates like the Octopus. Licenses to timberland and timber concessionaires have also been known to cause destruction and result in the death of many Muslims and other cultural minorities.

Mr. Macapanton Abbas, Jr.<sup>68</sup> adequately summed up the feelings of the Muslim people in his paper: "Towards the Integration of Muslim Filipinos". To quote him: "In the cabinet of Presidents of the Philippines, the Muslims have been privileged to serve only one position, the Commission on National Integration (created in 1957) ... In the Judiciary, no one has yet reached the appellate court. Only two Muslims have ever been appointed Court of First Instance Judge: the first Muslim CFI judge was the late Macapanton Abbas, Sr. appointed by the President Ramon Magsaysay, the second being Judge Mama Busran who was appointed by President Macapagal and who was reappointed by President Marcos when his appointment was bypassed by the Commission on Appointments.

In the military, only two Muslims have ever been admitted to the Philippine Military Academy, then still known as Philippine Constabulary School: namely Luis Marohombsar and Pullong Arpa. These two graduates have since then been promoted to the rank of Colonel and have retired. Muslim Filipino applicants to the PMA have always been disqualified for one reason or another, thus discouraging possible recruits

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<sup>68</sup> Macapanton Abbas, Jr., "Towards the Integration of Muslim Filipinos," Journal on National Integration, Manila; Bu. of Printing, (1968), pp. 11-12.

from applying at all.

... Only one Muslim since the founding of this Republic has ever been appointed General. Mamarinta Lao was appointed by President Macapagal, but for some reason, although his service was only 28 years, 2 years short of the 30-year service requirement for retirement, he was retired in the administration of President Marcos ...

It is therefore not any wonder that the Filipino Muslims feel that they are at a very great disadvantage compared to their Christian counterparts. They have not only to overcome their feeling of inferiority given them by their Christian brothers, they have also to overcome the formidable three centuries of backwardness in technology, science and education ...

Because their Islamic religion is closely interwoven into their culture, tradition and way of life, the consistent reduction of their power in the South and the eventual incursions of non-Muslims into their territory pose a challenge to their very existence, and survival as a people. Whereas before, the South was predominantly a Muslim land, now less than 23 years after the Republic, they have only 4 Muslim Filipino Congressmen, 3 Muslim Filipino Governors, one Muslim Filipino City Mayor and one cabinet member. Zamboanga, Davao, Basilan, Iligan were lost sometime ago and now Cotabato has likewise fallen out of their sphere.

This feeling of urgency and fear of eventual extinction should be understood by those in power and responsible for policy-making in the country ... "

#### The Mindanao Secession Movement

For some time now, there have been speculations and loose talk about Mindanao's plan to secede. These have been triggered by the openly hostile sentiments expressed by discontented

Muslim leaders and certain directions taken towards self-government. In view of this, the assessment of the situation and determination as to whether or not a real danger exists became objectives of the study.

From the Alpha Survey and data obtained from various informants -- both Muslims and non-Muslims -- it appears that the Muslim Filipinos are divided into two: those in favor of secession and those who are against it -- with the latter being only slightly behind in number (55% as contrasted to 45% whose attitudes range from ambivalence to negativism). Informants and even Datu Udtog Matalam, Ex-Governor of Cotabato, himself admits to the existence of a Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM), the purpose of which is to unite the Muslims toward a common goal: the independence of Mindanao.

Datu Matalam, organizer of the MIM, has been actively soliciting members and requesting for support from people in the various regions of Mindanao. He views Mindanao as economically self-sufficient, and, as such, fully capable of handling its own affairs. Echoing the general feelings and sentiments of Muslim Filipinos, he deplored what he calls the government's neglect of a region which has been a rich source of income for the administration. He likewise cited the familiar problems of bad roads, lack of peace and order, economic crises and the widening gap between the rich and the poor.

Datu Matalam openly advocates secession as a solution to the present Muslim problems. But he was also amenable to the concept of a federated form of government which he feels would enable the Muslims to participate more actively in the affairs of the government. He likewise emphasized efficient management of government as his principal desire, further stressing that he is mainly interested in seeing the development and progress of Mindanao regardless of who is in power. To the Ex-Governor, it is of little importance who governs and controls the region -- whether Christians or Muslims -- so long as the goal is achieved.

Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, Alejandro Almendras and Roseller T. Lim were among those he cited as capable of ministering to the needs of people in Mindanao.

Secession can be regarded as the anti-thesis of integration and when a section of the population threatens to secede, it somehow points to a weakness of the government to enhance unity. While non-secessionists tend to take the matter lightly, the secessionists are reportedly increasing the strength of their activities through a widespread propaganda. Besides the old Ex-Governor of Cotabato, there are effective propagandists who are behind this movement and who can influence others to join them in increasing number. Thus while no immediate danger is seen, there is the possibility that more drastic measures may be used at some future time to obtain the desired governmental reforms. In view of this, it is in order to keep a watchful eye on the movement and to take the necessary steps toward strengthening the nation through intensified program of national integration.

#### Integration as a National Goal

National integration is a common goal towards which many strive. And yet it holds different meanings for different people. One school of thought presupposes that national integration can be achieved by providing only the same sets of cultural traits, ways of life, and systems of thought and government to all Filipinos. It proposes the assimilation of the cultural minorities into the mainstream of Philippine society, which implies, among other things, that all of them shall eventually be Christians. In this process, the cultures of the minorities must be absorbed by the culture of the dominant group, that is, the Christians. The other major school of thought conceives of national integration in terms of human tolerance in an atmosphere of liberalmindedness. Advocates of the school favor the idea of cultural plurality, in which the members of both the majority and the minority groups are in mutual agreement to co-exist with each other peacefully despite marked differences in their cultural heritage.

This suggests that assimilation and cultural plurality are polar to each other. The former idea connotes some forced process; assimilation is effected by absorbing minor parts into the major or dominant part. Cultural plurality, on the other hand, invites liberalism in idea and action and advocates tolerance of group differences.

Despite the obvious advantages of the latter over the former, the two processes can be considered as extremes. In the process of assimilation, the minority groups, despite their resistance, have to lose their identities in the midst of the majority group. Conversely, these identities have to be preserved in the process of cultural plurality, even if they occasionally hamper the smooth functioning of the entire society or nation.<sup>69</sup>

Hence, Mr. Leothiny S. Clavel suggests a midpoint between the two extremes in what he calls "free cultural" borrowing. In this case, a cultural group may absorb only the traits which it desires of the majority or minority group. At the same time, it can also refuse influences which it dislikes.

The same author suggests that national integration be equated with a nation's political cohesiveness which basically demands that both the Christians and non-Christians submit some of their primary rights to the state and subject themselves to its law. To both groups, there shall only be one government.

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<sup>69</sup> Leothiny S. Clavel, "National Integration: A Case of Planned Change", Journal on National Integration (Quezon City: Bureau of Printing, 1968), pp. 15 - 16.

## CHAPTER 8

## AGENTS OF CHANGE AND BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION

The efforts to integrate the minorities into the body politic date as far back as the latter half of the 19th century. During this period, the Spanish missionaries and the governors-general organized politico-military comandancias for each of the minority language groups. Here, the minorities' affairs were controlled and supervised.

From 1900 to 1910, the Philippine Commission set up special provinces and towns, which were patterned, to some degree, after the comandancias. In 1902, the so-called Moro Province was established and this covered the whole island of Mindanao and Sulu. The Philippine Commission, by virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902, exercised jurisdiction and control over it.

In 1907, the Department of Mindanao and Sulu administered the Moro province. A Military Governor headed this department and under him were deputy governors for each sub-province of Zamboanga, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Agusan, Bukidnon, Surigao, and Sulu. The department was under the immediate control of the Philippine Commission.

Under the Reorganization Act No. 2913 the Department of Mindanao and Sulu was abolished, and so in 1917 the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribe was organized. The latter was "to continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, internal, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between the complete fusion of all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago."

The administration of non-Christians was placed under the control of the Secretary of the Interior through the Director of non-Christian Tribes. The Director appointed governors and deputy-governors for each special province supposed to be non-Christians. After the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the executive orders and memoranda he promulgated had the force of law upon the non-Christians.

The Director also approved the resolutions and ordinances of the various provincial boards under his jurisdiction. He could ask the Constabulary to assist him and his subordinates to execute the function of their office.

With the passage of the Reorganization Act was the transformation of sub-provinces which constituted the Moro Province into special provinces. Under this Act, these provinces were provided with semi-civil regimes.

The law abolished the Department Governor and so for some time it became the policy that the Provincial Commanders of the Constabulary were to be appointed Provincial Governors of the special provinces. Later, Civil Governors were appointed in the special provinces of Lanao, Zamboanga, Sulu, Davao, Agusan and Bukidnon.

Under the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, each special province was divided into districts, and each district was administered by a Deputy Governor. Each district was further subdivided into municipal districts. The president, vice-president and councilors in every municipal district were elected by the people in informal elections.

During the Commonwealth period, the Bureau was abolished and replaced by the office of the Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu. When the Department of the Interior, under which the Commissioner for Mindanao was placed, was abolished in 1950, the duty of the Commissioner was assumed by the Office of the President.

In 1956 until the creation of the Commission on National Integration in 1957, the Executive Secretary discharged this duty.

Created by Republic Act 1888, the Commission aims at bringing about the "economic, social and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos" and of rendering "real, complete and permanent (their) integration ... into the body politic." To attain this goal, it has drawn up four major projects, namely, the scholarship, settlement, legal, and social and administrative programs.

This brief description of the agencies created for the purpose of helping the minorities improve their living conditions and, adopt modern ways of life, demonstrates the government's interest in bringing about national integration, yet to what extent their attempts were effective in bringing about changes and improvements in the socio-cultural life of the minorities is the large question which is taken up in the following discussions.<sup>70</sup>

#### An Evaluation of Integration Efforts<sup>71</sup>

The integration efforts during the Spanish regime were designed to "assimilate" the non-Christians into the already growing Christian society. Spanish missionaries penetrated the hinterlands of the country, so that, among others, most Muslims in Rizal and Batangas had been converted to Christianity before the arrival of the Americans.

In Mindanao, Sulu and some parts of Palawan, the Spanish missionaries met difficulties with the Muslims. They found these minorities deeply ingrained in their faith and willing to die for it. The Muslims thwarted any effort to convert them

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid, pp. 18-20.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, pp. 21-26.

to another faith, since they believed that Islam was the only religion for them and the only way of life under which they could rear their children with peace and contentment.

To control and supervise the affairs of the non-Christians, the Spanish government in the Philippines established politico-military comandancias where people were taught modern ways of living and enlightened on Christian doctrines.

If the Spaniards would make the number of Filipinos converted to Christianity as the criterion for "national integration" (in this particular sense, assimilation), then they could claim that they almost succeeded in their integration efforts.

Before the Spaniards came to the Philippines, the Muslims were actually the majority group, and because they were able to reverse the picture -- that is, reduce this majority group to size and create a new majority group composed of Christians.

Historically, the early Muslim natives in the 13th century could be considered as the first majority group in the Philippines. When the Spaniards first came to Manila in 1570, it was a principality ruled by Muslim rajahs who were members of the ruling family of Brunei. There were also indications that many provinces were peopled by Muslims. At this time, most Muslims were found in Mindanao, but Islamic practices like the avoidance of pork and the performance of prayer rituals were already spreading in Batangas and even as far North as the provinces of Cagayan. The datus in the island of Mindanao between Luzon and Sulu, were also Muslims who were tributary to the Sulu Sultan. One may therefore conclude that most inhabitants of Mindoro were Muslims.

As early as the latter part of the 13th century, the idea of integrating all the natives of Mindanao into one homogeneous group was already known. The whole idea, however, was inspired by purely economic motives. The early Muslim traders who came

to the Philippines, were looking forward to the conversion of the entire Mindanao into a Muslim territory. They wanted to convert all its inhabitants to Islam, because trade with them would improve if they had common religious beliefs. Later on, the Makdumin (Arab singular: Makdum) or the Muslim missionaries, considered it necessary to integrate them into one religious body through the preaching of the Koran and through efforts to dispel all superstitious beliefs.

In the political sense, however, the movement was not for national integration. The people had yet no idea of a nation or a national life. The inhabitants of the different islands were still organized into political entities (i.e., barangays); their sense of nationhood was aroused only after the Spaniards had successfully introduced Christianity in most parts of the country. This was in the latter part of the 16th century and the natives had to accept painfully the sudden intrusion of an entirely new culture -- the Spanish culture -- into their way of life. All Muslim provinces were made Christian within the next 200 years or so, with the exception of the Sulu Sultanate and, to some extent, the Maguindanao Sultanate in Mindanao. These sultanates maintained an almost independent status until the last quarter of the 19th century.

In this period, the Spaniards had realized that most of the Muslims in said sultanates were deeply rooted in their faith, and they could not do anything to convert them to Christianity. They had to face the truth that they could not solve what they called the "Moro Problem", which was more or less the problem of converting the Muslims in the South and assimilating them into the mainstream of the already forming Philippine society.

The efforts at national integration took a different form under the Americans. This time, it was to be effected according to the principle of cultural plurality.

In brief, the Americans aimed at achieving national integration, initially, by solving the land problems of the minorities. With their creation of the Moro Province, they started one of the greatest changes in Philippine society: the bringing of the Muslims close to the government and the establishing of their intimate contact with their Christian fellowmen. Such contact was developed and maintained through the different agencies (e.g. the Department of Mindanao and Sulu Tribes, etc.) designed to improve their living conditions.

However, the settlement program of the Americans was quite defective: Positive incentives for permanent settlement were absent during their regime. Although they succeeded to a considerable degree in settling many minority groups in the reservations, they failed to encourage them to live there permanently. After their settlement, the minorities were left on their own and because of their meager education, their civilized neighbors would succeed in driving them out of their lands once they had cleared and brought them under cultivation.

The lack of positive incentives for permanent settlement went on until the Commonwealth period, so that the reservations were not fully developed. Until the outbreak of World War II, the minorities who were settled at the various reservations, seldom, if ever, received aid from the government.

It was worse during the Japanese occupation. The Japanese made vegetable gardens out of many reservations. Those whose reservations did not fall into the hands of the Japanese had to give the same up to unscrupulous Christian Filipinos who lived with them while hiding from the Japanese.

Some reservations which were rendered maimed by the war were activated upon the creation of the Commission on National Integration in 1957.

The Commission was created as a result of the nation's awareness of the deteriorating peace and order in some areas in Mindanao. The years following the liberation had left the Muslims and other cultural minorities on their own. They had to fend for themselves in the fast-changing, mid-century Philippines.

Population growth caused these people to go deeper into the hinterlands, and cases of landgrabblings by influential persons and other forms of agrarian malpractices caused personal conflicts among themselves. The most serious of these conflicts found expression in the uprisings of Datu Tawantawan and his followers in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte and that of Kamlon in Luuk, Sulu, in the early 50's. The government spent millions of pesos in suppressing these threats to the country's peace and order.

In the 50's, therefore, the Moro Problem was generated by the government's neglect of many Muslims in Cagayan, Zamboanga, and most especially Sulu, who in their frustrated efforts to get government aid, threatened the national peace and order with sporadic revolts. It had, in other words, become a problem of quelling the uprisings of discontented Muslims and establishing peace and order in many areas in Mindanao.

Consequently, a House Committee was created by Congress in 1954 to study the problem. The Committee found that said problem was actually one of integrating the Muslims into the body politic. It was thought that this could be done, primarily, by making them realize the fact that they are also Filipinos for whose welfare the government was instituted.\* The Committee recommended, then the creation of a special agency, later known as the Commission on National Integration, which could attend to the social, economic and political needs of the country's cultural minorities.

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\* Emphasis, ours.

Like its predecessors, the Commission aims at improving the living condition of the minorities, by giving them farm lots in reservations, helping them out in their land problems, granting scholarships to the deserving among them, and extending social aids such as tractors, fertilizers, or even money to pay hospital bills.

General legal services are extended to those minorities who are victims of landgrabbing by some influential people. For example, records show that from 1963 to 1966, there were 456 cases brought to the attention of the Commission. Within this period, however, the Commission had 16 decided cases only -- both civil and criminal. From 1963 it has (some) 760 civil cases and 251 criminal cases pending in court.

At this point, these main questions may be posed: "Are these integration programs moving things towards the objective of Republic Act 1888? How effective are these programs as means for achieving national integration?" Our evaluation of the CNI in terms of goal attainment may be gleaned from the succeeding paragraphs.

#### An Evaluation of the CNI From an Economic Perspective

A Review of the Beginnings of the Commission. The establishment of the Commission on National Integration in 1957 was preceded by a succession of government agencies charged with the responsibility of accelerating the political, economic, educational and social development of the Muslims. During the American occupation, the first civilian government in the Muslim areas was created in 1903, within the so-called Moro Province. The Moro Province was subdivided into subprovinces of Agusan, Bukidnon, Davao, Lanao and Zamboanga (including Basilan and Sulu). In 1913 the Moro Province was replaced by the Department of Mindanao and Sulu; the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was created under this Department in 1916. In 1920 the Department was

abolished and the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes exercised its functions under the newly-created Department of the Interior. Then, in 1936, the Office of the Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu was created within the Department of the Interior, with headquarters at Dansalan, Lanao (now Marawi City).

All these government agencies were concerned mainly with road building, peace and order, land subdivision and settlement. Independence brought a new succession of agencies. The Department of the Interior was abolished and its function transferred to the Office of the President. The responsibility for overseeing Muslim welfare was transferred to a small section of the legal department under the Office of the President, and the main activity of this section was the administration of the scholarship funds for non-Christians.

This long succession of agencies was an indication of a chronic dissatisfaction with the government agencies with responsibility for the welfare of Muslims. National attention was finally focused on the so-called Moro Problem in 1955, during the height of the Kamlon campaign, when the House of Representatives created a committee to study the problems of the Muslims.\* It was apparent to the congressional committee that the neglect of the National government had almost alienated the Muslims from the rest of the country. The committee found that Muslims felt such resentment for the government that a significant number felt offended to be called Filipinos.\*\*

It was under this background that the CNI was created. Its charter was approved in 1955, and implemented in 1957 with the appointment of Madki Alonto as first commissioner.

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\* The Committee members were Congressmen Alonto of Lanao, Mangelan of Cotabato and Amilbangsa of Sulu.

\*\* A finding which tallies with the Alpha survey data.

Functions and Duties of the CNI. The most striking characteristics of the charter of the CNI is the extremely wide range of functions entrusted to it. The Commission has the power, function and duty: (1) to engage in industrial and agricultural enterprises for the benefit of the cultural minorities, to be eventually transferred to those minorities at cost; (2) to provide all types of utilities to the cultural minorities: irrigation systems, dams, generating plants, etc.; (3) to cooperate with government agricultural extension workers in assisting farmers; (4) to set le landless members of the minorities on homesteads and other areas; (5) to establish public schools for minorities; (6) to construct feeder and farm roads in the areas of the minorities; (7) to promote community life among the cultural minorities; (8) to contract loans and form credit institutions, subject to the approval of the President; (9) to assist in training, the cultural minorities and to help them secure employment; (10) to grant scholarships to the minorities; (11) to aid and enhance the development of local government in Muslim areas; (12) in general, to further the agricultural, industrial and social development of the minorities; and (13) to give legal assistance to the national minorities, especially when problems of literacy arise.

It is clear from this long list of functions that the CNI is legally empowered to undertake any form of economic activity which could possibly accelerate the progress of the Muslim areas. If adequately funded the CNI has all the legal powers necessary to engage in a general economic development program for minorities in the Philippines. However, a glance at the budgetary allocation of the CNI indicates clearly the impossibility of fulfilling such an enormous task. The total appropriation is ₱5 million, of which only ₱2.5 million can be assured of release. Fully 70% of the appropriation is allocated for college scholarships. About 15% is for administration, and

the remaining 15% is for administrative aid, aid to indigents, social development aid, farm settlement aid and for special purposes. The CNI is therefore basically an agency charged with general development but which allocates almost all of its funds to one aspect of development, namely college education.

The CNI College Scholarship Program. The CNI scholarship program consists of providing college scholarships to members of the minority. Table 1 contains a summary of the number of scholars and graduates over the period of 1958-1967. We find that the number of scholars increased from about 100 in 1958 to over a thousand in 1967. However, the number of graduates increased from about 20 in 1958 to a maximum of only 250 towards the end of the period. After giving an allowance of 4-5 years for college training, it appears that there is a very low graduation rate among the CNI scholars. This indicates a generally poor performance of the CNI scholars in college.

Table 1. Commission on National Integration Scholars and Graduates, 1958-1967

	<u>Scholars</u>	<u>Graduates</u>	
		<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
1958	109	20	18.3
1959	460	60	13.0
1960	610	110	18.0
1961	620	110	17.7
1962	930	180	19.4
1963	1,020	130	12.7
1964	930	150	16.1
1965	960	170	17.7
1966	1,460	250	17.1
1967	1,210	211	17.4

Source: L.S. Clavel, They Are Also Filipinos,  
Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1969, p. 28.

The smallness of the ratio of graduates to scholars may be accounted for partly by deficiencies in the selection of the scholars. A desirable manner of selection would be based on demonstration of merit and financial need. It appears, however, that politics played a serious role in the choice of both the number of awardees and the selection of the awardees themselves. Criticisms of the scholarships have been heard from the grantee themselves. There seems to be very little correlation between the allowance of a grantee and the cost of living. This is especially true for the grantees who stay in the Manila area. The CNI appears more disposed to having a large number of grantee than to providing each grantee with a reasonable amount of support. If grantees have to supplement their CNI allowance, those coming from poor families particularly are handicapped.

There are no available data on the distribution of the grantees and graduates by course of study. It appears however that there has been too much concentration on liberal arts, law and commerce and not enough emphasis on the technical courses. This indicates a need for greater supervision by CNI over the field of choice of a grantee. When the choice of school is left to the grantee, he tends to enroll in a school on the basis of the relative ease of passing the course and also on the relative cost of living. It does not seem advisable to leave the choice of school to the grantee when there is a wide disparity (of which he may not be aware) in the quality of instruction among colleges and universities. Precise figures are not available on the performance of CNI grantees on government board examinations, but the success rate appears lower than the average. This might be traced to the poor choice of schools by the grantees.

Evaluation. The other activities of the CNI -- chiefly legal assistance, community development, resettlement and relief -- are so poorly funded that very little impact can be expected on the welfare of the cultural minorities. (It is reported, for instance, that when three-fourths of Jolo was 'guttled by fire', the amount of CNI relief aid was a mere ₱4,500<sup>72</sup>). Given the present productivity of the college scholarship program with respect to graduates, it seems safe to presume that a re-consideration of the policy of concentrating on scholarships is now necessary. Alternatives may be offered which conform to the principle of providing educational assistance to cultural minorities.

First, it may be advisable to shift the responsibility for administration of the college scholarships to experienced universities such as the University of the Philippines and Mindanao State University. Stricter, less politically-affected administration procedures should result in the selection of more qualified grantees, who will be able to finish their courses. Financial aid could continue to come from the CNI. Second, it has been shown that Muslim labor suffers from a lack of skills desirable in industrial positions and hence tends to compete at a disadvantage with non-Muslim labor. Generally, the skills involved do not require college training. The CNI may wish to consider whether allocating its educational funds to a manpower training program for middle range skills will be or not be a more effective method for increasing the average productivity of Muslim labor (including college graduates) in general. In particular, the secondary level of schooling appears in Muslim areas to be a weaker point in the

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L.S. Clavel, They Are Filipinos, (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1969), p. 59.

educational structure than the collegiate level. It is for this reason that Mindanao State University has established a number of community high schools in Lanao del Sur and Sulu.

It is immediately obvious that there are several national agencies whose responsibilities would overlap with many of the activities which CNI is empowered to undertake: the establishment of enterprises in Mindanao is being done by Mindanao Development Authority; financing comes from the DBP, the PNB, and the Central Bank (through rural banks); there is a national relief agency, a community development agency, an agricultural extension agency, an electric power agency; and there is a government school system. It would seem to be a misuse of human resources if CNI were to attempt to duplicate the technical staffs which each of these institutions needs.

If CNI were able to act as an effective spokesman for the cultural minorities vis-a-vis the above enumerated agencies, such that these agencies allocated a more equitable portion of their resources to projects benefiting the minorities, this would appear to be sufficient. The CNI would be better able to accomplish this task if it were given a share in the policy-making of these institutions, especially in matters affecting Mindanao. A productive indirect approach would be for CNI to ensure that some members of the minorities occupy technical if not policy positions in these agencies or in their appropriate branches. A shortage of qualified members of certain minority groups could be a bottleneck. But with respect to Muslims in particular this problem should not be as serious; where qualified Filipino Muslims are lacking; it should be worthwhile to consider hiring trained Muslims from such other countries as India, Pakistan and Malaysia. This suggestion acknowledges the feeling among some Filipino Muslims that

Filipino Muslims would have a greater tendency to be alert for matters affecting the welfare of Muslims in Mindanao than would non-Muslim Filipinos.

#### A Brief Review of CNI's Performance

The worthwhile objectives of the CNI and its past accomplishments notwithstanding, this research group has reason to believe that the CNI has generally not been successful in reaching its goal of improving the social and economic lot of the cultural minorities. In the first place the Commission has not been without its share of anomalies, mismanagement, and misuse of funds. Secondly, its efforts have been noticeably slanted towards the direction of education. More funds have been allocated to scholarships when it is evident that education is not the only problem nor perhaps the most crucial one. As we look back into the data gathered during this investigation, it becomes obvious that the most pressing and current need is the improvement of the economic lot of Muslim Filipinos although, this undeniably, is interwoven with other requirements. It is also further evident that the CNI has not maximized the use of its resources to disseminate information that would bring about a better understanding of the people about whom the general public know so little. In other words, it is suggested that the Commission has not actually explored the use of other channels of communication or other instruments to bring about a closer relationship between the so-called majority group and cultural minorities. This statement is borne out by Dr. Feliciano's studies as reported in her paper on "The Role Played by the Mass Media in National Integration in Recent Years",<sup>73</sup> portions of which are presented below.

"From 1960 to 1965, The Manila Times published 38 articles, followed by The Daily Mirror, 24; The Manila Daily Bulletin and The Manila Chronicle, 22 each;

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<sup>73</sup>Gloria D. Feliciano, "Mass Media and National Integration", Journal on National Integration (Quezon City: Bureau of Printing, 1968) pp. 43-46.

The Philippines Herald, 20; and The Evening News, 15. These gave a total of 141 articles in all the six dailies combined. In contrast, the CNI Bulletin came out with no less than 3,000 articles in its 8-page monthly issues during this same period.

The content discussed can be listed under five categories, namely; 1) minority groups on the warpath, 2) decapitations by headhunters, 3) cases of land-grabbing by minority groups, 4) material and technical assistance given by public officials to specific minority groups and, 5) announcements of the Annual Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca.

Except for The Sunday Times Magazine which had 37 articles and The Philippines Free Press which had 28, the other magazines studied had very few articles about the minority groups during the 5-year period: The Chronicle Magazine, 12; The Saturday Mirror, 10; The Philippines Herald Magazine, 8; The Woman and the Home, 6.

... Content categories were as follows: the invasion of change, courtship, marriage, and burial ceremonies, flora and fauna in specific regions, educating the national cultural minorities, land problems and prospects, native crafts and industries and mores and folkways.

Space-wise, the entire coverage in the newspapers and magazines studied totalled 14, 130 column inches or approximately fifteen pages (excluding photographs) of a standard size daily like The Manila Times.

A study of the provincial newspapers conducted by the Institute of Mass Communication in regions where minority groups are concentrated showed that relative to the Manila dailies, these newspapers gave a greater coverage to the minority groups. One of the papers in Baguio City, the weekly Baguio Midland Courier, carried 82 articles about the Ibaloi, the Ifugao, the Bontok, Kalingas, Kankanais, the Gaddangs, Ilongots, and the Apayaos in its 1965 issues alone. Content focused on Muslim rites, fiestas, annual pilgrimage to Mecca, needs such as land, roads and bridges and land cases involving the minority groups and the Christians.

In Cotabato, newspapers such as The Cotabato Recorder and The Mindanao Cross gave much coverage to the cultural minorities such as the Moslems, Bilaans, Tirurays, Manobos,

and others. The latter has a circulation of over 16,000 and is distributed to 23 high schools all over Mindanao. Besides English, other languages such as Tagalog, Cebuano and Maguindanao are also used in regular columns of these papers. The Mindanao Cross has on its staff a Muslim, Alunan Glang, who recently completed his Ph.D. in history from Cairo University and who now writes a column catering to his minority group. Similar situations exist in Davao, Basilan, Zamboanga and Sulu.

An analysis of the coverage given to the national cultural minorities by the six major Manila dailies showed that measured against the reported number of press releases issued by the public relations office of the Commission on National Integration in Manila and the six regional offices throughout the Philippines, said coverage is extremely inadequate. At the reported number of press releases of once a week from the seven offices which is no less than 423 releases a year or 2160 releases a total of 141 for all the six major dailies during the five-year period constitutes only a little over five percent. Interviews with four editors of the Manila dailies revealed that the weekly press releases from the seven offices apparently do not reach the "key" people such as the editors and the deskmen who determine, to a large extent, what releases are to be published and what releases are to be discarded. The editors emphasized that from the provincial reporters alone they usually get 60 to 80 releases more than they have space for so that rigid screening of the articles relative to their newsworthiness and other criteria is often done. It might be possible that these releases are either dealing mostly as they do with ceremonies and private legal disputes over land or are very poorly written or both. (Underscoring ours) These explanations were intimated by the present Public Relations Officer of the Commission on National Integration who also attributed the situation to lack of funds, lack of much needed trained personnel and bureaucratic red-tape. The same officer expressed appreciation for the magazine coverage on the minority groups since these were, in nine cases out of ten, writers some of whom were social scientists. The same was true in the case of the radio broadcasts and television presentations since neither radio releases nor television programs were prepared by the Commission on National Integration.

Contents-wise, the news articles are seemingly far from objective as they over-emphasized activities and events such as head hunting, landgrabbing, annual pilgrimage to Mecca and giving of aid to various minority groups by the government which tended to portray them as fierce, lawless and helpless. There was also an obvious lack of restraint in the use of terminologies which tended to give an unsavory image to said groups. Examples of such terminologies were the following: headhunters, decapitated, warpath, warlike, fierce, landgrabbers, black natives and so forth. Moreover, there was an overuse of terms which tended to offend their sensibilities and which often put them on the defensive. These included "Moros", the popular term for Muslims, which Jocano calls 'inappropriate' and rightly so since "Moros" is a corruption of 'Moors', Moslems of mixed Arab and Berber descent living in northwestern Africa. Other value-laden terms were 'crude and primitive', 'tribe', 'dole-out' or 'hand-out', 'cultural minorities' and so forth.

Interviews with educated Ibaloi in the Mt. Province, educated Maranaws of Marawi City and educated Maguindanaws of Cotabato revealed that these particular groups resent writers who refer to their household industry and other techniques as 'crude' and 'primitive', since by their standards, these are far from being so. The respondents stated that they get terribly upset when they read their groups described as 'tribes' or 'in the loin (bahag) stage' as these connote backwardness and hence, low status.

Majority of these educated groups are not too happy with the term 'cultural minorities.' The word cultural, they point out, is rather general and nebulous; it could have other connotations. 'Minorities', according to them, smacks of discrimination; it denotes inferiority in number and connotes inferior strength, diminished power, influence and prestige. Even the term 'non-Christian groups' is not too acceptable because this makes them feel alienated from the great majority.

These same groups claim that the terms 'dole-out' and 'hand-out' tend to discount the fact that they can help themselves if advised 'how', and they should by no means be treated as 'charity cases'.

In many of the news articles, as also in the magazine feature articles, there was little or sometimes no attempt to analyze in depth, the psychosociological factors relating to the practice/activity presented in the write-up. An article on headhunting is a case in point. How many of us know that headhunting is associated with the highest and noblest traditions and customs of the Ilongots? That to the young Ilongot boy, a decapitated human head is the best proof of his attainment of manhood? That the decapitated human head of a Christian is a supreme honor because of the greater risks involved and the Ilongot's mistaken belief that Christians are his natural enemies? While it is true that a knowledge of these facts will not make the act less gruesome or less terrifying it is equally true that it will help generate a certain amount of understanding and serve as a forewarning which will act as a shield against those who practice headhunting. These newspaper and magazine articles, too, tended to underplay such things as art and literature, customs and traditions, beliefs and practices in the forms of poems, riddles, legends, songs, dances, and essays."

The CNI has also been evaluated as unsuccessful by Clavel<sup>74</sup> who weighed the efforts of the Commission against the following criteria for national integration (i.e. cultural plurality):

1. Mutual intelligence of culturally different groups to co-exist with each other peacefully.
2. Identification of the majority and the minority groups with one big group known as the nation and the voluntary submission to its government.
3. Cooperation of the various groups -- majority and minority -- to effect economic, social, and political progress.

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<sup>74</sup> Clavel, op. cit., p. 26.

4. Awareness and appreciation of complementary-cultural traits, that is, cultural similarities, rather than differences should be stressed.

5. Economic interdependence, meaning the various groups should involve each other to produce goods at least for the nation's consumption.

6. Intergroup desire to preserve the revered traditional values, customs, and thoughts.

7. Intergroup agreement to have national commitments and involvement.

8. Freedom of any group to accept any desired change, if such change does not prejudice any group's or the nation's interest.

9. Groups' effort to project the personality of the nation.

10. Religious tolerance of each other.

## CHAPTER 9

PROSPECTS FOR MUSLIM PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT OF MINDANAO

Future Muslim participation in the economic development of Mindanao will depend primarily on the economic growth of the provinces where they are concentrated, and on the distribution of the benefits from economic growth in these provinces between Muslims and non-Muslims. The following analysis by FFI's economic research group concentrates on the possible economic growth of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Zamboanga del Sur. The distribution of economic benefits in these provinces between Muslims and non-Muslims cannot be precisely analyzed on account of a lack of data -- apart from casual observation and the subjective judgment of persons interviewed -- regarding economic participation categorized by religious or cultural grouping. It would have been preferable to obtain such data by a statistical survey. The research group nevertheless feels that an analysis concentrating on the above five provinces will be basically accurate.

The Effect of Peso Devaluation on the Development of Mindanao

Given the recent de facto devaluation of the peso, it appears that the most promising sources of economic development in Mindanao are the export sectors of the region, i.e., wood products, mining, fishing, coconut products and other agricultural export crops. This conclusion is well borne out by a review of past Mindanao growth (below). There would seem to be little need for governmental assistance for the favored industries, apart from non-interference with the present state of incentives. From the viewpoint of increasing Muslim benefits as much as possible, the government may wish

The identity of the individual owning or controlling a piece of land does have important economic implications: for the economic use to which the land shall be applied, and for the distribution of the economic returns from employment of the land. In general, if an individual can make more profitable use of a piece of land than the present owner, he will be able to afford to purchase the land for a sum which will enable the former owner to earn at least a comparable income when he relinquishes possession. Illegal acquisition of land in general implies a transfer of land resources to individuals who do not show, by standards of the market, that they can put the land to more productive use than previous occupants. This is the basic economic argument against landgrabbing. This should be added to other valid arguments which concern concepts of justice and fairness, respect for the law, etc.

However, although illegal acquisition of land does have serious economic implications, the elements of a solution would not seem to be essentially economic in nature. They more properly belong to the fields of public administration and systems management and control.\* However, it appears obvious that heavy expenditures on extensive cadastral surveys would be a basic element in a successful solution to the landholding problem.

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\* The economic research group does not feel it within its competence to suggest efficient ways of applying vigilance to prevent legal violations, or sanctions to punish accomplished violations. We do foresee, however, that a basic problem which will face a competent systems manager is the lack of basic data.

purchase, or illegally. Hence cases of landgrabbing go unnoticed less easily than in former years, when population pressure was not as great.

TABLE 7

Population Density in Mindanao by Province: 1960 and 1970

	Total area (sq. km.)	Density per sq. km.	
		1960	1970
Southern and Western Mindanao			
Cotabato	23,797	43	75
Davao	19,672	45	80
Zamboanga del Norte	6,075	46	74
Zamboanga del Sur	9,922	75	136
Sulu	2,688	122	177
Northern and Eastern Mindanao			
Agusan	11,556	23	41
Bukidnon	8,294	23	42
Lanao del Norte	3,092	87	154
Lanao del Sur	3,873	98	143
Misamis Occidental	1,939	128	184
Misamis Oriental	3,800	102	150
Surigao del Norte	2,739	71	105
Surigao del Sur	4,552	36	54
Mindanao	101,999	53	88

4. Capital. A glaring feature of the most important firms established in Mindanao is that they are almost entirely controlled by non-Muslims. It has already been pointed out that this tends to work against the employment of Muslims in such firms. There is therefore an urgent need for greater Muslim participation in capital. Part of the solution has been suggested, namely for the government to extend equity loans to Muslims. This can be done through branches of the PNB and DBP already established in Muslim areas. It will be necessary to liberalize lending policies of these government institutions in their branch banks. The PNB in Jolo, for instance, grants only token loans and is mainly a collection agency. The hiring of Muslim managers and personnel for such branches should prove helpful.

A second part of the solution would be the encouragement of financial institutions at locations where saving by Muslims may be channelled into investment in Mindanao enterprises. The provinces of Sulu, South Cotabato and Lanao del Sur are notably lacking in banks and similar institutions. Again, to avoid problems of clash of cultures, it is recommended that government support of such institutions (rural banks for example) be conditioned on the sharing of Muslims in equity, so that they may share in the making of policy affecting themselves as a group.

#### Remarks on the Land-Holding Problem in Mindanao

Present-day Mindanao is no longer a region where unused and idle lands lay waiting to be exploited by pioneers. Rapid population growth coupled with large migration rates have greatly reduced the proportion of land to people (Table 7), and to a large extent the acquisition of land now implies a relinquishment of it by some other party, whether legally, as through

to play a role in directing new investments in these industries (as well as in new export products) so as to attain a more equitable distribution of the benefits between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The importance of devaluation for the growth of Mindanao can be ascertained from an examination of the (approximate) effects of the 1962 devaluation on the growth of Mindanao. It is well known, first of all, that Mindanao is the major export surplus region in this country.

TABLE 1

Estimates of Net Earnings from Foreign Trade, Mindanao Region\*

In million pesos at current prices

	FY 1964	FY 1965	FY 1966	FY 1967	FY 1968	FY 1969
Total Annual Exports	550.4	564.5	703.0	873.5	1,051.3	1,141.8
Total Annual Imports	68.4	90.0	95.8	112.4	113.1	118.1
Net Exports	482.0	474.5	607.2	761.1	938.2	1,023.7

\* Includes Palawan.

Source: Mindanao Development Authority. Basic data from the Bureau of Customs.

Net exports from Mindanao grew from less than ₱500 million in FY 1964 to over ₱1 billion in FY 1969 -- or a growth rate of about 15% per year. We then drew on a recent study for estimates of the ratio of regional economic growth to national economic growth.

TABLE 2<sup>76</sup>

Estimated Ratios of Annual Growth Rates in Gross Regional Product to Annual Growth Rates in Gross National Product

	1948-1961	1961-1966	Entire Period 1949-1966
Luzon	110%	100%	100%
Visayas	80%	80 to 90%	80%
Southern & Western Mindanao	100%	130%	120 to 130%
Northern & Eastern Mindanao	80 to 90%	120 to 160%	100 to 140%

In this table, a ratio of 100% implies growth at the same rate as the national average, and ratios above 100% imply above-average growth rates. We immediately see Mindanao as the leading region in growth during 1948-1966. The two periods 1948-1961 and 1961-1966 approximately correspond to the pre- and post-devaluation time spans (the 'decontrol' period prior to the 1962 devaluation will be recalled). This table shows that Luzon was the leading region in the period prior to the 1962 devaluation. Southern and Western Mindanao was growing at about the same rate

75 G. P. Sicat, "Dimensions of Regional and Economic Growth in the Philippines," paper presented at the First Pacific Regional Science Conference, East-West Center, University of Hawaii, August 1969.

76 Ibid, p. 16.

as the nation as a whole; but Northern and Eastern Mindanao was lagging behind in growth. The 1962 devaluation changed the pattern radically, and both of the Mindanao regions become leading growth sectors for the nation as a whole, with growth rates which were 20% to 60% above the national average.

### Population Growth and the Development of Mindanao

The rapid growth of Mindanao in gross terms in 1961-66 was, however, offset by the rate of population growth, with a notably high migration component. Migration rates for the several regions are given in Table 3, where it is seen that the rates in Mindanao are second only to Rizal province (which, on account of locational advantages and industrial development, deserved treatment as a separate region). The entry of more highly skilled labor into Mindanao has created an employment problem for Muslims; this will be treated in a later section. After the regional product is placed on per capita terms, the growth rates for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao tend to equalize.

TABLE 3<sup>77</sup>Population Growth and Migration Rates by Region

Region	Average Annual population growth 1948-1960	Migration Rate per 1000 popu- lation in 1948
I. Metropolitan Manila	3%	- 55
Rizal	10%	578
II. Ilocos & Mt. Province	2%	- 34
III. Cagayan Valley & Batanes	5%	58
IV. Central Luzon	3%	- 53
V. Southern Luzon & Islands	4%	7
VI. Bicol	4%	- 33
VII. Western Visayas	2%	- 78
VIII. Eastern Visayas	1%	-100
IX. Southwestern Mindanao & Sulu	9%	253
X. Northwestern Mindanao	4%	119

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, p. 18.

Economic Growth of Muslim Provinces

The above estimates are based on data with respect to revenue and expenditures of local governments, which may be assumed to be highly correlated with the gross regional product. Since these are surrogate data, they would be expected to give more accurate implications for larger areas such as regions than for smaller areas such as provinces. Nevertheless it is important to examine provincial results, since this will give a clearer picture of the participation of Muslims in economic growth.

TABLE 4<sup>78</sup>

Estimated Ratios of Annual Growth Rates in Gross Provincial Product to Annual Growth Rates in Gross National Product for Mindanao and Sulu, 1961-1966.

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Agusan	115%
Bukidnon	200%
Cotabato	160%
Davao	120%
Lanao del Norte	140%
Lanao del Sur	140%
Misamis Occidental	60%
Misamis Oriental	100%
Sulu	63%
Surigao del Sur	160%
Zamboanga del Sur	103%

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Note: The estimates for Surigao del Norte and Zamboanga del Norte were rather ambiguous, and so are omitted. 'Cotabato' and 'Davao' are with reference to old provincial boundaries, prior to recent subdivisions.

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78 Ibid, pp. 84-85.

When viewed as a whole, the figures in Table 4 would not seem to show that economic growth is biased in favor of the non-Muslim provinces of Mindanao. However, it needs to be stressed, at the outset, that there are two reasons why the figures in Table 4 probably over-estimate the economic progress of Muslims relative to the nation as a whole. First, in the Muslim provinces local officials were chosen by election rather than by appointment beginning only in 1959. Increases in revenues and expenditures of local governments in Muslim provinces after 1959 would therefore be related not only to economic development but also to political development: elected officials have more incentive to raise revenues and expenditures than appointed ones. Second, it appears from subjective judgment that in Muslim provinces the economic progress of non-Muslim elements is more rapid than that of Muslim elements. The figures in Table 4 of course reflect the progress in each province of all religious or cultural groups combined.

For the high growth period, 1961-1966, we find that the leading province is Bukidnon (location of Philippine Packing Corporation's pineapple plantation), growing at double the national rate. Among the Muslim provinces, the most serious problem of lagging growth is found in Sulu, (95% Muslim) where growth was nearly 40% below the national average rate. This strongly correlates with the earlier finding that the lowest literacy level in the entire Mindanao region is found in Sulu, and indicates the urgent need for increased schooling among Sulu residents. In Zamboanga del Sur (over 20% Muslim), growth was hardly different from the national average. In Lanao del Norte (20% Muslim), the growth rate was 40% above the national average; however, much of this should probably be attributed to the industrial growth of Iligan City, in which Muslim participation is very minor. The growth rate was estimated at

40% above the national level in Lanao del Sur (nearly 95% Muslim) and at 60% above the national average in Cotabato (nearly 35% Muslim). In both provinces, part of this progress would have to be attributed to the development of the basically non-Muslim logging and wood products industry and agricultural plantations.

It would be quite difficult to obtain more precise information on the economic progress of the Muslim population. The general finding here is that the provincial growth data and the adjustments which are required for their interpretation indicate that the progress of the Muslim population is less than that of the region as a whole, and suggest the provinces in which economic assistance is particularly needed.

#### General Problems Facing Muslim Participation in Development

In any given province, Muslim participation in development will depend on factors affecting the size of and the remuneration to the employment of resources which are owned or controlled by Muslims.

1. Labor. Chief among these resources is labor. The problem of employment is encountered in large industrial and agricultural firms, which are primarily Christian-controlled, and has both cultural and non-cultural aspects. The difficulty for Muslims of obtaining employment in the industrial firms in the Iligan area would typify this situation. From the viewpoint of these firms, it is said to be disadvantageous to employ Muslims because of their relative lack of skills and training, undependability for continuous employment, and a propensity for causing problems with non-Muslim personnel, who

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\* Several of the newer plantations are in Southern Cotabato, which is only about 10% Muslim.

tend to fear for their personal safety and security when differences arise.

This view of Muslim labor probably hinders to some extent the establishment of industrial firms in heavily Muslim-dominated areas. In Lanao del Sur, for example, there is on only one firm -- Maranao Timber Corporation -- which can be considered "large" by usual standards. One observer has explained this situation in terms of the Muslim's sense of independence from authority, sense of collective protection, and alleged disaffection for manual work (in the case of hadjis).\*

The problem of differential in skills has been noted previously. There are, strictly speaking, only three ways by which skills may be increased: formal schooling, on-the-job training, and brute trial-and-error without supervision. We have already seen that, on the average, Muslims obtain less schooling than non-Muslims. This tends to hinder the acceptance of Muslims into business firms where they may benefit from on-the-job training. It is worthy of note that Mindanao State University is faced with a serious shortage of Muslim high school graduates, such that the present ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim college students is less than desirable. The University has been forced to establish its own high schools in Marawi and Jolo.

The skill-differential problem can only be solved by applying more resources into manpower training for Muslims, and in the long-run this can only be accomplished by substantially increasing the quantity of schooling which Muslims are able to obtain. Certain quarters have suggested the

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\* Professor Jan Messelink, formerly with the Economics Department of Mindanao State University.

creation of short, three - to six-month programs. This proposal would definitely add a larger number of Muslims to the skilled labor force, and would deserve further study into aspects of cost-efficiency.

The most efficient way of handling cultural aspects of the employment problem would appear to be to create incentives for greater Muslim participation in equity and in management positions of firms which are based or to be established in Muslim-dominated areas. A recommended incentive would be preferential development loans to Muslims for investment in equity in firms to be established in such areas. The fishing and refrigeration industries, in which new investment is likely to be quite profitable, would be areas in which government probably needs to take care that a substantial share in new equity is held by Muslims.

There do not appear to be problems with respect to the quantity of the available labor force. Labor force and employment statistics are given in Tables 5 and 6.

TABLE 5

Experienced Labor Force in Agriculture and  
Non-Agriculture, Minsupala Region, 1965-1967

	1965	1966	1967
TOTAL	2,177,600	2,502,975	2,622,400
Total Employed	2,145,600	2,473,650	2,557,200
Total Unemployed	32,000	29,325	65,200
Agriculture Total	1,596,490	1,824,475	1,882,000
Employed	1,580,890	1,810,100	1,844,000
Unemployed	15,600	14,375	38,000
Non-Agricultural Total	581,110	678,500	740,400
Employed	564,710	663,550	713,200
Unemployed	16,400	14,950	27,200

Source: Mindanao Development Authority. Basic data from the Bureau of the Census and Statistics.

TABLE 6

Employed Persons by Industry Group in Mindanao  
and Sulu, 1966 - 1967

	As of May 1966	As of May 1967
TOTAL EMPLOYED	<u>2,390,850</u>	<u>2,475,600</u>
Agriculture	1,744,550	1,778,000
Mining	575	13,200
Manufacturing	154,675	139,600
Construction	31,050	51,600
Trade and Commerce	225,400	214,800
Trans. and Communication	41,400	40,800
Services	193,200	237,600

Note: Excludes Palawan.

Source: Mindanao Development Authority. Basic data from the Bureau of the Census and Statistics.

2. Land. The second major resource is land. In the Lanao and Cotabato provinces, the majority of Muslims are engaged in farming. However, only coconuts and such other plantation export crops are expected to develop considerably in the near future. In the Cotabato provinces the main product is rice, and a large

number of the farmers are Muslims. These farmers can be expected to become better off if they are able to take advantage of the recently developed new rice varieties. Efforts should therefore be made to expand the diffusion of such varieties and of necessary complementary inputs (such as fertilizer and irrigation) to Muslim farmers in particular. However, the resulting improvement in these farmer's incomes should not be overestimated, since the new technology has made the price outlook somewhat pessimistic for producers; it is becoming increasingly difficult to export rice, as the technology spreads in other Asian countries. This overseas diffusion of the technology offsets to some extent the attractiveness of Philippine rice exports on account of devaluation.

The production of corn will probably also be limited to the domestic market; but there is a possibility of some expansion in demand as the livestock industry progresses. The general solutions to the problem of sluggish agricultural development are applicable here, with the qualification that government would need to exert more effort to ensure that no bias prevails in the distribution of the following services among Muslims and non-Muslims: irrigation, agricultural extension with emphasis on diffusion of new technology, development of the marketing and transportation system, and the provision of agricultural credit.

The plantation export crops, notably pineapples and bananas, can be expected to do well without outside assistance. The participation of Muslims in the progress of plantation exports will be insignificant in the absence of policies which will benefit employment of Muslims and/or encourage the establishment of similar enterprises by Muslims themselves. These plantations are primarily in South Cotabato, where the Muslim population density is relatively low.

The problem of irregularities in land titling, reported landgrabbing, and consequent disruption of agriculture is

definitely quite serious, and deserving of immediate government attention.

3. Fishing. An increasingly important natural resources is fish, which is especially relevant for the province of Sulu. Sulu stands out as the province most in need of assistance. It is 95% Muslim, has the highest population density and the lowest rate of literacy; it experienced the lowest rate of economic growth among Mindanao provinces during 1961-1966, when most of Mindanao was experiencing rapid growth.

At present, fishing appears to be the industry with the greatest potential for the Sulu Archipelago. Reports from the Fisheries Commission, confirmed by local businessmen and government officials of Sulu province, give the fishing industry top priority among development projects for the region. The fishing industry becomes doubly important because the possible Muslim participation in its expansion is very large. There is a great potential for production for the population centers of the entire Philippines. Dried fish is already shipped farther to North. But the largest potential for further expansion is in tuna fishing for export to the United States and Japan. The development of this aspect of the fishing industry will of course also depend upon the development of facilities for quick-freezing and the development of commercial contacts to dispose of frozen tuna in foreign markets.

The brief experience of the Mindanao Development Authority in the operation of its ice-plant in Zamboanga City gives cause for optimism. In a relatively short time the ice plant in Zamboanga was profitably operating at full capacity, so much so that several private business firms are competing to handle the export end of the fishing business, and dissuading government agencies from doing the same. Several

Muslim government officials and businessmen have indicated the need for a similar ice-plant in Jolo, to serve the fishermen of the outlying region. When asked whether some local businessmen would be interested to invest in a joint venture with Mindanao Development Authority or other parties, the interviewees answered in the affirmative. They also expressed the desire to see the completion of the ice-plant which was established in Bato-bato, but which was terminated due to lack of funds. They were optimistic that this ice-plant will be as successful as that of Zamboanga City as soon as it becomes operative.

Fishing is not as important an industry for the Cotabato area as it is for Sulu and Zamboanga del Sur, if we use port of landing to indicate the base of fishing vessels. A relatively small production of the catch in nearby fishing grounds is landed in Cotabato ports: about half of the produce of nearby Illana Bay is landed in Zamboanga del Sur; much of the Sarangani Bay catch is landed in Davao; and almost all of the Moro Gulf catch is landed in Zamboanga del Sur.

The richest fishing ground in Mindanao is the Sulu Sea along Palawan; however, this area is plied almost completely by Christian fishermen, as indicated by the fact that about 90% of the catch is landed in Navotas, Rizal. Muslim fishermen are concentrated in the Sulu Sea, Sibuguey Bay, Moro Gulf and Illana Bay. In tuna fishing (for which there is an export market), the efficiency of the hook and line method reportedly allows competition of Muslims with fishermen having more modern craft. In general, the strong competition from non-Muslims indicates the necessity for preferential government policies towards Muslims if they are to even keep their share of this expanding industry. A suggested policy would be the granting of loans on favorable terms from the Development Bank of the Philippines, or some other government financial institution.

## CHAPTER 10

## SOCIAL CHANGE FOR NATIONAL UNITY

The entire Muslim group is composed of sub-groups differing in requirial habitat and speaking different languages or dialects. These are the Maranao of Lanao, the Maguindanao of Cotabato, the Tausug and Samal of Sulu Archipelago, and the minor population groups in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. Separated by geographic barriers and other factors that segmentalize the entire groups, the Islam religion is the single cohesive factor that identifies them as a group from the views of outsiders and by themselves.

Islam, incidentally, constitutes the second largest religious community in the world today. Its adherents have been variously estimated from 430 million to 580 million and are found in practically all countries of the world. Representing more than 20% of the total human population, they are mostly concentrated in Asia and Africa covering about one-sixth of the world's land surface. They include more than three dozen sovereign states in addition to non-Muslim countries like India, China, and the Soviet Union which have Muslim minorities. In our neighboring countries, the Muslim population predominates; Indonesia was reported to have 97 million in 1961; Pakistan, 89 million; India, 47 million; China, 40 million; and Malaysia, 7 million.

Some 65% of today's Muslim Filipinos identify themselves more readily as Muslims than as Filipinos. This may be attributed to the fact that the term "Filipino", while purely political, has acquired a religious color. In the Muslim parlance, the name "Filipino" is far from complimentary because

it means "Christian", "Bisayan" or "unbeliever". Hence, these people would prefer to be called "Muslim-Filipinos"-- a fact which, by itself, implies the presence of a cultural-religious cleavage with the Muslims on one side and the Christians on the other. But religion, which has been identified as the sole culprit of strained Muslim-Christian relations, is not the only reason for the present existence of a politically volatile situation in Mindanao.

An objective appraisal of the present state of Muslim affairs in the Philippines show an embarrassing lack of concern on the part of both the national government and private sector to understand Muslims as Filipinos, much less to contribute to their social and economic upliftment. Dissemination of information has not only been inadequate but high biased and discriminating. For instance, news articles over-emphasized activities and events such as headhunting, landgrabbing, annual pilgrimage to Mecca and giving of aid to various minority groups by the government which tended to portray these people as fierce, lawless and helpless. There has also been an obvious lack of restraint in the use of terminologies such as "headhunters", "decapitated", "warpath", "warlike", "landgrabbers", "black natives", etc., which tended to give an unsavory image to the mentioned groups. Thus, instead of enlightening the public and helping to bring about a free-exchange of values among the different ethnocentric groups, differences in ways of life were magnified and prejudice nurtured.

A premise upon which this project was undertaken is that: unless people of a nation, or for that matter, members of a group understand one another, perceive what things they have in common, and look beyond cultural differences, integration can never take place. The concept of the true "bayanihan" spirit in which Filipinos take pride actually disregards individual, regional, or ethnocentric differences and focus

on lending a hand to one's neighbor. In the same vein, the key to interaction (which must soon take place if this nation is to stay and progress together) is one's acceptance of the fact that people differ without regarding such differences as shortcomings.

With these in mind, we are summarizing in this chapter the principal findings gathered in the course of investigation, with emphasis on the attitudes and expectations of Muslim-Filipinos as they relate to the currently thorny problem of national integration.

### Muslim - Christian Relations

As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, Muslim-Christian relations leave much to be desired. From both directions, Christian and Muslim, Filipinos have ethnocentric feelings against each other - inwardly or outwardly - due to their different ideologies and their past experience of having been involved in centuries of warlike relations. In majority and minority dealings, the former has been found to be more hostile against the latter people and their institution, which is what probably has lead Muslims to consider Christians as a discriminating and prejudiced people who look down on them, belittle their customs and traditions, and avoid their company.

Presently, the Christians constitute a "reference group" for Muslims, especially because of the former group's material achievement which the latter increasingly tries to imitate. However, while Muslims imbibe much of the Christian's non-religious values and practices, Christians have notably failed to increase their understanding and appreciation of Muslim social and cultural values which could be accepted by

the majority and added to the common values of an emerging Filipino nation.

### The Attitudes of Muslim Filipinos

For convenience, the discussion on the attitudes of Muslim Filipinos shall be apportioned among the following topics: (1) Muslims as Filipino Citizens; (2) Image of the Government; (3) Religious Attitudes of Muslim-Filipinos; (4) Attitudes Toward Western Culture and Education.

Muslims as Filipino Citizens. In relation to their status and role as Filipino citizens, Muslims are fully conscious of the fact that their section of the country and the controlling institution therein are parts and parcels of the geographical and political jurisdiction of the Philippine Republic. They recognize their membership or citizenship in this country, but are simultaneously aware that they represent a minority group, numerically and politically. The mere reference to them as a "minority" has the effect of making the more educated or enlightened ones feel like "second class citizens". Jokes about being "second class" have been bandied about, even by Muslims.

Image of the Government. For many decades, the Maranao, one of the major Muslim groups, regarded the national government as gobierno a sarwang a tao (alien or foreign people's government) because its power or force had been used against them. The same feeling and attitude toward the government likewise prevails among other Muslim groups. Because most of the government agents - including army personnel - are Christians, the national government is primarily seen as a "Christian" government whose main concern is for the welfare of their own kind. Only the more enlightened ones accept the concept that they share

similar allegiance to the government or state along with the Christian majority.

"Urbanized" Muslims, like urban Christians, are also sensitive about poor administration policies and practices within the government. They generally blame the government when it fails to preserve peace and order or promote general welfare in their respective communities. In addition, a great many do not regard the payment of government taxes as an important obligation that must be fulfilled strengthen the institution. One of the numerous prevailing reasons seems to arise from the fact that Muslim Filipinos generally consider the state laws to be contrary to their adat (customary) laws of religion and culture. One such example is the opposition between the general marriage law of the state (based on the Christian majority's religious and moral values) and their own Islamic laws on marriage and divorce.

The Alpha findings support the above observations. In the numerous interviews made, Muslim Filipinos have been bared as being negatively predisposed toward the national government. Both Muslims as well as non-Muslims stressed that it is not the mechanics nor form of government per se that may be considered undesirable, but the way the government is run by those in power.

Politicians project a most unfavorable public image to the people of Mindanao, especially among the Muslim group. In fact, they are seen as the culprits of existing social ills: the current spiraling of prices, the floating rate, rampant smuggling, and the presence of graft and corruption in the country. Instead of being considered helpful, they are perceived as impediments to national development owing to "red tape" practices and similar irregularities.

Compounding the already many existing problems is the prevailing feeling of neglect among Muslim-Filipinos, who perceive the government to be neglectful and grossly amiss in their

obligations to Mindanao, seeking only to exploit its rich natural resources, yet hardly giving anything in return. Many community problems were cited as needing attention: lack of transportation and housing facilities, light, water, medical aid, health centers, adequate roads, bridges, school buildings, and developed agricultural lands. In Iligan, for example, the housing situation, presence of squatters, skyrocketing prices, and unemployment were found to be principal problems. In Cotabato, the peace and order situation pose great difficulty. The region is marked by cattle rustling, political feuds, vendettas, land conflicts and similar problems. Compounding such problems is the big gap between the rich and the poor, the lack of technical knowledge and financial resources that could be applied to develop the region, as well as the obvious neglect of the government in maximizing the area's potential. Transportation is difficult and poor roads make travelling tedious and unpleasant. In Marawi City, sanitation is a big problem. Various diseases have been known to plague its citizens owing to lack of medical facilities and scientific knowledge with which to control epidemics. On top of these, there are no hotel facilities. Marawi's visitors are compelled to lodge in Iligan City, unless the hospitality of the Mindanao State University or Marawi residents are extended to them.

Awareness of such problems notwithstanding, the specific agency which could be instrumental in their solution has not been identified. First of all, there is absence of confidence in the government's interest and capacity to solve existing community problems. To the Muslim mind, the role of politics in community development is hazy and ill-defined. Even Islam seems to offer no practical solutions, and quite a number of Muslims themselves feel that religion has no concrete role in affairs which should be the concern of the government. The significant implication here is that while definite problems are seen and felt, there is a consensus that no particular individual or group is really attending to their solution.

Religious Attitudes of Muslim Filipinos. The Muslims are conscious of the rivalry between the Christian and Islam religions. During the Spanish regime, they defended the latter against the former as Christianization was an important part of Spanish colonization. Their past resistances against the American and Filipino forces of the government took the form of a  Jihad  to protect Islam, Muslim territory, and independence from invasion.

Now that Muslim and Christian populations are in residential integration in many towns and form communities, both groups are beginning to gradually adjust to each other in a situation of understanding and tolerance. Such mutual adjustment, however, should be consciously accelerated in a broad program of integration, education, and acculturation. For example, social science should be made as an applied measure or conscious approach to the problem of intergroup adjustment. In addition, there should be a respect for the Muslim attitude that the government and the Christian group should not interfere with Islamic religious affairs, which are different from plain "social" affairs of the people.

How do Muslims regard the concept of separation of Church and State?

In the Muslim traditional system of government, there is an alliance, if not total unity, between the sultanate form of government and Islam. A Muslim community has two sets of leadership, one for the temporal political power, and another for spiritual affairs. A secular leader is an ally of a religious leader and they know each other's jurisdiction in the authority system. However, in their fear that the interest of the Christian Church, especially the Catholic majority, will dominate the state, Muslim-Filipinos now view the separation of Church and State as highly desirable for the entire nation.

Attitudes Toward Western Culture and Education. What are the attitudes of Muslim-Filipinos in relation to Western culture and education?

Many Muslims are reacting against the danger of too much westernization. Since early post-liberation, there has been an on-going revitalization and reinforcement of Islamic institutions. Muslim communities, especially in the centers of large populations, build more schools and mosques, send more pilgrims to Mecca, and scholars to the Middle East in order to reinforce Muslim faith and avoid cultural drift in the face of increasing Western influence.

The task of the past educational system in the Philippines was to make more Christians in number and strength, with the ultimate Christianization of the country in view. Yet even in centers which were permanently occupied by Spaniards, Muslims refused to be educated and Christianized. This attitude continued toward the beginning of the American regime which declared its policy to introduce free and democratic education. To educate a few, many Muslim youths were once arrested in the streets and thrown into the schoolroom to learn English and the new American way of life.

However, during the time of the Commonwealth, more Muslims sent their children to school in their realization that education gives more power, social participation, and opportunities for educated individuals to become leaders. Up to this time, they are extremely conscious that education is an effective means of social mobility. They voluntarily send their youth to school to obtain a profession which, they believe, is one means by which they can uplift their social standing and improve their capacity to earn a living.

Teachers are respected and Western education per se meets with little or no resistance from the upper socioeconomic stratum. In fact, educated Muslims today tend to develop the class of a "new elite" in contrast to the traditional "old elite". Education, as viewed in the eyes of this emerging group, is a "passport" that allows one to enter political and professional circles and participate in economic activities in the fast developing centers of business and population. Hence, higher and quality education beyond barrio level is looked forward to by those who can afford it.

A comparison of the responses of the two groups in relation to occupational preferences show a possible convergence among Muslims and non-Muslims. Although the traditional mobility aspirations of Muslims for the legal profession and military occupation continue to be strong, teaching, medicine, and engineering have been selected by both groups as the choicest occupations. However, the rank position of a lawyer appears to be significantly different between Muslims (who ranked law as fourth) and non-Muslims (who ranked the legal profession as sixth).

Muslims participate in two forms of education: (1) the one provided for by madrasa (Arabic) schools which is oriented to spiritual need and imitation of Arabic Middle East education, and (2) the other provided by the modern Philippine educational system which is oriented to western values shared with other Philippine groups. The main problem now confronting educational leaders is the integration of these two different directions within the educational system.

## Muslim Government and Politics

Aggravated by current socio-economic problems, a political conflict representing the clash between the old (datanship) and new (democratic) systems in Muslim land may be said to be at the core of the Moro problem. In spite of the prevailing democratic form of government, inhabitants of Muslim Mindanao have preserved the remnants of an ancient system called the Sultanate of Datu system and each clan is headed by a Datu to whom allegiance is paid.

While the present republican form of government and the concept of the Sultanate appear to be at odds, the actual conflict may be traced to the attempts of a Christian majority to assimilate the Muslim-Filipinos within their culture and the latter's resistance to such efforts, coupled with counter-movements to preserve their traditional religion and culture. However, a further study of the sultanate clearly shows its compatibility with the concept of democracy, so that even Muslim-Filipinos themselves agree that the two can co-exist peacefully, especially under a federal system of government which can define the relationship between the Muslim community and the national government. In fact, if representation is a test for democracy, there is representation of the commonwealth in the sultanate. A sultanate is governed by a Council of Elders ( a community council of communal groups ) who represent kin groups who are segments of a larger community group. Muslims like their sultanate because through it they can take up community action for the control and welfare of the people.

The Sultanate. Leadership in the sultanates is exercised by actual title holders who hold the title sultan and other equivalent titles. Below them are non-titled persons referred to as datu. Both sultan and datu compose the traditional

group called Council of Elders who are accorded high status and vested with leadership duties in their respective sultanates. They constitute what may be called the traditional elite when compared to the non-traditional elite who are their subordinates or followers.<sup>79</sup>

Traditional elites may be distinguished from non-traditional elites by their ascribed right to hold or claim titles. The former's right is derived through inheritance. As such, traditional elites may be actual or potential titleholders in their own sultanates. Regarded as persons of royal or aristocratic ancestry, they are vested with traditional authority and accorded high status and prestige. The authority of the traditional elite comes into play in the settlement of disputes and conflicts involving their followers. Traditional settlements are done through arbitration and in consonance with adat laws. In the settlement of disputes and conflicts, they may be assisted by the datu and other religious officers such as the Imam, so that the authority of the sultan is, to a considerable degree, shared by the datu. In addition to settlement of conflicts and disputes, there are other socio-religious functions and activities enjoyed by the traditional elite which include the promotion and maintenance of peace and order in their respective sultanates, giving aid to followers in time of need, financial assistance for the construction of mosques, attendance in social or religious gatherings and cooperation in other socio-religious affairs. In exchange for these services, the traditional elite, particularly their sultan, are accorded actual and symbolic recognition such as a share in the goods distributed during special community gatherings. They are also recipients of products and other goods during wedding

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<sup>79</sup> Teresita V. Benitez, "The Politics of Marawi", (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1969) p. 11.

ceremonies, death celebrations and other socio-religious gatherings.<sup>80</sup>

The introduction of universal suffrage with its concomitant encouragement of political participation of the people in governmental processes and extension of voting rights resulted in the emergence of a new elite group, consisting of elected city officials, which weakened the influence and authority of the traditional elite. The dominant power and authority of the elected public officials were superimposed on the traditional upper class. Likewise, the role of the traditional elite to settle conflicts among their subordinates lost its dominance due to the emergence of legal police agency represented by the modern government. All these, in effect, indicate a shift in the locus of power from the indigenous or traditional leadership composed of the sultan and datu to a new and dominant political leadership exercised by the elective officials. Needless to say, the overlapping of the composition of elite groups also indicates overlapping of roles. Thus, a mayor who is at the same time a sultan occupies dual roles and performs dual functions. There is, however, no conflict of roles in this particular case since the traditional activities of the mayor which center primarily on the promotion of the general welfare of his followers coincide with his legal role in maintaining peace and order.

While social status, prestige and authority of the traditional elite weakened owing to the superimposition on them of a new elite group consisting of elected public officials, they have managed to persist. Traditional titleholders are still accorded the respect given to persons of aristocratic ancestry while maintaining traditional leadership roles in their communities, as in the settlement of conflicts and disputes,

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid, p. 13.

attendance in social or religious gatherings and helping their needy followers. In fact, the two elite groups -- the sultan-datu axis and the elected public officials -- are not mutually exclusive of each other since quite a number of traditional elite also hold political offices. At this juncture it may be inferred that the avid interest shown by members of the traditional Muslim elite in national political affairs is at least partly, if not largely, governed by the need to maintain, preserve, or reinforce one's power and status. On the other hand, there are strong indications of a weakening in the image of a traditional elite member who gets elected into public office. Desire for presentation in the national government notwithstanding, Muslims nurture a negative attitude towards the institution and, consciously or unconsciously, are inclined to have a low regard for those who are connected with it. The poor image projected by politicians as revealed in the Alpha survey strongly suggests the presence of an ambivalent attitude towards the present political Muslim leaders. Thus, in terms of acceptance and amount of personal faith vested in them by their people, they suffer in comparison to previous political chiefs.

Muslim political leaders during the early inception of modern government in their regional and immediate local communities were not highly westernized or educated. But despite their lesser experience in the art of governing, they commanded the respect of their constituents, being fewer in number and having less competition among themselves.

Today's present leaders who are better educated are not only too many but highly competitive. They have intense rivalries among themselves, develop their own rival factions, and, by so doing, disrupt the political unity in each provincial or municipal community. Within their factions, they command sufficient faith from their followers. But for the entire

group of Muslims, there is not a single political leader who commands overall popularity. In fact, it is noteworthy that there has been no sultanate, past or present, that has exercised overall control of the various Muslim groups, although each group has similar political system.

The succeeding paragraphs is a discussion of the system of elections among the Muslims and in relation to their political leadership.

Politics and the Election Process. Muslim electoral candidates obtain political support in many ways. A major means is to have a command of intangible resources such as influence, social prestige and popularity. A Maranao candidate belonging to the traditional elite is likely to have a command of these resources. As a member of the elite group, he is accorded high social status and influence. Moreover, as a member of the traditional elite, he too has great maratabat (self-esteem or "amor propio") which is shared by his followers, most of whom are relatives. The right to possess maratabat carries with it the obligation to enhance it, and it is for this reason, too, that a person with high status is induced to work hard for his election. Winning a government post enhances his maratabat and since his relatives and followers share his maratabat, they are expected to provide him political support and help rally for more votes.

Another way by which a candidate secures political support is by fostering close and personal relationship. This may be made possible by expanding kinship ties through marriage, whether plural or otherwise, since the relatives of the wife in effect become the relatives of the husband (and vice-versa).

Political support may also be obtained through the creation of associational ties wherein members are expected to give mutual assistance and collective support, and, through the

system of reciprocity wherein the candidate grants personal favors not only to his kins but to other voters as well. The favors, in turn, are reciprocated by the political support of the voters.

In addition to all these, and, perhaps most important, an electoral candidate must have the financial resources. Money attracts both political leaders and voters. Thus, a candidate's chances of winning are enhanced if he is backed up by a political party since he has more financial resources at his disposal.

Campaign Techniques. Various campaign techniques are used by candidates to maximize their chances of winning. These include the following:

1. House-to-house campaign - wherein candidates personally call on households to court the family's votes.
2. Rallies - wherein candidates give speeches and acquaint or inform the people of their personal attributes, platforms and promises. Issues are, however, rarely discussed and, if at all, usually lack significance. The reason for this rests on the personalism of the electorate and their tendency to vote for a candidate on the basis of personal and subjective characteristics.
3. Vote buying - wherein the voters are paid either to vote for a certain candidate or not to vote at all. This campaign technique is timed to produce the greatest effect. At times it takes place during the campaign, on other occasions -- during the eve of election day. Generally, however, vote-buying takes place before a voter walks into the voting place since, the later it is done, the better the results as the candidate would have a chance to know the quantity of votes that have been bought and the price involved.
4. Bribery - is a technique resorted to by some politicians wherein some registration officials are bribed to approve, disapprove or delay the approval of the registration forms of certain persons.

Other negative campaign methods utilized include acts designed to intimidate or coerce voters into doing the desired thing. Among these are the use of goons to harass voters identified with the rival party, blocking of roads to prevent voters from voting, threats and such similar techniques.

The Muslims as an Organization. The existing heavy political rivalries among top Muslim leaders is an indication of the lack of cohesiveness among the Muslim population. While no social cleavage actually exists to separate the members as a group, they may be described as being loosely related with one another owing to lack of different contacts involving the entire population. Their communities lack a real center of life for all the groups. Jolo, Zamboanga City, Cotabato City, and Marawi City might only be meeting sites for a predominant ethnolinguistic group: for instance, Marawi City for the Maranaos, Cotabato for the Maguindanaos, Jolo for the Tausugs and Samals; Zamboanga is seemingly a place for diverse Muslim groups who are not truly united and lacking in overall leadership. In addition, Muslim Filipinos lack a strong natural organization or pseudo-organization. Despite the presence of many organizations and the formation of new voluntary associations aimed at uniting the Muslims into a single force which can take up leadership in protecting and enhancing common Muslim interests, there is yet no single Muslim leader who is strong enough to break down the barriers that segmentalize the Muslim people and unite them in the manner of a Rizal, Bonifacio, Muhammad Jinhah, and similar others.

In other words, while the term "disunited" may not be the correct terminology to use in describing the social situation, the Muslims may be portrayed as basically unorganized. Although there is relative degree of internal unity in each

Muslim group, they have not - on the whole - succeeded in establishing an intergroup association of considerable strength for unification or even alliance. Their present attempt to establish a national organization is yet at the level of the educated, professional, and civic or politically-minded individuals who have only frequent contacts when they casually meet in Manila. Moreover, they are disadvantaged by insufficient contacts among individuals and groups in their provincial communities.

The social situation may also be characterized by the lack of intergroup contact among the ethnolinguistic groups. Not one of the Muslim languages is used as the vehicle of intergroup communication. Except for the Maguindanao-Maranao linguistic similarity, the Muslim groups - especially the professional, business, and political classes - communicate with each other through a third language: English, Tagalog or Cebuano. However, members of one group may attempt to learn the language of another as, for example, the power-minority Samal who tries to speak the language of the dominant Tausug who, in turn, does not easily learn the Samal language.

Internally within each group of Maranao, Maguindanao, and Tausug-Samal, there is always modern political rivalry among their leaders. Their practices of modern politics is at one time integrative, but in most cases divisive. What hinders intergroup unification include physical isolation of communities from each other and linguistic barriers. Geographically and historically, they have variations, especially with respect to their relations with their environments. In fact, the Islam religion and their identity as Muslims are the only cohesive factors that make the people distinct as a group from the view of outsiders and serve as the rallying point for unity, offense, or defense. Where

Islam is threatened or any one Muslim group is invaded by an "outsider", all other groups would sympathize and unite in defense against a common enemy.

Modern politics and voluntary organization for the support of Muslim interests may likewise be considered as stimuli towards unification. A challenge against them and their institutions could further rally the Muslims to solidification. In similar manner, regional sentiments, properly organized and communicated, will add to their cohesiveness as a group. Applying the same logic, it is reasonable to envision the Muslims as laying aside differences in religion and culture and joining their "Christian brothers" in a genuine spirit of nationalism if the Philippines were endangered.

Psychologically, the citizens of a country tend to develop closer ties when faced with a common enemy and in the presence of common interests which are mutually reinforcing.

#### The Problem of Integration and the Secession Movement

Reconsidered, the problem of integration is first and foremost a problem of leadership. This means that the chief executive of the country should be viewed from a national rather than a regional perspective. For quite some time now, it has been common to regard the top official as a Pampangueño, an Ilocano, or a Tagalog -- a practice which promotes regionalism and divides Filipinos instead of cementing them into a cohesive group. This suggests that even among non-Muslims, the problem of integration exists, with -- again -- religion as the major if not the only saving grace. It also further suggests that, from a non-Muslim standpoint, the problem of Muslim integration is basically a problem of assimilating this group into a way of life and belief deemed as most acceptable by the dominating majority. From a Muslim perspective, the problem is essentially

a struggle for identity and the preservation of what has been handed down by past generations. Seen from both angles, the problem principally rests on the failure of both parties to accept each other in a spirit of understanding and tolerance for individual differences. Unfortunately, where there is failure to accept, a breakdown in communication ensues with a consequential failure in attempts to integrate.

At this point, it might be proper to regard the problem of integration as involving several stages:

1. The reinforcement of whatever unity exists among non-Muslim groups;
2. The uniting of different Muslim groups in order to be highly integrated with the larger Philippine group;
3. The identification of similarities between the various existing subcultures to bring about a closer affinity among them, and, consequently, better communication;
4. The stating and clarifying of common goals toward which the people could strive as one.

The Concept of Integration. Integration, as a concept, is perceived and interpreted in many ways. From a psychological viewpoint, it may be considered as acceptance of one another by members of a society. From a sociological perspective, four schools of thought have emerged:

1. The concept of assimilation which presupposes that national integration can be achieved by providing only the same sets of cultural traits, ways of life, and systems of thought and government to all Filipinos. It proposes the assimilation of the cultural minorities into the mainstream of Philippine society, which implies, among other things, that all of them shall eventually be Christians.

2. Cultural plurality opposes the concept of assimilation. Under this second major concept, which is in keeping with liberalmindedness, tolerance of group differences is advocated.

3. "Free cultural" borrowing is the term used to suggest a midpoint between the two extremes of assimilation and cultural plurality. Under this concept, a cultural group may absorb only the traits which it desires of the majority or minority group, while refusing influences which it dislikes. It is this last concept which best reflects the Muslim-Filipinos' interpretation of integration. Firstly, the idea of assimilation is, to them, not only repelling but also demeaning since loss of identity connotes submission and is suggestive of a lowering of one's status and prestige. Hence, as a concept, it is also inconsistent with the Muslim value of maratabat. Secondly, as a concept opposing assimilation, cultural plurality takes on such an extreme position as to be practical. Its liberalmindedness and tolerant views, notwithstanding, it has its limitations in that it does not encourage free cultural exchange which is needed for better understanding and closer relations among diverse groups of people.

Muslim Filipinos realize the importance of acculturation or a two-way borrowing of societal and cultural traits. In fact Muslim educational leaders have expressed a desire to see that, while Muslims are selectively borrowing Christian social traits, the latter should be acculturated to new selected traits.

4. The forging of a national ideology is the fourth alternative which - in the opinion of the researchers - is most significant. The concept behind this is the creation of national common goals to which all groups (including Muslims) can subscribe.

When common objectives are absent, people have a greater tendency to isolate themselves and form small and varied groups of members bound by similar values.

interests, and ends. Oftentimes, these objectives and activities come into conflict, create personal friction among the leaders, and contribute to the problems of national integration. With the forging of a national ideology, it is anticipated that Filipinos can achieve closer affinity with one another, synchronize their actions and minimize the frictions that disrupt national unity. Needless to say, it also contributes to the development of a single and common Filipino identity.

The Secession Movement. When the Muslim Independence Movement was organized by Datu Udtog Matalam in 1968, there were only a number of people who took him seriously. The impression that was in fact generated in Manila was that he was merely a disillusioned politician trying to bring national attention on himself by exploiting and reviving an extinct issue. Even up to the time of this investigation, there were some people in Mindanao who disclaimed the serious intentions of Datu Matalam to carry out his plans as contained in a Muslim manifesto signed by him on May 1, 1968, which called for the creation of a separate sovereign Muslim nation.

Interviews with various people, including Datu Matalam himself, lead the researchers to take the position that the secession movement actually exists in the Mindanao region, supported not only by the Ex-Governor of Cotabato, but by other Muslim groups who even more strongly advocate the idea of separation. In fact, little armies have been reportedly undergoing training in preparation for the move.

Datu Matalam gives the researchers the impression of being one who is sincerely concerned about the welfare of his people and the development of the Mindanao region which he has described as badly neglected and exploited by the government. He has expressed his "resignation" from political affairs, despite the attempts of many leaders, followers, and other politicians to encourage him to make a comeback.

While no immediate danger was perceived during the survey period, it was felt that the time had come for the government to seriously look into the matter and to take the appropriate steps required to strengthen national unity through an intensified program of socio-economic reforms in Mindanao.

The separatism of certain Filipino-Muslims is justified when one considers the many and long neglected problems that plague Mindanao and reviews the historical background of Muslim secession.

It appears that the Muslims have never been conquered; nor have they ever considered themselves as a part of the Christianized areas of the north. On the contrary, the Christians had been their bitter enemies for more than three hundred years owing to religious and political differences. Despite the fact that, historically, the Muslims were never part of the Filipino nation, the arguments of Christian Filipinos who insisted that Mindanao and Sulu were inseparable from the Filipino nation convinced the Americans during their regime to embark on a program of national integration for the Muslims. To quote a student-writer of the history of Muslim Secession.<sup>81</sup>

"The program of integration that was subsequently put into operation caused disastrous dislocations in Muslim society, forcibly tore the Muslims away from their cultural base, and in effect emasculated them as a people. A few instances at this point are worthy of mention:

- a. The establishment of provincial and municipal governments undermined the power and status of traditional Muslim leaders, dislocated the authority and communications set-up, and negated existing coalition-formation patterns so necessary in the cooperative and communal ventures that the Muslims were accustomed to. These new poli-

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<sup>81</sup>De los Santos, R. Joel, "Some Observations on the Historical Background of Muslim Secession", (Philippines: Verge, December, 1970), pp. 5-7.

tical structures were based on western political concepts that the Muslims were alien to. In operation they were disruptive in the society and they were not at all functional therein. The traditional patterns that the Muslims were accustomed to were responsive to their needs as they saw them. They therefore did not respond enthusiastically to these innovations.

- b. The imposition of a new legal system negated the judicial function of the village elders and made impotent the existing traditional conflict-resolution institutions of Muslim society. This caused a breakdown in the social order and gave rise to a lot of social problems which exist up to this day.
- c. It was in the field of education however where irreparable dislocations were created. The public schools systematically alienated the Muslim children from their heroic past. The English language which they were forced to learn in school glamorized a new set of values which despised the cultural milieu that gave them life. A great amount of money was spent on education by the colonial master and this investment was expected to yield captive minds with loyalty to Washington and slavish devotion to the American way of life. In the classrooms, they read books that were historically distorted and that pictured their valiant and heroic ancestors as brigands and murderers. Consequently, the poor Muslim children became bewildered victims of a tug-of-war between the influences of the home and that of the school.
- d. The transportation of Christian Filipino as well as American families to Muslim provinces and the creation of agricultural colonies out of Muslim lands caused a lot of resentment in Muslim circles and in effect reduced the economic base of Moroland. In some cases, the best cultivable lands were given to this (these\*)

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\*probable word

colonists after the original owners were forced out. This practice was later on continued by the Philippine Republic in the case of surrendered Huks who were relocated in Cotabato and Lanao.

In 1914, the Moro Province was transformed into the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. This department was abolished in 1920 and its powers were transferred to the Bureau of non-Christian tribes under the newly constituted Department of Interior. Under the rule of Governor General Francis B. Harrison, Christian Filipinos assumed bigger responsibilities in the affairs of Morolandia. This increasing participation resulted in more unrest among the Muslims and fanned the centuries-old hostilities that smoldered in their hearts.

The program of Filipinization not catapulted Christian Filipinos to sensitive government offices but also propelled the campaign for independence eloquently led by the powerful and the rich among them. The independence they demanded was for the whole archipelago - including the Muslim areas therein. The Muslims of course had other ideas about the same subject. Very few if any among them welcomed the idea of union with their enemies in the north. In their thinking, they were always a separate people. It was preposterous and even absurd for them to be ruled by a people who had nothing to show but mendicancy and puppetry for more than three hundred years!

Some Americans surprisingly agreed with this Muslim viewpoint. Dean Worcester, writing in 1914, said:

With all our resources, we have not as yet been able to establish a decent state of public order in the little island of Jolo. No serious minded person, familiar with the facts with whom I have ever talked, believes for a moment that the Filipinos could establish an effective government over the Moros, or could keep them at home.

Continuing in the same vein, he said that in the event that American control were withdrawn from the islands and if no other foreign power would interfere to restore a decent state of public order, the Moros would resume the conquest of the Philippines which they were so actively and effectively pushing when the Spaniards compelled them to abandon it, and would have slowly but none the less surely carried it through to a successful termination.

The same author observed that in spite of all protestations to the contrary, the Filipinos were absolutely without sympathy for non-Christian peoples, and had never voluntarily done anything for them, but on the contrary had shamelessly exploited them whenever opportunity had offered.

The cunning Filipino politicians however succeeded in pulling the wool over the eyes of American colonial administrators. Gradually, the concept of a new country composed of Christian as well as Muslim elements (in spite of their differences and animosities) was accepted by American policy makers. In the third decade of American rule, the Tydings-McDuffie Law signalled the success of the Filipino politicians.

The Muslims vehemently opposed the proposed status and manifested their stand in many ways. In the Rizal day celebrations in 1923, the Muslims in Zamboanga demonstrated, bearing placards that read:

'We Moros are not with the Christian Filipinos in their asking for independence. We wish our Moro country to be segregated from Luzon and the Visayan islands.

The chronicler of the above incident also quoted Datu Sacaluran of Sulu as reacting sharply to the American desire of letting the Christian Filipinos decide the political destiny of the whole archipelago including Mindanao and Sulu. Datu Sacaluran said: 'I am an old man now. I don't want any more trouble. But should it come to that, that we are given over to the Filipinos, I still would fight.' Another unnamed Datu was also quoted as saying: 'I will never be able to hold my men in check under the rule of the Filipinos. They will take to the hills and will never submit. The old days of jungle warfare I saw thirty years ago will return to Mindanao and Sulu.'

In 1935, in Dansalan, Lanao (now Marawi City) an assembly of Maranao Datus drafted a declaration which was sent to the President of the United States which strongly petitioned the exclusion of the Muslim areas from the proposed Philippine Commonwealth.

But all these protestations fell on deaf ears. When the present Philippine Constitution was finally promulgated in 1935, the delegate from Lanao was the only delegate who did not sign it. He believed that the people he was representing were given a raw deal. The closing years of American rule in the archipelago was characterized by feverish activities on the part of Filipino politicians to lay the foundations of a workable republic for all. The fascistic imperialist expansion of Japan, however, abruptly interrupted these activities.

The Philippines suffered disastrously from the ravages of the war. In 1946 independence was declared and a new Republic was born. In spite of the pressing problems that

threatened to snuff out its existence, the Republic has miraculously survived up to the present. In the meantime, the Muslim problem was relegated to the background by the rise of other dynamic social and political forces that brought with them problems which the new Republic approached with a sense of urgency. In the middle fifties, the Commission on National Integration was created by law to hasten the integration process which was started by the Americans at the turn of the century. In the last five years, however, rumblings of secession by the Muslims from the Philippine Republic and the creation of a new Muslim Republic of Mindanao and Sulu have surfaced.

Despite the serious implications of the secessionist movement, Congress and Malacañang seem more preoccupied with other matters than with the socio-economic reforms required for the country's development. As a result, the Muslim problem has steadily worsened and now threatens national security.

The following is a rundown of just some factors contributing to or aggravating the restiveness of the Muslims:

1. The disparity in the enjoyment of economic and social benefits between the Muslims and the rest of the country.
2. Lack or absence of representation in government bodies like financing institutions.
3. The bypassing of Muslim officers in the promotion within the Armed Forces.
4. The non-establishment of an embassy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to take care of Muslims going annually to perform their pilgrimage.
5. The misrepresentation of the character and nature of the Muslim struggle against the Spaniards and the Americans in the history of our country.
6. The landgrabbing activity in Muslim areas protected by the Bureau of Forestry and Bureau of Lands.
7. The government's inability to give small pieces of land for the Muslim community in Manila so that they will have a place to bury their deceased and to build mosques.
8. The ineffectiveness of the Commission on National Integration in accomplishing the objectives for which it was created.

9. The presence of discriminatory legislation such as Commonwealth Act No. 473, Sec. 4, par C, whereby it is a disqualification for naturalization for the practice of polygamy. This obviously is directed against the Muslims.

10. The termination of R.A. 394 and 241 which allows divorce and marriage under Islamic laws among Muslims. The Muslims believe that these laws should be permanent in character because the majority has no right to impose their morality on a historical minority considering the fact that their system of law and society existed four centuries ahead of the republic.

#### Prejudice and the Search for Identity

The problem of national integration in the face of a crisis in majority-minority relations is essentially a problem of prejudice, and from all indications, the many factors contributing to the restiveness of Muslim-Filipinos are merely by-products of an attitudinal ailment. This is a condition which has been created by both groups of Christians and Muslims.

Oversight or neglect on the part of a "Christian" national government may have been unintentional, yet unconsciously influenced by prejudice. And, considering the present state of affairs, it seems evident that the Muslim population is reacting to prejudice with equal, although justified, animosity.

To appreciate what is presently happening and why the problem exists is to understand, at least in part, the meaning and the nature of prejudice. Since a full treatment of the subject matter is not within the scope of this study, we shall confine ourselves to a brief description of the mechanism as it operates to obstruct national integration.

Prejudice is a preconceived judgment, usually accompanied by an irrational attitude of hostility directed against an individual, a group, a race, or their supposed characteristics. Many theories have evolved out of efforts to explain it, and one of these presents prejudice as a defense against identity diffusion or total loss of identity. Under this concept, prejudice is seen as something which bolsters a weak sense of identity; hence the loss of this psychological supportive mechanism may threaten a weak identity. If this is so, efforts toward integration threaten not only the social status and economic security of the prejudiced members of both groups but also their inner sense of identity. For steps toward integration mean criticism of their prejudices--a criticism that increases certain guilt feelings they may be unable to admit even to themselves. As a result, they may feel psychologically trapped, because now both criticism and guilt threaten their sense of identity. At a loss in seeking to protect their identity, such prejudiced persons may try to further buttress it by maintaining their prejudice.

Unless one seriously backtracks into the history of the Philippines, he may encounter some difficulty in comprehending why the Christians, who now dominate this country, should feel insecure in their identity. Yet one can hardly fail to note the centuries of exposure to foreign rule felt perhaps mainly by Christian Filipinos who more readily succumbed to it.

While the general countenance of their behavior may deny a weakened sense of identity, it appears that even the Christian Filipinos have not quite reached a full sense of being and achievement. Thus the denial of common grounds with minority groups reflects a need to identify with an image ideal that has been influenced by western values, while also possibly symbolically eradicating a more humble past.

In short, both Christian as well as Muslim Filipinos feel threatened in terms of identity. The greater danger seen by the latter is identity diffusion, in the event that assimilation rather than free-cultural borrowing takes place. With the former, the threat is more in terms of being "identified with lesser powers" and a traditional past that falls back on more humble beginnings. If this is so, then national integration also calls for a re-examination of values, self-criticism, and a very high degree of humility.

#### Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

Aside from the principal questions outlined at the start, this investigation commenced with six hypotheses for testing as follows:

1. There is a lack of identification among Muslim Filipinos with the national government as a result of cultural background and traditions.
2. Muslims perceive their group as rejected and their status and roles demeaned by Christians who comprise the largest segment of our society.
3. Muslim Filipinos perceive themselves as independent and self-sufficient, thus capable of conducting their own affairs without the help of the national government.
4. Consciously or unconsciously, Western education is viewed in a negative light as it is deemed a threat to Muslim unity and Islamic culture.
5. Muslim political leaders who have received Western education are not fully accepted by their people and, as such, do not voice nor reflect the common opinions of the community under study.
6. Politics is viewed as a means of upward mobility, and yet, the practice is also perceived negatively. Hence, ambivalence toward political leaders of the Philippine Muslim community is present.

The findings support the above hypotheses. However, further qualifying statements must be made relative to the last two hypotheses:

Muslim political leaders who have received Western education are not fully accepted by their people and do not voice the common opinions of their community -- not so much because of diminished prestige or status in this group but owing to the presence of multiple leaders and conflicts that divide the loyalties of the Muslim population. It appears that, while present Muslim political leaders may be just as influential in terms of degree of power exerted over their followers, their scope of influence or span of control have been considerably diminished due to split factions and intense rivalries among the different political leaders. This is of course aggravated by the negative view in which politicians -- whether Christians or Muslims -- are held.

Taking all the findings into consideration, it is envisioned that the undertaking of a socio-cultural, political and economic program through the steps outlined below can help foster Muslim-Christian unity in the Philippines and achieve the goal of national integration.

#### A. Socio-Cultural Development

1. A re-definition of the term "national integration" so that this term will be understood to mean political cohesiveness, or the "fusion of a nation's cultural groups -- normally classified into the majority and the minority (ies) -- into one body politic, with a view to granting the minority (ies) under a common government all the rights and privileges enjoyed by the majority, and getting them involved in the usual efforts to further that nation's interests."

2. Amendment of Republic Act 1888 (as amended by R.A. 3852). Amendments to the Act should aim, basically, at changing the term National Cultural Minorities to National Culture Groups.

The former term implies the idea that various subgroups exist within one big group and connote the presence of "inferior" groups. It also has unpleasant connotations of divisiveness, inferiority ideas, and marked cultural differences. The latter term, however, is not only more neutral but also suggestive of equality.

3. Passing a bill requiring 12 units of Philippine cultural studies for college students. These 12 units will replace those required 12 units of Spanish which were deleted by the passage of a bill requiring only 12 units of Spanish in the college course.
4. Appropriation of additional funds for the establishment of additional schools in Mindanao, improvement of educational facilities, and hiring of teachers with better qualifications.
5. In relation to the above, the setting up of a Special Committee which shall be assigned the task of studying the present educational system to incorporate within it the objectives of a national program of integration and recommending a budget for the improvement of education in Mindanao. It is specifically recommended that a review of current literature and textbooks in Philippine history be reviewed and, if necessary, re-written to erase prejudiced descriptions of Muslim Filipinos and more objectively give information on the people of this country and those with whom they have associated in the past. Muslim historians should be allowed to express their opinions and criticisms of the various existing Filipino literature and participate

in the review and re-writing of Philippine history which has been criticized by many as containing many inaccuracies and biases.

6. The implementation of a Tax Deduction bill in Congress for projects involving cultural minorities. The tax deduction should be significant enough to encourage businessmen but statistically and economically calculated so as to insure no great loss on the part of the government. The calculation of tax deduction should rest on the Presidential Economic Staff's analysis. Filipino movies depicting the colorful and rich history of the minorities of the South and business endeavors such as production and marketing of Muslim wares, Kampilans, sari, and the like are examples of projects referred to here.

#### B. Political

1. Approval of the proposal for the addition of the ninth ray on the Filipino flag, which will recognize the Muslims' role in the history of Philippine resistance movement.
2. Recruitment of Muslims for the army. Muslim Filipino soldiers, after rigid training, should replace non-Muslim Filipino soldiers who are deployed in the South to foster a better understanding the Muslim civilians and the government troopers.
3. The appointment of more Muslims in government positions. There should be more Muslim ambassadors, judges, government officials and representatives to public financing institutions and other agencies such as the Board of Textbooks, National Historical Shrines Commission, and the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures.

4. The creation of a Special Study Committee on Land-grabbing in Mindanao the members of which shall include Muslims as well as people from other religious denominations.
  
- 5. The establishment of an embassy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to take care of Muslims going annually to perform their pilgrimage.
  
- 6. Conferences with Muslim leaders. It cannot be denied that the friction between Muslim Filipinos and their Christian brothers is the fault of both Muslim and Christian leaders in the Philippines. While the Christians obviously share the greater blame, the fact cannot be bypassed that even the Muslim leaders in Congress have yet to come up with a feasible plan of national integration for their own people. It would be appropriate for the government to press these Muslim leaders to give their own contribution for the socio-economic advancement of their own people. Thus the government can be instrumental in helping these Muslim leaders realize that, from the very start, they owe their fellow Muslims the place they now enjoy and hence they would do well to cooperate with the government in their socio-economic programs either by giving a direct hand or supervision of these proposed projects.
  
- ...7. On the other hand, Muslim leaders should unite, and, as a solid body, present their views and recommendations to the government. Political factions and rivalries should be laid aside for greater strength and bargaining power.

### C. Economic

1. The mobilization of army troops for the construction of roads, bridges, health centers, and recreation halls and courts for the Muslim youths.
2. Enhancing the employment opportunities of Muslims by providing them vocational and technical training schools and giving them whatever other help may be required to promote their skills.
3. The appropriation of funds required to provide Muslims with adequate knowledge of mechanized farming.
4. Improving the production of agricultural crops by establishing projects necessary for development: irrigation, diffusion of seeds, breeds and practices, establishment of processing industries, etc.
5. The promotion of Marawi City as a tourist spot by the government which would have both economic as well as socio-cultural advantages. Marawi City and other areas in the South show promise of turning out to be income-producing tourist spots owing to their scenic beauty and culture. However, an improvement in the peace and order conditions is badly required. In addition, hotels suitable for tourists are conspicuously missing in Marawi and Jolo. Commercial planes do not fly into Marawi at present. The Maranao brass work industry will be considerably benefited by an increase in tourism; but there is reportedly a problem of short supply in raw materials which will have to be solved before a significant expansion in output will be possible.
6. A further study and development of export industries in Mindanao. It is expected that the development will be greatest in export sectors, given the

recent devaluation, with or without government support. Government participation in projects which will break export bottlenecks -- such as refrigeration plants for fish exports, or port construction -- will of course increase development in export sectors further. Since investors will be rushing into these fields, the government's task would be mainly to take care that profitable sectors are not quickly pre-empted by non-Muslim investors. At present, for instance, the Sulu Sea fishing grounds along Palawan are almost entirely monopolized by Navotas fishermen. As investment into fishing expands, it would be advisable to provide loans for such investment preferentially to Muslims, to ensure them an equitable share of the fishing industry.

7. The establishment of a Muslim Development Bank to lend assistance to the community and insure the participation of Muslim capital or equity resources.
8. Government lending activity should be geared to this end: loans for equity can be made directly to Muslims; or loans to non-Muslims for new Mindanao enterprises can be made conditional on an offering of shares in equity to Muslims.
9. The construction of a distribution network for electric power originating from Maria Cristina Falls. Efforts should be made to secure an equitable share of the Muslim provinces in this network. It has been pointed out that Lanao del Sur in particular is sadly lacking in industrial development, an incongruity for the province from which the electric power at Maria Cristina is ultimately derived.
10. The encouragement for investment in and development

of the pearl farming industry in the Sulu-Zamboanga area. World demand for high-quality cultured pearl is projected to expand with rising income so that the potential for this industry is optimistic. It is also a relatively large employment multiplier because the pearl farm buys oysters for pearl cultivating from several thousand families in diverse outlying areas.

11. The creation of a more effective office to replace the Commission on National Integration, which will be given a share in the policy-making processes of the development-oriented agencies on both Mindanao and national level. This office shall be controlled by a board composed of both Muslims and non-Muslims.
12. A further study of the potentials of putting up a canning industry in Mindanao is recommended since the Philippines is a heavy importer of canned sardines. In effect, a more intensive project feasibility study on the economic potentials of the region in relation to varied industries is recommended with the end in view of obtaining a detailed account of the financing required.

As a result of the participation of Muslim resources in growth sectors of Mindanao increases, greater interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims in business firms and in government agencies will be unavoidable so that a certain amount of cultural friction may still be anticipated. However, with greater efforts made to understand the Muslims as Filipino citizens first and foremost, and allowing them to obtain a share in the policy-making activities in these firms and agencies, it is expected that such friction will eventually be diminished.

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PROSPECTS FOR MUSLIM PARTICIPATION

IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF MINDANAO

A Report Prepared For

FILIPINAS FOUNDATION, INC.

By

Economic Research Associates, Inc.

July 1970

## 1. A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF MINDANAO

As of February 15, 1960, the total population of Mindanao was 5,384,000. This was about 20% of the 1960 national population and represented an increase of 83% from the reported Mindanao population in 1948. This may be compared to a 41% increase in the national population within the same period.

Table 1 contains the population and the implied population annual growth rates for the Mindanao provinces, based on the censuses of 1948 and 1960. Except for Sulu, Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur, the provinces in Mindanao have population growth rates higher than that of the whole Philippines. Davao, Cotabato, Agusan, Zamboanga del Sur and Lanao del Norte exhibit the highest growth rates.

Allowing for migration into the region, the Mindanao population is estimated to be 9,186,000 by 1970 and 11,377,000 by 1975. A more detailed projection of population in the Mindanao provinces for 1970-1975 is given in Table 2.

The Muslim population in Mindanao is concentrated in three provinces in the region: there are the Tausugs, Samals and Badjaos in Sulu; the Maranaos in Lanao del Sur; and the Magindanaos in Cotabato<sup>1</sup>. Somewhat lower concentrations

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<sup>1</sup>Unless otherwise stated, 'Cotabato' refers to the present (Northern) Cotabato and Southern Cotabato combined.

of Muslims are found in Zamboanga del Sur and Lanao del Norte. In Table 3, the population of Muslims in Mindanao is given for the years 1948 and 1960. It is interesting to note that the Muslim population ratios in the Mindanao provinces underwent only slight changes from 1948 to 1960. Small increases are recorded for Sulu and Misamis Oriental, and small decreases for the remaining provinces, with Davao registering a maximum decrease of 2.4 percentage points.

Finally, Table 4 indicates the literacy of persons aged 10 and over in Mindanao for the year 1960. Levels of literacy are seen to be higher for the Northern and Eastern Mindanao region than for the Southern and Western Mindanao region. The literacy level in Sulu (95% Muslim) is far below the other provinces; the levels in Cotabato, Zamboanga del Sur and Lanao del Norte are also below those of the 'Christian' provinces. Only in Lanao del Sur do we have a literacy level comparable to the 'Christian' provinces.

These literacy levels are of course averages for both the Muslim and non-Muslim residents. The literacy levels for Muslims alone may be expected to be much lower<sup>1</sup>, especially in Cotabato, Zamboanga del Sur and Lanao del Norte,

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<sup>1</sup>Another problem with interpretation of the data is the strong possibility that many of the recorded Muslim literates are actually 'functional illiterates', i.e., not able to follow printed instructions or to undertake simple arithmetical calculations.

Table 1. Population and Population Growth Rates for Mindanao, by Province: 1948 and 1960

	Oct. 1, 1948 (thousands)	Feb. 15, 1960 (thousands)	Annual % growth rates
<b>Southern and Western Mindanao</b>			
Cotabato	440	1,029	8.0
Davao	365	893	8.5
Zamboanga del Norte	168	281	4.8
Zamboanga del Sur	354	743	7.0
Sulu	241	327	2.8
<b>Northern and Eastern Mindanao</b>			
Agusan	126	271	7.2
Bukidnon	64	194	10.6
Lanao del Norte	132	270	6.8
Lanao del Sur	212	378	5.4
Misamis Occidental	208	249	1.7
Misamis Oriental	370	389	0.5
Surigao del Norte	143	195	2.9
Surigao del Sur	122	165	2.8
Mindanao	2,945	5,384	5.6
Philippines	19,234	27,088	3.2

Source: Bureau of the Census and Statistics.

Table 2. Projected Population of Mindanao by Province: 1970-1975

	As of July 1st (Thousands)					
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Southern and Western Mindanao						
Cotabato	1,790	1,867	1,949	2,033	2,122	2,215
Davao	1,578	1,649	1,722	1,798	1,878	1,962
Zamboanga del Norte	448	466	485	505	526	547
Zamboanga del Sur	1,353	1,410	1,469	1,531	1,595	1,662
Sulu	476	493	512	531	550	571
Northern and Eastern Mindanao						
Agusan	475	498	522	548	575	603
Bukidnon	349	366	383	401	419	439
Lanao del Norte	477	503	531	560	590	622
Lanao del Sur	554	574	594	615	637	660
Misamis Occidental	356	368	380	392	405	419
Misamis Oriental	569	590	611	633	656	680
Surigao del Norte	288	299	311	323	336	349
Surigao del Sur	244	258	272	288	304	321
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Mindanao	8,927	9,316	9,722	10,145	10,587	11,050

Source: Mindanao Development Authority.

Table 3. Muslim Population in Mindanao by Province: 1948 and 1960

	1948		1960	
	Number	Percentage of Population	Number	Percentage of Population
<b>Southern and Western Mindanao</b>				
Cotabato	155,162	35.3	356,460	34.6
Davao	18,362	5.0	22,883	2.6
Zamboanga del Norte )	133,348 )	25.5 )	16,211	5.7
Zamboanga del Sur )			178,233	24.0
Sulu	226,883	94.2	310,926	95.1
<b>Northern Eastern Mindanao</b>				
Agusan	373	0.3	151	-
Bukidnon	1,321	1.9	2,781	1.4
Lanao del Norte )	237,215 )	69.0 )	56,533	20.9
Lanao del Sur )			355,727	94.1
Misamis Occidental	415	0.2	133	-
Misamis Oriental	384	0.1	660	0.2
Surigao del Norte )	1,101 )	-	67	-
Surigao del Sur )			72	-
<hr/>				
Mindanao	774,474	26.3	1,300,837	24.2
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Note: Dash means less than 0.1%.

Source: Bureau of the Census and Statistics.

Table 4. Literacy of persons 10 years old and over for Mindanao, by Province: 1960

	Number of persons ten years old and over	Number able to read and write	Literacy rate (percent)
Southern and Western Mindanao			
Cotabato	681,099	362,951	53.3
Davao	571,207	379,678	66.5
Zamboanga del Norte	181,652	106,299	58.5
Zamboanga del Sur	478,719	253,879	53.0
Sulu	223,901	63,205	28.2
Northern and Eastern Mindanao			
Agusan	173,330	136,272	78.6
Bukidnon	122,034	77,960	63.9
Lanao del Norte	174,737	114,261	65.4
Lanao del Sur	258,277	188,798	73.4
Misamis Occidental	166,633	127,364	76.4
Misamis Oriental	250,849	193,233	77.0
Surigao del Norte	131,906	100,411	76.1
Surigao del Sur	109,960	80,152	72.9
Mindanao	3,524,304	2,184,463	70.0
Philippines	18,145,872	13,073,748	72.0

Source: Bureau of the Census and Statistics.

all of which have large non-Muslim populations. It appears that the educational disparity is more evident among adults, i.e., persons in the productive ages, and less evident among children. However, the schooling drop-out rate is also observed to be much higher among Muslims, and so the educational disparity is likely to remain for a long time to come, unless corrected by appropriate policies. This point is emphasized because it seems to be the fundamental reason for the unequal competitive position of Muslims and Christians for gainful positions in present-day Mindanao.

## 2. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR MUSLIMS IN MINDANAO

### Introduction

Future Muslim participation in the economic development of Mindanao will depend primarily on the economic growth of the provinces where they are concentrated, and on the distribution of the benefits from economic growth in these provinces between Muslims and non-Muslims. The following analysis concentrates on the possible economic growth of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Zamboanga del Sur. The distribution of economic benefits in these provinces between Muslims and non-Muslims cannot be precisely analyzed on account of a lack of data -- apart from casual observation and the subjective judgment of persons interviewed -- regarding economic participation categorized by religious or cultural grouping. It would have been preferable to obtain such data by a statistical survey. The research group nevertheless feels that an analysis concentrating on the above five provinces will be basically accurate.

### The Effect of Peso Devaluation on the Development of Mindanao

Given the recent de facto devaluation of the peso, it appears that the most promising sources of economic development in Mindanao are the export sectors of the region, i.e.,

wood products, mining, fishing, coconut products and other agricultural export crops. This conclusion is well borne out by a review of past Mindanao growth (below). There would seem to be little need for governmental assistance for the favored industries, apart from non-interference with the present state of incentives. From the viewpoint of increasing Muslim benefits as much as possible, the government may wish to play a role in directing new investments in these industries (as well as in new export products) so as to attain a more equitable distribution of the benefits between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The importance of devaluation for the growth of Mindanao can be ascertained from an examination of the (approximate) effects of the 1962 devaluation on the growth of Mindanao. It is well known, first of all, that Mindanao is the major export surplus region in this country (Table 5); net exports from Mindanao grew from less than ₱500 million in FY 1964 to over ₱1 billion in FY 1969 -- or a growth rate of about 15% per year. We then draw on a recent study<sup>1</sup> for estimates of the ratio of regional economic growth to national economic growth (Table 6).

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<sup>1</sup>G. P. Sicat, "Dimensions of Regional and Economic Growth in the Philippines," paper presented at the First Pacific Regional Science Conference, East-West Center, University of Hawaii, August 1969.

Table 5. Estimates of Net Earnings from Foreign Trade, Mindanao Region\*

In million pesos at current prices

	FY 1964	FY 1965	FY 1966	FY 1967	FY 1968	FY 1969
Total Annual Exports	550.4	564.5	703.0	873.5	1,051.3	1,141.8
Total Annual Imports	68.4	90.0	95.8	112.4	113.1	118.1
Net Exports	482.0	474.5	607.2	761.1	938.2	1,023.7

\* Includes Palawan.

Source: Mindanao Development Authority. Basic data from the Bureau of Customs.

Table 6. Estimated Ratios of Annual Growth Rates in Gross Regional Product to Annual Growth Rates in Gross National Product

	1948-1961	1961-1966	Entire Period 1948-1966
Luzon	110%	100%	100%
Visayas	80%	80 to 90%	80%
Southern & Western Mindanao	100%	130%	120 to 130%
Northern & Eastern Mindanao	80 to 90%	120 to 160%	100 to 140%

Source: Sicat, op. cit., p. 16.

In this table, a ratio of 100% implies growth at the same rate as the national average, and ratios above 100% imply above-average growth rates. We immediately see Mindanao as the leading region in growth during 1948-1966. The two periods 1948-1961 and 1961-1966 approximately correspond to the pre- and post-devaluation time spans (the 'decontrol' period prior to the 1962 devaluation will be recalled). This table shows that Luzon was the leading region in the period prior to the 1962 devaluation. Southern and Western Mindanao was growing at about the same rate as the nation as a whole; but Northern and Eastern Mindanao was lagging behind in growth. The 1962 devaluation changed the pattern radically, and both of the Mindanao regions have become leading growth sectors for the nation as a whole, with growth rates which were 20% to 60% above the national average.

#### Population Growth and the Development of Mindanao

The rapid growth of Mindanao in gross terms in 1961-66 was however offset by the rate of population growth, with a notably high migration component. Migration rates for the several regions are given in Table 7, where it is seen that the rates in Mindanao are second only to Rizal province (which, on account of locational advantages and industrial development, deserved treatment as a separate region). The entry of more highly skilled labor into

Table 7. Population Growth and Migration Rates by Region

Region	Average Annual population growth 1948-1960	Migration rate per 1000 population in 1948
I. Metropolitan Manila	3%	-55
Rizal	10%	578
II. Ilocos & Mt. Province	2%	-34
III. Cagayan Valley & Batanes	5%	58
IV. Central Luzon	3%	-53
V. Southern Luzon & Islands	4%	7
VI. Bicol	4%	-33
VII. Western Visayas	2%	-78
VIII. Eastern Visayas	1%	-100
IX. Southwestern Mindanao & Sulu	9%	253
X. Northwestern Mindanao	4%	119

Source: Sicat, op. cit., p. 18.

Mindanao has created an employment problem for Muslims; this will be treated in a later section. After the regional product is placed on per capita terms, the growth rates for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao tend to equalize.

#### Economic Growth of Muslim Provinces

The above estimates are based on data with respect to revenue and expenditures of local governments, which may be assumed to be highly correlated with the gross regional product. Since these are surrogate data, they would be expected to give more accurate implications for larger areas such as regions than for smaller areas such as provinces. Nevertheless it is important to examine provincial results, since this will give a clearer picture of the participation of Muslims in economic growth (Table 8).

When viewed as a whole, the figures in Table 8 would not seem to show that economic growth is biased in favor of the non-Muslim provinces of Mindanao. However, it needs to be stressed, at the outset, that there are two reasons why the figures in Table 8 probably over-estimate the economic progress of Muslims relative to the nation as a whole. First, in the Muslim provinces local officials were chosen by election rather than by appointment beginning only in 1959. Increases in revenues and expenditures of

local governments in Muslim provinces after 1959 would therefore be related not only to economic development but also to political development: elected officials have more incentive to raise revenues and expenditures than appointed ones. Second, it appears from subjective judgment that in Muslim provinces the economic progress of non-Muslim elements is more rapid than that of Muslim elements. The figures in Table 8 of course reflect the progress in each province of all religious or cultural groups combined.

For the high growth period, 1961-1966, we find that the leading province is Bukidnon (location of Philippine Packing Corporation's pineapple plantation), growing at double the national rate. Among the Muslim provinces, the most serious problem of lagging growth is found in Sulu, (95% Muslim) where growth was nearly 40% below the national average rate. This strongly correlates with the earlier finding that the lowest literacy level in the entire Mindanao region is found in Sulu, and indicates the urgent need for increased schooling among Sulu residents. In Zamboanga del Sur (over 20% Muslim), growth was hardly different from the national average. In Lanao del Norte (20% Muslim), the growth rate was 40% above the national average; however, much of this should probably be attributed to the industrial growth of Iligan City, in which Muslim participation is very minor. The growth rate was estimated at 40% above the

Table 8. Estimated Ratios of Annual Growth Rates in Gross Provincial Product to Annual Growth Rates in Gross National Product for Mindanao and Sulu, 1961-1966.

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Agusan	115%
Bukidnon	200%
Cotabato	160%
Davao	120%
Lanao del Norte	140%
Lanao del Sur	140%
Misamis Occidental	60%
Misamis Oriental	100%
Sulu	63%
Surigao del Sur	160%
Zamboanga del Sur	103%

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Note: The estimates for Surigao del Norte and Zamboanga del Norte were rather ambiguous, and so are omitted. 'Cotabato' and 'Davao' are with reference to old provincial boundaries, prior to recent subdivisions.

Source: Sicat, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

national average in Lanao del Sur (nearly 95% Muslim) and at 60% above the national average in Cotabato (nearly 35% Muslim). In both provinces, part of this progress would have to be attributed to the development of the basically non-Muslim logging and wood products industry and agricultural plantations.<sup>1</sup>

It would be quite difficult to obtain more precise information on the economic progress of the Muslim population. The general finding here is that the provincial growth data, and the adjustments which are required for their interpretation indicate that the progress of the Muslim population is less than that of the region as a whole, and suggest the provinces in which economic assistance is particularly needed.

#### General problems facing Muslim participation in development

In any given province, Muslim participation in development will depend on factors affecting the size of and the remuneration to the employment of resources which are owned or controlled by Muslims.

1. Labor. Chief among these resources is labor. The problem of employment is encountered in large industrial and

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<sup>1</sup>Several of the newer plantations are in Southern Cotabato, which is only about 10% Muslim.

agricultural firms, which are primarily Christian-controlled, and has both cultural and non-cultural aspects. The difficulty for Muslims of obtaining employment in the industrial firms in the Iligan area would typify this situation. From the viewpoint of these firms, it is said to be disadvantageous to employ Muslims because of their relative lack of skills and training, undependability for continuous employment, and a propensity for causing problems with non-Muslim personnel, who tend to fear for their personal safety and security when differences arise. This view of Muslim labor probably hinders to some extent the establishment of industrial firms in heavily Muslim-dominated areas. In Lanao del Sur, for example, there is only one firm -- Maranao Timber Corporation -- which can be considered "large" by usual standards. One observer has explained this situation in terms of the Muslim's sense of independence from authority, system of collective protection, and alleged disaffection for manual work (in the case of hadjis).<sup>1</sup>

The problem of differential in skills has been noted previously. There are, strictly speaking, only three ways by which skills may be increased: formal schooling, on-the-job training, and brute trial-and-error without supervision. We have already seen that, on the average,

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<sup>1</sup>Professor Jan Messelink, formerly with the Economics Department of Mindanao State University.

Muslims obtain less schooling than non-Muslims. This tends to hinder the acceptance of Muslims into business firms where they may benefit from on-the-job training. It is worthy of note that Mindanao State University is faced with a serious shortage of Muslim high school graduates, such that the present ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim college students is less than desirable. The University has been forced to establish its own high schools in Marawi and Jolo.

The skill-differential problem can only be solved by applying more resources into manpower training for Muslims, and in the long-run this can only be accomplished by substantially increasing the quantity of schooling which Muslims are able to obtain. Certain quarters have suggested the creation of short, three- to six-month programs. This proposal would definitely add a larger number of Muslims to the skilled labor force, and would deserve further study into aspects of cost-efficiency.

The most efficient way of handling cultural aspects of the employment problem would appear to be to create incentives for greater Muslim participation in equity and in management positions of firms which are based or to be established in Muslim-dominated areas. A recommended incentive would be preferential development loans to Muslims for investment in equity in firms to be established in such areas. The fishing and refrigeration industries, in which

new investment is likely to be quite profitable, would be areas in which government probably needs to take care that a substantial share in new equity is held by Muslims.

There do not appear to be problems with respect to the quantity of the available labor force. Labor force and employment statistics are given in Tables 9 and 10.

2. Land. The second major resources is land. In the Lanao and Cotabato provinces, the majority of Muslims are engaged in farming. However, only coconuts and such other plantation export crops are expected to develop considerably in the near future. In the Cotabato provinces the main product is rice, and a large number of the farmers are Muslims. These farmers can be expected to become better off if they are able to take advantage of the recently developed new rice varieties. Efforts should therefore be made to expand the diffusion of such varieties and of necessary complementary inputs (such as fertilizer and irrigation) to Muslim farmers in particular. However, the resulting improvement in these farmers' incomes should not be overestimated, since the new technology has made the price outlook somewhat pessimistic for producers; it is becoming increasingly difficult to export rice, as the technology spreads in other Asian countries. This overseas diffusion of the technology offsets to some

Table 9. Experienced Labor Force in Agriculture and Non-Agriculture,  
Minsupala Region, 1965-1967

TOTAL	<u>2,177,600</u>	<u>2,502,975</u>	<u>2,622,400</u>
Total Employed	2,145,600	2,473,650	2,557,200
Total Unemployed	32,000	29,325	65,200
Agriculture Total	<u>1,596,490</u>	<u>1,824,475</u>	<u>1,882,000</u>
Employed	1,580,890	1,810,100	1,844,000
Unemployed	15,600	14,375	38,000
Non-Agricultural Total	<u>581,110</u>	<u>678,500</u>	<u>740,400</u>
Employed	564,710	663,550	713,200
Unemployed	16,400	14,950	27,200

Source: Mindanao Development Authority. Basic data from the Bureau of the Census and Statistics.

Table 10. Employed Persons by Industry Group in Mindanao and Sulu, 1966-1967

	As of May 1966	As of May 1967
TOTAL EMPLOYED	<u>2,390,850</u>	<u>2,475,600</u>
Agriculture	1,744,550	1,778,000
Mining	575	13,200
Manufacturing	154,675	139,600
Construction	31,050	51,600
Trade and Commerce	225,400	214,800
Trans. and Communication	41,400	40,800
Services	193,200	237,600

Note: Excludes Palawan.

Source: Mindanao Development Authority. Basic data from the Bureau of the Census and Statistics.

extent the attractiveness of Philippine rice exports on account of devaluation.

The production of corn will probably also be limited to the domestic market; but there is a possibility of some expansion in demand as the livestock industry progresses. The general solutions to the problem of sluggish agricultural development are applicable here, with the qualification that government would need to exert more effort to ensure that no bias prevails in the distribution of the following services among Muslims and non-Muslims: irrigation, agricultural extension with emphasis on diffusion of new technology, development of the marketing and transportation system, and the provision of agricultural credit.

The plantation export crops, notably pineapples and bananas, can be expected to do well without outside assistance. The participation of Muslims in the progress of plantation exports will be insignificant in the absence of policies which will benefit employment of Muslims and/or encourage the establishment of similar enterprises by Muslims themselves. These plantations are primarily in South Cotabato, where the Muslim population density is relatively low.

The problem of irregularities in land titling, reported landgrabbing, and consequent disruption of agriculture is definitely quite serious, and deserving of immediate government attention. Its implications are considered in a separate section.

3. Fishing. An increasingly important natural resources is fish, which is especially relevant for the province of Sulu. Sulu stands out as the province most in need of assistance. It is 95% Muslim, has the highest population density and the lowest rate of literacy; it experienced the lowest rate of economic growth among Mindanao province during 1961-1966, when most of Mindanao was experiencing rapid growth.

At present, fishing appears to be the industry with the greatest potential for the Sulu Archipelago. Reports from the Fisheries Commission, confirmed by local businessmen and government officials of Sulu province, give the fishing industry top priority among development projects for the region. The fishing industry becomes doubly important because the possible Muslim participation in its expansion is very large. There is a great potential for production for the population centers of the entire Philippines. Dried fish is already shipped to these places. With the use of refrigerated vessels from Manila, the catch from the Sulu and Palawan areas is being shipped farther to the North. But the largest potential for further expansion is in tuna fishing for export to the United States and Japan. The development of this aspect of the fishing industry will of course also depend upon the development of facilities for quick-freezing and the development of commercial contacts

to dispose of frozen tuna in foreign markets.

The brief experience of the Mindanao Development Authority in the operation of its ice-plant in Zamboanga City gives cause for optimism. In a relatively short time the ice-plant in Zamboanga was profitably operating at full capacity, so much so that several private business firms are competing to handle the export end of the fishing business, and dissuading government agencies from doing the same. Several Muslim government officials and businessmen have indicated the need for a similar ice-plant in Jolo, to serve the fishermen of the outlying region. When asked whether some local businessmen would be interested to invest in a joint venture with Mindanao Development Authority or other parties, the interviewees answered in the affirmative. They also expressed the desire to see the completion of the ice-plant which was established in Bato-bato, but which was terminated due to lack of funds. They were optimistic that this ice-plant will be as successful as that of Zamboanga City as soon as it becomes operative.

Fishing is not as important an industry for the Cotabato area as it is for Sulu and Zamboanga del Sur, if we use port of landing to indicate the base of fishing vessels. A relatively small production of the catch in nearby fishing grounds is landed in Cotabato ports: about

half of the produce of nearby Illana Bay is landed in Zamboanga del Sur; much of the Sarangani Bay catch is landed in Davao; and almost all of the Moro Gulf catch is landed in Zamboanga del Sur.

The richest fishing ground in Mindanao is the Sulu Sea along Palawan; however, this area is plied almost completely by Christian fishermen, as indicated by the fact that about 90% of the catch is landed in Navotas, Rizal. Muslim fishermen are concentrated in the Sulu Sea, Sibuguey Bay, Moro Gulf and Illana Bay. In tuna fishing (for which there is an export market), the efficiency of the hook and line method reportedly allows competition of Muslims with fishermen having more modern craft. In general, the strong competition from non-Muslims indicates the necessity for preferential government policies towards Muslims if they are to even keep their share in this expanding industry. A suggested policy would be the granting of loans on favorable terms from the Development Bank of the Philippines, or some other government financial institution.

4. Capital. A glaring feature of the most important firms established in Mindanao is that they are almost entirely controlled by non-Muslims. It has already been pointed out that this tends to work against the employment of Muslims

in such firms. There is therefore an urgent need for greater Muslim participation in capital. Part of the solution has been suggested, namely for the government to extend equity loans to Muslims. This can be done through branches of the PNB and DBP already established in Muslim areas. It will be necessary to liberalize lending policies of these government institutions in their branch banks. The PNB branch in Jolo, for instance, grants only token loans and is mainly a collection agency. The hiring of Muslim managers and personnel for such branches should prove helpful.

A second part of the solution would be the encouragement of financial institutions at locations where saving by Muslims may be channelled into investment in Mindanao enterprises. The provinces of Sulu, South Cotabato and Lanao del Sur are notably lacking in banks and similar institutions. Again, to avoid problems of clash of cultures, it is recommended that government support of such institutions (rural banks for example) be conditioned on the sharing of Muslims in equity, so that they may share in the making of policy affecting themselves as a group.

### 3. REMARKS ON THE LAND-HOLDING PROBLEM IN MINDANAO

Present-day Mindanao is no longer a region where unused and idle lands lay waiting to be exploited by pioneers. Rapid population growth coupled with large migration rates have greatly reduced the proportion of land to people (Table 11), and to a large extent the acquisition of land now implies a relinquishment of it by some other party, whether legally, as through purchase, or illegally. Hence cases of landgrabbing go unnoticed less easily than in former years, when population pressure was not as great.

The identity of the individual owning or controlling a piece of land does have important economic implications: for the economic use to which the land shall be applied, and for the distribution of the economic returns from employment of the land. In general, if an individual can make more profitable use of a piece of land than the present owner, he will be able to afford to purchase the land for a sum which will enable the former owner to earn at least a comparable income when he relinquishes possession. Illegal acquisition of land in general implies a transfer of land resources to individuals who do not show, by standards of the market, that they can put the land to more productive use than previous occupants. This is the basic economic argument against landgrabbing. This should be added to other valid arguments which concern concepts of justice and fairness, respect for

Table 11. Population Density in Mindanao by Province:  
1960 and 1970

	Total Area (sq. Km.)	Density per sq. km.	
		1960	1970
Southern and Western Mindanao			
Cotabato	23,797	43	75
Davao	19,672	45	80
Zamboanga del Norte	6,075	46	74
Zamboanga del Sur	9,922	75	136
Sulu	2,688	122	177
Northern and Eastern Mindanao			
Agusan	11,556	23	41
Bukidnon	8,294	23	42
Lanao del Norte	3,092	87	154
Lanao del Sur	3,873	98	143
Misamis Occidental	1,939	128	184
Misamis Oriental	3,800	102	150
Surigao del Norte	2,739	71	105
Surigao del Sur	4,552	36	54
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Mindanao	101,999	53	88
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the law, etc.

However, although illegal acquisition of land does have serious economic implications, the elements of a solution would not seem to be essentially economic in nature. They more properly belong to the fields of public administration and systems management and control. The economic research group does not feel it within its competence to suggest efficient ways of applying vigilance to prevent legal violations, or sanctions to punish accomplished violations. We do foresee, however, that a basic problem which will face a competent systems manager is the lack of basic data. With the time and resources at our disposal, it was not possible to obtain more than a rough outline of the disposition of lands (Table 12). It appears obvious that heavy expenditures on extensive cadastral surveys would be a basic element in a successful solution to the landholding problem.

Table 12. Land Classification, Mindanao Region, as of June 30, 1969

Province	Alienable or Disposable (Hectares)	Timberland (Hectares)	Unclassified Public Forest (Hectares)	Area of Provinces (Hectares)
1. Agusan and Butuan City	264,342	514,627	376,610	1,155,579
2. Basilan City	75,462	57,261	-	132,723
3. Bukidnon	278,497	199,212	351,669	829,378
4. Cotabato and Cotabato City	646,345	489,290	508,503	1,644,138
5. Cotabato South and Gen. Santos	290,787	219,091	225,689	735,567
6. Davao del Norte and Davao City	248,607	245,509	318,859	812,975
7. Davao del Sur	186,556	204,859	246,347	637,762
8. Davao del Orien- tal	158,501	168,520	189,425	516,446
9. Lanao del Norte and Iligan City	148,645	64,285	96,274	309,204
10. Lanao del Sur and Marawi City	115,356	75,376	196,557	387,289
11. Misamis Occ. and Ozamis City	121,918	27,720	44,294	193,932
12. Misamis Or. and Cagayan de Oro	186,401	42,208	151,374	379,983
13. Palawan	260,919	303,974	924,733	1,489,626
14. Sulu	126,721	38,517	103,546	268,784

Table 12. Land Classification, Mindanao Region, as of June 30, 1969  
(Continuation)

Province	Alienable or Disposable (Hectares)	Timberland (Hectares)	Unclassified Public Forest (Hectares)	Area of Provinces (Hectares)
15. Surigao del Norte	115,453	115,989	42,460	273,902
16. Surigao del Sur	130,706	239,286	85,224	455,216
17. Zamb. del Norte and Cities of Dapitan and Dipolog	247,646	298,071	61,802	607,519
18. Zamb. del Sur and Zamboanga City	397,735	305,351	156,402	859,488
Total Mindanao Region	4,000,597 34.23%	3,609,146 30.87%	4,079,768 34.90%	11,689,511 100%
Total Philip- pines	12,489,778	8,198,463	9,302,759	30,000,000

Source: Mindanao Development Authority.

Basic data; Bureau of Forestry.

4. AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMISSION ON NATIONAL INTEGRATION  
FROM AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

The Beginnings of the Commission

The establishment of the Commission on National Integration in 1957 was preceded by a succession of government agencies charged with the responsibility of accelerating the political, economic, educational and social development of the Muslims. During the American occupation, the first civilian government in the Muslim areas was created in 1903, within the so-called Moro Province. The Moro Province was subdivided into subprovinces of Agusan, Bukidnon, Davao, Lanao and Zamboanga (including Basilan and Sulu). In 1913 the Moro Province was replaced by the Department of Mindanao and Sulu; the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was created under this Department in 1916. In 1920 the Department was abolished and the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes exercised its functions under the newly-created Department of the Interior. Then, in 1936, the Office of the Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu was created within the Department of the Interior, with headquarters at Dansalan, Lanao (now Marawi City).

All these government agencies were concerned mainly with road building, peace and order, land subdivision and settlement. Independence brought a new succession of agencies. The Department of the Interior was abolished

and its function transferred to the Office of the President. The responsibility for overseeing Muslim welfare was transferred to a small section of the legal department under the Office of the President, and the main activity of this section was the administration of the scholarship funds for non-Christians.

This long succession of agencies was an indication of a chronic dissatisfaction with the government agencies with responsibility for the welfare of Muslims. National attention was finally focused on the so-called Moro Problem in 1955, during the height of the Kamlon campaign, when the House of the Representatives created a committee to study the problems of the Muslims.<sup>1</sup> It was apparent to the congressional committee that the neglect of the National government had almost alienated the Muslims from the rest of the country. The committee found that Muslims felt such resentment for the government that a significant number felt offended to be called Filipinos.

It was under this background that the CNI was created. Its charter was approved in 1955, and implemented in 1957 with the appointment of Madki Alonto as the first commissioner.

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<sup>1</sup>The Committee members were Congressmen Alonto of Lanao, Mangelan of Cotabato and Amilbangsa of Sulu.

Functions and Duties of the CNI

The most striking characteristics of the charter of the CNI is the extremely wide range of functions entrusted to it. The Commission has the power, function and duty:

- (1) to engage in industrial and agricultural enterprises for the benefit of the cultural minorities, to be eventually transferred to those minorities at cost;
- (2) to provide all types of utilities to the cultural minorities: irrigation systems, dams, generating plants, etc.;
- (3) to cooperate with government agricultural extension workers in assisting farmers;
- (4) to settle landless members of the minorities on homesteads and other areas;
- (5) to establish public schools for minorities;
- (6) to construct feeder and farm roads in the areas of the minorities;
- (7) to promote community life among the cultural minorities;
- (8) to contract loans and form credit institutions, subject to the approval of the President;
- (9) to assist in training the cultural minorities and to help them secure employment;
- (10) to grant scholarships to the minorities;
- (11) to aid and enhance the development of local government in Muslim areas;
- (12) in general, to further the agricultural, industrial and social development of the minorities; and
- (13) to give legal assistance to the national minorities, especially when problems of literacy arise.

It is clear from this long list of functions that the CNI is legally empowered to undertake any form of economic

activity which could possibly accelerate the progress of the Muslim areas. If adequately funded the CNI has all the legal powers necessary to engage in a general economic development program for minorities in the Philippines. However, a glance at the budgetary allocation of the CNI indicates clearly the impossibility of fulfilling such an enormous task. The total appropriation is ₱5 million, of which only ₱2.5 million can be assured of release. Fully 70% of the appropriation is allocated for college scholarships. About 15% is for administration, and the remaining 15% is for administrative aid, aid to indigents, social development aid, farm settlement aid and for special purposes. The CNI is therefore basically an agency charged with general development but which allocates almost all of its funds to one aspect of development, namely college education.

#### The CNI College Scholarship Program

The CNI scholarship program consists of providing college scholarships to members of the minority. Table 13 contains a summary of the number of scholars and graduates over the period of 1958-1967. We find that the number of scholars increased from about 100 in 1958 to over a thousand in 1967. However, the number of graduates increased from about 20 in 1958 to a maximum of only 250 towards the end of the period. After giving an allowance of 4-5 years for

Table 13. Commission on National Integration Scholars and Graduates, 1958-1967

	<u>Scholars</u>	<u>Graduates</u>
1958	109	20
1959	460	60
1960	610	110
1961	620	110
1962	930	180
1963	1,020	130
1964	930	150
1965	960	170
1966	1,460	250
1967	1,210	211

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Source: L.S. Clavel, They Are Also Filipinos, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1969, p. 28.

college training, it appears that there is a very low graduation rate among the CNI scholars. This indicates a generally poor performance of the CNI scholars in college.

The smallness of the ratio of graduates to scholars may be accounted for partly by deficiencies in the selection of the scholars. A desirable manner of selection would be based on demonstration of merit and financial need. It appears, however, that politics played a serious role in the choice of both the number of awardees and the selection of the awardees themselves. Criticisms of the scholarships have been heard from the grantees themselves. There seems to be very little correlation between the allowance of a grantee and the cost of living. This is especially true for the grantees who stay in the Manila area. The CNI appears more disposed to having a large number of grantees than to providing each grantee with a reasonable amount of support. If grantees have to supplement their CNI allowance, those coming from poor families particularly are handicapped.

There are no available data on the distribution of the grantees and graduates by course of study. It appears however that there has been too much concentration on liberal arts, law and commerce and not enough emphasis on the technical courses. This indicates a need for greater supervision by CNI over the field of choice of a grantee. When the choice of

school is left to the grantee, he tends to enroll in a school on the basis of the relative ease of passing the course and also on the relative cost of living. It does not seem advisable to leave the choice of school to the grantee when there is a wide disparity (of which he may not be aware) in the quality of instruction among colleges and universities. Precise figures are not available on the performance of CNI grantees on government board examinations, but the success rate appears lower than the average. This might be traced to the poor choice of schools by the grantees.

### Evaluation

The other activities of the CNI -- chiefly legal assistance, community development, resettlement and relief -- are so poorly funded that very little impact can be expected on the welfare of the cultural minorities. (It is reported, for instance, that when three-fourths of Jolo was 'gutted by fire', the amount of CNI relief aid was a mere P4,500<sup>1</sup>). Given the present productivity of the college scholarship program with respect to graduates, it seems safe to presume that a reconsideration of the policy of concentrating on scholarships is now necessary. Alternatives may be

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<sup>1</sup>L.S. Clavel, They Are Also Filipinos, (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1969), p. 59.

offered which conform to the principle of providing educational assistance to cultural minorities.

First, it may be advisable to shift the responsibility for administration of the college scholarships to experienced universities such as the University of the Philippines and Mindanao State University. Stricter, less politically-affected administration procedures should result in the selection of more qualified grantees, who will be able to finish their courses. Financial aid could continue to come from the CNI. Second, it has been shown that Muslim labor suffers from a lack of skills desirable in industrial positions and hence tends to compete at a disadvantage with non-Muslim labor. Generally, the skills involved do not require college training. The CNI may wish to consider whether allocating its educational funds to a manpower training program for middle range skills will be not be a more effective method for increasing the average productivity of Muslim labor (including college graduates) in general. In particular, the secondary level of schooling appears in Muslim areas to be a weaker point in the educational structure than the collegiate level. It is for this reason that Mindanao State University has established a number of community high schools in Lanao del Sur and Sulu.

It is immediately obvious that there are several national agencies whose responsibilities would overlap with

many of the activities which CNI is empowered to undertake: the establishment of enterprises in Mindanao is being done by Mindanao Development Authority; financing comes from the DBP, the PNB, and the Central Bank (through rural banks); there is a national relief agency, a community development agency, an agricultural extension agency, an electric power agency; and there is a government school system. It would seem to be a misuse of human resources if CNI were to attempt to duplicate the technical staffs which each of these institutions needs.

If CNI were able to act as an effective spokesman for the cultural minorities vis-a-vis the above enumerated agencies, such that these agencies allocated a more equitable portion of their resources to projects benefiting the minorities, this would appear to be sufficient. The CNI would be better able to accomplish this task if it were given a share in the policy-making of these institutions, especially in matters affecting Mindanao. A productive indirect approach would be for CNI to ensure that some members of the minorities occupy technical if not policy positions in these agencies or in their appropriate branches. A shortage of qualified members of certain minority groups could be a bottleneck. But with respect to Muslims in particular this problem should not be as serious; where qualified Filipino Muslims are

lacking; it should be worthwhile to consider hiring trained Muslims from such other countries as India, Pakistan and Malaysia. This suggestion acknowledges the feeling among some Filipino Muslims that Filipino Muslims would have a greater tendency to be alert for matters affecting the welfare of Muslims in Mindanao than would non-Muslim Filipinos.

5. IMPLICATIONS FOR A DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR MINDANAO  
WITH REFERENCE TO MUSLIMS

The responsibility for creating a development program for the Mindanao region is currently with the Mindanao Development Authority. Some guidelines from this program are presented in supporting tables for reference. A development program is of course typically put together in broad terms, indicating for instance aggregate capital requirements on the basis of a target growth rate and a general relationship between the regional product and the capital stock. The focus of this concluding section is to provide an outline of policies which could assist in the allocation of this capital formation (for instance) so as to ensure a socially desirable amount of participation by Muslims in the development of Mindanao.

Mindanao Development Authority. Let us briefly summarize in quantitative terms the Mindanao economic situation and the general development plan, as prepared by the MDA. In current prices, the gross regional product for Mindanao grew from ₱3.9 billion to ₱5.0 billion per year from FY 1966 to FY 1968. Regional income per capita grew from ₱519 per year in FY 1966 to ₱618 per year in FY 1968 (Table 14). These figures represent real growth of between 8 and 12% per year in gross terms, and between 3 and 7% per year in per capita terms.

Table 14. Regional Income by Industrial Origin, Mindanao Region \*

Regional Income at Factor Cost	At Current Prices (in million pesos)			At 1960 Prices (in million pesos)			Real Annual Growth	
	FY65-66	FY66-67	FY67-68	FY65-66	FY66-67	FY67-68	FY66 FY67	FY67 FY68
Agriculture	1,879.9	2,109.8	2,492.3	1,422.0	1,542.3	1,763.8	8.5	14.4
Mining	25.3	28.1	35.8	16.2	16.8	21.6	3.7	28.6
Manufacturing	460.2	527.4	592.8	372.3	417.2	449.8	12.1	7.8
Construction	126.7	172.9	211.6	102.9	138.4	164.9	34.5	19.1
Trade and Commerce	519.6	576.7	692.0	424.2	451.6	521.9	5.8	15.6
Transportation & Communication Services	68.2	76.1	81.6	59.0	63.7	66.6	8.1	4.4
	766.6	835.4	920.2	657.6	678.1	716.1	3.1	5.6
Combined Private Services	472.6	509.0	568.8	400.2	413.1	442.6	3.2	7.1
Rental Value of Owner- Occupied Dwellings	170.5	184.4	195.8	144.4	149.7	152.4	3.7	1.8
Governmental Services	133.5	142.0	155.6	113.0	115.8	121.1	2.0	5.0
TOTAL: REGIONAL INCOME AT FACTOR COST	3,856.5	4,326.4	5,026.3	3,054.2	3,308.2	3,704.7	8.3	12.0
POPULATION (thousands)	7,436	7,776	8,130	7,436	7,776	8,130	4.6	4.6
PER CAPITA REGIONAL INCOME (pesos)	519	556	618	411	425	456	3.4	7.3

\* Includes Palawan.

Source: Mindanao Development Authority.

The MDA's Mindanao investment plan for FY 1970 to FY 1975 envisions investments growing from ₱2.2 billion in FY 1970 to 4.2 billion in FY 1975 (Table 15). These are very large rates of investment, which MDA expects will be placed mainly in manufacturing, construction and service industries. The anticipated sources of the required savings are given in Table 16. No gap is expected between saving and required investment. The great bulk of the savings is expected to be provided by private households and business firms. The expected government contribution has been placed at 10% or less of total savings. Loans from financial institutions are expected to play a much more significant role; projections of these loans are itemized in Table 17. About 66% of the loans are expected to come from private commercial banks, private development banks and loan association; another 17% is expected from the DBP, about 13% from the Government Service and Insurance System, and about 4% from rural banks.<sup>1</sup> The total loan volume is projected to grow from ₱675 million in 1970 to ₱1,052 million in 1975; the implied growth rate approximates that of the preceding five

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<sup>1</sup>Some loans from foreign sources are also available, but data on these are scanty. In November 1969 the Asian Development Bank granted a ₱2.5 million loan at 3%, through the national government, for an irrigation system in Cotabato. It is reported that negotiations are presently being made with the United Nations Development Fund for a fishponds project, also in Cotabato.

Table 15. Projected Minsupala Investment Requirements By Industrial Sector, FY 1970 - FY 1975 (in million pesos at current prices)

	FY '70	FY '71	FY '72	FY '73	FY '74	FY '75
Agriculture	83	229	264	297	349	389
Mining	53	169	73	135	84	443
Manufacturing	601	1,016	847	434	876	1,235
Construction	539	621	782	882	935	1,038
Commerce	103	170	185	220	226	249
Services	917	407	453	559	674	825
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>2,296</u>	<u>2,612</u>	<u>2,604</u>	<u>2,527</u>	<u>3,144</u>	<u>4,179</u>

Source: Mindanao Development Authority.

Table 16. Estimated Resources in Financing Regional Development Plan  
FY 1970 - FY 1975 (in million pesos at current prices)

	FY '70	FY '71	FY '72	FY '73	FY '74	FY '75
<u>Private Resources:</u>						
New business enterprise	40.1	45.7	46.8	50.1	53.4	58.3
Loans from financial institutions	675.3	751.2	826.0	901.8	976.7	1,052.4
Savings of business firms and private households	<u>1,426.0</u>	<u>1,764.0</u>	<u>2,002.0</u>	<u>2,335.0</u>	<u>2,816.0</u>	<u>3,399.0</u>
Total Private Resources	<u>2,141.4</u>	<u>2,558.9</u>	<u>2,874.8</u>	<u>3,286.9</u>	<u>3,846.1</u>	<u>4,509.7</u>
<u>Government Resources:</u>						
Government Savings	<u>47.0</u>	<u>51.0</u>	<u>56.0</u>	<u>62.0</u>	<u>66.0</u>	<u>75.0</u>
National Gov't.	33.6	35.5	38.4	42.1	44.1	50.9
Local Gov't.	13.4	15.5	17.6	19.9	21.9	24.1
Budgetary Appropriations	<u>213.4</u>	<u>226.2</u>	<u>239.9</u>	<u>254.8</u>	<u>270.8</u>	<u>288.4</u>
Total Government Resources	<u>260.4</u>	<u>277.2</u>	<u>295.9</u>	<u>316.8</u>	<u>336.8</u>	<u>363.4</u>
TOTAL PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT RESOURCES	<u>2,401.8</u>	<u>2,836.1</u>	<u>3,170.7</u>	<u>3,603.7</u>	<u>4,182.9</u>	<u>4,873.1</u>

Source: Mindanao Development Authority.

Table 17. Estimates of Resources of Financial Institutions in the Mindanao Region, FY 1970 - FY 1975 (in million pesos at current prices)

	FY '70	FY '71	FY '72	FY '73	FY '74	FY '75
Loans granted by commercial banks, private development banks and loan associations	447.7	496.5	545.3	594.1	642.9	691.7
Loans granted by the Development Bank of the Philippines	108.0	123.0	137.0	152.0	166.0	181.0
Loans granted by rural banks	29.9	33.2	36.4	39.6	42.9	46.1
Loans granted by the Government Service Insurance System	<u>89.7</u>	<u>98.5</u>	<u>107.3</u>	<u>116.1</u>	<u>124.9</u>	<u>133.6</u>
<b>TOTAL LOANS GRANTED</b>	<u><u>675.3</u></u>	<u><u>751.2</u></u>	<u><u>826.0</u></u>	<u><u>901.8</u></u>	<u><u>976.7</u></u>	<u><u>1,052.4</u></u>

Source: Mindanao Development Authority.

Basic data: Central Bank.

years, during which the volume grew from ₱275 million in 1964 to ₱588 million in 1969.

Certain principles may be used in the allocation of these investment funds so as to improve the Muslim share in Development. To ensure the allocation, it is recommended that a Muslim-oriented organization such as the Commission on National Integration be given a voice in policy decisions of the Mindanao Development Authority. If the government sincerely desires to raise the economic welfare of minorities, including Muslims, then economic profitability need not be the sole criterion for selection of development projects. These remarks would apply likewise to the forthcoming Sulu Development Authority (established on the basis of the Sulu Development Act of 1969).

Export Industries. It is expected that development will be greatest in export sectors, given the recent devaluation, with or without government support. Government participation in projects which will break export bottlenecks -- such as refrigeration plants for fish exports, or port construction -- will of course increase development in export sectors further. Since investors will be rushing into these fields, the government's task would be mainly to take care that profitable sectors are not quickly pre-empted by non-Muslim investors. At present, for instance, the Sulu Sea fishing grounds along Palawan are almost entirely monopolized

by Navotas fishermen. As investment into fishing expands, it would be advisable to provide loans for such investments preferentially to Muslims, to ensure them an equitable share of the fishing industry.

Non-export Industries. Investments cannot be assumed to be as rapidly forthcoming here as for export industries. A greater effort must be made to increase overall investment which will benefit sectors producing for the domestic market. In terms of the role of government, this implies basically an increase in so-called infrastructure projects and an expansion of manpower training.

With respect to infrastructure, there has perhaps been too little emphasis on electrification relative to roads and bridges. Economists in Mindanao presently feel that the single highest-impact infrastructure project would be the construction of a distribution network for electric power originating from Maria Cristina falls. Efforts should be made to secure an equitable share of the Muslim provinces in this network. It has been pointed out that Lanao del Sur in particular is sadly lacking in industrial development, an incongruity for the province from which the electric power at Maria Cristina is ultimately derived.

With respect to agricultural products for the domestic market there is little need to enumerate the various

projects necessary for development: irrigation, diffusion of improved seeds, breeds, and practices, establishment of processing industries, etc.

Banking and financial institutions. In some Muslim areas there is a severe lack of banking institutions. In the extreme case of Jolo, businessmen are forced to travel at least as far as Zamboanga City for their financial needs. There is a definite need for more branch banks, rural banks, and credit unions (at least one of which has been successfully established).

It seems that, Koranic prohibitions against the taking of interest notwithstanding, lending at interest takes place except among the most orthodox Muslims. There do not therefore seem to be insurmountable cultural barriers to the establishment of lending institutions to be managed by Muslims themselves. It may also be noted that the Commission on National Integration, which is dominated by Muslims on account of their dominance among the 'minorities', is expressly given the power to borrow, establish a financial institution, and undertake lending operations.

The free port proposal. Several sectors have suggested a revival of the Sulu-Borneo barter trade as a means of ameliorating depressed economic conditions in the region. It is argued that trading with Borneo and environs has been a

traditional activity with the Muslims for generations such that to many of them this activity is their normal means of livelihood. Under the laws of the Republic, however, this is now considered smuggling. It has been suggested, therefore, that Jolo be set up as a free port similar to Singapore and Hongkong.

The implications of this suggestion on the administration of tariff laws are varied. To legalize the activity in a certain area will not solve the problem of smuggling into the country but might simply exacerbate it. The economic justification for a free port in Mariveles, and Mactan (proposed) is to facilitate entry of imported materials for re-exports embodying Philippine labor which is in surplus supply in these regions. Unless a similar justification can be made in the case of Jolo, the creation of a free port will create more problems than it will solve.

Canning. Even though Philippine experience in fish canning has been disappointing so far, the economic feasibility of setting up such facilities to service the Palawan or the Sulu fishing grounds should be looked into seriously. Considering that the Philippines is a heavy importer of canned sardines, there is no doubt that domestic demand exists. Moreover, statistics on fish production indicate that the sardine is by far the most plentiful variety in the Philippines.

It appears that the most important difficulties have been in the managerial and technical aspects of the industry.

Canning of seasonal fruits might be another industry that can be set up in certain areas in Mindanao, with similar economic benefits.

Pearl Farming. A promising new industry for the Sulu-Zamboanga area is pearl farming. The seas around Jolo abound with oysters and the conditions are reported to be ideal for pearl culture. There is at present one pearl farm in Zamboanga, employing some eighty workers, mostly Muslims. The Japanese technicians say that expansion of pearl farming into the Sulu Archipelago would be possible if the peace and order situation can be improved.

For this part, several Muslim government officials are confident that security and protection can be easily given to investors who will set up new industries if local political leaders say so.

World demand for high-quality cultured pearls is projected to expand with rising income so the potential for this industry is bright indeed. Although direct employment in the pearl farms is relatively small at present, there is a relatively large employment multiplier, because the pearl farm buys oysters for pearl cultivating from several thousand families in diverse outlying areas.

Tourism. For this to be a greater source of income for the many Muslim scenic areas, investments in tourist facilities and an improvement in the peace and order situation are badly required. Hotels suitable for tourists are conspicuously missing in both Jolo and Marawi. Commercial planes do not fly into Marawi at present. The Maranao brass work industry will be considerably benefited by an increase in tourism; but there is reportedly a problem of short supply in raw materials, which will have to be solved before a significant expansion in output will be possible.

## SUMMARY

The rate of population growth among Muslims has been comparable to that of non-Muslims in Mindanao. Despite the high rate of migration into Mindanao, the density of Muslims in the 'Muslim provinces' has not changed. The main effect of the high rate of migration has been an increase in the competition facing Muslim labor for jobs, particularly in industrial enterprises. A relatively low level of training and of schooling underlies the weak competitive position of Muslim labor.

Since Mindanao is the main export surplus region in the country, it is expected that the recent devaluation of the peso will occasion a surge in the economic growth of Mindanao. The favorable effect of the 1962 peso devaluation on Mindanao's economic growth supports this contention. Growth in per capita terms will, however, probably not tend to be much different from that in other regions of the Philippines, as long as Mindanao is pressed by a relatively high rate of population growth.

It is assumed from the start that the benefits from Mindanao's economic growth will be more equitably distributed if Muslims take a greater share than they have had to date. Government should therefore ensure that economic resources -- labor, land, capital, etc. -- controlled by Muslims

participate to a greater extent in the rapidly growing sectors in Mindanao. In export industries growth is more or less assured, and the problem is one of protecting and expanding the participation of Muslims. In certain of these industries, such as logging and wood processing, the participation of Muslim labor resources will play a dominant role; short- and long-term training programs constitute the basic solution. In other industries, such as fishing and the production of agricultural export crops, the participation of Muslim capital or equity resources will be relatively more feasible. To ensure this, it is suggested that a governmental lending policy which is preferential towards Muslims be established.

Those industries which produce primarily for the domestic market will pose the joint problem of accelerating growth and the distribution of the growth benefits more equitably towards Muslims. The semi-subsistence rice and corn sectors are of particular importance here. The elements of a growth policy for such sectors are well-known: more irrigation, diffusion of new technology, improvements in marketing and processing facilities, etc. More care than previously should be taken to ensure that areas of high Muslim density are not neglected when these growth programs are mapped out.

Greater interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims in business firms and in government agencies will be unavoidable, as the participation of Muslim resources in growth sectors of Mindanao increases. A certain amount of cultural friction may therefore be anticipated. The basic recommendation here is that greater efforts be made to place Muslims in policy-making as well as technical positions in these firms and agencies. For Muslims to sit with policy-making bodies of business firms, it is recommended that they obtain a share in equity. Government lending policy can be geared to this end: loans for equity can be made directly to Muslims; or loans to non-Muslims for new Mindanao enterprises can be made conditional on an offering of shares in equity to Muslims.

There is a general scarcity of technical talent, and more so among Muslims than among non-Muslims, due to present unevenness in educational opportunities. It would therefore seem more efficient to distribute trained Muslims among critical government agencies than to attempt to duplicate, with Muslim personnel and within a body charged with general Muslim economic development, the technical staffs required by the several government agencies concerned with Philippine economic development in the aspects of finance, irrigation, agricultural extension, etc.

In particular, it is observed that the Commission on National Integration -- which is a body given full legal scope to enhance the economic development of Muslims and members of other 'minorities' -- is not able to engage in most of the assistance activities with which it is charged. It is suggested that the CNI, whether better funded or not, would be more effective if it were given a share in the policy-making processes of the development-oriented agencies on both Mindanao and national levels than if it attempted to duplicate the efforts of these agencies in Muslim and minority areas.

A P P E N D I X    I I

S T A T I S T I C A L    D A T A

TABLE 1a

## NATIONALITY WITH WHICH MUSLIM FILIPINOS IDENTIFY

(Q. "Some people consider themselves to be Americans, Indonesians, Chinese, or Japanese and so on. What do you consider yourself to be?")

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	%
Muslim	65.5
Filipino	29.1
Indonesian	3.0
No Answer	2.4
Total	<u>100.0</u>

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Chi-Square = 86.159\* with 3 d.f.

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\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 1b

PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIM FILIPINOS WHO REFER TO  
THEMSELVES AS "MUSLIMS" BUT STILL CONSIDER  
THEMSELVES AS "FILIPINOS"

(Q. "How about 'Filipino' - do you consider yourself to be a Filipino?")

(N = 133)

	%
No <sup>1</sup>	0.75
Yes <sup>2</sup>	97.75
No Answer	1.50
Total	<u>100.00</u>

Z = 1.774 significant at 5%

<sup>1</sup> Only one respondent answered "No"; hence, no table is presented for Q. 2c - "Why not?"

<sup>2</sup> Only three (3) Muslim respondents out of 130 who answered "Yes" to above question gave answers to the question "What are the things you are most proud of as a Filipino?" Hence, no separate table is given for Q. 2e. The responses are as follows:

	#
"Nothing to be proud of"	1
"Because of Filipino traits like hospitality, friendliness, generosity, and other traits"	1
"For being an independent country"	1

TABLE 2

## MUSLIMS' ATTITUDES TOWARD ENGLISH OR WESTERN EDUCATION

(Q. "How do you feel about present English or Western education?")

(N = 203)

	TOTAL				BY AGE						BY EDUCATION		
	AB	C	D	%	16 - 20	21 - 30	31 - 45	46 & Over	No Education	Elementary	High School	College	
No answers/ refusals	47.2	10.0	51.5	48.0	66.6	48.7	41.5	57.9	32.0	61.1	61.3	63.9	
No opinion	7.4	20.0	7.4	5.2	-	1.3	11.7	15.8	14.0	2.8	-	-	
No difference/ same	7.4	-	13.7	1.0	16.7	-	13.8	-	3.0	13.9	6.5	13.9	
Philippine education is better/Westerners are dominant	1.0	-	2.1	-	-	1.3	1.1	-	-	-	-	5.6	
Good/of great help/improving	37.0	70.0	25.3	45.8	16.7	48.7	31.9	26.3	51.0	22.2	32.2	16.6	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	Chi-Square = 44.66* with 30 d.f.				Chi-Square = 69.02* with 30 d.f.				Chi-Square = 83.23* with 30 d.f.				

\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5% level of significance. This suggests differences in the strata. The degrees of freedom (d.f.) are higher than are expected from the above tabulations because of the incorporation of some categories into more concise and appropriate ones.

TABLE 3

ATTITUDES TOWARD PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

(Q. "Do you feel that young people should study for a profession?")

	BY RELIGION			BY TYPE OF REGION		BY S E L			BY AGE GROUPING					BY EDUCATION			
	Total %	Muslims %	Non-Muslims %	Urban %	Rural %	AB %	C %	D %	16 - 20 %	21 - 30 %	31 - 45 %	46 & Over %	No Education %	Elementary %	High School %	College %	
Yes	90.2	94.6	89.9	91.9	88.4	95.4	93.1	87.8	96.85	89.8	90.9	88.6	87.3	87.4	93.1	95.7	
No	5.6	2.4	6.0	3.9	7.4	2.3	4.7	6.7	3.15	5.9	6.1	5.4	6.4	7.5	4.5	2.9	
No Answer	4.2	3.0	4.1	4.2	4.2	2.3	2.2	5.5	-	4.3	3.0	6.0	6.3	5.1	2.4	1.4	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Chi-Square = 7.35 with 3 d.f.

Chi-Square = 9.30\* with 4 d.f.

Chi-Square = 14.16 with 9 d.f.

Chi-Square = 70.80\* with 12 d.f.

Chi-Square = 42.48\* with 12 d.f.

\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

## OCCUPATIONS PERCEIVED AS DESIRABLE

(Q. "If you had a son, which of the following occupations would you most like your son to follow?")

	<u>TOTAL</u> %	<u>MUSLIMS</u> %	<u>NON-</u> <u>MUSLIMS</u> %
Teacher	18.8	21.7	18.3
Doctor	13.6	14.3	13.6
Engineer	12.9	10.3	13.3
Businessman	9.4	4.9	10.2
Agriculturist	9.3	5.9	9.9
Lawyer	5.0	9.4	4.3
AFP official	3.5	7.9	2.8
Government official	1.3	2.5	1.1
Politician	1.2	0.5	1.3
Architect	0.7	1.0	0.7
Artist	0.6	2.5	0.3
No response	23.7	19.2	24.2

TABLE 4b

PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL  
PREFERENCES OF MUSLIM FILIPINO\*

(Q. "Why ... (would you like your son to take/follow this occupation)?")

Occupation: Teacher (N = 266)

	TOTAL %	MUSLIMS %	NON- MUSLIM %
No answer	12.0	22.7	8.7
To mould & educate the youth	30.4	50.0	26.9
Not expensive	21.5	2.3	25.6
To impart knowledge/help educate people/teach brother Filipino	6.0	9.1	5.5
It is a noble profession/basis of all courses	7.9	2.3	9.1
In demand/lack of teachers	6.0	2.3	6.9
Bright, better future	5.3	-	6.4
To help support family	3.8	-	4.6
To improve education in our country	1.9	4.5	1.3
My son likes it	1.1	-	1.3
Other answers	4.1	6.8	3.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* Only the three common major occupations are treated in this table.

	TOTAL %	MUSLIMS %	NON- MUSLIMS %
<u>Occupation: Doctor (N = 193)</u>			
No answer	14.5	27.6	11.7
To serve humanity/the nation/ country/barrio	33.8	45.0	33.0
Aid sick indigents	21.8	-	25.8
Help family and relatives when they are sick	6.8	3.4	7.4
Have a family doctor/pride of his father	14.0	10.3	14.8
Good career/does a lot of good	4.7	3.4	4.9
To insure high standard of living	1.5	-	1.8
Easy employment/in demand	1.0	3.4	0.6
Noble profession/looked up to	1.0	-	1.2
Others	3.0	6.9	2.4

Occupation: Engineer (N = 183)

No answer	16.4	76.1	6.9
Easy employment/in demand/high pay	49.9	4.8	45.3
To help family and relatives	16.9	-	19.5
For industrialization	8.8	-	10.1
Son's inclination	6.0	-	6.9
Improve and help the nation/community	6.0	9.5	5.7
Bright future/to be somebody/to be popular	3.3	4.8	3.1
Good career	2.7	-	3.1
To follow father's footsteps	2.2	-	2.5
Other answers	1.8	4.8	1.2

\* Percentages may not total 100% due to multiple responses.

TABLE 5

PERCEPTION OF CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(Q. "What do you think of your present economic situation?")

	TOTAL %	BY RELIGION		BY TYPE OF REGION		BY S E L			BY AGE GROUPING				BY EDUCATION			
		Muslims %	Non-Muslims %	Urban %	Rural %	AB %	C %	D %	16 - 20 %	21 - 30 %	31 - 45 %	46 & Over %	No Education %	Elementary %	High School %	College %
Good	40.2	43.8	39.8	42.0	38.3	47.7	42.1	34.3	33.1	39.5	41.7	41.6	33.2	42.6	38.2	43.0
Bad	36.2	34.0	36.7	33.0	39.4	34.1	36.4	40.7	44.5	34.0	37.1	34.3	36.6	35.8	36.8	36.2
Indifferent	20.0	19.2	20.1	22.5	17.6	15.9	18.1	21.8	17.3	22.9	18.9	19.6	26.3	18.1	22.3	17.2
No Answer	3.6	3.0	3.4	2.5	4.7	2.3	3.5	3.2	3.1	3.6	2.3	4.5	3.9	3.5	2.7	3.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Chi-Square = 3.54 with 2 d.f.

Chi-Square = 13.95\* with 3 d.f.

Chi-Square = 28.32\* with 9 d.f.

Chi-Square = 84.96\* with 12 d.f.

Chi-Square = 28.32\* with 12 d.f.

\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 6a

PERCEPTION OF POLITICIANS IN RELATION TO GREED

(Q. "From your impressions of the politicians, is greedy descriptive of none or very few politicians ... some of them ... or most of them?")

	TOTAL %	BY RELIGION		BY TYPE OF REGION		BY S E L			BY AGE GROUPING					No Education %	BY EDUCATION		
		Muslims %	Non-Muslims %	Urban %	Rural %	A B %	C %	D %	16 - 20 %	21 - 30 %	31 - 45 %	46 & Over %	Elementary %		High School %	College %	
None or Few	17.8	6.9	19.7	19.2	16.3	22.7	21.2	12.9	26.0	18.7	17.0	14.8	9.8	16.8	20.8	22.2	
Some	33.7	31.0	34.0	37.4	29.9	15.9	35.2	33.1	35.4	37.3	30.1	34.9	34.6	33.0	34.3	33.0	
Most	18.4	21.7	18.0	17.0	19.7	27.3	17.6	15.6	19.7	21.3	15.8	18.4	11.7	19.0	18.7	23.3	
Don't know/no opinion	25.9	39.4	23.8	22.2	29.8	31.8	20.4	35.2	17.3	18.9	33.5	26.2	42.4	26.7	21.7	17.6	
No answer	4.2	1.0	4.5	4.2	4.3	2.3	5.6	3.2	1.6	3.8	3.6	5.7	1.5	4.5	4.5	3.9	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Chi-Square = 33.03\*  
with 3 d.f.

Chi-Square = 16.79\*  
with 4 d.f.

Chi-Square = 70.80\*  
with 12 d.f.

Chi-Square = 84.96\*  
with 16 d.f.

Chi-Square = 70.80\*  
with 16 d.f.

\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 6b

## PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICIANS IN RELATION TO HONESTY

(Q. "From your impressions of the politicians, is honest descriptive of none or very few politicians ... some of them ... or most of them?")

TOTAL %	BY RELIGION		BY TYPE OF REGION		BY S E L		BY AGE GROUPING			BY EDUCATION					
	Muslims %	Non- Muslims %	Urban %	Rural %	AB %	C %	D %	16 - 20 %	21 - 30 %	31 - 45 %	46 & Over No Education %	Elementary %	High School %	College %	
None or Few	43.8	32.3	38.9	29.2	36.4	36.7	31.9	44.9	36.2	34.5	27.7	39.0	28.6	37.9	39.1
Some	21.7	41.1	35.1	40.9	29.5	41.4	34.3	32.3	36.6	37.9	41.9	31.2	39.3	38.9	39.8
Most	4.9	6.6	5.2	7.5	2.3	5.9	4.6	3.1	6.6	5.1	9.0	2.0	9.6	5.7	3.2
Don't know/no opinion	28.1	18.1	19.4	19.7	31.8	14.1	27.1	18.1	18.4	21.0	19.6	26.8	20.8	15.7	15.8
No Answer	1.5	1.9	1.4	2.7	-	1.9	2.1	1.6	2.1	1.5	1.8	1.0	1.7	1.8	2.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Chi-Square = 29.72\* Chi-Square = 18.82\* Chi-Square = 70.80\*  
with 3 d.f. with 4 d.f. with 12 d.f.

Chi-Square = 99.12\*  
with 16 d.f.

Chi-Square = 84.96\*  
with 16 d.f.

\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 6C

## PERCEPTION OF POLITICIANS IN RELATION TO INDUSTRY

(Q. "From your impressions of the politicians, is the word hardworking descriptive of none or very few politicians ... some of them... or most of them?")

	TOTAL %	BY RELIGION		BY TYPE OF REGION		BY AB %	BY S E L C %	D %	16 - 20 %	21 - 30 %	BY AGE GROUPING	31 - 45 %	46 & Over %	NO Education %	BY EDUCATION		
		Muslim %	Non-Muslim %	Urban %	Rural %										Elementary %	High School %	College %
None or Few	31.1	43.8	29.0	34.6	27.5	36.4	34.7	27.8	41.7	35.5	28.6	26.2	41.5	23.2	35.6	36.9	
Some	36.1	17.7	39.3	36.1	36.0	20.4	38.1	33.8	26.0	32.4	39.4	39.8	21.5	39.6	34.6	38.7	
Most	8.6	7.9	8.9	7.4	9.9	18.2	8.1	5.0	11.0	8.5	7.6	9.3	5.8	11.0	8.4	6.5	
Don't know/no opinion	21.2	29.1	19.8	19.25	23.2	25.0	15.0	31.1	19.7	20.3	22.3	21.1	30.2	23.4	18.4	14.3	
No Answer	3.0	1.5	3.0	2.65	3.4	-	4.1	2.3	1.6	3.3	2.1	3.6	1.0	2.8	3.0	3.6	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Chi-Square = 35.26\* with 3 d.f.

Chi-Square = 11.51\* with 4 d.f.

Chi-Square = 113.28\* with 12 d.f.

Chi-Square = 84.96\* with 16 d.f.

Chi-Square = 99.12\* with 16 d.f.

\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 6d

## PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICIANS IN RELATION TO CORRUPTION

(Q. "From your impressions of the politicians, is corrupt descriptive of none or very few politicians ... some of them ... or most of them?")

TOTAL %	BY RELIGION		BY TYPE OF REGION		BY S E L		BY AGE			GROUPING			BY EDUCATION		
	Muslims %	Non-Muslims %	Urban %	Rural %	A B %	C %	D %	16 - 20 %	21 - 30 %	31 - 45 %	46 & Over %	No Education %	Elementary %	High School %	College %
None or Few	12.7	8.6	13.4	11.7	13.7	11.4	14.6	10.8	9.5	11.6	13.0	10.2	14.0	13.25	11.1
Some	24.7	28.1	24.2	25.5	23.9	18.2	24.8	25.85	17.3	24.0	26.5	28.3	25.6	23.2	24.0
Most	35.7	29.6	36.9	39.2	32.0	31.8	40.9	25.85	55.1	33.5	32.2	20.5	33.0	39.75	48.0
Don't know/no opinion	25.5	32.5	24.3	22.6	28.5	38.6	18.35	36.1	16.5	29.9	27.1	40.0	26.2	22.6	16.2
No Answer	1.4	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.9	-	1.35	1.4	1.6	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.2	0.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Chi-Square = 10.93\* with 3 d.f.  
 Chi-Square = 13.25\* with 4 d.f.  
 Chi-Square = 84.96\* with 12 d.f.  
 Chi-Square = 155.76\* with 16 d.f.  
 Chi-Square = 127.44\* with 16 d.f.

\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 6e

## PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICIANS IN RELATION TO NATIONALISM

(Q. "From your impressions of politicians, is nationalistic descriptive of none or very few politicians ... or most of them ... or most of them?")

	TOTAL %	BY RELIGION		BY TYPE OF REGION		BY SEX	BY AGE GROUPING	BY EDUCATION								
		Muslims %	Non- Muslims %	Urban %	Rural %			AB %	C %	D %	16 - 20 %	21 - 30 %	31 - 45 %	46 & Over %	No Education %	Elementary %
None or Few	26.4	30.1	25.8	29.8	22.9	38.6	26.9	23.0	24.4	30.5	26.9	22.0	36.1	23.75	24.4	26.9
Some	26.4	11.3	29.1	29.7	23.0	27.3	28.3	21.6	28.35	24.8	25.3	29.5	16.1	24.4	33.5	29.75
Most	9.5	17.7	8.2	9.1	9.9	4.55	12.8	6.2	9.45	8.5	12.8	5.7	8.8	9.4	8.1	12.55
Don't know/no opinion	33.3	39.9	32.2	27.5	39.3	29.55	25.8	46.2	36.2	32.9	31.2	36.2	37.55	37.2	29.2	28.0
No Answer	4.4	1.0	4.7	3.9	4.9	-	6.2	3.0	1.6	3.3	3.8	6.6	1.45	5.25	4.8	2.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Chi-Square = 40.07\*  
with 3 d.f.Chi-Square = 28.31\*  
with 4 d.f.Chi-Square = 99.12\*  
with 12 d.f.Chi-Square = 70.80\*  
with 16 d.f.Chi-Square = 56.64\*  
with 16 d.f.

\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 6f

PERCEPTION OF POLITICIANS IN RELATION TO BEING AN EXAMPLE TO FOLLOW

( Q. "From your impressions of politicians, is an example to follow descriptive of none or very few politicians ... some of them ... or most of them?" )

	TOTAL %	BY RELIGION		BY TYPE OF REGION		BY S E L		D %	BY AGE GROUPING			BY EDUCATION				
		Muslims %	Non-Muslims %	Urban %	Rural %	AB %	C %		L %	21 - 30 %	31 - 45 %	46 & Over %	No Education %	Elementary %	High School %	College %
None or Few	36.4	32.5	37.0	42.1	30.6	38.6	36.4	31.3	40.15	42.1	35.1	31.0	43.4	33.9	34.65	39.8
Some	17.2	3.0	19.7	18.4	15.9	18.2	16.7	16.5	16.55	16.3	15.8	20.5	7.3	19.2	19.6	17.2
Most	3.9	2.4	4.2	5.0	2.7	2.3	5.1	2.8	3.95	4.0	4.0	3.6	1.5	4.0	5.1	4.3
Don't know/no opinion	37.0	61.1	33.1	29.5	44.8	38.6	33.8	45.85	36.2	33.1	39.8	38.0	46.3	37.3	33.1	34.0
No Answer	5.5	1.0	6.0	5.0	6.0	2.3	8.0	3.55	3.15	4.5	5.3	6.9	1.5	5.6	7.55	4.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Chi-Square = 61.98\* with 3 d.f.  
 Chi-Square = 42.10\* with 4 d.f.  
 Chi-Square = 70.80\* with 12 d.f.  
 Chi-Square = 42.48\* with 16 d.f.

Chi-Square = 42.48\* with 16 d.f.

The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 7

RELIGION OF POLITICIANS DESCRIBED

(Q. "Are you referring to these people as Muslims or non-Muslims?")

TOTAL %	BY RELIGION		BY TYPE OF REGION		BY AB %	BY S E L D %		BY AGE GROUPING						BY EDUCATION		
	Muslims %	Non-Muslims %	Urban %	Rural %		C %	D %	16 - 20 %	21 - 30 %	31 - 45 %	46 & Over %	No Education %	Elementary %	High School %	College %	
Muslims 2.2	10.8	0.8	1.3	3.1	4.6	3.9	0.3	0.8	2.1	3.2	1.2	5.4	1.9	2.4	0.4	
Non-Muslims 25.4	2.0	29.5	22.7	28.2	13.6	25.3	19.3	24.4	24.1	24.6	28.9	16.1	29.3	30.7	19.35	
Both 59.3	74.4	56.9	64.7	53.8	72.7	62.7	60.9	68.5	63.4	58.5	53.0	61.9	52.7	57.8	72.75	
No Answer 13.1	12.8	12.8	11.3	14.9	9.1	8.1	19.5	6.3	10.4	13.7	16.9	16.6	16.1	9.1	7.5	
Total 100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Chi-Square = 140.15\* with 3 d.f.

Chi-Square = 20.46\* with 3 d.f.

Chi-Square = 127.44\* with 9 d.f.

Chi-Square = 42.48\* with 12 d.f.

Chi-Square = 70.80\* with 12 d.f.

\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 8a

PERCEPTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT

(Q. "What do people in general think about the government?")

TOTAL %	BY RELIGION		BY TYPE OF REGION		BY S E L D				BY AGE GROUPING				BY EDUCATION		
	Muslims %	Non-Muslims %	Urban %	Rural %	AB %	C %	D %	16-20 %	21-30 %	31-45 %	46 & Over %	No Education %	Elementary %	High School %	College %
1.1	-	1.2	1.0	1.2	2.3	0.75	1.05	0.8	0.5	1.1	1.5	1.5	0.7	0.9	1.1
66.7	73.4	65.8	69.1	64.2	84.1	72.8	61.6	61.4	64.3	70.5	66.9	63.9	63.5	65.1	80.3
31.7	25.1	32.8	29.1	34.3	13.6	26.0	37.0	37.0	34.5	28.2	31.6	33.6	35.8	33.4	18.6
0.5	1.5	0.2	0.8	0.3	-	0.45	0.35	0.8	0.7	0.2	-	1.0	-	0.6	-
100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
		Chi-Square = 107.32* with 2 d.f.		Chi-Square = 32.42* with 2 d.f.		Chi-Square = 24.76* with 4 d.f.				Chi-Square = 5.811 with 6 d.f.				Chi-Square = 25.664* with 6 d.f.	

\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 8b

## COMMENTS ON THE GOVERNMENT

	TOTAL %
We are faced with economic problems like high prices/the government is sinking due to economic conditions	18.01
Government officials are inefficient/they only have private (personal) interests in the government	16.03
The government is getting worse/we are hard up in living because of high taxes	14.62
People are discontented and neglected	2.54
Barrios are neglected	2.05
Not so good nor so bad*	1.77
The government is now not for the people but the people are for the government	0.92
We have a good democratic government**	0.71
We must change the administration/eliminate graft and corruption	0.56
The government is trying its best to lower the prices**	0 35
Other (negative) responses	11.94
Too much politics/high number of unemployed/ becoming undemocratic/government is for the rich and not for the poor	
No comment/refused to answer*	29.94
Blanks***	0.56

\* Classified as "neutral" response

\*\* Classified as "positive" response

\*\*\* Classified separately

All others were classified as "negative" responses

TABLE 8C

ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT

(Q. "What do people in general feel about the government?")

TOTAL %	BY RELIGION		BY TYPE OF REGION		BY S E L		BY AGE GROUPING					BY EDUCATION			
	Muslims %	Non-Muslims %	Urban %	Rural %	AB %	C %	D %	16 - 20 %	21 - 30 %	31 - 45 %	46 & Over %	No Education %	Elementary %	High School %	College %
11.95	20.2	10.6	8.8	15.2	18.2	11.4	9.6	8.7	10.2	13.5	13.2	1.9	3.5	3.0	2.1
49.9	50.3	49.8	51.4	48.3	50.0	55.0	45.4	42.5	48.4	52.5	48.3	65.4	54.2	60.0	64.6
37.5	28.1	39.3	38.8	36.2	31.8	33.1	44.5	48.0	40.9	33.6	38.2	31.7	42.1	36.4	33.3
0.65	1.4	0.3	1.0	0.3	-	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.3	1.0	0.2	0.6	-
100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total															

Chi-Square = 19.21\* with 2 d.f.  
 Chi-Square = 13.58\* with 2 d.f.  
 Chi-Square = 15.479\* with 4 d.f.  
 Chi-Square = 16.378 with 9 d.f.  
 Chi-Square = 29.257\* with 9 d.f.

\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

## TABLE 8d

COMMENTS ON GENERAL FEELINGS ABOUT  
THE GOVERNMENT

(Q. "What do people in general feel about the government?")

	TOTAL %
They feel sad and miserable because of of sudden increase of price and tax	13.06
Helpful government**	11.94
Discontented / neglected	10.03
Government is not efficient/unfair administration	4.73
It's a puppet government because it is no longer exercising its real duty/we feel that we're being sold out	3.74
They feel happy, but sometimes bad*	2.82
There is need to improve the present government	1.84
We have unemployment problems	0.92
Tight money situation	0.85
There is a little similarity to communism	0.14
Other (negative) responses	14.62
Too much politics/losing faith in the government due to economic crisis/need a general change in government/govern- ment cannot help the poor/getting worse everyday	
No answer/don't know/no comment*	34.67
Blanks***	0.64

\* Classified as "neutral" response

\*\* Classified as "positive" response

\*\*\* Classified separately

All other responses were classified as "negative"

TABLE 9a

## GENERAL CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT

(Q. "If the community had a problem which needed action from the government, do you feel that, as a general rule, it can get the needed action from the government?")

	BY RELIGION		
	Total %	Muslims %	Non-Muslims %
No	41.5	22.1	44.9
Yes	13.3	28.1	10.8
Maybe	35.2	40.4	34.5
Don't know/no comment	8.8	8.9	8.8
Blank	1.2	0.5	1.0
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Chi-Square = 64.33\* with 3 d.f.

TABLE 9b

(Q. "How about you, if you had a problem, do you feel that as a general rule, you can get the needed action from the government?")

No	21.8	31.5	20.3
Yes	29.2	23.7	30.4
Maybe	35.4	30.5	36.3
Don't know/no comment	11.9	13.3	11.5
Blank	1.7	1.0	1.5
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Chi-Square = 14.16\* with 2 d.f.

\*The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 10

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE "SHARIA"  
AS PERCEIVED BY MUSLIM FILIPINOS

(Q. "In the present system of government, do you think the government should have a say in the Sharia?" )

	TOTAL %
No	40.4
Yes	15.3
No Response	44.3
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Chi-Square = 23.02\* with 1 d.f.

\*The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5% level of significance.

TABLE 11a

OPINION OF MUSLIM FILIPINOS AS TO WHETHER THE "SHARIA"  
SHOULD BE A PART OF THE NATIONAL LAW OR PRESENT  
GOVERNMENT

	TOTAL %
No (should not be a part of the national law)	47.8
Yes (should be a part of the national law)	13.8
No Response	38.4
Total	100.0

Chi-Square = 38.09\* with 1 d.f.

TABLE 11b

REASONS FOR BELIEVING THAT THE "SHARIA" SHOULD NOT BE  
A PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OR NATIONAL LAW

(N = 97)

Not Answering	14.5
Don't know/no idea	76.2
"A way of life must be free and is no business of the government"	9.3
Total	100.0

TABLE 11c

REASONS FOR BELIEVING THAT THE "SHARIA" SHOULD BE A  
PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OR THE NATIONAL  
LAW

(N = 28)

	No.
Not Answering	20
"Sharia is also part of the national law"	2
"The Philippines is our native land and Muslims are also Filipinos"	3
"In order to be popular"	1
"The government and people are equal"	1
"It can help Muslims and Christians cooperate with each other"	1
Total	28

\*The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5% level of significance

TABLE 12a

MUSLIM FILIPINOS' OPINIONS AS TO WHETHER THEY SHOULD  
STAY AS A PART OF THE REPUBLIC

	TOTAL %
Yes (should stay)	55.1
No (should separate)	21.1
No answer	23.7
Total	<u>100.0</u>

TABLE 12b

REASONS OF MUSLIM FILIPINOS FOR WANTING TO STAY AS  
PART OF THE REPUBLIC

(N = 112)

"We are all Filipinos and the Philippines is our native land"	44.6
"We love the Philippines"	14.3
"Our land is part of the Philippines"	7.1
"We are not ready for independence"	7.1
"Our area is not rich enough to support us"	5.4
Other answers	2.7
No answer	18.8
Total	<u>100.0</u>

TABLE 12c

REASONS OF MUSLIM FILIPINOS FOR WANTING TO BE UNDER  
A SEPARATE GOVERNMENT

(N = 43)

	No.
"Muslims want to have their own administration"	17
"Malacañang and the government do not improve our area anyway"	3
No answer	23
	<u>43</u>

TABLE 13

MOST PRESSING COMMUNITY PROBLEMS AS PERCEIVED  
BY MUSLIM FILIPINOS

(Q. "What do you consider the most pressing problems in this community?")

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
No comment/none	11.32	12.0	10.5
Unemployment	0.49	0.85	-
Noisy vehicles and passersby	1.48	2.56	-
Lack of facilities like light, water, medical aid & health centers	60.10	58.97	61.6
Lack of roads, bridges, school buildings & transportation	12.81	11.97	13.95
Lack of residential lots	0.49	0.85	-
Thefts and robberies	0.99	0.85	1.2
Peace and order	0.99	1.71	-
Congested area/accident-prone roads	0.49	0.85	-
Land grabbing/natives are deprived of their property	0.49	0.85	-
More general improvements	2.96	-	7.0
Other answers	4.43	4.27	4.65
Blank	2.96	4.27	1.1

TABLE 14

THE PERCEIVED ROLE OF ISLAM IN SOLVING  
COMMUNITY PROBLEMS

	TOTAL %
No comment/no answers	25.1
People must go to school	0.5
No way of helping/Islam can't help	5.4
Religion cannot help solve government problems	1.0
Religion plays no role in government problems	12.3
By giving true concentration on the Islam practices	1.0
Teach religion to the younger generation to minimize crime & evil	0.5
By holding barrio meetings	40.4
Cooperate with politicians/mayor/governor	5.4
Support the Muslim religion	3.5
Have more faith in Allah and brotherhood	4.9
Total	<u>100.0</u>

MUSLIMS' EVALUATION OF POLITICS IN RELATION TO ITS  
CAPACITY TO ASSIST IN COMMUNITY PROBLEMS

(Q. "In what way can politics help or not help in solving the problems of the community?")

(N = 203)

Responses to how it can help...

	TOTAL %
None/no comment/no answer	50.7
Don't know	3.9
Giving aid to the poor people in the community	3.9
Having cooperation	3.9
Giving good recommendations	3.5
Solving unemployment problems	3.5
Attending the regular sessions of the council	2.4
Increasing the minimum wage	2.5
Submitting the problems to politicians	2.0
Politicians should work hand in hand to improve the community schools, roads & bridges, etc.	7.4
Maintaining peace and order	1.0
Other responses	15.3
Total	100.0

How it cannot help...

No comments/no answers	97.5
They are not conducting peaceful politics	0.5
Politicians don't mind community problems	0.5
Politicians are liars	0.5
The government is sinking due to economic depression	0.5
The Datu takes all the help given by the politicians	0.5
Total	100.0

TABLE 16a

PERCEIVED ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE LIFE OF  
MUSLIM FILIPINOS

(Q. "In what way has the government affected your life?")

	TOTAL %
<hr/>	
(N = 203)	<u>100.0</u>
Negative Responses	57.6
Positive Responses	7.9
Neutral Responses	18.2
No Answer	16.3
<hr/>	
(N = 117)	
<u>Negative Responses</u>	
No peace and order/rate of criminality has increased too	30.8
The prices of commodities are too high/rising prices	18.8
We've become economically unstable	28.2
We have very low incomes and a low standard of living	16.2
The government does not provide enough job opportunities, aid, protection	6.0
<hr/>	
(N = 16)	
<u>Positive Responses</u>	
The government provides job opportunities	81.2
It provides protection and aid to the citizen	12.5
It gives a chance for better education	6.3
<hr/>	
(N = 37)	
<u>Neutral Responses</u>	
It hasn't affected us in any way	100.0
<hr/>	

TABLE 16b

PERCEIVED ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE LIFE  
OF MUSLIM FILIPINOS IN MINDANAO

(N = 1,416)

	TOTAL %
Present minimum wage is too low to meet current high prices	8.0
Rising prices	8.5
Unbalanced economy/low standard of living	4.6
Unemployment	1.2
Increased taxes	3.5
Unsolved crimes/peace & order situation is not good	0.6
Corrupt government officials	0.3
Barrio leadership	0.3
Other answers*	45.1
gives us jobs/improves rural areas/ gives funds to the people/builds schools, hospitals & markets	
Unclassifiable (i.e., does not answer the question)	6.3
No answer/no comment/don't know	21.7

\* Positive replies

TABLE 17

## GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES CONSIDERED AS MOST HELPFUL

(Q. "What are some government activities which you feel have been most helpful to you and your family?")

(N = 1,416)

	TOTAL %
School buildings/educational programs	20.0
NAWASA/electrification programs and communication system	3.0
Construction of roads and bridges/aid of provincial engineers	16.9
Construction of playgrounds, tennis courts and multi-purpose pavements	0.4
Construction of social halls, reading centers and market places	0.7
Construction of Health Centers/aid from WHO/distribution of medicine & free hospitalization	9.4
PACD	10.3
Bureau of Plant Industry/Food Production/National Irrigation/NACIDA/Land Reform and Authority	2.7
Red Cross/SWA/Family Planning Program	2.3
Granting loans/housing loans/increases of salaries/GSIS/SSS/DBP	1.7
Police authority/campaign against terrorism and criminality/peace and order campaign	0.3
No answer/refusals/don't know/etc.	32.3
Total	100.0

## COMMENTS ON MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONSHIP

(Q. "Can you tell me something about the Muslims and Christians in this community?")

	TOTAL %	MUSLIMS %	NON- MUSLIMS %
Positive Responses	22.7	16.6	60.1
Negative Responses	10.4	12.0	2.5
Neutral Responses	22.6	24.2	14.8
No Answer	44.3	47.2	22.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Chi-Square = 113.37 with 2 d.f.

Positive Responses

Muslims and Christians have social harmony, peacefully toward each other

77.6 78.9 75.4

They treat each other equally, with no discrimination

22.4 21.1 24.6

Negative Responses

Muslims and Christians are not united/cannot live harmoniously

55.4 54.5 80.0

There exists a lack of communication and association

8.8 8.4 20.0

Muslims are considered troublesome, traitors

27.0 28.0 -

We are indifferent

6.8 7.0 -

Christians are considered better, more educated

2.0 2.1 -

Neutral Responses

There are no Muslims/Christians in the area

75.9 74.1 93.3

Some Muslims are friendly and cooperative/some not. The same is true for Christians

13.4 14.1 6.7

Christians and Muslims differ in customs, practices

10.6 11.7 -

\*The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%

## ATTITUDES TOWARD MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONSHIP

(Q. "How do you feel about it?")

	TOTAL %	MUSLIMS %	NON- MUSLIMS %
Positive Responses	17.0	21.2	16.4
Negative Responses	8.8	2.0	10.1
Neutral Responses	3.2	-	3.8
No Response	71.1	76.9	69.7
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Positive Responses</u>			
feels happy, contented and proud of the relationship	86.2	95.3	84.2
feels secure/has peace of mind	10.0	2.3	11.7
hopeful to have harmonious relationship	3.8	2.3	4.1
<u>Negative Responses</u>			
Christian's fear evident because of presence of Muslims	36.8	100.0	34.7
hard to have harmonious relationship due to socio-economic differences	33.6	-	34.7
war between Christians and Muslims is imminent risky situation	25.6	-	26.4
hard to deal with uneducated Muslims	1.6	-	1.7
the relationship is getting worse	1.6	-	1.7
there is discrimination against Muslims	0.8	-	0.8
<u>Neutral Responses</u>			
feels nothing because there is no Muslims living in this area	100.0	-	100.0

SUGGESTIONS OFFERED TO IMPROVE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN  
RELATIONSHIP

(Q. "What suggestions can you give for improving the Muslim-Christian relationship?")

	TOTAL %	MUSLIMS %	NON- MUSLIMS %
Not Answering	56.1	44.8	57.4
Answering	43.9	55.2	42.6
<u>Responses</u>			
Cooperate, understand, unite, respect each other	37.4	57.1	33.0
Intermarriage	15.1	33.9	11.0
Educate both Muslims and Christians	13.7	-	16.7
No social discrimination, equal rights	9.7	1.8	11.4
More Muslim participation in community civic projects	8.7	0.9	10.4
More and equal council representation	4.0	0.9	4.7
Social integration	3.9	5.4	3.5
Government should solve Muslim and Christian disputes/enact laws/have good government	2.9	-	3.5
Separate the Muslims from the Christians	4.8	-	2.2
Uplift socio-economic condition of Muslims through government agencies	1.6	-	2.0
Assimilation into Christianity	0.8	-	1.0
Muslims should not abuse	0.3	-	0.4
No way of improving relationship	0.2	-	0.2

TABLE 21a

## MUSLIMS' PERCEPTION OF CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES

(Q. "How do you think Christians feel towards the Muslims?")

	TOTAL %
Positive Responses	4.4
Negative Responses	11.3
Neutral Responses	12.8
No Answer	71.4
	<u>100.0</u>
	<u>NO.</u>
<u>Positive Responses</u>	<u>9</u>
They have good feelings towards Muslims	9
<u>Negative Responses</u>	<u>23</u>
Christians feel superior and discriminate against Muslims	18
Christians have ill feelings towards Muslims	4
Christians think Muslims are traitors	1
<u>Neutral Responses</u>	<u>26</u>
They feel the same as Muslims feel towards Christians	24
It depends on the person	2

TABLE 21b

NON-MUSLIMS' PERCEPTION OF THE ATTITUDES  
OF MUSLIMS TOWARD CHRISTIANS

(Q. "How do you think Muslims feel towards the Christians?")

	TOTAL %
Positive Responses	9.9
Negative Responses	24.0
Neutral Responses	7.9
No Answer	58.3
	100.0
	<u>NO.</u>
<u>Positive Responses</u>	<u>118</u>
Muslims are friendly and generally harbor goodwill towards Christians	110
Muslims think Christians are brave, thrifty, respect their traditions	8
<u>Negative Responses</u>	<u>287</u>
Muslims feel Christians are inferior	84
Muslims feel Christians look at them with discrimination	112
Muslims feel unfriendly, have ill feeling and treat Christians as enemies	64
Muslims are treacherous, seek revenge against the Christians	25
Muslims feel Christians are dirty because they eat pork	2
<u>Neutral and Other Responses</u>	<u>94</u>
Muslims treat Christians in the same manner Christians treat them	68
Muslims do not believe we both will unite because of differences in culture, religion	18
There are no Muslims in my area	7
Muslims believe Christians and Muslims need a good leader	1

TABLE 22

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS  
ARE PERCEIVED AS ABLE TO COOPERATE AND  
LIVE WITH ONE ANOTHER

(Q. "Under what conditions do you think Muslims and Christians can cooperate and live with each other? Can you tell me more about it?")

	TOTAL %	MUSLIMS %	NON- MUSLIMS %
Not Answering	64.1	51.2	65.8
Answering	35.9	48.8	34.2
<u>Responses</u>			
Have respect for each other, cooperation, love, understanding	55.9	69.7	52.6
Through intermarriage	11.0	12.1	10.8
No discrimination in giving privileges/opportunities	7.9	14.1	6.4
Through education for both Muslims and Non-Muslims, conferences, teach-ins	4.7	-	5.9
Give Muslims more participation in government/community projects, activities	4.3	1.0	5.1
Socio-religious integration	3.1	-	3.9
Through cooperation in business trade	2.4	-	2.9
Socio-economic upliftment of Muslims	1.6	-	2.0
Enforcement of law	1.2	-	1.5
Impossible to attain harmonious relationships between Muslims and Non-Muslims due to differences in character, customs, religions and government others	5.7	-	7.1
	2.2	2.0	3.0

TABLE 23

THINGS WHICH NON-MUSLIMS ARE MOST PROUD OF  
AS A FILIPINO CITIZEN

(N = 1196)

	TOTAL %
No answer	37.8
Because of Filipino traits such as hospitality, friendliness and other noted traits	17.5
For being an independent country	14.8
Our national heroes	0.5
Our international beauties	2.8
It is the only Christian/Catholic nation in Asia	0.4
The superiority of the brown race	4.3
It is my birthplace/we live in the Philippines	3.2
We have a President who is one of the richest men in Asia	0.2
Our Philippine industries	0.5
Nothing to be proud of	5.2
Other combined responses	12.8

TABLE 24a

## PERSONAL TRAITS CONSIDERED AS MOST IMPORTANT

(Q. "What three traits do you consider as most important for a man to have?")

	TOTAL		MUSLIMS		NON-MUSLIMS	
	RK	%	RK	%	RK	%
Honesty, trustworthiness	1	46.0	1	52.2	1	45.7
Helpfulness, cooperation	2	34.0	7	8.4	2	38.4
Hospitality, good public relations	3	25.6	2	25.6	3	28.1
Good manners	4	22.1	3	15.7	4	27.1
Industry	5	20.2	6	8.9	5	25.6
Loyalty/faithfulness/sincerity	6	16.6	5	11.8	6	16.7
Courtesy	7	10.0	8	4.0	7	11.0
Intelligence	8	4.3	4	12.3	9	3.0
Responsibility, maturity	9	3.4	9	2.4	8	3.4
Other answers combined	-	54.8	-	67.4	-	53.0

\*Ranking computed on the basis of frequency of mentions since many respondents failed to give the three traits, as requested.

\*\*Percentages have been computed on the basis of total number of respondents involved, out of which 7.8% failed to mention even one trait.

TABLE 24b

## PERSONAL TRAITS CONSIDERED AS "MOST" IMPORTANT\*

(Q. "What three traits do you consider as most important for a man to have?")

	TOTAL %	MUSLIMS %	NON- MUSLIMS %
Total Answering	100.0	100.0	100.0
Honesty, trustworthy	26.2	28.5	25.6
Helpful, cooperative, considerate	11.4	1.5	13.2
Good manners, with character	10.5	1.0	12.3
Good public relations, hospitable	9.4	2.5	10.4
Hardworking, industrious, persevering	7.1	2.5	7.9
Loyal, faithful, dedicated, sincere	3.5	1.0	4.0
Courteous	2.6	-	3.0
Intelligent, brainy	2.2	11.8	0.6
Responsible and mature	1.4	-	1.6
Patriotic, nationalistic	0.1	-	.2
Others (brave, good leader, not corrupt, resourceful, dignified, thoughtful)	17.8	34.9	15.0
No answer/refused to answer	7.2	14.8	6.0
Blanks	0.6	1.5	0.2

\* Note: The question required the respondent to give three important traits from highest to lowest order. The above table shows the distribution of the sample population in terms of weight given to specific individual traits, e. g. the table refers to the sample population's evaluation of personal characteristics which have been cited as being topmost priority.

TABLE 25

TRAIT PERCEIVED AS MOST IMPORTANT IN AN ELECTORAL  
CANDIDATE\*

(Q. "What is the characteristic that you consider most important in an electoral candidate?")

	TOTAL		MUSLIMS		NON-MUSLIMS	
	RK	%	RK	%	RK	%
Honesty	1	37.0	1	40.0	1	36.5
Helpfulness	2	16.3	4	14.7	2	16.5
Loyalty, sincerity	3	15.2	5	13.3	3	15.5
Industry	4	13.7	3	15.7	4	13.4
Hospitality, good PR	5	11.3	2	22.6	6	9.5
Good manners	6	11.0	8.5	0.5	5	13.0
Responsibility, maturity	7	2.8	8.5	0.5	7	3.2
Patriotism, nationalism	8	2.75	6	10.8	9	1.4
Intelligence	9	2.6	7	8.3	8	1.7
Other answers combined	-	26.2	-	33.0	-	25.1

\*Ranking computed on the basis of frequency of mentions, as in Table 24.

TABLE 26a

## PERCEPTION OF PEACE AND ORDER IN THE COMMUNITY

(Q. "How is the peace and order situation in your community?")

	TOTAL %	BY RELIGION		BY TYPE OF REGION	
		Muslims %	Non- Muslims %	Urban %	Rural %
Good	77.1	75.4	77.7	77.1	77.1
Bad	9.8	7.4	10.3	8.9	10.6
Other Answers	10.0	14.3	9.2	11.6	8.4
No Answer	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.4	3.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Chi-Square = 1.22 with 2 d.f.

Chi-Square = 6.95\* with 2 d.f.

TABLE 26b-1

"GOOD" COMMENTS ON THE PEACE AND ORDER SITUATION  
IN THE COMMUNITY

	TOTAL	MUSLIMS	NON- MUSLIMS
	<u>No.</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>No.</u>
<u>Comments</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Total Commenting Under the Category "Good"	825	138	681
Very little trouble/no casualties or abuses/no problem	67.3	79.7	65.3
The people have cooperation, under- standing of each other and discip- line to maintain peace and order	14.5	7.2	16.2
Police officers/officials/barrio leaders guard peace & order and help solve community problems	10.9	8.7	10.6
Crimes are seldom committed	3.8	-	4.6
There is harmony between Muslims and Non-Muslims	2.1	4.4	1.6
Peaceful but not sure about the future due to migration/outsideers	0.5	-	0.6
Delinquents have already been reformed	0.4	-	0.4
People are contented with living/busy with work so no time to create trouble	0.2	-	0.3
No vices such as gambling, prostitu- tion	0.1	-	0.1
Other responses	0.2	-	0.3

"BAD" COMMENTS ON THE PEACE AND ORDER SITUATION  
IN THE COMMUNITY

	TOTAL	MUSLIMS	NON- MUSLIMS
	<u>No.</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>No.</u>
Total Commenting Under the Category "Bad"	124	13	111
<u>Comments</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Plenty of trouble makers/drunkards/ constant trouble (especially at night)	36.3	15.4	38.7
Conflict among the leaders/undis- ciplined and bad officials/they themselves break the law	21.8	-	24.3
Plenty of crimes (esp. piracy) committed and unsolved	16.1	38.4	13.5
Lack of protection/very few police- men/not well equipped enforcer of peace and order	12.1	7.7	12.6
Plenty of juvenile delinquents	8.9	15.4	8.2
Police officers cannot maintain peace and order	2.4	23.1	-
No unity among barrio people	0.8	-	0.9
No respect for the officials/law enforcers	0.8	-	0.9
Frequent fires	0.8	-	0.9

TABLE 26b-3

"OTHER" COMMENTS ON THE PEACE AND ORDER SITUATION  
IN THE COMMUNITY

	TOTAL	MUSLIMS	NON- MUSLIMS
	<u>No.</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>No.</u>
Total Commenting Under the Category "Others"	106	29	77
<u>Comments</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Sometimes peaceful, sometimes bad/ sometimes crimes are solved	55.7	100.0	39.0
"Tuba" addiction and juvenile delinquency	29.2	-	39.1
Lacks peace officials/barrío gets no attention from government	4.7	-	6.5
Gambling, hence trouble	3.8	-	5.2
No unity and harmony among barrío people (esp. between Muslims and Non-Muslim)	2.8	-	3.9
Performance of peace officials/ inefficient, uncooperative	2.8	-	3.9
Different effects depending on the situation	1.0	-	1.3

TABLE 26c

## EVALUATION OF THE COMMUNITY IN TERMS OF SAFETY

(Q. "How safe is your community? Would you say it is very safe, fairly safe, unsafe?")

	BY RELIGION		BY TYPE OF REGION	
	Muslims %	Non- Muslims %	Urban %	Rural %
Very safe	40.3	50.2	37.2	43.5
Fairly safe	42.7	42.8	48.3	37.0
Unsafe	6.7	1.5	8.4	5.1
No answer/blanks	10.3	5.4	6.1	14.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Chi-Square = 86.159\* with 2 d.f.

Chi-Square = 54.32\* with 2 d.f.

\* The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 26d-1

"VERY SAFE" COMMENTS ON THE SAFETY OF THE  
COMMUNITY

	TOTAL	MUSLIMS	NON- MUSLIMS
	<u>No.</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>No.</u>
Total Commenting Under the Category "Very Safe"	407	37	370
<u>Comments</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Little trouble/crimes committed	59.7	13.5	64.3
Because of efficiency of barrio officials/peace officers	17.9	2.7	19.4
Because of discipline, cooperation, respect for the law, understanding, honesty, love and friendliness among people (particularly between Muslims and Non-Muslims)	16.5	78.4	10.3
No transients, outsiders, strangers to create troubles	2.4	5.4	2.2
No juvenile delinquency	2.2	-	2.4
Safe to go around at night/can leave doors unlocked	1.2	-	1.4

TABLE 26d-2

"FAIRLY SAFE" COMMENTS ON THE SAFETY OF THE  
COMMUNITY

	TOTAL	MUSLIMS	NON- MUSLIMS
	<u>No.</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>No.</u>
Total Commenting Under the Category "Fairly Safe"	512	79	433
<u>Comments</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Some troubles but mostly not serious	55.5	54.4	55.6
Sometimes there are crimes, banditry robbery	11.3	13.9	10.8
At times inefficiency and neglect of barrio captain, leaders, peace officers	8.4	1.3	9.9
There is respect, discipline, cooperativeness and understanding, love among people	7.6	2.5	8.5
There are some trouble-makers/ drunkards	5.3	-	6.2
Depends on persons involved/ circumstances	4.3	10.1	3.2
Lacks peace force	2.3	5.1	1.8
Juvenile delinquency	2.1	3.8	1.8
Some immigrants enter community and create trouble	1.6	5.1	0.9
Little trouble between Muslims and Non-Muslims	1.0	3.8	0.5
Fear of Muslim attack	0.2	-	0.2
Others	0.4	-	0.5

TABLE 26d-3

"UNSAFE" COMMENTS ON THE SAFETY OF THE  
COMMUNITY

	TOTAL	MUSLIMS	NON- MUSLIMS
	<u>No.</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>No.</u>
Total Commenting Under the Category "Unsafe"	59	1	58
<u>Comments</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Lack of police force	22.0	-	22.4
Frequent troubles	18.6	-	19.0
Very high crime rate (e.g. piracy, theft, robbery)/ crimes remain unsolved	16.9	100.0	15.5
Many are abusing/lack discipline, respect for law	16.9	-	17.2
Police are inefficient, uncoopera- tive	11.9	-	12.1
Conflict between Muslims and Christians due to Muslims' unlaw- fulness	10.2	-	10.3
Juvenile delinquency	1.7	-	1.7
Presence of immigrants and strangers who are trouble-makers	1.7	-	1.7

## TOP RANKING COMMUNITY LEADERS BY PROVINCE

Davao Oriental

PERCENTAGE

Not Answering	42.4
Answering	57.6
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Top Community Leaders\*

Jing Angala	45.5
Pablo Sumaoy	18.2
Mr. Regidor	15.2
Mr. Baral**	

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\*Based on the 33 respondents from Davao Oriental.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 3.0%.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Lanao del Sur

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	
Answering	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Top Community Leaders*</u>	
Barsi Tomawis	34.9
Macabayo Dicompong	34.9
Mata Atar	34.9
Tarimbabak Ronda	34.9
Shiek Alabi Abdul	34.9
Hadji Tiburon Alamada	34.0
Hadji Yusop	18.9
Quezon Gato	18.9
Basher Badio	18.9
Asis Batalo	18.9
Macondara Manardas	18.9
Hasien Alapa	15.1
Maura Patarean	15.1
Han Mariga	13.2
Mr. Olayo	10.4
Matarog Bagowan	9.4
Mayaunang Donato	9.4
Paraimbang Carapong	9.4
Mola Sumagina	9.4
Aramtos Jusug	9.4
Armosa Pangcoya	9.4
Caran Diyaka	9.4
Mongorla Macua	9.4
Ordac Comakakas	9.4
Rangaiy Imau	6.6
Bagowamaura Colayo	4.7
Berna Alawir	4.7
Mr. Mindalano	2.8
Maganaboya Alapa	1.9
Mama Maralubos	1.9
Jalanto Maratubang	1.9
Mr. Macasalinabaras	1.9
Others**	
Hadji Ibrahim Miguel, Intuos Daligdig, Usmair Marauda, Madlawi Alawir, Badnor Alapa, Councilor	

\*Based on the 106 respondents from Davao del Sur.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 0.9% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Surigao del Sur

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	4.8
Answering	95.2
Total	100.0

Top Community Leaders\*

Mayor Masangkay	47.6
Mayor Linaza	14.3
Barrio Captain Tony Malazarte	14.3
Barrio Captain Salvacion	12.7
Martin Valdevar	4.8
Odelon Salvacion	4.8
Vice-Mayor Balingon	3.2
Ex-Mayor Marcelo	3.2
Gregorio Falcon	3.2
Vice-Mayor Picasales	3.2
Others**	
Barrio Captain A. Lim, Eulogio Onsing, Vicente Erquita, Lucio Lim, Gregorio Bandy, Isidro Prado, Mr. Godinez, Engineer Mendizona, Governor Castillo, Barrio Captain Medrano	

\*Based on the 63 respondents from Surigao del Sur

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.6% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd)

Davao del Norte

---

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	41.4
Answering	58.6
Total	100.0

Top Community Leaders\*

Agustin Ragay	27.6
Pedro Torno	24.1
Bonifacio Villa Abrillo	10.3

Others\*\*

Ilumino Lapitan, Terencio Boston, Priscilla Balbequer, Priscilla Sison, Bienvenido Amarillo, Bernabe Sison

---

\*Based on the 29 respondents from Davao del Norte.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 3.4% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd)

Cotabato

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	27.4
Answering	72.6
Total	100.0
 <u>Top Community Leaders*</u>	
Crispin Gardose	11.9
Arthur Bagang	11.9
Domingo Jacosalem	8.3
Guiana Sabangan	8.3
W. de la Serna	7.1
Fandi Moro	7.1
Sabina Mendoza	7.1
Felipe Salazar	6.0
Anas Dangal	6.0
Pacifico de la Serna	4.8
Jesus Padu	4.8
M. Domingo	4.8
Mr. Diqueña	4.8
Carlos Panes	2.4
Others**	
Jesus Ortiz	
Mr. Catulong	
Datu Dilanggahin	
Amay Mundong	
Dr. Calaliman	

\*Based on the 84 respondents from Cotabato.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.2% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Misamis Occidental

413

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	20.0
Answering	80.0
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Top Community Leaders\*

Timoteo Eribuagas	26.3
Isabelo Bembrazo	16.8
William Gonzaga	10.5
Dionisio Tejano	10.5
Ramon Quimno	10.5
Hilario Iyog	8.4
Gregorio Tactacon	7.4
Arsenio Anino	6.3
Tiburcio Maquiling	6.3
Lucas Nericua	5.3
Esteban Balcita	5.3
Juan Salvia	5.3
Emiliano Bantilan	4.2
Catalino Quimno	3.2
Neptali Sajofia	3.2
Ricardo Cajan	2.1
Alberto Parejo	2.1
Ricardo Gomez	2.1
Trudes Deloza	2.1
Valeriano Legaspi, Jr.	2.1
Lorenzo Resma	2.1
Gabriel Xavier	2.1

## Others\*\*

Francisco Velasco, Catalino Anino, Liberato Bacayo, Ciriaco Bao, Tiburao, Tactacon, Paterno Dagundon, Cafarino Jarales, Brigida Sagrado, Hilario Lagas, Agripino Benesito, Rufino Bensito, Florencio Resma, Bernardo Carreon, Valeriano Sivela, Maria Majuri, Mrs. Ocaya.

\*Based on the 95 respondents from Misamis Occidental.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.05% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Misamis Oriental

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	41.5
Answering	58.5
Total	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Top Community Leaders*</u>	
Marcelo Biaco	11.3
Timoteo Vasquez	10.4
Espero Rodriguez	9.4
Eufemio Tobira	9.4
Eleuterio Saballero	1.9
Mordeno Cua	1.9
F. Dugenio	1.9
Gerondio Tuba	1.9
E. Sarmiento	1.9
<u>Others**</u>	
Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, Governor C. Diel, J. Serifia, P. Roa, A. Balaba, P. Melendez, A. Legaspi, R. Canoy, S. Herminio, M. Avanceña, E. Liloc, S. Alejo, Attorney C. Liloc, Mrs. T. Manhura, Nrs. G. Daya, Teofilo Seroyla, Serapion Presilias, C. Sabur- niclo, Congressman Aloy Roa, Abundio Cañete, Antonio Abrea, Jose Barro, Miguel Cañete	

\*Based on the 106 respondents from Misamis Oriental.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 0.94% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Davao del Sur

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	21.2
Answering	78.8
Total	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Top Community Leaders*</u>	
Lorenzo Aranguis	12.4
Inguan Bankas	11.5
Ricardo Reyes	10.6
Felipe Traverro	8.0
Rosa Abellana	6.2
Capt. Josefina Osales	6.2
Benigno Bangoy	5.3
Domingo Palapas	5.3
Severino Capulong	4.4
Pedro Dakdak	1.8
Ignacio Buat	1.8
<u>Others**</u>	
Mr. Comidoy, Boy Cabalde, Mr. Matabia, G. Recimilla, Martino Adtuon, Erespo Celso, Lope Tar, P. Auman, P. Ankla, Blas Naparam, Bonifacio Debayle, Daniel Evangelio, Regino Paclar, Benito yo, Simeon Dimayuga, Camilo Judar, Bayani Claudio, Eliseo Gonzaga.	

\*Based on the 113 respondents from Davao del Sur.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 0.9% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Zamboanga del Sur

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	41.5
Answering	58.5
Total	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Top Community Leaders*</u>	
Nicolas Guevarra	10.6
Tomas Gonzales	10.6
Captain E. Falcasantos	8.5
Leandro Esperal	8.5
Charlie Sebastian	7.4
Mayor Enriquez	5.3
Jun Alabar	3.2
Pedro Lacandalo	3.2
Barrio Councilors	2.1
Juan Condoso	2.1
Ernesto Cabato	2.1
Councilor Atilano	2.1
<u>Others**</u>	
Jun Luy, Ismael Rodriguez, Vicente Manuel, Cesar Yap, Ex-Mayor Suarez, Pelagio Mandi, Barrio Captain (Precinct 69), I. P. Pamaran	

\*Based on the 94 respondents from Zamboanga del Sur.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.1% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Sulu

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	18.0
Answering	82.0
Total	100.0
 <u>Top Community Leaders*</u>	
Barrio Captain	27.9
Gumla Yusop	18.0
Alawi Abubakar	16.4
Calli Ahmad	13.1
Hadji O. Ismael	11.5
Barrio Board Members	9.8
Hadji Fauzi Omar	9.8
Panglima Ussam	8.2
Hadji Gapur Harum	6.6
Superintendent Abdul Cachil Mayvorsa	4.9
Congressman Anni of Jolo	4.9
Hadji Noli Nur Mur	4.9
Ahmad Abubakar	4.9
Hadji Karim Abdulla	3.3
Hadji Yasim Jaulla	3.3
Attorney Asaali Isnani	3.3
Kali Akmad	3.3

## Others\*\*

Nolu Sali, Hadji A. Alhabsi, Ali Hussein,  
 Datu Bandahala, Councilor Hawari, Governor  
 Sangkula, Judge Omar Anim, Board Member  
 Ispurido

\*Based on the 61 respondents from Sulu.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.6% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Zamboanga del Norte

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	5.7
Answering	94.3
Total	100.0

Top Community Leaders\*

	<u>Percentage</u>		
Bartolome Saile	18.8	Tomasa Tomaclas	2.3
Mayor M. Bael	14.2	Zosimo Ceriales	2.3
Jaime Reynate	12.5	Azcuna	2.3
Felipe Delasas	11.9	Antonio Moro	2.3
Gil Bermudez	11.4	Vic Lacaya	2.3
E. Acosta	10.2	Ignacio Sumagang	2.3
Lapu-Lapu Villanueva	8.5	Lood	1.7
Ramon Sasuman	6.2	Hilario Andoy	1.7
Sofronio Orong	4.5	Santiago Andag	1.7
Dodong Noel	4.0	Miguela Tagapan	1.7
Francisco Saile	4.0	Jacinto Dinghong	1.1
Leon Pagatang	4.0	Ricardo Buhesan	1.1
Tarciano Pungot	2.8	Dominga Palubon	1.1
Teodulo Tumogon	2.8	Roque Villanueva	1.1
Daniel Turot	2.8	Pedro de la Cruz	1.1
Fabio Tuitor	2.8	L. Equia	1.1
Virgilio Butalid	2.8	A. Noel	1.1
Melchor Agom	2.3	Concordio Campilan	1.1
Lorenzo Campilan	2.3	Josefa Andag	1.1
Jose Bangkal	2.3	Marino Alingal	1.1

## Others\*\*

Andres Sumagang, Marcial Selendro, Guadalupe Adaza, C. Agustin, F. Sedrome, Antonio Garsula, Marcelino Gonzales, Exequiel Moro, Francisco Corpuz, Vicente Martinez, Mr. Gondola, Florencio Paglinawan, Victor Andag, Epifanio Andag, Consorcio Bularon, Cornelio Abang, Basilia Tomaclas, Alfonso Rectaso, P. Balancar, F. Saldariaga, M. Equia, Ercaldo Gairanan, Roque Villanueva, Arsenio Mamanla, Felipe Turot, Ernesto Paes, Robert Poculan, Alberto Ubay, Ricardo Pangasian

\*Based on the 176 respondents from Zamboanga del Norte.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 0.6% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Lanao del Norte

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	16.3
Answering	83.7
Total	100.0
<u>Top Community Leaders*</u>	
Mayor Simplicio Hernandez	17.7
Macabangkit Sangkay	12.0
Pedrito Socillo	7.6
Ex-Mayor Alvia	6.2
Dicasaran Diacat	5.7
Eufemio Selpada	5.7
Gregorio Magaro	5.7
Laureano Casas	3.8
Remigio Razo	3.3
Evenita Depas	2.9
Tranquilino Alia	2.9
Barrio Captain (of Pob. Baroy)	2.9
Ambrosio Sanches	2.4
Antonio Movera	2.4
Digno Duaban	2.4
Dr. Regino Gaite	2.4
Dr. Resurreccion	2.4
Mayor Camilo Cabili	2.4
Fortunato Mohado	2.4
P. Abragon	1.9
Roman Paradilla	1.4
Mr. Achacoso	1.4
Mr. Obaldo Laya	1.4
Antonio Lacida	0.95
Gregorio Lluch	0.95
Rex Resurreccion	0.95
Mr. Figueroa	0.95
Atty. Obach	0.95
Mr. Tabimina	0.95
<u>Others**</u>	
Pedro Generalao, Honorio Aquino, Marcelo Gallardo, Damenceano Pang-sian, Saturnino Segovia, Andres Llander, Mr. Ferraren, Mr. Koppin, Dr. Colven, Mr. Adiba, Mrs. Ramona Sino, Mr. Catiel, Mayor Urbi, Barrio Captain (Precinct 14, Rosario Street), Mrs. Soriano, Mrs. B. Gaite, Danny Casas, Attorney Subido, Anicia Labao, James Echievierre, Engineer Talin, Diangkat Didato, Visitacion Caballero	

\* Based on the 209 respondents from Lanao del Norte

\*\* Frequency of mention is one (1) with 0.5% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Bukidnon

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	-
Answering	100.0
<u>Top Community Leaders*</u>	
Jose Aseñero	32.2
Candido Simbulan	25.6
Arthur Mariano	24.4
Pedro Ronario	24.4
Mayor Dinlayan	24.4
Teodoro Pepito	15.6
Alfredo Baldivia	11.1
Honorio Jimenez	7.8
Vice-Mayor Limbo	6.7
Victorino M. Rodano	6.7
Felipe Yamzon	4.4
Governor Carlito Fortich	4.4
Marco Polo	4.4
Marcelo Antiporta	4.4
Rodolfo Lapay	3.3
Vice-Governor Lopez	3.3
Board Member Esmie Cudal	3.3
Isias Orog	3.3
Ernesto Garcia	2.2
Ruperto Sagala	2.2
Ontejo	2.2
Victorino Silyan	2.2

Others\*\*

Mr. Aurelio, Mr. Ragay, Jose Layao, Adolfo Dayaba, Felipe Monalem, Mauricio Aban, Mrs. Flores, Mrs. Ocaya, Board Member Pedro Daapong, Tabios Family, Quintin Lim, Pascual Aboy, Mauricio Asan, Cesar Fortich

\*Based on the 90 respondents from Bukidnon.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.1% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Surigao del Norte

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	28.9
Answering	71.1
Total	100.0
<u>Top Community Leaders*</u>	
Eriberto Gemad	17.8
Bernalda Modelo	15.6
Ludivico Años	13.3
Floriano Ceda	13.3
Prudencio Gealan	13.3
Alfredo Ebal	13.3
Roque Geir	13.3
Sulphicio Codillo	13.3
Patillano Montanes	13.3
Andres Cabag-Iran	13.3
Lamberto Sibonga	11.1
Anselmo Premio	11.1
Fausto Perez	11.1
Ladelina Alceba	11.1
Andres Tabasa	11.1
Pedro Ebale	8.9
Juanito Robuesa	8.9
Ricafort Jabien	8.9
Maximo Navale	8.9
Esteban Ladaga	8.9
Federico Sibonga	6.7
Jose Fedelis	6.7
Miguel Pitello	6.7
Vicente Orquina	6.7
Josefina Jamiko	6.7
Basilio Fedelis	4.4
Ponciano Torejos	4.4
Gregorio Laba	4.4
Teofilo Ambio	4.4
Constancio Todefa	4.4
Wennis Peralton	4.4
Sosimo Manlagis	4.4
Eugenio Piudo	4.4
Brexio Emao	4.4
Seldonio Emao	4.4
Antonio Echin	4.4
Nicolas Gealan	4.4
Others**	
Ponciano Paglinawan, Quintin Paredes, Jr., Pedro Tantay, Jr., Teofilo Ambid	

\*Based on the 45 respondents from Surigao del Norte.  
 \*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 2.2% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Camiquin

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	23.5
Answering	76.5
Total	100.0
 <u>Top Community Leaders*</u>	
Congressman Jose Neri	76.5
Governor Crisologo Llacuna	76.5
Mayor Julio Vivares	58.8
Vice-Governor Antonio Corrales	41.2
 <u>Others**</u>	
Vice-Mayor Vicente Aravas	
Board Members	
Councilors	

\*Based on the 17 respondents from Camiquin.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 5.9% each.

TABLE 27a: (Cont'd.)

Agusan

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	58.8
Answering	41.2
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Top Community Leaders\*

Exiquio Hesta	19.1
Dagani	14.7
Ernesto Campus	11.8
Francisco Rodoble	7.4
Mamerto Dilima	5.9
Mrs. Paz Roxas	4.4
Isabelo Magrelos	4.4
Daniel Adlaon	4.4
B. Atega	4.4
Sabino Burdios	2.9
T. Curato	2.9
N. Villanueva	2.9

## Others\*\*

Ortencio Rojasles, Tranquilino Calo, Lorenzo Resionente

\*Based on the 68 respondents from Agusan.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.5% each.

TABLE 28a

TOP-RANKING PROVINCIAL/CITY LEADERS

(Q. "Who are the top leaders in this province/city?")

Camiguin

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	-
Answering	100.0
 <u>Top Provincial/City Leaders*</u>	
Jose Neri	88.2
Crisologo Llacuna	82.4
Julio Vivares	82.4
Antonio Corrales	52.9
Vicente Aravas	11.8
Councilor Reyes	11.8
 Others**	
Board Member Jajalla, Judge Chan, Board Members, Councilors	

\*Based on the 17 respondents from Camiguin.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 5.9% each.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Lanao del Sur

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	-
Answering	100.0

Top Provincial/City Leaders\*

Linang Mandangan	90.6
Vice-Governor Marohombsar	86.8
Omar Dianala	59.4
Rasid Sampaco	55.7
Guiemba Mendayan	53.8
Honorable Lucman	14.2
Makudi Pangcogo	9.4
Ali Ibrahim	2.8
Honorable Balindang	1.9
Aremao Minor	1.9
Ibrahim Limpao	1.9

## Others\*\*

Mr. Almorida	
Honorable Sarangani	
Honorable Mamintal Tamano	
Miling Calaca	

\*Based on the 106 respondents from Lanao del Sur.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 0.9% each.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Lanao del Norte

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	7.2
Answering	92.8
Total	100.0

Top Provincial/City Leaders\*

Mayor Camilo Cabili	60.8
Governor Arsenio Quibranza	27.3
Congressman Ali Dimaporo	13.4
Vice-Mayor Gerardo Padilla	11.5
Vice-Governor Umpa	7.2
Malimit Rimpa	3.3
Councilor Actob	3.3
Mr. Urbi	2.9
Gregorio Lluch	2.4
Councilor Benito Ong	2.4
Councilor Obach	1.4
Councilor Celdran	1.4
Collector Pacasim	1.4
Councilor Ambragan	1.0
Leopoldo Malilim	1.0
Dr. Colven	1.0

## Others\*\*

Mr Achacoso, F. Somontan, V. Javiol, C. Sevidal  
 Atty. Macaponton Magondato, Mr. Tinongos, Mr.  
 Badiles, Mr. Tuazon, Councilor Padilla,  
 Mr. Cabigon, Jaycee Head

\*Based on the 209 respondents from Lanao del Norte.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 0.5% each.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Zamboanga del Norte

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	22.2
Answering	77.8
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Top Provincial/City Leaders\*

Congressman F. Azcuna	50.6
Governor Lacaya	46.0
Vice-Governor Lood	9.1
Poculan	9.1
Ubay	8.0
Mayor Gayapa	6.8
Maning Carreon	5.7
Adaza	2.3
Vice-Governor Ramos	1.7
Cleto Olvis	1.7
Jacinto	1.1
Cido Cadungog	1.1
M. Bael	1.1
Julieta Pila	1.1

## Others\*\*

Jesus Vidal, Ricardo Gonzales, Paterno Bajamunde, Balisado, B.M. Guada, Lourdes Carcueba, Leon Pagatang, Narding Tuala, Victor Andag, Alberto Josol

\*Based on the 176 respondents from Zamboanga del Norte.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 0.6% each.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Misamis Occidental

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	88.4
Answering	11.6
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Top Provincial/City Leaders\*

Mayor Alfonso Tan	10.5
The Governor of the Province**	

\*Based on the 95 respondents from Misamis Occidental.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.05%.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Zamboanga del Sur

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	48.9
Answering	51.1
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Top Provincial/City Leaders\*

Joaquin Enriquez, Jr.	33.7
Mayor Brown	9.6
Alano Family	4.2
Bert Lim	4.2
Pelagio Mandi	3.2
Ex-Mayor Suarez	2.1

## Others\*\*

Congressman Cerilles, Rustico Varela,  
Santiago Pantaleon, Atilano Family

\*Based on the 94 respondents from Zamboanga del Sur.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.1% each.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Surigao del Sur

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	12.7
Answering	87.3
Total	100.0
 <u>Top Provincial/City Leaders*</u>	
Governor Castillo	77.8
Congressman Puyat	6.3
Fiscal Morello	3.2
Gregorio Morello	3.2
Board Member Elfa	3.2
Dumagan	3.2
Others**	
Llaguno, Father Rham, Vicente Pimentel	

\*Based on the 63 respondents from Surigao del Sur.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.6% each.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Agusan

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	16.2
Answering	83.8
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Top Provincial/City Leaders\*

G. Sanchez	64.7
Consuelo Calo	47.1
Osin	17.6
Democrito Plaza	11.8
Jose Gonzales	10.3
Jose Aquino	7.4

Others\*\*

Ernesto Campus, Arriola, Paul Alaxan,  
Maring Sanchez, Nelo Cembrano

\*Based on the 68 respondents from Agusan.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.5% each.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Sulu

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	8.2
Answering	91.8
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Top Provincial/City Leaders\*

Congressman Indanan Anni	80.3
Governor Murphy Sangkula	80.3
Mayor A. Abubakar	27.9
Hadji Arsad Salih	18.0
Secretary Salih Ututalum	14.8
Muss Escuerdo	9.8
Bo. Capt. Hadji Fauzi	6.6
Board Member Yokiya Rodjare	4.9
Vice-Mayor Nin Hussin Ututalum	3.3
Atty. Hashim Abubakar	3.3
Board Member Julkipli Anni	3.3

## Others\*\*

Atty. Hanijan Usman, Captain Calingalan Kaluang,  
 Lt. Col. E. Cabelin, Ex-Governor Benjamin  
 Abubakar, Councilor Hawari, Vice-Governor Cauti  
 Lim

\*Based on the 61 respondents from Sulu.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.6% each.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Davao Oriental

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	39.4
Answering	60.6
Total	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Top Provincial/City Leaders*</u>	
Constancio Maglana	57.6
Leopoldo Lopez	30.3
Doding Palma Gil	12.1

\*Based on the 33 respondents from Davao Oriental.

TABLE 2a: (Cont'd)

Davao del Sur

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	5.3
Answering	94.7
Total	100.0
<u>Top Provincial/City Leaders*</u>	
Elias Lopez	79.6
De Los Cientos	10.6
Benigno Bangoy	3.5
Noli Sotto	3.5
Dodong Loyola	2.6
Alejandro Almendras	1.8
Luis Santos	1.8
Others**	
Honorable Tamayo, Honorable Monteverde,	
Honorable Garcia, Honorable Castillo,	
Miguel Axalan, S. Capulong, Felipe	
Traverra.	

\*Based on the 113 respondents from Davao del Sur.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 0.9% each.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Bukidnon

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	3.3
Answering	96.7
Total	100.0

Top Provincial/City Leaders\*

Governor Carlos Fortich	96.7
Congressman Cesar Fortich	66.7
Esmeraldo Cudal	16.7
Pedro Daapong	16.7
Rosario Rodano	14.4
Angelo Lopez	11.1

\*Based on the 90 respondents from Bukidnon.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Misamis Oriental

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	29.2
Answering	70.8
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Top Provincial/City Leaders\*

Romulo Rodriguez	29.2
J. Serina	18.9
P. Roa	18.9
Governor Diel	13.2
Emmanuel Pelaez	9.4
C. Jaraula	3.8

## Others\*\*

Mr. Munez, Julio Ganaban, Filemon Gomez,  
 Esco Gobunao, P. Borromeo, Rufino Deliosa,  
 C. Luminarias, Atty. R. Canoy, H. Adazo,  
 O. Waga, Lim Ket Kai, Councilor Sabal,  
 M. Neri

\*Based on the 106 respondents from Misamis Oriental.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 0.9% each.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd)

Davao del Norte

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	69.0
Answering	31.0
Total	100.0

Top Provincial/City Leaders\*

Verulo Boiser	27.6
Lorenzo Sarmiento	6.9

\*Based on the 29 respondents from Davao del Norte.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Cotabato

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	60.7
Answering	39.3
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Top Provincial/City Leaders\*

Salipada Pendatun	26.2
Simeon Datumanong	11.9
Honorable Angeles	11.9
Blah Sinsuat	10.7
Matalam	8.3
Mr. Chiongbian	6.0
Medpantao Dalangaon	6.0
Dr. S. Morales	4.8
Doroteo Palencia	2.4
Datu Piong**	

\*Based on the 84 respondents from Cotabato.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 1.2%.

TABLE 28a: (Cont'd.)

Surigao del Norte

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	80.00
Answering	20.00
Total	100.00

Top Provincial/City Leaders\*

Governor Jose Sering	13.3
Constantino Navarro	13.3
Mr. Cortez	13.3
Mr. Eviota	11.1
Mrs. Patenio	11.1
Mrs. Hondrado	11.1
Damian Arnigo	6.7
Antonio Echem	6.7
Porfirio Babtisma	4.4
Escolastico Uba	4.4

## Others\*\*

Lamberto Sibonga, Floriano Ceda, Jose Fedeliz,  
 Basilio Fedeliz, Federico Sibonga, Pedro Ebale,  
 Ponciano Torejos, Ludivico Años, Juanito Robuesa,  
 Anselmo Premio, Fausto Perez, Diego Odchimar

\*Based on the 45 respondents from Surigao del Norte.

\*\*Frequency of mention is one (1) with 2.2% each.

TABLE 28b

## REASONS FOR BEING TOP-RANKING LEADERS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community	Good in their Profession	Religious-Civic Organization	Road Construction
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Misamis Occidental</u>							
Timoteo Eribuagas	25	3	21			1	
Isabelo Bembrazo	16		8		11		
William Gonzaga	10			9			2
Dionisio Tejano	10		10				
Ramon Quimno	10		10				
Hilario Iyog	8		8				
Gregorio Tactacon	7		7				
Arsenio Anino	6		6				
Tiburcio Maquiling	6		6				
Lucas Nericua	5		5				
Esteban Balcita	5		5				
Juan Salvia	5		5				
Emiliano Bantillan	4		4				
Catalino Quimno	3		3				
Néptali Sajoña	3		3				
Ricardo Cajan	2		2				
Alberto Parejo	2		2				
Ricardo Gomez	2		2				
Trudes Deloza	2		2				
Valeriano Legaspi Jr.	2		2				
Lorenzo Resma	2		2				
Gabriel Xavier	2		2				
Francisco Velasco	1		1				
Catalino Anino	1		1				
Liberato Bacayo	1		1				
Ciriaco Bao	1		1				
Tiburao Tactacon	1		1				
Ceferino Jarales	1		1				
Paterno Dagundon	1		1				
Brigida Sagrado	1		1				
Hilario Lagas	1		1				
Agrifino Benesito	1		1				
Rufino Benesito	1		1				
Bernardo Carreon	1		1				
Valeriano Sivela	1			1			
Maria Majuri	1		1				
Mrs. Ocaya	1		1				



TABLE 28b

## REASONS FOR BEING TOP-RANKING LEADERS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community	Good in their Profession	Religious-Civic Organization	Road Construction
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Misamis Occidental</u>							
Timoteo Eribuagas	25	3	21			1	
Isabelo Bembrazo	16		8		11		
William Gonzaga	10			9			2
Dionisio Tejano	10		10				
Ramon Quimno	10		10				
Hilario Iyog	8		8				
Gregorio Tactacon	7		7				
Arsenio Anino	6		6				
Tiburcio Maquiling	6		6				
Lucas Nericua	5		5				
Esteban Balcita	5		5				
Juan Salvia	5		5				
Emiliano Bantillan	4		4				
Catalino Quimno	3		3				
Néptali Sajoña	3		3				
Ricardo Cajan	2		2				
Alberto Parejo	2		2				
Ricardo Gomez	2		2				
Trudes Deloza	2		2				
Valeriano Legaspi Jr.	2		2				
Lorenzo Resma	2		2				
Gabriel Xavier	2		2				
Francisco Velasco	1		1				
Catalino Anino	1		1				
Liberato Bacayo	1		1				
Ciriaco Bao	1		1				
Tiburao Tactacon	1		1				
Ceferino Jarales	1		1				
Paterno Dagundon	1		1				
Brigida Sagrado	1		1				
Hilario Lagas	1		1				
Agrifino Benesito	1		1				
Rufino Benesito	1		1				
Bernardo Carreon	1		1				
Valeriano Sivela	1			1			
Maria Majuri	1		1				
Mrs. Ocaya	1		1				

TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected, Appointed Position	Personal Traits	Help Improve Community	Help Poor	Good in their Profession	Wealth and Power	Religious-Civic Organization	Road Construction	Popularity
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	*
<u>Misamis Oriental</u>										
Marcelo Biaco	12	6	3	4	1					
Timoteo Vasquez	11	11								
Espero Rodriguez	10	10								
Eufemio Tobira	10	10								
E. Sarmiento	2		1			2				
Senator E. Pelaez	1	1								
E. Liloc	1	1								
E. Caballero	2						1			
A. Balaba	1						1			
Abundio Cañete	1	1								
P. Melendez	1						1			
S. Herminio	1					1				
Gerondio Tuba	2						2			
Mordeno Cua	2						2			
Teofilo Seroyla	1	1								
Serapion Presilias	1						1			
Governor C. Diel	1	1								
S. Alejo	1						1			
J. Seraña	1		1							
P. Roa	1						1			
M. Avanceña	1	1								
Mrs. T. Manhura	1						1			
Mrs. G. Daya	1						1			
C. Saburmido	1	1								
Antonio Abrea	1	1								
R. Canoy	1					1				
F. Dugenio	2	1								
Atty. C. Liloc	1						1			
Congressman Aloy Roa	1			1				1		
Jose Barro	1	1								
<u>Camiguin</u>										
Congressman Jose Neri	13	2	13	1						1
Governor Crisologo Llacuna	13	2	8	1						3
Mayor Julio Vivares	10	2	6	1						2
Vice Gov. Arturo Corrales	7	1	5							
Vice Mayor Vicente Aravas	1		1							

TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community	Help Poor	Wealth and Power	Religious-Civic Leadership	Road/School Construction, Light System,	Popularity
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Bukidnon</u>									
Jose Aseñero	29	29							
Candido Simbulan	23	23							
Pedro Ronario	22	22							
Arthur Mariano	22	22							
Mayor Dinlayan	22	4	2	2	5	3			7
Teodoro Pepito	14	14							
Alfredo Baldivia	10	10							
Vice-Mayor Limbo	6	2		1	3				1
Honorio Jimenez	7	7							
Victorino M. Rodano	6	5	1				1		
Felipe Yamzon	4	4							
Governor Carlito Fortich	4	3		1					
Vice-Governor Lopez	3	3		1					
M. Antiporta	4	4							
Marco Polo	4						4		
Mauricio Asan	1	1							
Pascual Abay	1	1							
Tobias Family	1								1
Mr. Ragay	1	1							
Quintin Lim	1								1
Mr. Aurelio	1	1							
Mrs. Ocaya	1						1		
Isaas Orog	3						3		
Rodolfo Lapay	3	3							
Mr. Ontejo	2	2							
Victorino Silyan	2	2							
Ernesto Garcia	2	2							
Ruperto Sagala	2	2							
Cudal	3	1		2	1				
Jose Layao	1	1							
Felipe Monalem	1	1							
Mrs. Flores	1						1		
Adolfo Dayaba	1	1							
Cezar Fortich	1	1							

TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community
<u>Zamboanga del Norte</u>	#	#	#
Bartolome Saile	33	33	
Mayor M. Bael	18	18	
Jaime Reynante	18	18	
Felipe Delasas	18	18	
Gil Bermudez	16	16	
E. Acosta	10	10	
Lapu-Lapu Villanueva	15	15	
Ramon Sasuman	6	6	
Sofronio Orong	7	7	1
Dodong Noel	5	5	
Francisco Saile	7	7	
Leon Pagatang	7	7	1
Tarciano Pungot	5	4	1
Teodulo Tumogon	4	4	
Daniel Turot	4	4	
Fabio Tuitor	5	5	
Virgilio Butalid	5	5	
Melchor Agom	4	3	1
Lorenzo Campilan	3	3	
Jose Bangkal	3	3	1
Tomasa Tomaclas	4	4	
Zosimo Ceriales	3	3	
Azcuna	2	2	
Antonio Moro	2	2	
Vic Lacaya	2	2	
Ignacio Sumagang	2	2	
Lood	2	2	
Hilario Andoy	2	2	
Santiago Andag	3	3	
Miguela Tagapan	3	3	
Jacinto Dinghong	2	2	
Ricardo Buhisan	1	1	
Dominga Palubon	2	2	
Roque Villanueva	1	1	
Pedro de la Cruz	2	2	
L. Equia	2	2	
A. Noel	2	2	
Concordio Campilan	2	2	
Josefa Andag	2	1	1

TABLE 28c: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community
	#	#	#
<u>Zamboanga del Norte</u>			
Marino Alingal	2	2	
Andres Sumagang	1	1	
Marcial Selendro	1	1	
Guadalupe Adaza	1	1	
C. Agustin	1	1	
F. Sedrome	1	1	
Marcelino Gonzales	1	1	
Exequiel Moro	1	1	
Francisco Corpuz	1	1	
Vicente Martinez	1	1	
Victor Andag	1	1	
Cornelio Abang	1	1	
Basilisa Tomaclas	1	1	
Alfonso Rectaso	1	1	
P. Balancar	1	1	
F. Saldariega	1	1	
M. Equia	1	1	
Ercaldo Gairanan	1	1	
Ernesto Paes	1	1	
Robert Poculan	1	1	
Alberto Ubay	1	1	
Ricardo Pangasian	1	1	

TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Personality Traits	Help Poor	Good in their Profession	Religious-Civic Organization	Popularity
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Macamboanga del Sur</u>							
Leandro Esperal	8	7		1			
Pedro Lacandalo	3	1			2		
I. P. Pamaran	1					1	
Charlie Sebastian	7	7					
Councilor Atilano	2	2					
Ernesto Cabate	2	2					
Pelagio Mandi	1		1				
Joaquin Enriquez	5	4		1			
Tomas Gonzales	10	10					
Ex-Mayor Suarez	1		1				
Ismael Rodriguez	1			1			
Nicolas Guevarra	10	10					
Vicente Manuel	1	1					
Cesar Yap	1	1					
Estanislao Falcasantos	8		2		6		
Juan Condono	2			2			
Jun Alabar	3			2	1		
Jun Luy	1		1				
Barrio Councilors	2			2			

TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected, Appointed Positions	Personality Traits	Wealth and Power	Religious-Civic Leadership
	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Lanao del Sur</u>					
Barsi Tomawis	36	36			
Macabayo Dicompong	36	36			
Nata Atar	36	36			
Tarimbabak Ronda	36	36			
Shiek Slabi Abdul	36	36			
Hadji Tiburan Alamada	36	36			
Hadji Yusop	20	20			
Quezon Gato	20	20			
Bahser Badio	20	20			
Asis Batalo	20	20			
Macondara Manardas	20	20			
Hasien Alapa	16	16			
Maura Potarean	16	16			
Mayor Mariga	14	12	2		
Mr. Olayo	11	11			
Matarog Bagwan	10			10	
Mayaunag Donato	10		10		
Caran Diyaka	10	9		1	
Mongorla Macua	10	10			
Ordac Comakadas	10	10			
Rangaiy Imau	5				5
Berna Alanir	5	5			
Mr. Mindalano	3	3			
Maganaboya Alapa	3	3			
Mr. Macasalinabaras	2	2			
Mama Maralubos	2	2			
Jalanto Maratubang	2			2	
Intuos Daligdig	1	1			
Usmair Maruda	1	1			
Badnor Alapa	1	1			
Madlawi Alavir	1	1			

TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected, Appointed Position	Personality Traits
	#	#	#
<u>Lanao del Sur</u>			
Linong Mandangan	96	96	
Vice-Governor Marohombsar	92	92	
Omar Dianala	63	63	
Rasid Sampaco	59	58	1
Guiemba Mendayan	57	57	
Honorable Lucman	15	15	
Ali Ibrahim	3	3	
Honorable Balindang	2	2	
Aremao Minor	2	2	
Ibrahim Limpao	2	2	
Mr. Almorida	1	1	
Honorable Sarangani	1	1	
Honorable Mamintal Tamano	1	1	
Miling Calaca	1	1	

TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected, Appointed Position	Personality Traits	Good in their Profession	Wealth and Power	Religious-Civic Leadership	Popularity	Help Improve Community
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Lanao del Norte</u>								
Atty. Obach	2					2		
Mr. Tabimina	1	1						
Honorio Aquino	1				1			
Mr. Marcelo Gallardo	1					1		
Damaciano Pang-sian	1					1		
Saturnino Segovia	1					1		
Andres Llander	1		1					
Mr. Ferraren	1		1					
Mr. Koppin	1					1		
Dr. Colven	1		1					
Mr. Adiba	1		1					
Mrs. Ramona Sino	1				1			1
Mr. Catiel	1	1						
Major Urbi	1	1						
Mrs. Soriano	1			1				
Mrs. Buenaventurada Gaité	1						1	
Danny Casas	1					1		
Attorney Subido	1		1					
Anicia Labao	1					1		
James Echivierra	1					1		
Engineer Talin	1				1			
Diangkat Didato	1	1						
Visitacion Caballero	1			1				

TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Personality Traits	Help Poor	Religious-Civic Organization	Popularity
	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Surigao del Norte</u>						
Eugenio Pindo	2			2		
Seldonio Emao	2			2		
Nicolas Gealan	2			2		
Antonio Echin	2			2		
Eriberto Emao	3	1		2		
Brexio Emao	2			2		
Frudencio Gealan	1	1				
Alfredo Ebol	1	1				
Roque Geir	1	1				
Simplicio Codillo	1	1				
Patillano Mon Tanes	1	1				
Andres Cabag-iran	1	1				
Vicente Orquina	3	3				
Quintin Paredes Jr.	1		1			
Pedro Tantey Jr.	1			1		
Bernardo Madelo	1		1			
Teofilo Ambio	1				1	
Ponciano Paglinawan	1	1				
Anselmo Premio	2	1		1		
Andres Tabasa	3	3				
Ladelina Alceba	2	2				
Ricafort Jabien	2	2				
Ludevico Años	3	2		1		
Fauto Perez	3	2		1		
Juanito Rebuesa	2	2				
Jose Fedelis	1	1				
Lamberto Sibunga	2	1		1		
Pedro Ebale	1		1			
Miguel Pitelo	2	1			1	
Floriano Ceda	1		1			

TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community	Good in their Profession	Popularity
	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Surigao del Sur</u>						
Mayor Masangcay	30	25	15			2
Mayor Linaza	9	2	3	2	1	4
Barrio Capt. Tony Malasarte	9		7			4
Barrio Captain Salvacion	8	8				
Martin Valdevar	3	3				
Odelon Salvacion	3	2	1			
Gregorio Falcon	2	2				
Ex-Mayor Marcelo	2	1		1		
Vice-Mayor Balingon	2	1	1			
Barrio Captain A. Lim	1		1			
Eulogio Onsing	1		1			1
Barrio Captain Medrano	1	1				
Vicente Erquita	1	1				

TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Help Poor	Good in their Profession	Wealth and Power	Religious-Civic Leadership	Road/School Construction	Popularity
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Surigao del Sur</u>								
Vice-Mayor Picasales	2		1					1
Lucio Lim	1					1		
Mr. Godinez	1			1				
Mr. Castillo	1				1			
Gregorio Bandy	1			1				
Isidro Prado	1						1	
Engineer Mendizona	1		1					
<u>Davao del Norte</u>								
Agustin Kagay	8	8						
Pedro Torno	7	7						
Bonifacio Villa Abrilla	3	3						
Terencio Boston	1	1						
Bienvenido Amarillo	1	1						
Ilumino Lapitan	1	1						
Priscilla Balguer	1	1						
Prisilla Sison	1	1						
Bernabe Sison	1				1			



TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected, Appointed	Position	Personality	Religious Traits	Leadership	Popularity
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Agusan</u>							
Exiquio Hesta	13	13					
Dagani	3					3	
Ernesto Campera	7	7					
Francisco Rododle	5	5					
Mamerto Dilima	4	4					
Mrs. Paz Roxas	3				3		
Isabelo Magrelos	3	3					
Daniel Adlaon	3	3					
B. Ortega	3		1			2	
Sabino Burdios	2	2					
T. Curato	2					2	
N. Villanueva	2					2	
Ortensio Rojas	1	1					
Tranquilino Calo	1	1					
Lorenzo Resimente	1	1					

TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected, Appointed Position
	#	#
<u>Cotabato</u>		
Crispin Gardose	10	10
Arthur Bagang	10	10
Domingo Jacosalem	7	7
Guisama Sabangan	7	6
W. de la Serna	6	6
Fandi Moro	6	6
Sabina Mendoza	6	6
Felipe Salazar	5	5
Anas Dangal	5	5
Mr. Digueña	4	4
Pacifico de la Serna	4	4
Jesus Padu	4	4
Marcelo Domingo	4	4
Carlos Panes	2	2
Jesus Ortis	1	1
Mr. Catulong	1	1
Datu Dilanghahin	1	1
Amay Mundong	1	1

TABLE 28b: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Personality Traits	Help Poor	Good in their Profession	Wealth and Power	Religious-Civic Organization	Popularity
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Sulu</u>								
Barrio Captain	11		11					
Gumla Yusop	11		11					
Ali Abubakar	7	1	2	1		3		
Alawi Abubakar	7	6	1					
Hadji O. Ismael	6	1					5	
Panglima Usam	5		5				3	
Calli Ahmad	5	3	1					1
Hadji Gapor Harum	4	1	4	1				
Hadji Fauzi Omar	4	3		2				
Hadji Noli Nur Mur	3			3				
Asaali Isnani	2	1	2	1				
Ahmad Abubakar	2					2		
Supt. A. Manjuorsa	2				2			
Calli Akmad	2	2						
Barrio Board Members	2	2						1
Hadji Karim Abdulla	2		2					1
Hadji Yasin Jaula	2		2					
Congressman Anni	2		2					
Data Bandahala	1							1
Board Member Ispurido	1		1					
Governor Sangkula	1		1					
Councilor Hawari	1		1					
Judge Omar Amin	1			1				
Ali Hussein	1			1				

## REASONS FOR BEING TOP-RANKING PROVINCIAL/CITY LEADERS

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community	Help Poor	Good in their Profession	Wealth and Power	Popularity
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Bukidnon</u>								
Governor Carlos Fortich	87	64	5	6	12			
Congressman Cesar Fortich	60	60			4			
Esmeraldo Cudal	15	13			2			
Pedro Daapong	15	13			2			
Rosario Rodano	13	11			2			
Angelo Lopez	10	8			4			
<u>Camiguin</u>								
Congressman Jose Neri	15	5	9			1		
Governor Crisologo Llacuna	13		8			2		4
Major Julio Vivares	12		8			1		3
Vice Mayor Vicente Aravas	4		3			1		
Antonio Corrales	4	1	4					
Board Member Jajalla	1	1						
Councilor Reyes	1		1					
<u>Agusan</u>								
G. Sanchez	41	23	6		3		4	8
Consuelo Calo	29	17					4	9
Osin	9	3			1		3	3
Democrito Plaza	5				1	3	1	
Joe Aquino	5	2	1					2
Ernesto Campus	1	1						
Arriola	1						1	
Paul Alaxan	1	1						
Maring Sanchez	1	1						
Nelo Cembrano	1	1						

TABLE 28c: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community	Help Poor	Good in their Profession	Wealth and Power	Road/School Construction	Popularity
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Misamis Oriental</u>									
Rómulo Rodriguez	31	31							
J. Seraña	19	12	3	2	1			1	
P. Roa	20	10		4	4	1	2		
Governor Diel	10	5	1		2			2	
Senator E. Pelaez	8	1	2		3			2	
J. Jaraula	4	2			1	1			
Mr. Munez	1				1				
Julio Ganaban	1	1							
Filemon Gomez	1	1							
Esco Gobunao	1		1						
P. Borromeo	1	1							
Rufino Deliosa	1			1					
C. Luminarias	1	1							
Attorney R. Canoy	1		1						
H. Adazo	1					1			
O. Waga	1		1		1				
Lim Ket Kai	1				1				
N. Neri	1				1				

TABLE 28c: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community	Help Poor	Road/School Construction	Popularity	Peace and Order Maintenance
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Misamis Occidental</u>								
Mayor Alfonso Tan	10		6	7				
Provincial Governor	1	1						
<u>Zamboanga del Sur</u>								
Joaquin Enriquez, Jr.	16		7	6		1		2
Mayor Brown	9	8	1					
Alano Family	4				1		4	
Bert Lim	3		1		3			
Pelagio Mandi	2			2				1
Ex-Mayor Suarez	1	1			1			
Congressman Cerilles	1	1					1	
Rustico Varela	1		1					

TABLE 28c: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community
	#	#	#
<u>Zamboanga del Norte</u>			
Congressman F. Azcuna	75	72	3
Governor Lacaya	64	62	2
Vice-Governor Lood	15	14	1
Poculan	16	16	2
Ubay	13	12	1
Mayor Gayapa	9	9	
Maning Carreon	8	8	
Adaza	4	4	
Vice-Governor Ramos	3	3	
Cleto Olvis	3	3	
Jacinto	2	2	
Cido Cadungog	2	2	
M. Bael	2	2	
Julieta Pila	2	2	
Jesus Vidal	1	1	
Ricardo Gonzales	1	1	
Balisado	1	1	
B. M. Guada	1	1	
Alberto Josal	1	1	

TABLE 28c: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Help Poor	Road/School Construction
	#	#	#	#
<u>Surigao del Norte</u>				
Jose Sering	1	1		
Constantino Navarro	1	1		
Mr. Cortez	1	1		
Mr. Eviota	1	1		
Mrs. Pateño	1	1		
Mrs. Hondrado	1	1		
Ludivico Años	1		1	
Juanito Robuesa	1		1	
Anselmo Premio	1		1	
Diego Odchimar	1			1

TABLE 28c: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community	Help Poor	Good in their Profession	Wealth and Power	School Construction
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Surigao del Sur</u>								
Governor Castillo	44	42	5	1			27	
Congressman Puyat	4	1	1		2			
Fiscal Morello	3	2		1				
Board Member Elfa	2	2						
Mr. Dumagan	2	2						
Gregorio Morello	1	1						
Father Rham	1							1
Vicente Pimentel	1	1						
<u>Cotabato</u>								
Salipada Pendatun	16	10	2				4	
Blah Sinsuat	5	2				3		
Datu Piong	1	1						
Matalam	4	4						
James Chiongbian	5	5						
Dr. S. Morales	4	4						
Simeon Datumanong	10	10						
Honorable Angeles	10	10						
Medpantao Dalangaon	5	5						
Doroteo Palencia	2	2						

TABLE 28c: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected, Appointed Position	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community	Help Poor	Good in their Profession	Religious-Civic Leadership	Road/School Construction	Popularity
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Lanao del Norte</u>									
Mayor Camilo Cabili	117	109	4	1	1				2
Gov. Arsenio Quibranza	52	49	2				1		
Congressman Ali Dimaporo	21	20	2						
Vice-Mayor Gerardo Padilla	15	14				1			
Vice-Governor Umpa	12	10	2						
Malamit Rimpa	7	7							
Councilor Actob	7	7							
Mr. Urbi	6	6							
Gregorio Lluch	5	2	2				2		
Councilor Benito Ong	4	4							
Councilor Obach	3	3							
Councilor Celeran	3	3							
Collector Pacasim	3	3							
Councilor Ambragan	2	2							
Leopoldo Malilim	2	2							
Dr. Colven	2					2			
F. Somontan	1	1							
V. Javiol	1		1						
C. Sevidal	1					1			
Atty. Macaponton Magondato	1	1							
Mr. Tinongos	1	1							
Mr. Bandilles	1		1				1		
Mr. Tuazon	1					1			
Councilor Padilla	1	1							
Mr. Cabigon	1	1							
Jaycee Head	1						1		

TABLE 28c: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected, Appointed	Position	Personality Traits	Help Poor
	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Davao del Sur</u>					
Elias Lopez	90	75	20		
De los Cientos	12	4	17		
Benigno Bangoy	4	3	1	1	
Noli Sotto	4	4			
Dodong Loyola	2	2			
Alejandro Almendras	2	2			
Luis Santos	2	2			
Honorable Tamayo	1	1			
Honorable Monteverde	1	1			
Honorable Garcia	1	1			
Miguel Axalan	1		1		
Felipe Traverra	1	1			

TABLE 28c: (Cont'd.)

	Total Answering	Elected Position	Personality Traits	Help Improve Community	Help Poor	Good in their Profession	Wealth and Power	Road/School Construction	Popularity	Peace and Order Maintenance
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Sulu</u>										
Indanan Anni	34	2	26		3		1		2	
Murphy Sanjkula	37		19	11	2	1		3	1	
A. Abubakar	16		14	2						
Hadji Arsad Salih	9		7						2	
Salih Ututalum	5		5							
Muss Escuredo	2				2					
Hadji Fauzi	4		4							
Yokiya Rodjare	1	1								
Nin Hussin Ututalum	2		2		2					
Hashim Abubakar	2		2							
Julkipli Anni	2	1	1							
Hanijan Usman	1					1				
Calingalan Kaluang	1				1					
E. Cabelin	1									1
Benjamin Abubakar	1		1					1	1	
Councilor Hawari	1		1							
Cauti Lim	1		1							

TABLE 29a

## TOP RANKING MUSLIM LEADERS

(Q. "Who are the top Muslim leaders?")

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	79.9
Answering	20.1
Total	100.0
<u>All Regions</u> *	
Congressman Ali Dimaporo	41.4
Malamit Umpa**	23.5
Sen. Mamintal Tamano	22.1
Congressman Anni	16.1
Governor Sangkula	14.4
Governor Salih	7.7
Congressman Salipada Pendatun	6.7
Datu Udtog Matalam	6.0
Blah Sinsuat	5.3
Simeon Datumanong	3.2
Yakiya Rodjare	2.8
Mayor A. Abubakar	2.4
Ampang	2.4
Secretary S. Utulalum	2.1
Attorney Abraham Rasul	2.1
Jacob Isni	2.1
Hadji Nuño	1.8
Dimakuta Mandangan	1.8
Collector Pacasim	1.4
Ben Abubakar	1.1
Escuerdo	1.1

\*Representing respondents who are aware of Muslim leaders.

\*\*Ranking second since the concentration of respondents is in Lanao del Norte.

TABLE 29a: (Cont'd.)

Misamis Oriental

PERCENTAGE

Not Answering	98.1
Answering	1.9
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Top Muslim Leaders\*

Sen. Mamintal Tamano	1.9
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\*\*Based on the 106 respondents from Misamis Oriental.

TABLE 29a: (Cont'd.)

Davao del Sur

PERCENTAGE

Not Answering	98.2
Answering	1.8
Total	100.0

Top Muslim Leaders\*

Sen. Mamintal Tamano	1.8
Congressman Salipada Pendatun	0.9

\*Based on the 113 respondents from Davao del Sur.

TABLE 29a: (Cont'd.)

Sulu

		PERCENTAGE
Not Answering		6.6
Answering		93.4
Total		100.0
<u>Top Muslim Leaders*</u>		
Cong. Anni		75.4
Gov. Sangkula		67.2
Gov. Salih		36.1
Yakiya Rodjare		12.1
Mayor A. Abubakar		11.5
Sec. S. Ututalum		9.8
Atty. Abraham Rasul		9.8
Yacob Isni		9.8
Ben Abubakar		4.9
Escuerdo		4.9
Alawi Abubakar		3.3
Atty. Abraham Malli		1.6
Julkipli Anni		1.6
Asaali Isnani		1.6
Hadji Hasan Tawasil		1.6
Supt. A. Nur		1.6
Atty. Hashim Abubakar		1.6
Vice-Mayor N. Ututalum		1.6
Atty. Abdulwahid Bidin		1.6

\*Based on the 61 respondents from the Province of Sulu.

TABLE 29a: (Cont'd.)

Zamboanga del Sur

Zamboanga del Sur

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	88.3
Answering	11.7
Total	100.0

Top Muslim Leaders\*

Hadji Nuño	5.3
Hadji Abdul Hah	2.1
Datu Ayu Mandi	2.1
Sakluran	2.1
Pelagio Mandi	1.1
Hadji Abubakar	1.1
Karil Family	1.1

\*Based on the 94 respondents from Zamboanga del Sur.

TABLE 29a: (Cont'd.)

Bukidnon

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	98.9
Answering	1.1
Total	<u>100.0</u>
 <u>Top Muslim Leaders*</u>	
Sen. Mamintal Tamano	1.1
Cong. Salipada Pendatun	1.1
Cong. Ali Dimaporo	1.1
Ex-Cong. Rasid Lucman	1.1
Ex-Sen. Domocao Alonto	1.1
Ex-Gov. Dimacuta	1.1

\*Based on the 90 respondents from Bukidnon.

TABLE 29a: (Cont'd.)

Cotabato

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	65.5
Answering	34.5
Total	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Top Muslim Leaders*</u>	
Cong. Salipada Pendatun	20.2
Datu Udtog Matalam	20.2
Blah Sinsuat	17.8
Simeon Datumanong	10.7
Datu Piong	1.2
Hadji Druz Ali	1.2

\*Based on the 84 respondents from Cotabato.

All Regions

## Others\*

Alawi Abubakar  
 Makabangkit Sangkay  
 Macapoton Macandato  
 Domocao Alonto  
 Hadji Abdul Hah  
 Datu Ayu Mandi  
 Datu Druz Ali  
 Datu Piong  
 Ex-Congressman Rasid Lucman  
 Ex-Governor Dimakuta  
 Attorney Abraham Malli  
 Julkipli Anni  
 Asaabi Isnani  
 Hadji Hasan Tawasil  
 Superintendent A. Nur  
 Attorney Hashim Abubakar  
 Vice Mayor N. Utulalum  
 Attorney Abdulwahid Bidin  
 Mayor Camilo Cabili  
 Captain Mandangan  
 Dicasaran Diacat  
 Bartolome Hariole  
 Pitano Mambudy  
 Pelagio Mandi  
 Hadji Abubakar  
 Karil Family

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\*Less than 1% each.

TABLE 29a: (Cont'd.)

Lanao del Norte

	PERCENTAGE
Not Answering	12.4
Answering	87.6
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Top Muslim Leaders\*

Congressman Ali Dimaporo	56.0
Malamit Umpa	31.6
Senator Mamintal Tamano	27.7
Ampang	3.3
Dimakuta Mandangan	2.4
Collector Pacasim	1.9

## Others\*\*

Macabangkit Sangkay
Macaponton Magondato
Governor Quibranza
Domocao Alonto
Mayor Camilo Cabili
Captain Mandangan
Dicasaran Diacat
Bartolome Hariole
Pitano Mambudy

\*Based on the 209 respondents from Lanao del Norte.

\*\*Less than 1% each.

TABLE 29b

PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR BEING TOP MUSLIM LEADERS

(Q. "What makes them top Muslim leaders?")

	Elected Position	Wealth and Power	Popularity	Helping Improve Muslim-Christian Relations	Helping Minority Muslim	Aiding Community	Personality Traits
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Bukidnon</u>							
Mamintal Tamano			1				
Salipada Pendatun	1						
Congressman Ali Dimaporo	1						
Ex-Congressman Rasid Lucman	1						1
Domocao Alonto	1						
<u>Cotabato</u>							
Salipada Pendatun	11	4					
Udtog Matalam	11	6					
Blah Sinsuat	9	5					
Simeon Datumanong	8						
Datu Piong	1						
Hadji Druz Ali	1						
<u>Zamboanga del Sur</u>							
Hadji Nuño	2	1	2	2	2		
Hadji Abdul Hah				2			
Datu Ayu Mandi		1			1		
Sakaluran		1					
Pelagio Mandi				1			
Hadji Abubakar					1		
Karil Family							1

TABLE 29b: (Cont'd.)

	Elected Position	Wealth and Power	Popularity	Helping Minority Muslims	Aiding Community	Personal Traits	Good in their Profession
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Misamis Oriental</u>							
Mamintal Tamano	1			1			
<u>Sulu</u>							
Congressman Anni	2		4		1	46	
Governor Sangkula	4		1			29	
Governor Salih						22	
Mayor Abubakar						6	
Yakiya Rodjare	8					1	
Secretary S. Ututalum	1				1	2	
Attorney Abraham Rasul	1		1	3		1	
Yacob Isni	6					1	
Ben Abubakar							3
Escuerdo						2	
Alawi Abubakar						2	
Attorney Abraham Malli							1
Julkipli Anni	1					1	
Asaali Isnani						1	
Hadji Hasan Tawasil				1			
Superintendent A. Nur							1
Attorney Hashim Abubakar						1	
Vice-Mayor N. Ututalum						1	
Attorney Abdulwahid Bidin						1	

TABLE 29b: (Cont'd.)

	Elected Position	Helping Minority Muslims	Aiding Community	Personal Traits	Good in their Profession
	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Lanao del Norte</u>					
Congressman Ali Dimaporo	104		2		
Malamit Umpa	36	1			
Senator Mamintal Tamano	42				
Ampang	6				
Dimakuta Mandangan	3			1	1
Collector Pacasim				1	4
Macabangkit Sangkay	1				
Macaponton Magondato	2				
Governor Quibranza	1				
Domocao Alonto	1				
Mayor Camilo Cabili	1				
Captain Mandangan				1	
Bartolome Hariole	1				
Pitano Mambudy					1

TABLE 29c: (Cont'd.)

	Road/Bridge/School Constructions	Community Help/ Donations	Community Improvement	Maintaining Peace and Order	Helping Muslim- Christian Relations	Teaching People Religion	Improving Education	Improving Food Production	Land Reform Projects	Improving Employment & Labor Condition
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Sulu</u>										
Congressman Anni			27							
Governor Sangkula	15		11							
Governor Salih	22		2		3					
Mayor A. Abubakar	3		2							
Yakiya Rodjare	5				4					
Secretary S. Ututalum	5									
Atty. Abraham Rasul					6					
Yacob Isni					5					
Ben Abubakar						3				
Escuerdo			2							
Julkipli Anni	1									
Supt. A. Nur						1				
Atty. Hashim Abubakar			1							
Vice-Mayor N. Ututalum			1							
Atty. Abdulwahid Bidin				1						
<u>Lanao del Norte</u>										
Ali Dimaporo	80	4	8	5	1		1	2	7	
Mamintal Tamano	1	11							1	
Malamit Umpa	1	3	1	5					3	
Ampang			1							
Dimakuta Mandangan		1	1						1	
Macabangkit Sangkay	2									
Mr. Pacasim				2						
Pitano Mambudy			1							

TABLE 29c

## MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE TOP MUSLIM LEADERS

(Q. "What have they done for their people?")

	Road/Bridge/School Constructions	Community Help/ Donations	Community Improvement	Maintaining Peace and Order	Helping Improve Muslim- Christian Relations	Laws Made	Improve Education
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
<u>Bukidnon</u>							
Mamintal Tamano					1		
Salipada Pendatun						1	
Ali Dimaporo	1						
Rasid Lucman		1					
Domocao Alonto					1		
Dimakuta	1						1
<u>Cotabato</u>							
Udtog Matalam				1			
Simeon Datumanong	6						
Hadji Druz Ali	1						
<u>Zamboanga del Sur</u>							
Hadji Nuño			1				
Hadji Abdul Hah	1	1					
Datu Ayu Mandi			1				
Sakaluran			1				
Pelagio Mandi					1		
Hadji Abubakar			1				
Karil Family			1				

PERSON WHOM MUSLIMS CONSIDER AS MOST CAPABLE  
OF ASSISTING THEM

(Q. "Who do you feel is the person who could help you most if he is given the resources and the help to accomplish his objectives?")

	TOTAL %
Governor	14.3
Congressman	20.2
PACD workers	1.5
Engineers	1.0
Mayor	10.8
Lawyer	1.5
Representatives	5.9
President of R.P.	0.5
Senators	0.5
Sultan	9.3
Others:	19.2
Barsi Tomawis	
Felipe Salazar	
Simeon Datumanong	
No answers	15.3
Total	<u>100.0</u>

MUSLIM RESPONDENTS' EVALUATION OF THE POPULARITY  
OF PERSONS IDENTIFIED AS CAPABLE  
OF GIVING HELP

( Q. "Is he liked by the people or not?" )

( N = 203 )

	TOTAL %
Yes ( Liked )	85.2
No (Not Liked)	1.5
No Answer	13.3
Total	<u>100.0</u>

Chi-Square = 164.20\* with 1 d.f.

\*The statistic Chi-Square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 31

## EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF RESPONDENTS

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURÁL %
No formal schooling or education	14.5	14.8	14.20
Elementary graduate or less	40.5	36.1	44.90
High school graduate or less	23.4	25.1	21.75
College graduate or less	19.7	22.3	17.00
No answer	1.9	1.7	2.15
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
AB	3.0	3.3	2.9
C	47.0	53.0	40.8
D	40.0	37.7	42.2
Unclassified	10.0	6.0	14.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Chi-Square = 104.35 with 1 D.F.

The statistic chi-square is significant at 5%.

TABLE 33

## DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY AGE GROUPING

AGE RANGE	TOTAL	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
16-20	9.0	9.0	11.0	6.9
21-30	29.9	29.9	32.9	26.75
31-45	37.1	37.1	36.1	38.05
45 and over	23.4	23.4	19.4	27.6
Unclassified	0.6	0.6	-	0.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 34

## DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY RELIGION

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
Roman Catholic	73.5	74.6	72.3
Protestant	5.2	5.6	4.9
Islam	14.3	16.3	12.3
Iglesia ni Kristo	0.8	0.55	1.0
Aglipayan	2.5	0.55	4.4
Others	2.5	1.7	3.4
Unclassified	1.2	0.7	1.7
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

TABLE 35

## DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY ETHNIC GROUPING

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
Tagalog	2.3	3.4	1.3
Cebuano	49.2	46.6	51.9
Ilocano	3.5	4.2	2.9
Hiligaynon, Ilonggo, Panay	4.9	6.7	3.0
Bicolano	0.65	0.4	0.9
Pangasinan	0.35	0.3	0.4
Pampango	0.2	0.4	-
Samar, Leyte, Waray	3.2	3.9	2.4
Cagayan	2.8	4.0	1.6
Muslim	13.8	16.0	11.6
Others	14.6	8.7	20.6
Unclassified	4.5	5.4	3.4
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

TABLE 36

## DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY REACTION TO THE SURVEY

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
Very cooperative	47.5	41.42	53.78
Fairly cooperative	41.1	45.33	36.77
Not cooperative	5.2	6.83	3.58
Unclassified	6.2	6.42	5.87
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

TABLE 37

## MEDIA EXPOSURE

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
<u>A. Radio Ownership</u>			
Not owning	29.2	25.0	33.5
Owning	67.5	71.5	63.4
No Answer	3.3	3.5	3.1
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>B. Radio Listenership*</u>			
Not regularly listening	31.9	28.45	35.3
Regularly listening	61.9	65.7	58.0
No answer	6.2	5.85	6.7
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>C. TV Ownership</u>			
Not owning	75.0	73.9	76.0
Owning	1.0	1.4	0.7
No answer	24.0	24.7	23.3
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

\*Base=Number of total respondents covered in the survey  
(N=1416).

TABLE 37: (Cont'd.)

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
<b>D. <u>TV Viewership</u></b>			
Not viewing regularly	70.9	70.3	71.5
Viewing regularly	0.9	1.1	0.7
Not answering	28.2	28.6	27.8
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<b>E. <u>Newspaper Readership</u></b>			
No answer	39.5	40.0	38.9
Not reading regularly	31.0	24.55	37.6
Manila Times	21.3	26.1	16.6
Manila Chronicle	1.9	2.65	1.1
Manila Daily Bulletin	1.5	1.8	1.1
Philippines Herald	4.7	4.9	4.4
Taliba	0.1	-	0.3
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<b>F. <u>Magazine</u></b>			
No answer	37.4	33.6	41.4
Not reading regularly	28.5	26.2	30.9
Weekly Women's Magazine	9.4	12.0	6.7
Weekly Graphic	5.5	6.4	4.4
Weekly Nation	1.1	1.4	0.9
Philippines Free Press	6.2	7.1	5.3
Readers Digest	2.2	2.0	2.4
Life	0.7	1.0	0.4
Time	0.3	0.3	0.3
Comics	8.7	10.0	7.3
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

TABLE 38a

## EMPLOYMENT DATA

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
<b>A. <u>Percentage of Regularly Employed Respondents</u></b>			
Not regularly employed	65.9	69.3	62.4
Regularly employed	23.7	25.5	21.7
No answer	10.4	5.2	15.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>B. <u>Percentage of Regularly Employed Household Heads</u></b>			
Not regularly employed	57.4	59.4	55.4
Regularly employed	31.3	34.2	28.3
No answer	11.3	6.4	16.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>C. <u>Percentage of the Number of Persons Over 15 Years Looking for Employment</u></b>			
None	34.4	34.0	34.8
One	21.7	22.8	20.8
Two	12.1	9.6	14.6
Three	4.8	6.2	3.4
Four	2.6	2.5	2.7
Five	0.8	0.7	0.8
Six	0.1	0.3	-
Seven	0.1	0.1	-
Eight	0.1	0.1	-
Ten	0.1	0.1	-
No answer	23.2	23.6	22.9
	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>D. <u>Distribution of Households by Number of Employed Members</u></b>			
None	12.5	12.4	12.9
One	48.2	51.5	44.8
Two	12.4	14.9	9.9
Three	3.7	4.7	2.7
Four	1.0	1.1	0.6
Five	0.7	1.0	0.3
Six	0.1	0.3	-
Ten	0.1	-	0.1
No answer	21.3	14.1	28.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 38b

## DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY JOB

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
Farmer/Fisherman	27.2	23.4	31.0
Teacher/Supervisor	6.6	7.0	6.2
Businessman/Storeowner/ Food Caterer	5.7	8.9	2.4
Laborer/Foreman/Collector/Janitor Woodcutter/Construction man/Bus Inspector/Security Guard	3.0	3.9	2.0
Employee/Secretary	2.1	2.4	1.9
Driver/Mechanic/Welder	1.8	2.7	0.9
Tailor/Dressmaker/Master Cutter	1.5	1.8	1.0
Storekeeper/Helper/Laundry Woman/Butcher	1.4	0.8	1.9
Government Employee/Municipal Treasurer/Barrio Captain/ Administration Officer	1.1	1.2	0.9
Carpenter/Weaver/Basket Maker "Tuba" Gatherer	1.1	1.1	0.9
Beautician/Barber/Watch Repairer/ Photographer/Tricycle Driver/ Radio Mechanic	0.7	1.0	0.3
Salesman	0.7	0.7	0.5
Security Man/AFP Official/Soldier/ Chief of Police/Police Officer	0.6	1.0	0.1
Medical Profession/Midwife/Nurse/ Doctor/Pharmacist/Optometrlist/ Dentist/Veterinarian	0.5	0.6	0.4
Engineer/Contractor/Chemist	0.3	0.1	0.4
Collector/Telegraph Operator/ Messenger	0.2	0.3	0.1
Draftsman/Stage Artist/Radio Announcer	0.2	0.3	0.1
Lawyer	0.2	0.4	-
Technician/Agriculturist	0.2	-	0.4
Accountant	0.1	-	0.1
Pastor	0.1	0.1	-
Jack of All Trades	0.1	-	0.1
None	32.4	31.0	33.8
No Answer	12.2	11.3	14.6

## DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY OCCUPATION

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
Farmer/Fisherman	26.7	24.4	29.0
Housewife	23.4	21.0	25.9
Teacher	6.6	7.0	6.3
Student	5.8	6.0	5.6
Businessman/Storeowner/Food Caterer	5.3	8.4	2.3
Laborer/Foreman/Collector/Janitor/ Woodcutter/Construction Man/Bus Inspector Security Guard	2.7	3.6	1.9
Driver/Mechanic/Welder	1.8	2.7	0.9
Tailor/Dressmaker	1.5	2.0	1.0
Storekeeper/Helper/Laundry Woman	1.3	0.8	1.9
Employee/Secretary	1.3	1.9	0.7
Government Employee/Municipal Treasurer/ Barrio Captain/Administrative Officer/ Inspector	1.1	1.2	0.9
Carpenter/Weaver/Basket Maker "Tuba" Gatherer	1.0	1.1	0.9
Accountant	0.7	1.1	0.3
Medical Profession/Midwife/Nurse/Doctor Pharmacist/Dentist/Optometrlist/ Veterinarian	0.6	0.7	0.6
Beautician/Barber/Watch Repairer/ Photographer/Radio Mechanic/ Tricycle Driver	0.6	1.0	0.3
Security Man/AFP Official/Soldier/ Chief of Police/Policeman	0.6	1.0	0.1
College Graduate	0.4	0.1	0.7
Retired	0.4	0.6	0.1
Salesman	0.4	0.4	0.3
Engineer/Contractor/Chemist	0.3	0.1	0.4
Lawyer	0.2	0.4	-
Draftsman/Stage Artist	0.2	0.3	0.1
Technician/Agriculturist	0.2	-	0.4
Collector/Telegraph Operator/Messenger	0.2	0.3	0.1
Pastor	0.1	0.1	-
Jack of All Trades	0.1	-	0.1
None	2.9	2.9	2.9
No Answer	13.6	10.9	16.3

TABLE 38d

DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY JOB

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
Engineer	2.9	3.3	2.4
Doctor	0.2	0.3	0.1
Lawyer	0.4	0.6	0.1
Teacher	5.1	6.0	4.2
Businessman	6.7	9.2	4.2
Government Official	0.9	0.1	0.7
Architect	0.4	0.6	0.3
Artist	0.2	0.1	0.3
Politician	0.4	0.7	0.1
AFP Official	0.6	0.7	0.6
Agriculturist	30.0	27.5	32.6
No Answer	52.2	50.1	55.4

TABLE 38e

## DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY OCCUPATION

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
Farmer/ Fisherman	36.6	33.3	39.9
Janitor/Driver/Laborer/ Carpenter/Housepainter	11.0	13.0	9.0
Salesman/Salesgirl/Vendor	8.9	13.2	4.4
Employee/Clerk	7.3	8.2	6.3
Teacher/District Supervisor	4.9	5.4	4.4
AFP Official/Policeman/ Security Guard	3.1	3.5	2.6
Engineer	2.0	2.1	1.9
Sari-Sari Storeowner/Baker/Butcher	1.7	2.4	1.0
Electrician/Mechanic/Foreman	1.4	2.2	0.6
Government Official/Government Employee	1.3	2.0	0.7
Dressmaker/Tailor	1.0	1.4	0.6
Medical Profession/Optician/ Nurse/Pharmacist/Physician	0.5	0.4	0.4
Accountant	0.4	0.6	0.2
Lawyer/Politician	0.4	0.7	0.1
Architect/Contractor	0.3	0.3	0.3
Beautician/Barber/Cosmetologist	0.2	-	0.4
Watch Repairer/Photographer	0.1	0.3	-
Preacher	0.1	-	0.3
None	14.1	8.8	19.6
No Answer/Refused to Answer	4.7	2.2	7.3

TABLE 39

## TENANCY STATUS

	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
<b>A. <u>House Ownership</u></b>			
Not owning	15.32	21.1	9.4
Owning	82.84	77.4	88.4
No answer	1.84	1.5	2.2
Total	100.00	100.0	100.0
<b>B. <u>Lot Ownership</u></b>			
Not owning	22.25	24.6	19.9
Owning	9.53	15.3	3.6
No Answer	68.22	60.1	76.5
Total	100.00	100.0	100.0
<b>C. <u>Rental</u></b>			
<u>N = 217</u>			
No	23.5	21.85	27.3
Yes	47.0	56.30	25.7
No Answer	29.5	21.85	47.0
Total	100.0	100.00	100.0
<b>D. <u>Farmland Ownership (Farmers only)</u></b>			
<u>N = 506</u>			
Owns land	53.1	49.4	56.5
Tenant	35.0	40.8	29.9
Lessee	1.0	1.3	0.7
Combination	1.8	3.0	0.7
No answer	9.1	5.5	12.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

A P P E N D I X    I I I

QUESTIONNAIRE FORMS

Reason for Replacement

1. If selected  
2. If replaced

C O N T R O L S

DECK I Col. 1-1

NAME OF RESPONDENT: \_\_\_\_\_

ID NO: \_\_\_\_\_ Col. 2-5

HOUSE NO./STREET : \_\_\_\_\_

AREA: Col. 6-1 () Urban

BARRIO/PRECINCT NO: \_\_\_\_\_

() Rural

MUN./CITY: \_\_\_\_\_

PROVINCE: \_\_\_\_\_

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INTRODUCTION

Good morning/afternoon/evening  
Sir/Madam, I am (state your name)  
We are conducting a regional study  
on what people think about various  
matters which will be of help to you  
and your community and which you'll  
find interesting.

CONTROL DATA

List all qualified household members (16 years and over). You'll  
call back on selected respondents who happen to be not at home at  
the time of call.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Household Member</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Mark</u> / if selected <u>X</u> if replaced	<u>Reason for Replacement</u>
1.	_____	_____	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____	_____	_____
5.	_____	_____	_____	_____
6.	_____	_____	_____	_____
7.	_____	_____	_____	_____
8.	_____	_____	_____	_____
9.	_____	_____	_____	_____
10.	_____	_____	_____	_____

RESPONDENT'S CHARACTERISTICS

<u>Sex</u>		<u>Civil Status</u>		<u>Education</u>	
7-1	<input type="checkbox"/> Male	9-1	<input type="checkbox"/> Single	10-1	<input type="checkbox"/> No formal schooling
2	<input type="checkbox"/> Female	2	<input type="checkbox"/> Married	2	<input type="checkbox"/> Elem. graduate or less
		3	<input type="checkbox"/> Widow/ Widower	3	<input type="checkbox"/> High school graduate or less
				4	<input type="checkbox"/> College graduate or less

Socio Eco. Level

11-1  AB (upper)  
2  C (middle)  
3  D (lower)

Age

8-1  16-20  
2  21-30  
3  31-40  
4  41 & Over

Religion

12-1  Roman Catholic  
2  Protestant  
3  Islam  
4  Iglesia Ni Kristo  
5  Aglipayan  
6  Others (Specify)

Ethnic Group

14-1  Tagalog  
2  Cebuano  
3  Ilocano  
4  Hiligaynon,  
Ilongo, Panay  
5  Bicolano  
6  Pangasinan  
7  Pampango  
8  Samar, Leyte,  
Waray  
9  Cagayan  
10  Muslim  
11  Others (Specify)

Exposure to Media

1. a. Do you have a radio?  
19-1  No 2  Yes 3  DK/NA  
b. Are you a regular listener?  
20-1  No 2  Yes 3  DK/NA  
2. a. Do you have a TV?  
17-1  No 2  Yes 3  DK/NA  
b. Are you a regular viewer?  
18-1  No 2  Yes 3  DK/NA  
3. What newspaper and/or magazines, if  
any, do you read regularly?

Newspaper

15 \_\_\_\_\_  
21-1  No Answer  
2  Not reading regularly  
3  Manila Times  
4  Manila Chronicle  
5  Manila Daily Bulletin  
6  Philippines Herald  
7  Taliba

Cooperativeness of Respondent

16-1  Very cooperative  
2  Fairly cooperative  
3  Not cooperative

22 Others \_\_\_\_\_

Independent Magazines

- 23-1 ( ) No answer
- 2 ( ) Not reading regularly
- 3 ( ) Weekly Women's Magazine
- 4 ( ) Weekly Graphic
- 5 ( ) Weekly Nation
- 6 ( ) Free Press
- 7 ( ) Reader's Digest
- 8 ( ) Life
- 9 ( ) Time
- 10 ( ) Comics (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_

24 Others \_\_\_\_\_

25 Occupation/Vocation:

26 Job

Respondent \_\_\_\_\_  
 Household Head \_\_\_\_\_

Respondent \_\_\_\_\_  
 Household Head \_\_\_\_\_

27 Employment:

Is respondent regularly employed? \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_ Yes  
 Is household head regularly employed \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_ Yes  
 No. of persons over 15 years looking for employment \_\_\_\_  
 No. of persons in household with jobs \_\_\_\_

28 Tenancy Status

Do you or your family own  
 the house? \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_ Yes

(If not owning house)  
 Pays rent \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_ Yes

Do you or your family own  
 the lot? \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_ Yes

(If farmer)  
 \_\_\_\_ Owns land  
 \_\_\_\_ Tenant  
 \_\_\_\_ Lessee  
 \_\_\_\_ Combination

1. a) If you had a son which of the following occupations would you most like your son to follow?

- Engineer
- Doctor
- Lawyer
- Teacher
- Businessman
- Government Official
- Architect
- Artist
- Politician
- AFP Official
- Agriculturist

b) Why?

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2. a) (For non-Muslim only) What are the things you are most proud of as a Filipino citizen?

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b) (For Muslims only) Some people consider themselves to be Americans, Indonesians, Chinese, or Japanese and so on. What do you consider yourself to be? \_\_\_\_\_

c) (If the answer to 2b is "Muslim") How about "Filipino" - do you consider yourself to be a Filipino?

- No
- Yes

d) (If "no" to 2c) Why not? \_\_\_\_\_

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e) (If "yes" to 2c) What are the things you are most proud of as a Filipino? (PROBE)

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3. What three traits do you consider as most important for a man to have? (Ask respondent to give these from highest to lowest order)

Most Important Traits

- (1) \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) \_\_\_\_\_

4. What do you think of your present economic situation? Can you elaborate on this? (Check one item to indicate type of response given and probe)

- Good
  Bad
  Indifferent

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

5. Do you feel that young people should study for a profession? Why (or why not)?

- No because \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Yes because \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

( # 6 to 9 - for Muslims only)

6. How do you feel about the present English or Western education? (PROBE)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

7. What do you consider the most pressing problems in this community? (PROBE)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

8. In what way can Islam help in solving such problems? (PROBE)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

9. In what way can politics help or not help in solving the problems of the community? (PROBE)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

10. What do people in general think about the government? (PROBE)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

11. What do people in general feel about the government? (PROBE)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

12. What does the government do or not do that makes them feel that way? (PROBE)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

13. a) If the community had a problem which needed action from the government, do you feel that as, a general rule, it can get the needed action from the government?

- No
- Yes
- Maybe
- Don't know/NA

b) How about you, if you had a problem, do you feel that as a general rule you can get the needed action from the govt.?

- No
- Yes
- Maybe
- Don't know/NA

14. How is the peace and order situation in your community? Could you tell me more about it? (PROBE)

- Good
- Bad
- Others

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

15. In what way has the government affected your life? (PROBE)

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16. a) What are some government activities which you feel have been most helpful to you and your family? (Ask respondent to name all he can think of as having been helpful)

b) Which three are the most helpful?

HELPFUL GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

Most Helpful

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

17. a) From your impressions of politicians, is the word I will read to you descriptive of none or very few politicians ... some of them ... or most of them?

	None or Few	Some	Most	Don't know No Op.
(1) Greedy	_____	_____	_____	_____
(2) Honest	_____	_____	_____	_____
(3) Hardworking	_____	_____	_____	_____
(4) Corrupt	_____	_____	_____	_____
(5) Nationalistic	_____	_____	_____	_____
(6) An example to follow	_____	_____	_____	_____

b) Are you referring to these people as Muslims or non-Muslims?

- Muslims
- Non-Muslims
- Both

c) (If answer to 17b is "Muslim") How about non-Muslims? Would these apply to them as well? \_\_\_\_\_

d) (If answer to 17b is "Non-Muslim") How about Muslims? \_\_\_\_\_

18. What is the characteristic that you consider most important in an electoral candidate? What is the next most important? (Continue asking until respondent has given all characteristics he feels are important. Please note that these traits must be in order to importance, from most important to least important.)

Characteristic

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.

19. Can you tell me something about the Muslims and Christians in this community? (Probe by saying "Tell me more about it".)

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20. How do you feel about it? (The "it" in this case may refer to the general descriptions or specific situations.)

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21. What suggestions can you give for improving Muslim-Christian relationship? (PROBE)

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22. a) (For Muslims only) How do you think Christians feel toward the Muslims? (PROBE)

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b) (For Non-Muslims only) How do you think Muslims feel toward the Christians? (PROBE)

\_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_

23. Under what conditions do you think Muslims and Christians can cooperate and live with each other? Can you tell me more about it? (PROBE)

\_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_

24. (For Muslims only) In the present system of government, do you think the government should have a say in the "sharia"?

( ) No ( ) Yes

25. (For Muslims only) Do you think the "Sharia" should be a part of the national law or present government? Why?

( ) No because \_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_
( ) Yes because \_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_

26. (For Muslims only) Do you think it is good for the Muslims to stay as part of the Republic or be a separate government? Why?

( ) No/should separate because \_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_
( ) Yes/should stay because \_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_

FOR ALL RESPONDENTS

FPI PROJECT 702

27. a) Who are the top leaders in this village or community?  
b) What makes them top leaders?  
c) Are you aware of any of their programs? (If yes) What are these?

Top Leaders in Village or Community	Reasons for Leaders being Top	Aware of Programs	Unaware of Programs	Programs

28. a) Who are the top leaders in this province/city?  
b) What makes them top leaders?  
c) Are you aware of any of their programs? (If yes) What are these?

Top Leaders in Province/City	Reasons for Leaders being Top	Aware of Programs	Unaware of Programs	Programs

- 29. a) Who are the top Muslim leaders?
- b) What makes them top Muslim leaders?
- c) What have they done for their people?

Top Muslim Leaders

Reasons for their being Top

Accomplishments

30. a) (For Muslims only) Who do you feel is the person who could help you most if he is given the resources and the help to accomplish his objectives? \_\_\_\_\_

b) Is he liked by the people or not?

- No
- Yes

31. (For both Muslims and Non-Muslims)

a) How safe is your community? Would you say it is very safe, fairly safe, unsafe?

- Very safe
- Fairly safe
- Unsafe
- No answer

b) Why? (PROBE)

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I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND HONEST INTERVIEW

Interviewer :	_____	Date of Interview:	_____
Supervised by:	_____	Date:	_____
Spotchecked by:	_____	Date:	_____
Edited by:	_____	Date:	_____

MAGUINDANAO TRANSLATION

1. a) Amai ka aden wata nengka a aden galbek ken na maia?

- Indiner  
 Doktor  
 Abogado  
 Maestro  
 Padadagang  
 Opisial na goberno  
 Arkitek  
 Panonolad  
 Politiko a tao  
 Sondalo a opisial  
 Pamumulan

b) Ando ken?

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2. a) Para sa di kana Moslim bo) Ngin ni langon taman a mana pakagsandag a sakitano a manga Pilipino?

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b) (Para sa Moslim bo) Aden tao a mana nin pakatimpong e ginawa nin, mana Amerikano, Indonesian, Lanang, Hapon atao ka andao san. Ngin e katimpongan nangka kano laka a ginawa? \_\_\_\_\_

c) (Amai ka Ya nangka anser sa 2b na "Moslim") Andoken no amai ka "Pilipino" -ibegamo ngka e ginawa nangka a Pilipino?

- Di  
 Wai

d) (Amai ka di sa 2c) Ando ken ka di? \_\_\_\_\_

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e) (Amai ka wai sa 2c) Ngin ni mana nangka pakadsandag. (Ipaliwanag gangka) \_\_\_\_\_

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4. Antona-a i pamikiran ka ko kapapantagan a "ekanamik" imanto? Ba aden a mapetero ka makapantag on? (Sik a ngka so katero o pegisa-an ka a inibegai nian na sarati ngka)
- Mapia                       Marata                       Da Sembag
- Mapetero ka \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

5. Ba aia pamikiran ka na so wangoda tao na peganad sabap ko ilmo? Ngkaino (o di ngkaino di)?
- Di sabap \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

Owai sabap \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

( # 6 to 9 - so Moslem bo)

6. Antona-a i pamikiran ka makapantag ko kata<sup>o</sup> o English o di na so kata<sup>o</sup> a poon sa Sedepan? (Saraten ka.)
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

7. Antona-a sa pamikiran ka i tanto a grabe a problema sangkai a inged? (Saraten ka.)
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

8. Anda manaia i kapakatabang o Islam sa ka da a ngkai a manga problema? (Saraten ka.)
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

9. Anda manaia i kapakatabang o politika o di sa ka da problema ini sa inged a-i? (Saraten ka.)
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

10. Antona-a i komakalilid a pamikiran o tao makapantag ko Gobierno? (Saraten ka.)

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11. Antona-a i komakalilid a kagegedama/Kasisipata o tao ko Gobierno? (Saraten ka.)

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12. Antona-a i pesowa-an na di nian pesowa-an sa sabap si-i na di magegedam o tao so Gobierno? (Saraten ka.)

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13. a) Opama ka so inged na ana problema nian a kinanglan iran so ogop poon sa governo, ba ngka pamikiran sa aia komakalilid na so ogop reka na si-i pekapon ko governo?

- Di  
 Owai  
 Masiken  
 Di katawan/NA

b) Seka o ana problema ngka, ba aia ngka pamikiran a aia komakalilid na kekowa ngka so ogop reka a poon ko governo?

- Di  Masiken  
 Owai  Di katawan/NA

14. Antona-a i mapetero ka makapantag ko kapeginged ago so kali-lintad sa inged ka? Mapakai a matero ka raken? (Saraten ka.)

- Mapia  
 Marata  
 Ped a masosowa

Ped a mapetero ka. \_\_\_\_\_

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---

15. Anda mania i kiarambita o governo ko kapagginetao ngka? (Saraten ka.)

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16. a) Antona-a i manga programa o governo sa pamikiran ka a tanto a miakaogop reka ago so pamilia ngka? (Ise-i ngka so pegise-an ka taman sa mibegai nian reka langon a miaka ogop on a programa o governo.)

b) So tanto (3) a miakatabang reka?

Programa o Governo a Miakatabang

Tanto a Miakatabang

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

17. a) So pamikiran ka ko manga politisian, gia ngka-i a manga basa a pengadlan ko ba kiran makasisindil...di kiran makasisindil... so ped kiran...o di na komakalilid kiran?

Da o di komaka-  
na maito/ So ped/ lilid/ Di katawan

- |                            |       |       |       |       |
|----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| (1) Pendalo'on             | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| (2) Maontol                | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| (3) Mala i kanggalebek     | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| (4) Tanganiaia             | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| (5) Mala i tindeg sa inged | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| (6) Perawaten              | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |

b) Ino ngka-i a miasindil ka Moslem o di?

- Moslem
- Di Moslem
- Melagid

c) (O aia sembag sa 17b na "Moslem") Ino so di Moslem? Ba iran aia mambo parangai? \_\_\_\_\_

d) (O aia sembag sa 17b na "di Moslem") Ino mambo so manga Moslem? \_\_\_\_\_

18. Antona-a i importante a manga parangai o manga kandidato. So ika-dowa a importante a parangai iran? (Tarosen ka so pakaise ka taman sa langon a parangai na mibegai reka o pegisean ka. Takik a ngka sa ginawa ngka a gia ngka-i a manga parangai na isorat ipoon ko piamoroporo-an taman ko kabebaan ian.)

Parangai

- |    |     |
|----|-----|
| 1. | 6.  |
| 2. | 7.  |
| 3. | 8.  |
| 4. | 9.  |
| 5. | 10. |

19. Ba ana mapetero ka raken makapantag ko Moslem ago so Kristian sangka-i a inged? (Sarati ngka sa tero-a ngka raken.)

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

20. Antona-a i pamikiran ka on? (So komakalilid a pamikiran ka on.)

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21. Antona-aimapia a panggolaola-an a ipagosor a kangginawa-i o Kristian ago so Moslem. (Saraten ka.)

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22. a) (So Moslem bo) Antona-a sa pamikiran ka i kagegeda'a o Kristian makapantag ko Moslem? (Saraten ka.)

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---

b) (Sô di Moslem) Antona-a sa pamikiran ka i kagegeda'a o Moslem ko Kristian? (Saraten ka.)

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23. Antona-a a betad sa pamikiran ka a so Moslem ago so Kristian na makapagoiaga? Ba di mapakai a matero ka raken? (Sarati ngka.)

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24. (So Moslem bo) Si-i sangka-i a kapapantagan a kibebetad a goberno, sa pamikiran ka ba so goberno na aden a mapetero ian makapantag ko "Sharia"?

Di  Owai

25. (So Moslem bo) So pamikiran ka on, ba so "sharia" na rapeg o kitab o goberno o so kapapantagan a goberno? Ngkaino?

Di sabap sa \_\_\_\_\_

Owai sabap sa \_\_\_\_\_

---

27. a) Antawa-a i kababantogan a pekeonotan sangka-i a inged?  
 b) Ino siran kababantogi a pekeonotan?  
 c) Ba aden a katawan ka a programa iran? (O owai) Antona-a?

Kababantogan a Olowan sa inged	Kababantogan sabap sa	Mikakaip so programa	Di mikakaip so programa	Programa



29. a) Antawa-a i kababantogan a pekeonotan a Moslem?  
b) Ino kababantogi a pekeonotan a Moslem?  
c) Antona-a i mianggolaola iran para ko tao?

Kababantogan a Pekeonotan a Moslem	Kababantogan sabap	Miapasad

26. (So Moslem bo) Sa pamikiran ka, ba mapia a so Moslem na somibai sa governo o di? Ngkaino?

Di/sibai sabap sa \_\_\_\_\_

Owai/di sibai sabap sa \_\_\_\_\_

(NOTE: For # 27, and 29, please see the attached sheets.)

30. a) (So Moslem bo) Antawa-a tao i mataan a pekatabang reka amai ka panamagontamanan sikanian go so ogop a ipesad ko programa nian?

b) Ino kesoat on so tao o di?

Di

Owai

31. (So Moslem ago so Kristiano)

a) Ino lomilintad so inged ka? Mapetero ka sa tanto a lomilintad?

Tanto a lomilintad

Di tanto

Pelegro

Da a sembag

b) Ngkaino? (Saratén ka)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Peseksian aken a gia ngkai a miatero aken si-i na osto go ontol a kapangingise.

Miangingise \_\_\_\_\_ Gaw-i a kiapangingise \_\_\_\_\_

Inilai i \_\_\_\_\_ Gaw-i \_\_\_\_\_

Inontol i \_\_\_\_\_ Gaw-i \_\_\_\_\_

Inator i \_\_\_\_\_ Gaw-i \_\_\_\_\_

MARANAO TRANSLATION

1. a) O ana wata a ka antona-a ngka-i a manga galebek i kabaia ka a patot a sowa-an ian?

- Indiner  
 Doktor  
 Atorni  
 Maestro  
 Padagang  
 Opisyal sa Goberno  
 Arkitek  
 Panonolad (Artist)  
 Opisyal sa Armi  
 Taribasok

- b) Ngkaino?

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2. a) (So di Moslem) Antona-a i manga nganin a ipekesigi ngka sa kapagi-inged ka?

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- b) (So Moslem bo) So manga ped a tao na bitowan iran a ginawa iran sa Merikano, Indonesian, Insik, Apon o di na nganin. Antona-a i imbeto reka? \_\_\_\_\_

- c) O owai a sembag ka sa 2b na "Moslem") Ino so "Pilipino-" ba ngka di meetowi a Pilipino a ginawa ngka?

- Di  
 Owai

- d) (O di sa 2b) Ngkaino di?

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- e) (O owai sa 2b) Antona-a i manga nganin a ipekesigi reka sa sa kapagi-inged ka (Pilipino)? (Saratén ka) \_\_\_\_\_

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3. Antona-a i telo a motra a importante a ndodo ko nggaga-isa? Ise-i ngka so pegise-an ka ipoon ian ko piamoro-poroan taman ko kabebaan ian.)

Importante a motra:

- (1) \_\_\_\_\_  
 (2) \_\_\_\_\_  
 (3) \_\_\_\_\_

3. Ngin e tilotiman a palangai e pakabilang a aden sa isa a mama? Idsa ka sa tao a makainggai sa reka iganat sa maporo taman sa mabeba a kalilinian.

Importante a palangai

- (1) \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) \_\_\_\_\_

4. Ngin ni itongan nangka sa sagona bania a kanggolaola na ekonomia? (Tsik ka sa kalilinian nengka sa isa kano telo anan sa baba.)

Mapia                       Malat                       Pagalang-alang

Madtelo ka \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

5. Nagadam a ngka e manga mangoda a tao sa gona a pangadi ka ando pagkatao? Ando kan (atao ka andokan ka di?)

Di kagina \_\_\_\_\_

Wai kagina \_\_\_\_\_

6. Ngin e kagadam a ngka sa sagona a English sa Sedepan a kapangadi? (Ipaliwanaga ngka) (#6 to 9 para Moslem bo)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

7. Gine mana montos a problema na dalpa a niya? (Ipaliwanag ngka)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

8. Panon e katabang nga Islan isa a problema? (Ipaliwanaga ngka)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

9. Ngin na okit e katabang o di makatabang nga politiko sa kapasad da problema na dalpa? (Ipaliwanaga ngka)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

10. Ngin ni kapagitong na manga tao sa governo tano sagona?  
(Ipaliwanaga ngka)

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11. Ngin ni kagadam na manga tao sa governo sagona?  
(Ipaliwanaga ngka)

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12. Ngin ni a nggolan a tao ka di a nggolan na governo a makagkapia sa ginawa tano? (Ipaliwanaga ngka)

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13. a) Opama ka aden problema na dalpa a mailai nin ni okit na governo. Magadam a ngka sa ginawa ngka e sa kiogan na ngka e sa kiogan na ngka e makakowa ka sa mapia a okit.

- Wai  
 Di  
 Ipagkalang  
 Di ko katawan

- b) Andokan saka amai ka aden problema na ngka siya sa ginawa na ngka a makakowa ka sa mapia a okit sa governo?

- Wai  
 Di  
 Ipagkalang  
 Di ko katawan

14. Panon ni kanggolaola na di kapamagokag na manga tao sa dalpa.

- Mapia  
 Malat  
 Ngin sa (andao san)

Mapetelo ka \_\_\_\_\_

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15. Panon ni okit ta governo a kaapiktado a ginawa nangka?  
(Paliwanaga ngka)

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16. a) Ngin i ped a penggolán na goberno a pakagkapia ango montos a pakatabang sa pamilya no? (Idsa ka sa antain sa tao e nakapagitong sa langon na nakatabang)

b) Ngin na telo mapia tabang?

NAKATABANG A PINGGOLA NA GOBERNO

MONTOS A TABANG

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

17. a) Sa nakinag a ngka sa politiko, nakinaga ngka a pidtalo nialn na o da a tao ka paido kanilan... pad kanilan... o kadakelan?

	<u>Da o</u>	<u>Pad</u>	<u>Kada-</u>	<u>Di ko</u>
	<u>paido</u>	<u>Pad</u>	<u>kelan</u>	<u>katawan</u>
(1) Masingit	_____	_____	_____	_____
(2) Sotti	_____	_____	_____	_____
(3) Galbakan	_____	_____	_____	_____
(4) Tanagkaon	_____	_____	_____	_____
(5), Masla i tindeg sa inged	_____	_____	_____	_____
(6) Opaman sa makatondog	_____	_____	_____	_____

b) Pagkalangan na ngka sa manga tao ania a Moslim a tao da di?

- Moslim
- Di kena Moslim
- Magidsan

c) (Amai ka ansel sa 17b na Moslim) Panon so kena Moslim? Matawag silan a Moslim? \_\_\_\_\_

d) (Amai ka ansel sa 17b na kena Moslim) Panon so Moslim? \_\_\_\_\_

18. Ngin ni palangai a kalinyan na ngka importante sa kandidato? Ngin ni makatondog? (Italos e kabpagidsa taman langon na palangay e nagadamin ni importante. Ingat ka niya na mapia e kadtotondogin iganat sa mapia taman sa kano di kana gaid.)

Palangai

- |    |     |
|----|-----|
| 1. | 6.  |
| 2. | 7.  |
| 3. | 8.  |
| 4. | 9.  |
| 5. | 10. |

19. Madtalo na ngka sa laki panon ni Moslim anggo Kristian siya sa dalpa a niya? (Ipaliwanaga ngka sa kadtalo-adtalo ka panon)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

20. Panon ni kagadam a ngka?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

21. Ngin ni madtalo na ngka a makatabang sa Moslim ando Kristian a kabpagobai? (Ipaliwanag ka)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

22. (Moslim bo) Panon ni kapagitonga ngka sa kagadam a Moslim sa Kristian. (Ipaliwanaga ngka)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

b) (Moslim bo) Panon ni kagadam a ngka sa Kristian ando Moslim. (Ipaliwanaga ngka)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

23. Sa panon a okit e kapagitong nga Moslim ando Kristian na kapamagayon nilan sa kapamagoyag? Madtalo na ngka sa laki e panon ni okit tin? (Paliwanaga ngka)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

24. (Moslim bo) Sa sagona a sistima na gobelno. Kalangan na ngka sa gobleno na adtalo sa "sharia"?

Wai  Di

25. (Moslim bo) Kalangan na ngka na "sharia" na mapakai a pad da kitab a governo atao ka sagona a gobelno? Andokan?

Di ka panon na \_\_\_\_\_

Wai ka panon na \_\_\_\_\_

26. (Moslim bo) Kalaagan na ngka na Moslim na makagkapia sa kapadtimpong sa repoblika atao ka ambisa sa gobleno? Andokan?

( ) Di/ambisa panon ka \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

( ) Wai/tomimpong panon ka \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(Note: For # 27, 28 and 29, please see the attached sheets.)

30. a) (Moslim bo) Antain na tao e katawan na ngka montos a makanggih opama ka makaanggih opamam ka katago ka sa masinget? \_\_\_\_\_

b) Kalilinian ka sakanin na manga tao?

( ) Di  
( ) Wai

31. (Moslim ando kena Moslim)

a) Andao taman e kalentad na dalpa? Madtalo na ngka a kalentad, di kena gaid atao ka kena kalentad?

( ) Malentad  
( ) Kena gaid kalentad  
( ) Kena malentad  
( ) Da sompat

b) Ando kan (Ipaliwanaga ngka)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

27. a) Artain ni mapolo kaonotan sa dalpa ania?  
b) Panon i kinagkapolo nin na kaonotan?  
c) Pangandam ka sa ngin na programa? (Amai ka wai)  
Ngin ba e niya?

Mapulo a kaonotan sa dalpa	Rason ka panon e kinagkapolo a nin a kaonotan	Pangan dam sa programa	Di pangan dam sa programa	Programa

28. a) Antain ni manga mapolo a kaonotan sa inged/siodad?  
 b) Panon e kinagpolo nilan nagkaonotan?  
 c) Pangandam ka sa manga programa nilan? (Amal ka wai)  
 Ngin ni pinggola nin sa manga tao?

Mapolo a kaonotan sa inged/siodad	Rason sa kinagkapolo nin sa nin na kaonotan	Pangan dam sa programa	Di pangan dam sa programa	Programa
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29. a) Antain ni mapolo a kaonotan na Moslim?  
b) Panon ni kinagkapolo nin a kaonotan?  
c) Ngin ni pinggola nin sa manga tao?

Mapolo a kaonotan na Moslim	Rason sa kingakapolo nilan	Napasad



- 4. Uno in pikilan mo ha kabuhian mo bi ha on? Masa lassay mo ba? (Tunjuka in addat mag pakitah sin dihil iban palinawa  
 Marayaw                       Mangih                       Kandi

Palinawan: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

- 5. Bang kay mo in mga kabataan subay da mag iskul bat awn kasungan? Maytah? (Atawa maytah di)  
 dih sabab  
 hu-on sabab

(6 & 7 Ha mga Muslim sadja)

- 6. Biyadiin in pang nanam mo sin pangadji Engalis atawa tao puti? (Salaysaya)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

- 7. Uno in pamikil mo amo in dakula kasigpitan sin halaum paghula? (Salaysaya)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

- 8. Biya diin in katabang sin agama Islam ha mga sagut managut? (Salaysaya)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

- 9. Biya diin in katabang sin mga tao nag popolitik ha hikaraway sin sagut managut ha laum paghula? (Salaysaya)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

- 10. Uno in pikilan sin mga manusiyah sin pag parinta (Salaysaya)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

- 11. Uno in pang nanam sin kamatauran manusiyah ha pag pamarinta? (Salaysaya)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_



17. a) In pangannal ha mga nagpopolitik, in bissara bassahon ko kaymo mamaytah ha u-way atawa tiyoh-tiyoh mga nagpopolitik ... u-way kanila ... kamatauran kanila?

	U-way atawa tiyoh-tiyoh	Kaibanan	Mataud	Dih kaingatan way pangannal
1) manapsu	_____	_____	_____	_____
2) mabuntol	_____	_____	_____	_____
3) patihinang	_____	_____	_____	_____
4) pangutang	_____	_____	_____	_____
5) "nationalistic"	_____	_____	_____	_____
6) a-akaran	_____	_____	_____	_____

b) Iyupama mo ka in mga tao yan Muslim atawa bukon Muslim?

- Muslim
- bukon Muslim
- kaduwa

c) (Bang in sambung pa 17b Muslim) Biya diin isab in bukon Muslim? Hika sabut da isab kanila baha?

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d) (Bang in sambung pa 17c Muslim) Biya diin bang isab Muslim?

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18. Uno bang kaymo in addat amo, in kagunahan ha mga magkandi-dato? Uno in sumunod kagunahan? (Lanjala in paghinang mo sampay in tao nasabut makadihil sin mga addat mangaddat in ha pikilan mo amo kagunahan. Ibot-ibot subay mo hi sulat in mga kagunahan ha baktulan niya, dain ha amo tu-od kagunahan. Pa bukon da kagunahan.)

Mga addat mgaddat:

- |    |     |
|----|-----|
| 1. | 6.  |
| 2. | 7.  |
| 3. | 8.  |
| 4. | 9.  |
| 5. | 10. |

19. Hi ka baytah mo kakoh in mga uno-uno ha pasual sin Muslim iban bisayah ha laum paghula ini? (Salaysaya ha magbissara sin passal nila)

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20. Biyah diin in pangnaman mo passal yan? (In "ini" sabab ha mga kamatauran atawa ha katiu-tiuhan)

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21. Uno baha in hi kadihil mo pikilan amo hi karayaw sin pag lundang kasi sin Muslims iban Christians? (Salaysaya)

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22. a) (Ha mga Muslim sadja) Biyah diin in pamikil mo sin pangatud sin Christian pa mga Muslim? (Salaysaya)

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b) (Ha mga bukon Muslim sadja) Biyah diin in pamikil sin mga Muslim pa mga Christian? (Salaysaya)

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23. Halaum mo padjanjihan bang ha pikilan mo in Muslim iban Christian maka lundang kasi? Hi ka bayta mo ka ku? (Salaysaya)

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24. (Ha Muslim sadja) Ha pag pamarinta bihaon, bang kay mo in parinta subay awn lamud niya ha "Sharya" o (paghula)?

Dih

Huon

25. (Ha Muslim sadja) Bang kay mo in "Sharya" o "paghula" hi ka lamud sara sin pag pamamarinta bi haon? Maytah?

Dih Sabab \_\_\_\_\_

Huon Sabab \_\_\_\_\_

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26. (Ha Muslim sadja) Bang kay mo hi karayaw ha mga Muslim in subay da tumutog ha parinta sin mahaldika atawa kumandi parinta? maytah?

Dih/subay da kumandi sabab \_\_\_\_\_

Huon/subay da tumutog sabab \_\_\_\_\_

27. Ha katan piyangasubuhan:

a) Hi siyu naman nakura di ha paghula ini?

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

b) Uno in kiya hinang nila nakura?

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

c) Kaingatan mo ba bang awn pikilan nila hi karayaw sin paghula? (Bang-huon) Uno na man?

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

28. a) Hi siyo naman in nakura ha probin atawa tiyangi?

b) Uno in hiya hinang ka nila nakura?

c) Kaingatan mo ba bang awn paru-paru nila hi karayaw sin hula? (Bang huon) Uno na man?

29. a) Hi siyo na man in nakura sin mga Muslim?

b) Uno in kiya hinang ka nila nakura?

c) Uno in na hinang nila karayawan pa mga manusiya?

30. (Ha Muslim sadja)

a) Hi siyo ha pag nanam mo tao maka tabang tuod bang sa upama dihil kawasa maka lunjol sin paru-paru niya?

b) Kabayaan ba siya sin mga manusiyah?

Dih  
 Huon

31. (Ha mga Muslim iban bukon Muslim)

a) Masanang in laum pag hula mo? Hi ka bayta mo ba masanang tuod, bukon da masanang, mahilu?

- masanang tuod
- bukon da tuod masanang
- mahilu
- way sambung

b) Maytah (Salaysaya)

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Hi baytah ko in mga nasambung sabumal tuod iban mahantap in pagpangasubu ko.

Tao nangasubu \_\_\_\_\_

Adlaw sin pangasubu \_\_\_\_\_

Tao jumaga \_\_\_\_\_

Adlaw \_\_\_\_\_

Tao naglista \_\_\_\_\_

Adlaw \_\_\_\_\_

Tao nangusig \_\_\_\_\_